Any sober analysis of the military operations in Pakistan reveals that the menace of terrorism is spreading, with ever more dangerous consequences. Each operation is followed by a temporary respite followed by even more devastating terrorist attacks and increasing lawlessness. The writ of the state is gaining traction in the tribal areas but appears to be dissolving in urban centers, especially in Peshawar. Politicians are living in a bubble, increasingly unresponsive to public sentiment and thus are finding it more difficult to establish the national consensus required to govern effectively. Law enforcement authorities clearly lack the training and tools required to competently implement preventive measures.

As previously noted by PoliTact, in this situation extremists appear to be sophisticated and cutting-edge, while in reality they are merely exploiting the glaring vulnerabilities of Pakistan’s law enforcement agencies, both civilian and military. Meanwhile the government is losing the confidence of the public and its prestige internationally. The foot soldiers cannot be blamed for the shortcomings of the law enforcement agencies.

This analysis will focus on the implications of the attack on the Inter-Services Intelligence Office in Peshawar on November 13th. This followed an attack on Army General Headquarters on October 12th and one on the ISI Office in Lahore on May 27th. We also examine terrorist tactics and government security procedures in order to highlight apparent shortcomings. Lastly, we explore the future of terrorism in Pakistan vis-a-vis the situation in Afghanistan and the lessons of history.

Analysis

Extremist Tactics

Below are listed the different types of terrorist attacks, each adapted to its target:

Individual suicide attacks in which a person wearing a suicide belt blows himself up in a bazaar or in settings where support services for military and security personnel are present. Those utilizing Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED), the most lethal and destructive, and perhaps the hardest to pull off successfully. Cars and mid-size trucks have been used in most cases, but as demonstrated by the Marriott hotel bombing in Islamabad, big trucks have been used selectively. Ambushes in which a small team of assailants launch a surprise attack on a law enforcement or military facility in an attempt to kill its personnel and take hostages, thus prolonging the siege.

Extremist Targeting

The terrorists have attacked civilians, police and civil and military intelligence personnel; even players on the Sri Lankan Cricket team haven’t been spared. It must be noted, however, that responsibility for the attacks on civilians, such as the one which occurred in the Peshawar Meena Bazaar on October 28, (resulting in the deaths of more than 100 people and wounding many more), was not claimed by either the TTP or Al Qaeda. Instead, the extremists blamed American defense contractors operating in the country.

Oddly enough, political leaders are the only group that has been spared thus far. Possible explanations for this include:

The politicians receive better protection and are thus more difficult to attack;The terrorists believe that the politicians are proving so ineffective at governing that they are best left alone; that their ineptitude actually assists the extremists prevent the development of an effective counter-terrorism strategy;That politicians can be targeted later on when the escalation mounts;Leaving the politicians unharmed exacerbates tensions between the nation’s civilian and military;The terrorists are hoping that public discontent with the worsening situation will result in a violent revolution.

PoliTact’s analysis of September 29, 2009 identified some of the future potential targets. We also recommended closing of the Khyber Road to traffic, as it passes through areas housing sensitive government’s installations. If this measure were adopted, it would almost certainly eliminate the possibility of VBIED attacks, such as the ones launched against the ISI office and the Pearl Continental Hotel in Peshawar. Both facilities were located about a mile from each other on the Khyber Road in Peshawar.

Law Enforcement’s Weak Spots

It should also be pointed out that the extremists appear to have developed both a short and long- term strategy. Law enforcement agencies don’t seem to have anticipated the target surveying and selection activities of the extremists. One would hope that after each attack, the law enforcement agencies would tweak their countermeasures. Sadly, this doesn’t appear to be happening; it is the extremists who are more likely to adapt themselves to new contingencies.

For example, after careful scrutiny of the attack on the ISI Office in Peshawar and other similar ones, one feels compelled to ask the following questions:How did the truck used by the terrorists to attack the facility bypass numerous check posts located along each access point?The security measures in place at the facility appear to be more suited to countering an ambush than a VBIED-style attack. Why the oversight and what steps will be taken to deal with it?What does this dismal performance by security personnel tell us about the security of nuclear installations?

The following are possible answers:

The extremists had accomplices who helped the truck elude the check posts.The extremists know the area very well and arranged for the truck to move from a location situated between a given check post and the targeted facility, so that the truck never had to pass any check post.The fact that proper steps weren’t taken to protect the facility for VBIED attacks points to inadequate training and a failure to anticipate the worst-case scenario. A number of options suggest themselves. First, all traffic on Khyber Road should have been stopped and diverted. If this proved impossible due to public inconvenience, then the facility should have been moved to a more secure premise (inside a military base, for example), where its existence would not be common knowledge. If this was found to be untenable, blast-proof walls should have been constructed.

The extremists have shown themselves to be more astute than security personnel. The pattern underlying terrorist attacks point towards multiple groups with support within the country as well as outside it. The attacks on civilians and ethnic groups could have a different source than the ones on law enforcement and military facilities but they share the same motive; to destabilize Pakistan. Since the findings of government investigations of these attacks are never made public, it is hard to build a convincing case one way or the other.

Interpreting the Terrorist Message

By demonstrating their reach, the extremists send the message that the operations against them have failed to make a dent in their capabilities and that they can still freely attack the nation’s most secure facilities with impunity. This is worrisome to the Western powers, which are anxious about the safety of the country’s nuclear facilities. On its part, Pakistan is extremely sensitive about its nuclear status and thus these terrorist attacks play upon the government’s fears, as well as destabilizing the government itself. A nuclear power cannot afford the latter, which raises questions about terrorist motivation.

One explanation: by demonstrating their capabilities and reach, the extremists want to convince the country’s government and military to end support for the US-backed war in Afghanistan, in addition to military operations in the tribal areas of Pakistan. From the terrorist perspective, if the government fails to cease and desist, then it is not being true to Islam. Therefore, in the best interests of Islam, they feel justified in taking over the control of nukes.

The Future of Terrorism in Pakistan

In the absence of a political strategy accompanying the military one, Pakistan is fast sliding into the abyss. In the meantime, the United States is engaged in an extensive and realistic review of its strategy in Afghanistan; attempting to cope with a global recession, it will most likely leave more of the fighting to Pakistani and Afghan forces. According to some in Pakistan, the situation looks like a revival of the colonial model, where the native foot soldiers were led by British Army officers. When the British finally left, it wasn’t because they had won or that they had tamed the tribal areas, but simply because of the results of the two World Wars. The lessons of World War I and II educated the global powers to avoid direct confrontations, which could have disastrous consequences (for example, Mutually Assured Destruction, or MAD). Instead, “proxy powers” and “client states” emerged.

When government policies increasingly appear to be developed in response to foreign pressure and not to public opinion, it is the military where one usually detects the first signs of revolt. After all, this has been the case in other parts of the Islamic world, notably Egypt and Iraq. The Urabi Revolt of (1879-82) and the subsequent Free Officers Movement of 1952 in Egypt both provide historic antecedents and parallels to the current situation in Pakistan, as does The Iraqi Army Revolt of 1958. There is one significant difference, however: the above mentioned Arab revolts were mostly nationalistic in origin but today the reaction against pervasive corruption and perceived foreign meddling has both national and religious origins – a potentially explosive combination – one would think.

As the gap between a common citizen’s perception of reality and the elite increases, the chances of dangerous consequences escalate. The government is widely seen as corrupt and, in the public view, following foreign dictates and interests while compromising national interests. Additionally, the government and senior military officials seem to be working together with US under a tacit agreement, to conduct drone attacks on its own soil while launching military operations against its own people. Meanwhile, however, citizens are suffering under rising food prices and businesses are trying to deal with electricity shortages and price hikes resulting from IMF (International Monetary Fund) loan terms. Under these circumstances, the real question becomes, “How can a mutiny or a revolution in Pakistan be avoided?” The Western powers are bracing themselves for such an eventuality.

To prevent such a calamity, the government will have to prove to the public that it has the ability to discharge the minimal obligations of government: to safeguard human life and property. If the only security available is that provided by the extremists -that is, those occasions when they choose to initiate or conclude attacks – then why bother with a government? The need for credible leadership with the capacity to build a consensus on how to address critical issues has never been more pressing. Leadership means not only taking the initiative, but the ability to craft and then make a convincing case to the pubic on the suitable course for the future. In the interdependent world of the future the most daunting task is the ability to anticipate and cope with change as the status quo will not prevail. The institution most likely to initiate reform at this juncture, bringing a level of credibility to the system and help avoid extreme outcomes, is the Supreme Court of Pakistan and not the Parliament or the Executive.

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Any sober analysis of the military operations in Pakistan reveals that the menace of terrorism is spreading, with ever more dangerous consequences. Each operation is followed by a temporary respite followed by even more devastating terrorist attacks and increasing lawlessness. The writ of the state is gaining traction in the tribal areas but appears to be dissolving in urban centers, especially in Peshawar. Politicians are living in a bubble, increasingly unresponsive to public sentiment and thus are finding it more difficult to establish the national consensus required to govern effectively. Law enforcement authorities clearly lack the training and tools required to competently implement preventive measures.

As previously noted by PoliTact, in this situation extremists appear to be sophisticated and cutting-edge, while in reality they are merely exploiting the glaring vulnerabilities of Pakistan’s law enforcement agencies, both civilian and military. Meanwhile the government is losing the confidence of the public and its prestige internationally. The foot soldiers cannot be blamed for the shortcomings of the law enforcement agencies.

This analysis will focus on the implications of the attack on the Inter-Services Intelligence Office in Peshawar on November 13th. This followed an attack on Army General Headquarters on October 12th and one on the ISI Office in Lahore on May 27th. We also examine terrorist tactics and government security procedures in order to highlight apparent shortcomings. Lastly, we explore the future of terrorism in Pakistan vis-a-vis the situation in Afghanistan and the lessons of history.

Analysis

Extremist Tactics

Below are listed the different types of terrorist attacks, each adapted to its target:

•   Individual suicide attacks in which a person wearing a suicide belt blows himself up in a bazaar or in settings where support services for military and security personnel are present;
• Those utilizing Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED), the most lethal and destructive, and perhaps the hardest to pull off successfully. Cars and mid-size trucks have been used in most cases, but as demonstrated by the Marriott hotel bombing in Islamabad, big trucks have been used selectively;
• Ambushes in which a small team of assailants launch a surprise attack on a law enforcement or military facility in an attempt to kill its personnel and take hostages, thus prolonging the siege.

Extremist Targeting

The terrorists have attacked civilians, police and civil and military intelligence personnel; even players on the Sri Lankan Cricket team haven’t been spared. It must be noted, however, that responsibility for the attacks on civilians, such as the one which occurred in the Peshawar Meena Bazaar on October 28, (resulting in the deaths of more than 100 people and wounding many more), was not claimed by either the TTP or Al Qaeda. Instead, the extremists blamed American defense contractors operating in the country.

Oddly enough, political leaders are the only group that has been spared thus far. Possible explanations for this include:

• The politicians receive better protection and are thus more difficult to attack;
• The terrorists believe that the politicians are proving so ineffective at governing that they are best left alone; that their ineptitude actually assists the extremists prevent the development of an effective counter-terrorism strategy;
• That politicians can be targeted later on when the escalation mounts;
• Leaving the politicians unharmed exacerbates tensions between the nation’s civilian and military;
• The terrorists are hoping that public discontent with the worsening situation will result in a violent revolution.

PoliTact’s analysis of September 29, 2009 identified some of the future potential targets. We also recommended closing of the Khyber Road to traffic, as it passes through areas housing sensitive government’s installations. If this measure were adopted, it would almost certainly eliminate the possibility of VBIED attacks, such as the ones launched against the ISI office and the Pearl Continental Hotel in Peshawar. Both facilities were located about a mile from each other on the Khyber Road in Peshawar.

Law Enforcement’s Weak Spots

It should also be pointed out that the extremists appear to have developed both a short and long- term strategy. Law enforcement agencies don’t seem to have anticipated the target surveying and selection activities of the extremists. One would hope that after each attack, the law enforcement agencies would tweak their countermeasures. Sadly, this doesn’t appear to be happening; it is the extremists who are more likely to adapt themselves to new contingencies.

For example, after careful scrutiny of the attack on the ISI Office in Peshawar and other similar ones, one feels compelled to ask the following questions:

1. How did the truck used by the terrorists to attack the facility bypass numerous check posts located along each access point?
2. The security measures in place at the facility appear to be more suited to countering an ambush than a VBIED-style attack. Why the oversight and what steps will be taken to deal with it?
3. What does this dismal performance by security personnel tell us about the security of nuclear installations?

The following are possible answers:

1. The extremists had accomplices who helped the truck elude the check posts.
2. The extremists know the area very well and arranged for the truck to move from a location situated between a given check post and the targeted facility, so that the truck never had to pass any check post.
3. The fact that proper steps weren’t taken to protect the facility for VBIED attacks points to inadequate training and a failure to anticipate the worst-case scenario. A number of options suggest themselves. First, all traffic on Khyber Road should have been stopped and diverted. If this proved impossible due to public inconvenience, then the facility should have been moved to a more secure premise (inside a military base, for example), where its existence would not be common knowledge. If this was found to be untenable, blast-proof walls should have been constructed.
4. The extremists have shown themselves to be more astute than security personnel. The pattern underlying terrorist attacks point towards multiple groups with support within the country as well as outside it. The attacks on civilians and ethnic groups could have a different source than the ones on law enforcement and military facilities but they share the same motive; to destabilize Pakistan. Since the findings of government investigations of these attacks are never made public, it is hard to build a convincing case one way or the other.

Interpreting the Terrorist Message

By demonstrating their reach, the extremists send the message that the operations against them have failed to make a dent in their capabilities and that they can still freely attack the nation’s most secure facilities with impunity. This is worrisome to the Western powers, which are anxious about the safety of the country’s nuclear facilities. On its part, Pakistan is extremely sensitive about its nuclear status and thus these terrorist attacks play upon the government’s fears, as well as destabilizing the government itself. A nuclear power cannot afford the latter, which raises questions about terrorist motivation.

One explanation: by demonstrating their capabilities and reach, the extremists want to convince the country’s government and military to end support for the US-backed war in Afghanistan, in addition to military operations in the tribal areas of Pakistan. From the terrorist perspective, if the government fails to cease and desist, then it is not being true to Islam. Therefore, in the best interests of Islam, they feel justified in taking over the control of nukes.

The Future of Terrorism in Pakistan

In the absence of a political strategy accompanying the military one, Pakistan is fast sliding into the abyss. In the meantime, the United States is engaged in an extensive and realistic review of its strategy in Afghanistan; attempting to cope with a global recession, it will most likely leave more of the fighting to Pakistani and Afghan forces. According to some in Pakistan, the situation looks like a revival of the colonial model, where the native foot soldiers were led by British Army officers. When the British finally left, it wasn’t because they had won or that they had tamed the tribal areas, but simply because of the results of the two World Wars. The lessons of World War I and II educated the global powers to avoid direct confrontations, which could have disastrous consequences (for example, Mutually Assured Destruction, or MAD). Instead, “proxy powers” and “client states” emerged.

When government policies increasingly appear to be developed in response to foreign pressure and not to public opinion, it is the military where one usually detects the first signs of revolt. After all, this has been the case in other parts of the Islamic world, notably Egypt and Iraq. The Urabi Revolt of (1879-82) and the subsequent Free Officers Movement of 1952 in Egypt both provide historic antecedents and parallels to the current situation in Pakistan, as does The Iraqi Army Revolt of 1958. There is one significant difference, however: the above mentioned Arab revolts were mostly nationalistic in origin but today the reaction against pervasive corruption and perceived foreign meddling has both national and religious origins – a potentially explosive combination – one would think.

As the gap between a common citizen’s perception of reality and the elite increases, the chances of dangerous consequences escalate. The government is widely seen as corrupt and, in the public view, following foreign dictates and interests while compromising national interests. Additionally, the government and senior military officials seem to be working together with US under a tacit agreement, to conduct drone attacks on its own soil while launching military operations against its own people. Meanwhile, however, citizens are suffering under rising food prices and businesses are trying to deal with electricity shortages and price hikes resulting from IMF (International Monetary Fund) loan terms. Under these circumstances, the real question becomes, “How can a mutiny or a revolution in Pakistan be avoided?” The Western powers are bracing themselves for such an eventuality.

To prevent such a calamity, the government will have to prove to the public that it has the ability to discharge the minimal obligations of government: to safeguard human life and property. If the only security available is that provided by the extremists -that is, those occasions when they choose to initiate or conclude attacks – then why bother with a government? The need for credible leadership with the capacity to build a consensus on how to address critical issues has never been more pressing. Leadership means not only taking the initiative, but the ability to craft and then make a convincing case to the pubic on the suitable course for the future. In the interdependent world of the future the most daunting task is the ability to anticipate and cope with change as the status quo will not prevail. The institution most likely to initiate reform at this juncture, bringing a level of credibility to the system and help avoid extreme outcomes, is the Supreme Court of Pakistan and not the Parliament or the Executive.

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Context

The process of reaching a decision regarding timing and the number of troops to be sent to Afghanistan unexpectedly metamorphosed into a comprehensive review of President Barack Obama’s foreign policy. In the course of making such a choice, one logically ends up also assessing what is in the national interest as a whole; how to align the country’s economic and military policies in such a way as to reach the desired objective. This in large part explains why deciding on a new Afghanistan strategy has become so lengthy, confused and cumbersome.

Analysis

A strategic review worth its salt can never ignore the evolving global enviornment – one must consider not only current, but potential allies and adversaries. The first step in such an evaluation is to identify the major emerging players – Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC).

The President, of course, needs the advice of his closest associates and cabinet members, but he also has to develop his own perspective regarding difficult policy matters. One must take into account multiple viewpoints in order to grasp the complex reality.

Media reports claim that the new US strategy towards Afghanistan will be announced after President Obama’s all-important trip to Asia in mid-November.Hillary Clinton was recently in Pakistan, where she worked tirelessly to change misconceptions regarding US intentions towards the region. Senator John Kerry as well as US senior military officials, have also made recent trips to Pakistan. The Prime Minister of India, Manamohan Sigh, will be conducting his state visit to the US at the end of this month.

Moreover, President Obama and Vice President Biden have both recently spoken with Russian leaders, giving them a first-hand opportunity to develop fresh perspectives regarding Russia and its intentions. The President has also had in-depth encounters with Israeli leaders.

Reappraisal of American policy also involves a critical question: what is at stake for America in Afghanistan? Answering this question satisfactorily involves evaluating US interests internationally, understanding how they are related and then prioritizing in terms of the prevailing global recession. Prioritizing involves considering the following:

• Whether it is more important to confront the nuclear threat posed by Iran and North Korea or to focus on stabilizing Afghanistan;
• Which is more pressing – preventing destabilization in Afghanistan or Pakistan;
• Whether or not countering Chinese and Russian ambitions is more important than fighting extremism;
• Whether environmental developments like global warming are more of a threat than international rivalries;
• Whether progress towards a two-state solution in the Middle East or stopping the spread of extremism is more critical;
• Whether the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq will be helpful or hurtful to US interests;
• How to keep NATO intact and effective in the future.

Then comes the task of identifying the real challenges in Afghanistan – obviously necessary if the situation is to be improved significantly:

• Is the coalition mustering a counter-insurgency or counter-terrorist campaign in the region? Each requires a different approach.
• If safe havens in the tribal areas of Pakistan are eliminated, will that change the situation in Afghanistan and if so, at what cost?
• Is the goal to eradicate Al Qaeda only or the Taliban and other Jihadist groups in the region as well?
• What can and cannot be achieved in the short and long-term by altering the regional balance of power?

The US entered Afghanistan after 911 in order to prevent the country from becoming a refuge for Al Qaeda and other extremist groups who had helped plan the attack on the WTC. Although there have been no fresh attacks on US soil since that time, the situation in Afghanistan has unquestionably deteriorated (consider the recent election and bombings in Kabul). The Al Qaeda militants are still at large and Afghanistan’s neighbor, Pakistan, has been weakened by the local Taliban. Then there is the matter of the Jihadist’s involvement in Kashmir, damaging to India.

It is clear that only Al Qaeda has the capability to deliver. The members of the Taliban are fighting for their local agendas or often simply for money. US is moving in the direction of negotiations with those militants with merely local grievances and the question becomes if US will do the talking with or without the help of allies like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. It is commonly assumed that these allies can still bring the parties (Afghan Taliban) to the table. This, of course, means recognizing the importance of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The Af-Pak policy unveiled soon after President Obama’s inauguration attempted a comprehensive approach to the region, but didn’t take into account the critical issue of Kashmir.

US prefers a bilateral track between Inadia and Pakistan to solve outstanding disputes. US policy appears to envision a global role for India to counter China, while a much constrained one for Pakistan. US in all likelihood would prefer changing the behavior of Pakistan, particularly in view of its economic woes, which are worsening while fighting against extremist. From early indications, this change in Pakistan’s India perception might be occurring slowly, but a lot also depends on China-US-Russia relations.

In finding a solution to Afghanistan, the US will have to address the tangled interests of local and regional players. Perhaps the best strategy is to deal with these interests separately and at the appropriate time, that is, to prioritize them. As a practical matter, of course, help from allies will not be forthcoming without considering their interests. One can attempt through diplomacy to convince other players to become allies, the alternative being coercion via economic pressure and force.

Not all potential friends and foes are readily identifiable, of course, and thus much will depend on the assumptions underlying future policy, which in turn depends on correctly gauging the intentions of other international actors and then deciding what can be achieved through persuasion and compromise. At the moment, for obvious reasons, it is best to attempt cooperation with both allies and potential adversaries, utilizing diplomatic and economic leverages as much as possible. But a genuine compromise cannot occur without consideration of the interests of allies. It is this which complicates the new US Afghanistan strategy and foreign policy in general.

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Context

Introduction

Based on POLITACT’s Entropy Alerts, Vantage Point Analysis and Analysis of Perception and Perspective, following are a list of key themes which we consider vital to a meaningful geopolitical forecast for the South Asia region.

• The course of Pakistan’s current and future fight against extremists
• Pakistan domestic politics and NRO
• India’s Green Hunt Operation and the rise of Maoist in the region
• Changes in US Myanmar Policy
• Pakistan, Turkey and Iran Cooperation
• US-China Relations
• India-China Relations
• US Afghan Strategy
• NATO’s commitment to Afghanistan
• US-Iran Relations
• US-Russia Relations
• Saudi-Yemeni border situation
• Horn of Africa and Somalia situation
• Middle East Peace Process

Analysis

Unfortunately, while the South Waziristan Operation is in progress, the deadly terrorist attacks are continuing unabated across the urban centers of Pakistan. The government has claimed that it is encountering relatively low resistance from the militants. The latter have a strategy, however: to demonstrate their ability to inflict indiscriminate punishment on the country, which in the coming days might include Pakistan’s economic and financial hub, Karachi.

Well before the start of the South Waziristan operation, President Zardari made a public statement committing the nation to military action there-it wasn’t clear at the time, however, whether or not the Pakistani Army would undertake it. Similarly, in the aftermath of Hilary Clinton’s three-day public relations trip to Pakistan, he stated that action against extremists will not end with Waziristan.

Meanwhile, both conciliatory and confrontational statements have emanated from India regarding the Kashmir dispute and the role of Pakistan-based Jihadists in carrying out terrorist activities in India. The conciliatory statement came from the Prime Minister of India while the threatening one came from the Interior Minister. The Indian Prime Minister is scheduled to meet Mr. Obama in the White House on November 24, the first state visit of the new US administration. This visit will have a significant impact on the US Strategy for the region.

Kerry and Karzai
Kerry and Karzai

We believe the following regarding the future direction of counter-terrorist operations in Pakistan and other events in South Asia:

• The US pressure on Pakistan will increase to act against the Afghan Taliban as the price to be paid for a role in a US strategy which includes negotiating with the Taliban. US has conveyed ample messages that its dire position in Afghanistan does not bode well for Pakistan either. The upcoming summit meeting in Washington between President Obama and Prime Minster Manmohan Singh is a key part of the deliberation process regarding the future direction of the US strategy in the region and India’s role in it. The next frontier of Pakistan’s counter- terrorist operations might be Baluchistan, where the Afghan Taliban’s Quetta Shura Council is believed to be located.
• The distinction between Al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban and other Jihadists is minimal, so action against one group is ineffective; one must act against all. It appears that the only reason the Pakistani government is presently drawing distinctions between these groups is tactical, so as to go after them one at a time. Thus, it is clear that in principle Pakistan bought in to the belief that all of these groups must be liquidated if the problem of terrorism in the region is to be resolved. The recent sophisticated extremist attacks on the Army’s General Headquarters in Rawalpindi and the simultaneous ones in Lahore lends fresh support for this view. Based on the above, we at POLITACT have concluded that the next counter-terrorist operations will very well take place in Pakistan’s urban centers, including Karachi. Some analysts are calling it the “Civil War” scenario.
• It is not clear if President Zardari is making public commitment to military action in consultation with the military, or as a means to pressure them, thus protecting his good standing with the United States. The growing tensions in Parliament and in the ruling parties over the National Reconciliation Ordinance suggest that the second scenario is the correct one. This is exactly the intention of the Kerry-Lugar law (largely a response to Indian lobbying), designed to foster civilian government control of the military. The authors of the bill, however, did not take a critical factor into account: what happens if the head of the civilian government loses public and party support? In such a scenario the US would find itself the ally of unpopular leaders – obviously not a desirable position to be in.
• The conflicting statements from Indian leaders regarding Kashmir and Pakistani support for the Jihadists are also intended to buy time. In the past, President Zardari made a sensation when he called Kashmir-related Jihadists terrorists. India’s conciliatory gestures strengthen President Zardari’s hand against the military – if it is indeed standing in the way of an honorable peace between the two countries and a resolution of the Afghanistan situation. Moreover, India it is trying to exploit Pakistan’s economic weakness and dependence, including the water disputes, to get the country to change its ways – or so the Pakistanis think.
• India has other concerns, notably the Maoists in the Northeast, and is conducting Operation Green Hunt against them. The Maoists are known to have established a presence in 20 states and India has decided to confront this potentially lethal insurgency with 70,000 paramilitary troops. Thus, India benefits from delaying a resolution of the Kashmir situation, but on the other hand, failing to deal with the problem in a timely manner could lead to catastrophe if the country had to deal with two insurgencies at a time. India is curious to know if the insurgency in the Northeast is receiving support from other Maoists in the region. Meanwhile, the US has also altered its policy towards Myanmar and opted for more direct talks with the military junta there; it is also committed to countering China and strengthening India’s position in the Pacific realm and the South and Central Asian region generally.
• President Obama’s new approach to foreign policy can best be understood as one of “engagement” with adversaries and “reengagement” with allies. This is, of course, in marked contrast to the more confrontational credo of his predecessor: “Either you are with us or against us.” With the new Democratic administration in place, the emphasis is on the use of economic aid and diplomacy. A new willingness on the part of the US to compromise can be seen in its dealings with Russia regarding the missile defense shield and with Israel regarding settlements. Yet it remains unclear how successful diplomatic overtures, by themselves, will be. Thus, with respect to Afghanistan and Iran the US appears to playing a game of wait and see, trying to understand the unfolding reality before deciding on its direction. President Obama will also be making important visits this month to China, South Korea, Japan and Singapore which will further define US relations in the Pacific region.

As the geopolitical environment of the region remains in flux, buying time is beneficial for all involved, but only if it helps to reduce threats and not escalate them. If not handled well, today’s advantage can become tomorrow’s liability. Moreover, rash decisions can lead to costly mistakes, which can only benefit an adversary.

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Context

This article explores the implications of the recent (October 18, 2009) suicide attacks in the Sistan-Baluchistan province of Iran, which, the country alleges, were carried out by the Sunni Salafi Baluch jihadist group, the Jundallah; it is suspected that the groups leader, Malik Abdollah Regi, is hiding in Pakistan.

There were 42 casualties, including senior commanders of the Iran’s Elite Revolutionary Guard (IGRC). Iran subsequently accused the US, the UK and Pakistan of supporting Jundallah and generally of trying to destabilize the country. Pakistan has since replied that it has information regarding Regi’s location in Afghanistan, but that it cannot permit Iran to conduct operations on its side of the Iran-Pakistan border, as Iran has requested.

Other regional powers are engaged in finger-pointing:

• India maintains that Pakistan is attempting to undermine it by supporting the Kashmir-related Jihadis. It also blames the Pakistanis for complicity in the Mumbai incident, arguing that even if non-state actors were involved, Pakistan’s territory had been used.
• Afghanistan blames Pakistan for providing a safe haven for the Taliban. The country wants US forces to adopt a “boots on the ground” scenario,” that is, to cross the Durand Line in order to eliminate the safe havens and terrorists there.
• The Pakistan government officially blames India and Afghanistan for destabilizing the tribal areas and Baluchistan. Informally, Pakistan increasingly believes that the US and NATO, with their presence in Afghanistan, are also destabilizing the region.

So the question becomes: who is destabilizing who?

Analysis

As is so often the case, in order to make sense of what is going on at the regional level one has to look at current tussles between global players. The chief global rivals are the US, Russia and China. The global powers use the regional ones to further their interests, calling on them to choose sides. To exert pressure on the lesser powers, the international ones employ economic and military means, that is, soft and hard power. On the other hand, the regional powers might refuse to choose sides and attempt to use the global players to further their own goals.

In an effort to please Russia and obtain reciprocity on the issue of Iran, the US recently compromised regarding its defense missile shield plans. Russia’s initial reaction suggests that it is reluctant to meet America halfway, especially on the issue of a united front against Iran’s nuclear program. Russia recently stated that imposition of sanctions against Iran could backfire – definitely not the response the US was hoping for.

If we look at the regional situation from NATO’s perspective, China would be seen as the main adversary, with Russia occupying second place. While Russia has expressed resentment over NATO’s interference with its “Near Abroad,” China has not defined its sphere of influence in the South and Central Asian region, although its recent statements have shown escalating alarm regarding the growing American military presence in the region. Moreover, both the US and China appear to be upping the ante for influence in Pakistan.

In this context, China has the most to lose. A decision by the US to increase troop levels in Afghanistan by 40,000 is bound to have repercussions for China’s security calculus. It cannot sit idly by as one by one its regional allies falter. This might already be happening, as China appears to be adopting a more aggressive stance towards India and to be taking action matching Pakistan’s stand on the Kashmir dispute. Reportedly, Chinese incursions into India’s northern borders have doubled to 300 from 2007 to 2008. Furthermore, the Indian/ China rivalry over spheres of influence is heating up in the Indian Ocean region as well. The two powers, however, are united on issues relating to global warming, in opposition to the stance of developed countries.

By destabilizing Iran and Pakistan, China’s two allies and trade partners are themselves weakened in the region. This negatively impacts China and Russia loses its Iran leverage vis-a-vis the United States and NATO. Similarly, if Afghanistan remains in a chaotic state, Pakistan is menaced and the trouble must spill over into Iran sooner or later. Thus, if the other regional powers wane, India is bound to emerge in a stronger position with regards to China. Furthermore, the US and India’s improved strategic relationship is already a major concern for China and Pakistan.

Iran-Pakistani relations are better, mostly due to their cooperation on the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project. This in turn has led to a deteriorating relationship between Pakistan and the Saudis, who are entangled in Shiite-Sunni rivalries in the Islamic world. Thus, the Jundallah attacks can be seen as an attempt to drive a wedge between Iran and Pakistan and to isolate the latter. It also reinforces the perception that Pakistan is attempting to destabilize the regional countries. And, perceptions are very important in developing a perspective. The tribal areas (FATA) and Balochistan are increasingly out of Pakistan’s full control, and this creates an opportunity and possibility for non state and other adversarial actors, to use Pakistani territory for launching attacks on other countries. When Pakistan’s territory is used for attacking others, it creates mistrust regarding its role, as the country is often seen as unwilling to act against the perpetrators.

Of course, politics and extremism have never been separate entities, adding greatly to the complexity of the situation. The Jihadis were originally used by the US and Pakistan to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan and end the Cold War decisively. Learning from experience, Pakistan itself subsequently used the Jihadis as proxies in Kashmir and Afghanistan in order to create a sphere of influence. Then came 911 and everything changed; since then, Pakistan has been on the back foot and its sphere of influence has declined to the point that its own territory is now at risk in tribal areas and Balochistan.

From the US perspective, Pakistan must stop wavering between it and China and definitely ally itself with one or the other. It is this confusion over Pakistan’s intent which complicates relations with Iran and its other allies. These are some of the current interpretations of Pakistan’s behavior:

• Pakistan is working with extremists against India and NATO in Afghanistan;
• Pakistan-based extremists are involved in destabilizing China’s Uighur region;
• Pakistan is allied with the US, NATO and the UK against Iran;
• Pakistan has joined Saudi Arabia and Sunni extremists against Iran;
• Pakistan has teamed up with China against the US and India.

Based on its policies, the US appears to believe that if Pakistan decides on America as an ally, it must accept Indian dominance in the region, by virtue of which Kashmir would cease to be an issue. At the same time, in the aftermath of suspicions engendered by the provisions of the Kerry-Lugar bill and the news of strict terms accompanying forthcoming US military aid (reportedly the result of pressure from the Indian Lobby), esteem for the US in Pakistan has declined steeply.

On its part, Pakistan believes that in exchange for helping to tame the terrorist threat, it should receive assistance from the US in settling its issues with India. The US has, on the contrary, been working to strengthen its ties with India. Given all the circumstances – especially America’s bafflement as to what to do about the muddle in Afghanistan and the continued mystification regarding the intentions of the international players –  it is most likely that everyone will simply assume the worst, resulting in escalating rivalries.

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Context

This article explores the implications of the recent (October 18, 2009) suicide attacks in the Sistan-Baluchistan province of Iran, which, the country alleges, were carried out by the Sunni Salafi Baluch jihadist group, the Jundallah; it is suspected that the groups leader, Malik Abdollah Regi, is hiding in Pakistan.

There were 42 casualties, including senior commanders of the Iran’s Elite Revolutionary Guard (IGRC). Iran subsequently accused the US, the UK and Pakistan of supporting Jundallah and generally of trying to destabilize the country. Pakistan has since replied that it has information regarding Regi’s location in Afghanistan, but that it cannot permit Iran to conduct operations on its side of the Iran-Pakistan border, as Iran has requested.

Other regional powers are engaged in finger-pointing:

• India maintains that Pakistan is attempting to undermine it by supporting the Kashmir-related Jihadis. It also blames the Pakistanis for complicity in the Mumbai incident, arguing that even if non-state actors were involved, Pakistan’s territory had been used.
• Afghanistan blames Pakistan for providing a safe haven for the Taliban. The country wants US forces to adopt a “boots on the ground” scenario,” that is, to cross the Durand Line in order to eliminate the safe havens and terrorists there.
• The Pakistan government officially blames India and Afghanistan for destabilizing the tribal areas and Baluchistan. Informally, Pakistan increasingly believes that the US and NATO, with their presence in Afghanistan, are also destabilizing the region.

So the question becomes: who is destabilizing who?

Analysis

As is so often the case, in order to make sense of what is going on at the regional level one has to look at current tussles between global players. The chief global rivals are the US, Russia and China. The global powers use the regional ones to further their interests, calling on them to choose sides. To exert pressure on the lesser powers, the international ones employ economic and military means, that is, soft and hard power. On the other hand, the regional powers might refuse to choose sides and attempt to use the global players to further their own goals.

In an effort to please Russia and obtain reciprocity on the issue of Iran, the US recently compromised regarding its defense missile shield plans. Russia’s initial reaction suggests that it is reluctant to meet America halfway, especially on the issue of a united front against Iran’s nuclear program. Russia recently stated that imposition of sanctions against Iran could backfire – definitely not the response the US was hoping for.

If we look at the regional situation from NATO’s perspective, China would be seen as the main adversary, with Russia occupying second place. While Russia has expressed resentment over NATO’s interference with its “Near Abroad,” China has not defined its sphere of influence in the South and Central Asian region, although its recent statements have shown escalating alarm regarding the growing American military presence in the region. Moreover, both the US and China appear to be upping the ante for influence in Pakistan.

In this context, China has the most to lose. A decision by the US to increase troop levels in Afghanistan by 40,000 is bound to have repercussions for China’s security calculus. It cannot sit idly by as one by one its regional allies falter. This might already be happening, as China appears to be adopting a more aggressive stance towards India and to be taking action matching Pakistan’s stand on the Kashmir dispute. Reportedly, Chinese incursions into India’s northern borders have doubled to 300 from 2007 to 2008. Furthermore, the Indian/ China rivalry over spheres of influence is heating up in the Indian Ocean region as well. The two powers, however, are united on issues relating to global warming, in opposition to the stance of developed countries.

By destabilizing Iran and Pakistan, China’s two allies and trade partners are themselves weakened in the region. This negatively impacts China and Russia loses its Iran leverage vis-a-vis the United States and NATO. Similarly, if Afghanistan remains in a chaotic state, Pakistan is menaced and the trouble must spill over into Iran sooner or later. Thus, if the other regional powers wane, India is bound to emerge in a stronger position with regards to China. Furthermore, the US and India’s improved strategic relationship is already a major concern for China and Pakistan.

Iran-Pakistani relations are better, mostly due to their cooperation on the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project. This in turn has led to a deteriorating relationship between Pakistan and the Saudis, who are entangled in Shiite-Sunni rivalries in the Islamic world. Thus, the Jundallah attacks can be seen as an attempt to drive a wedge between Iran and Pakistan and to isolate the latter. It also reinforces the perception that Pakistan is attempting to destabilize the regional countries. And, perceptions are very important in developing a perspective. The tribal areas (FATA) and Balochistan are increasingly out of Pakistan’s full control, and this creates an opportunity and possibility for non state and other adversarial actors, to use Pakistani territory for launching attacks on other countries. When Pakistan’s territory is used for attacking others, it creates mistrust regarding its role, as the country is often seen as unwilling to act against the perpetrators.

Of course, politics and extremism have never been separate entities, adding greatly to the complexity of the situation. The Jihadis were originally used by the US and Pakistan to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan and end the Cold War decisively. Learning from experience, Pakistan itself subsequently used the Jihadis as proxies in Kashmir and Afghanistan in order to create a sphere of influence. Then came 911 and everything changed; since then, Pakistan has been on the back foot and its sphere of influence has declined to the point that its own territory is now at risk in tribal areas and Balochistan.

From the US perspective, Pakistan must stop wavering between it and China and definitely ally itself with one or the other. It is this confusion over Pakistan’s intent which complicates relations with Iran and its other allies. These are some of the current interpretations of Pakistan’s behavior:

• Pakistan is working with extremists against India and NATO in Afghanistan;
• Pakistan-based extremists are involved in destabilizing China’s Uighur region;
• Pakistan is allied with the US, NATO and the UK against Iran;
• Pakistan has joined Saudi Arabia and Sunni extremists against Iran;
• Pakistan has teamed up with China against the US and India.

Based on its policies, the US appears to believe that if Pakistan decides on America as an ally, it must accept Indian dominance in the region, by virtue of which Kashmir would cease to be an issue. At the same time, in the aftermath of suspicions engendered by the provisions of the Kerry-Lugar bill and the news of strict terms accompanying forthcoming US military aid (reportedly the result of pressure from the Indian Lobby), esteem for the US in Pakistan has declined steeply.

On its part, Pakistan believes that in exchange for helping to tame the terrorist threat, it should receive assistance from the US in settling its issues with India. The US has, on the contrary, been working to strengthen its ties with India. Given all the circumstances – especially America’s bafflement as to what to do about the muddle in Afghanistan and the continued mystification regarding the intentions of the international players –  it is most likely that everyone will simply assume the worst, resulting in escalating rivalries.

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Context
Pakistan’s ubiquitous feelings of distrust have their origin in a general sense of insecurity. For one thing, Pakistan believes that India has never accepted its legitimacy as a nation; as proof, it cites India’s active support of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) independence in 1971. On the other hand, Afghanistan has always questioned the validity of the border separating it from Pakistan, the Durand Line. Because of this scarred legacy, Pakistan initiated its nuclear program, but as soon as it had the bomb, it feared that its adversaries were attempting to destabilize the country in order to justify taking it away. So the question arises: who wants to weaken Pakistan and is this threat mostly internal or external?

Analysis

This is the quandary facing the security apparatus of Pakistan, including the military. The following explanations have been offered:

1. The US desires to weaken Pakistan so as to prevent it from garnering any benefit from the Afghan conflict, if and when US decides to leave. Although Pakistan is a major ally, the US could repeat its course at the end of the Cold War and abandon Pakistan, once its objectives in Afghanistan are achieved with Pakistan’s help.In addition, rather than looking out for the interests of its ally, the US is working to place India, Pakistan’s enemy, in the driving seat in Afghanistan so as to counter the rise of China; the latter is a close, long-term strategic partner of Pakistan, which also has adversarial relations with India.To counter this perception and undo past mistakes, such as the “Pressler Amendment” of 1985, the Kerry-Lugar bill envisions a long-term strategic partnership with Pakistan and its people. The controversy developed when some of the provisions of the bill appeared to aim at weakening its powerful military, the very institution in Pakistan whose help the US needs to stabilize Afghanistan and rid the world of Al Qaeda. Thus the intentions of the US appear contradictory to Pakistan, while the US believes that the Pakistani military secretly aids the Taliban, which carries out attacks against coalition forces in Afghanistan. So it appears that the real goal of the Kerry-Lugar Bill is to correct the behavior of an ally.
2. The extremists and Jihadists have been attacking the Pakistani government because they believe it has departed from Islamic ideology by supporting the US, which is trying to occupy Afghanistan. These groups believe that the US is hostile to Muslims all over the world and through its alliance with Israel and India is determined to weaken Pakistan. Furthermore, the extremists believe that the corrupt and inept politicians of the country are ruling through an unjust and un-Islamic system with western aid and support, and this system needs to change to Shariah.

With US moral credibility damaged internationally, it is difficult to make its case to Muslims. At the same time, people recognize that the extremists have only brought death and destruction to Muslims, whose cause it supposedly champions.

On the other hand, the US drone attacks in the tribal areas of Pakistan are having both desirable and undesirable effects. They achieve their immediate objectives, but at the cost of potentially dangerous precedents and consequences. Not only are these attacks seen as a violation of national sovereignty, but they also appear to substantiate the claim that America is out to get Muslims. Furthermore, reports of the civilian deaths resulting from these attacks are fodder for the extremist’s recruiting efforts. The negative psychological effects of the drone attacks can be seen in angry media discussions of the provisions of the Kerry-Lugar bill.

In short, to the Pakistani public, countermeasures like the drone attacks appear to justify the extremist case against the US, helping to facilitate growing Anti-Americanism in Pakistan. That is why the nation’s government and military, while continuing to assist the US, does so discreetly and without fanfare. But when the extremists attack the country, it perceives yet another attempt to destabilize it.

Amidst the confusion, there are signs of a new public consensus which sees both the extremists and the west as trying to weaken Pakistan; this is reflected in the escalating anti-extremism and anti-Americanism pervading the country. So Pakistan appears to want to redefine its identity, while rejecting the readily available options.

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The post Pakistan Asks Who Wants to Weaken It, As Deadly Extremist Revenge Attacks Spread and Multiply appeared first on Politact.

In POLITACT’s analysis of the bombing in Peshawar, which occurred a little over a week ago, we pointed to some of the weaknesses in the civil security apparatus of the country, whose attitude and aptitude has still not shifted enough to deal effectively with the existing threat. This unresponsiveness was in evidence today when a wily bomber, dressed in paramilitary garb, walked unmolested past security personnel after requesting to use the restroom.

In this article, we examine the intent behind the bombing in more detail, as well as analyze the war of perceptions and perspectives relating to the ‘imminent’ operation in Waziristan. After all, these perceptions and perspectives will almost undoubtedly play an important role in the success of the operation.

Analysis

• Hakimullah Mehsud, widely believed to have died in a scuffle that broke out after Baitullah’s death, appeared at a press conference timed to be released after the WFP attack today, in order to lend credibility to the TTP’s claims to launch suicide attacks across the country. Both Pakistan and the US authorities have been reporting that the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is in disarray due to the elimination of the senior leadership of the organization. Furthermore, Pakistan believes that as a result of the Pakistani Army’s successful operation in Swat and in other Tribal Agencies, the ability of the extremists to mount suicide and other destructive attacks across the country have been greatly reduced. The attacks in Peshawar last week and in Islamabad today are intended to disprove this narrative.
• Moreover, the bombing was intended as a message to the Pakistani army as it stands on the threshold of the Waziristan Operation. The extremists are saying that they can withstand the operation, as they did in the past, and continue unhindered attacks like the one today. These attacks are also intended to pressure the government into peace talks, like the one Mowlana Fazul-ur-Rehman of Jamatey Ulema Islam (JUI) initiated last week. His stated objective was to free Pakistan from American pressures to launch an operation in Waziristan. As recent public opinion surveys have shown, Pakistanis are overwhelmingly (by 80%) opposed to supporting the US in a war against extremism. Mowlana Fazl-ur-Rehman’s approach represents a sophisticated attempt to bank on mounting anti-American feeling in Pakistan.
• So it is apparent that public opinion in Pakistan is increasingly anti-American and anti-Taliban. The drone attacks in the Tribal Areas and conflicting messages emanating from the government, regarding not only its role in the drone operations but its relationship with the controversial civilian defense contractors (Blackwater and DynCorp), is discrediting the PPP government and other major politicians of the country, including PML-N’s Nawaz Sharif.  The TTP aims to capitalize on growing public disenchantment; the media debate on the conditions of the Kerry-Lugar bill has further poisoned the atmosphere. Confusing statements from the government on critical matters are interpreted negatively and rumors are generally accepted as truth by the public.
• The TTP’s propaganda strategy is to depict these attacks as part of an insurgency, similar to that in Afghanistan, although, as stated above, public sentiment in Pakistan and other parts of the tribal belt has shifted decisively against TTP style Talibanism in the country. In addition, even the Afghan Taliban has distanced itself from the tactics and strategies of the Pakistani Taliban. While in southern Afghanistan the Taliban enjoy increasing public sympathy, the same cannot be said of the Pakistani Taliban, so they are thus clutching at straws.
• Another reason for targeting the UN affiliated World Food Program was to strike at the critical role of the humanitarian organizations. After all, their work goes a along way towards helping civilians displaced as a result of military operations; in Swat, for example. The assistance provided by these groups is proving instrumental in turning the otherwise apprehensive and confused Pushtun masses against the Taliban. These people are the ones who suffered the brunt of the Taliban’s inhuman brutality.
• Defense Secretary Robert Gates reiterated today that more time will be needed to come up with the right strategy for the Afghanistan Pakistan region. No doubt, the operation in Waziristan is on everyone’s mind. Once it unfolds, it will provide crucial clues as to whether the elimination of the TTP leadership has actually caused disarray and confusion amongst the Taliban rank-and-file, as has been widely reported in the media. Furthermore, the outcome of the operation will also establish whether the approach favored by Vice President Joe Biden, premised on more use of drones and less of soldiers, can be fruitful. Perhaps the most important factor behind the delay of the operation is Pakistan’s attempts to create more tribal wedges and keep Haji Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur neutral while it is being carried out. For US the most critical element is how Pakistan deals with the Afghan Taliban.
• By announcing that the operation is imminent, the Pakistani Army is probably checking on TTP capabilities, to see if can still deliver on its threat regarding more suicide attacks across the country. This early warning is also probably designed to test the TTP’s capacity to withstand prolonged pressure.

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The post Suicide Attack on the World Food Program (WFP) Office in Islamabad And The Imminent Waziristan Operation appeared first on Politact.

In this article, we examine the intent behind the bombing in more detail, as well as analyze the war of perceptions and perspectives relating to the ‘imminent’ operation in Waziristan. After all, these perceptions and perspectives will almost undoubtedly play an important role in the success of the operation.

Analysis

• Hakimullah Mehsud, widely believed to have died in a scuffle that broke out after Baitullah’s death, appeared at a press conference timed to be released after the WFP attack today, in order to lend credibility to the TTP’s claims to launch suicide attacks across the country. Both Pakistan and the US authorities have been reporting that the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is in disarray due to the elimination of the senior leadership of the organization. Furthermore, Pakistan believes that as a result of the Pakistani Army’s successful operation in Swat and in other Tribal Agencies, the ability of the extremists to mount suicide and other destructive attacks across the country have been greatly reduced. The attacks in Peshawar last week and in Islamabad today are intended to disprove this narrative.
• Moreover, the bombing was intended as a message to the Pakistani army as it stands on the threshold of the Waziristan Operation. The extremists are saying that they can withstand the operation, as they did in the past, and continue unhindered attacks like the one today. These attacks are also intended to pressure the government into peace talks, like the one Mowlana Fazul-ur-Rehman of Jamatey Ulema Islam (JUI) initiated last week. His stated objective was to free Pakistan from American pressures to launch an operation in Waziristan. As recent public opinion surveys have shown, Pakistanis are overwhelmingly (by 80%) opposed to supporting the US in a war against extremism. Mowlana Fazl-ur-Rehman’s approach represents a sophisticated attempt to bank on mounting anti-American feeling in Pakistan.
• So it is apparent that public opinion in Pakistan is increasingly anti-American and anti-Taliban. The drone attacks in the Tribal Areas and conflicting messages emanating from the government, regarding not only its role in the drone operations but its relationship with the controversial civilian defense contractors (Blackwater and DynCorp), is discrediting the PPP government and other major politicians of the country, including PML-N’s Nawaz Sharif.  The TTP aims to capitalize on growing public disenchantment; the media debate on the conditions of the Kerry-Lugar bill has further poisoned the atmosphere. Confusing statements from the government on critical matters are interpreted negatively and rumors are generally accepted as truth by the public.
• The TTP’s propaganda strategy is to depict these attacks as part of an insurgency, similar to that in Afghanistan, although, as stated above, public sentiment in Pakistan and other parts of the tribal belt has shifted decisively against TTP style Talibanism in the country. In addition, even the Afghan Taliban has distanced itself from the tactics and strategies of the Pakistani Taliban. While in southern Afghanistan the Taliban enjoy increasing public sympathy, the same cannot be said of the Pakistani Taliban, so they are thus clutching at straws.
• Another reason for targeting the UN affiliated World Food Program was to strike at the critical role of the humanitarian organizations. After all, their work goes a along way towards helping civilians displaced as a result of military operations; in Swat, for example. The assistance provided by these groups is proving instrumental in turning the otherwise apprehensive and confused Pushtun masses against the Taliban. These people are the ones who suffered the brunt of the Taliban’s inhuman brutality.
• Defense Secretary Robert Gates reiterated today that more time will be needed to come up with the right strategy for the Afghanistan Pakistan region. No doubt, the operation in Waziristan is on everyone’s mind. Once it unfolds, it will provide crucial clues as to whether the elimination of the TTP leadership has actually caused disarray and confusion amongst the Taliban rank-and-file, as has been widely reported in the media. Furthermore, the outcome of the operation will also establish whether the approach favored by Vice President Joe Biden, premised on more use of drones and less of soldiers, can be fruitful. Perhaps the most important factor behind the delay of the operation is Pakistan’s attempts to create more tribal wedges and keep Haji Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur neutral while it is being carried out. For US the most critical element is how Pakistan deals with the Afghan Taliban.
• By announcing that the operation is imminent, the Pakistani Army is probably checking on TTP capabilities, to see if can still deliver on its threat regarding more suicide attacks across the country. This early warning is also probably designed to test the TTP’s capacity to withstand prolonged pressure.

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The post Suicide Attack on the World Food Program (WFP) Office in Islamabad And The Imminent Waziristan Operation appeared first on Politact.

Context

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As the Afghan war spreads deeper into Pakistan and its tribal areas, violence in the country’s urban areas has increased. Those who view these events as individual reactions to the Swat/Malakand Operation are deceiving themselves: in fact, the rise in violence is a consequence of a policy change.

The Pakistani government is currently ill-prepared to deal with these high-profile attacks and as a result is losing the public’s confidence.

Analysis

Some observers maintain that the attacks show a high level of ingenuity, but security lapses are too frequent to be explained solely in terms of terrorist sophistication. The targets of some recent high-profile attacks include: the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, the Sri-Lankan Cricket team, the ISI offices in Lahore and the Pearl Continental Hotel in Peshawar.

These attacks were successful in large part because in most cases not even the most elementary preventive measures were in place, not because of especially brilliant planning. In other cases what was lacking was serious attention to implementation of a contingency plan. Furthermore, the failure of the defensive plans to prevent or stop attacks was a sign of the ineptitude of the whole civilian security hierarchy and bureaucracy and raises the issue of whether their training and skills were up to snuff. The credibility of the politician is already at a low point; now the standing of the civil defense system, apparently unable to protect the public, is at stake.

If appropriate and stringent modern security measures were in place and employed, these attacks might have been prevented. All of these incidents, with perhaps the exception of the attack on the ISI offices in Lahore, involved a single catastrophic point of failure, which has the potential to wreak irreversible damage to the prestige and psyche of the country. The video footage of the attacks reveals that in each instance the security guards were caught off-guard by the speed with which the extremists executed their operations.

The intent here is not to blame the front-line security staff members themselves, but to point out that they were unfortunately a part of a bigger problem, a faulty security plan put together by their superiors. These higher-ups have failed so far to adapt to and counter frequently used extremist tactics. This points to their lack of modern training, which involves quick information sharing and analysis. Before any remedial action can be taken, failures in the existing apparatus have to be identified and then rectified immediately.

As to the new AfPak policy: it is based on the misplaced assumption that the Afghan Taliban and the insurgents in Aghanistan can be held at bay by controlling the cross border support for the Afghan Taliban from Pakistan’s tribal areas. Those who hold this view also maintain that pressure needs to be mounted on the Pakistani Taliban in the Pushtun support belt of the tribal areas of Pakistan. Some observers say that the failure to do this helps explain the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 80s. It should be pointed out, however, that although this might work out well in the short run, it will result in a strategic debacle over the long haul, by widening the theater of war and creating a civilian nightmare in the form of IDPs. If the United States and NATO, with their combined might, have not been able to isolate the troublemakers in Afghanistan, how can one expect Pakistan do so? Again, the above outlined approach risks spreading the war deeper into Pakistan, as the extremist and jihadist are not defined by region, nationality, or ethnicity but by an ideology spanning many Islamic countries and populations. In fact, targeted and precision weaponry in the hands of Pakistanis can be much more effective than large scale military operations (often resulting in civilian casualties) in dealing with the militants and eliminating their leadership. Large scale civilian casualties provide excellent ammunition for the extremists, strengthening passionate mass opposition to the Unites States, NATO and Pakistan.

No other measure can better reinforce the Pakistani resolve against extremists than support in the Kashmir dispute. This is also the issue by which the United States and the West can heal their credibility gap and burnish their public image in the region, giving teeth to their contention that they are not at war against Islam. President Obama’s speech in Egypt was the first major sign that the U.S. has this as a goal. Moreover, this approach is the most effective way to divide Al-Qaeda from the Taliban and the Punjabi/Kashmiri Jihadi’s. Without some improvement in America’s image, to be accomplished by quick, visible action regarding Kashmir and the Israel-Palestine conflict, no one – not the Pakistani Army, NATO, the American forces – can win against this rapidly spreading and deadly virus. Settling the Kashmir issue is not a losing proposition for India either, since the disastrous consequences of failing to do so through a negotiated settlement are becoming increasing clear. This refers not only to the nuclear threat but to the nexuses of Al-Qaeda, Taliban, and Jihadist groups that could, in the long run, gobble up both Pakistan and India.

Meanwhile, events such as the suicide bombing of the Mosque in Dir and the PC hotel in Peshawar, as well as the assassination of moderate religious scholars in Lahore, are tarnishing the image of the Taliban. The people of Pakistan are responding with growing resolve and increasing support for the army’s operations against Taliban militants and other extremists. Winning the hearts and minds of the public is one of the most challenging tasks involved in the war against terrorism, but it is esse

The post The Suicide Attack on the Pearl Continental Hotel in Peshawar – A Lesson in the Battle Of Public Perceptions appeared first on Politact.