Context
About a week ago, without the usual international attention, Pakistan miraculously achieved a milestone that has proved to be elusive since the war against terror erupted in 2001. With the US slated to withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014, the new government has achieved consensus on a strategy to fight the extremists. This is after realizing the bullet train cannot arrive at its destination with the suicide bombers blocking the tracks. If one goes by the comments of Imran Khan, Gen. Kiyani even agreed for a phased withdrawal from FATA.

According to reports, the new strategy emphasizes negotiations and perhaps simultaneous use of force as well; a popular maneuver US has applied to its approach in Afghanistan and now to the crisis in Syria.

The goal of the new policy is to dismantle, contain, prevent, educate and re-integrate. It’s just like another version of the American emphasis of deter, dismantle, and degrade mantra against Al Qaeda, and the Saudi lessons in educating and reintegrating extremists.

One hopes the new national security policy and counter terrorism strategy is equally focused to combat and counteract the emerging threats as well, and not just the past ones. The war against extremists has transformed over the years and without understanding the changing nature of this struggle, one cannot hope to address and check its progression. As the US withdraws from Afghanistan, Pakistan’s control over a spectrum of extremist organization bustling in the country will be tested. Furthermore, American policy is likely to align even more closely with India.
Emerging Threats

A new book from renowned counter-insurgency expert David Kilcullen points to the phenomenon of Urban Gorilla, which amply explains what is taking place in cities like Karachi. Dr. Kilcullen looks at major environmental trends such as exploding populations, coastal urbanization, and growing digital connectivity. He postulates these factors are putting large cities and urban systems under tremendous stress, and leading to an intricate overlap between crime and war, internal and external threats, and the real versus virtual realties.

The director of South Asia Center at Atlantic Council, Shuja Nawaz pointed to another stark trend during a recent event;  the peripheries are becoming more important. There will indeed be intended and unintended consequences of this, as government’s fight the extremities of their states for control, through out the region, while it’s capacity to provide security and services diminish.

On the other hand, US describes the emerging threats to its national security are from weak and failing states, the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, and cyber warfare. No wonder, the recent revelation of the Black Budget points out Pakistan to be at the top of the list. Meanwhile, a study by UK based International Institute for Strategic Studies IISS emphasizes the risks posed by Pakistan’s short-range ‘battlefield’ nuclear arsenal. As the state weakens, the extremists pose a growing threat to the nuclear assets of the country.

As the US withdraws from Afghanistan, Pakistan’s control over a spectrum of extremist organization bustling in the country will be tested. Furthermore, American policy is likely to align even more closely with India. In the event of any unforeseen incident, we could see a dangerous turn of direction.

Analysis

Emerging Challenges

India is concerned the American withdrawal from Afghanistan will shift the focus of extremist groups towards India, and reports have already started to re-emerge in western institutions reiterating allegations about Pakistan ‘s inhibitions in acting against these groups. In a recent study sponsored by United States Institute of Peace, Stephen Tankel states that the country will continue to not act against Islamist militants, which it deems to have strategic value.

It appears the Indian apprehensions are not that off the mark. The head of the United Jihadi Council, Syed Salahuddin recently stated with NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan approaching, thousands of militants would be shifting to Kashmir. Quoted by AFP, Salahuddin stated, “The coming months and years will see a tremendous surge in mujahedeen’s activities in Indian Kashmir.”

Under the circumstances, it is conceivable India may have agreed to Pakistan’s role in the Afghan reconciliation upon reassurance from the Americans; they will keep the pressure on Pakistan to deal with the India oriented jihadist groups.

Pakistan counter terrorism strategy remains focused on FATA and the Taliban and does not mention the other emerging threats. Many renowned Pakistani analysts fail to see how Punjab based, and India oriented groups, will be increasingly in the limelight in the near future. It is possible this omission is a tactic to keep these entities off guard.

In his comments at the Atlantic Council on September 10, Amb. James Dobbins pointed out the reasoning behind Pakistan not focusing on the whole array of extremists operating in the country. He stated the country wants to divide these groups and deal with them one by one, as it does not have the capability to deal with all of them simultaneously.

Obviously, once Afghan reconciliation materializes, including with TTP, Pakistan will no longer have the above logic to hold on to. After the Afghan settlement, the country would be hard-pressed to focus on these groups. Moreover, for improving ties, India will demand action against extremists even more forcefully.

Another complication to consider in the reconciliation with TTP would be their ambiguous connection and ties with Afghan Taliban. In absence of progress on Afghan reconciliation, negotiations with TTP are also unlikely to move forward. Furthermore, without clear indication of how many American troops will remain in Afghanistan beyond 2014; this will remain another stumbling block towards the final resolution. In any event, the emerging regional dynamics will fully test how much control Pakistan has on the various extremist groups that take refuge there.

If it can neither influence nor control them, then that could put the state in a very serious bind.

The post Pakistan’s Counter Terrorism Strategy And Emerging Threats appeared first on Politact.

Context
More than a decade in to the war against terror, Pakistan’s confusion persists. It has been unable to define if the enemy is internal or external, or if the battle it’s waging is its own. Faced with a trembling economy, the conflict appears more a necessity where the nation does not appear to have a choice to part with it.

It took more than 13 years to hear the country needs a policy and a strategy on how to combat the menace it is confronted with, which has eaten in to the very fabric of its existence, and its by no way final yet. To make matter worse, the not so fresh political leadership entrusted with formulating the new approach, are part of the revolving door that in one way or the other has lead to the present paralysis. And, it is relying on the same security apparatus that seems to have quietly handed over the initiative to the enemy.

The hardest conflicts to fight are the internal ones, where no army crosses the border to attack, no war is ever declared, and it may be lost without anyone knowing. It just took one Pearl Harbor and 9/11 for US to declare war and take the battle to the enemy. The state of affairs is so appalling in Pakistan that it’s not the bad guys on the run, but the police, the military, and the people that are struggling to protect themselves.

What good is ‘foolproof security’ when the adversary can breach it at will? And, when by chance the culprits are arrested, their comrades can launch humiliating assaults to free them. In this kind of conflict, the enemy wins when it takes away the confidence of an average citizen that the state can ensure the security of his/her life and property.

At the same time, procrastination and complacency can be the worse thing under the circumstances. As the saying goes, extraordinary situation require similar measures. New institutions and strategies only work when they are backed by ironclad will, resources, and capacity. The starting point is a clear assessment of what the threat really is, and it is quite dynamic. Incremental steps or muddling through is unlikely to work under the grave security situation.

Analysis

Two Fronts; Economic and Security

Yes, Pakistan is facing a two front war; an economic and a security one, and they are both are intertwined. It the security situation does not improve, the fiscal situation is not going to get any better. If the economics does not improve, dependence on aid will continue and so will the problem with owning the war.

At the same time, procrastination and complacency can be the worse thing under the circumstances. As the saying goes, extraordinary situation require similar measures. New institutions and strategies only work when they are backed by ironclad will, resources, and capacity. The starting point is a clear assessment of what the threat really is, and it is quite dynamic. Incremental steps or muddling through is unlikely to work under the grave security situation.

What Can Be Done?

As occurs in the business world, consistent failure to meet goals results in a complete overhaul with replacement of top executives with fresh blood. The new leadership then is tasked to take the harsh steps that the entrenched administration is unlikely to undertake: leading to a lot of firing, hiring, insecurity and golden handshakes. This causes the rest of the workforce to shape up to the new realities. In essence, urgency is created to shake things up and change the business as usual routine. This is exactly the recipe for Pakistan’s present predicament.

The question is where will the experienced replacements come from. Pakistan’s best-trained and equipped institution is its army, which wants to stay behind the scenes and was not trained for fighting insurgencies. Nonetheless, the military will have to spearhead this effort to organize and train a force capable of dealing with the emergent threats. As in other western countries, Pakistan’s private defense sector could have assisted immensely in this area i.e., if it was not so weak. In addition to strengthening science and technology sector, the private defense sector needs to be bolstered to provide the badly needed insights, ideas, and impetus.

After Mumbai Attack, India completely reorganized its security apparatus and capabilities. It is working closely with US and Israel on acquiring training and developing technologies to counter emerging risks. In case of US, after 9/11 the Department of Homeland security was created after to coordinate intelligence amongst many different arms. Pakistan similarly needs to continually assess its institutional and intellectual weaknesses and start implementing what it has, as oppose to perpetually waiting to devise a onetime perfect policy.

The End State And Leadership

Accompanied by these steps is a clear understanding of what the end state looks like. One cannot be in a consistent mode of war; the state of emergency can only be maintained for a short period of time.

While the solution to deal with extremists may be a political and a negotiated one; the state would have to first gain the initiative. Then there is the differentiation between groups that can be negotiated with and those that will have to be dealt with force. Thirdly, the political and security leadership would have to present a genuine public appraisal of the present condition, and a convincing case for why a certain direction or decision will be needed. Silence or confusion is the worst thing a government can convey at this juncture. Of course, a prerequisite to this is a credible leadership – and this is a problem in itself.

Credibility is earned by resolute action and transparency. If the government indicates these values, people will provide the backing, as they did during the Swat operation. Lofty claims of better relations with India barely gain any traction at the ground when there is minimal public buy in. There was hardly a battle in history that was won without galvanizing the public, or worse, by fooling them.

A fundamental change is taking place in the region with the planned US withdrawal from Afghanistan next year, and India simply cannot allow Pakistan to benefit from it. India is increasingly threatened that in the haste of leaving Afghanistan, US may tilt heavily in favor of Pakistan, which it assesses to be a bad omen for its long-term interests. If saner minds do not prevail, India may decide to act when it can and prevent history from repeating itself.

The post Pakistan’s National Security Policy: What Can Be Done? appeared first on Politact.

By Brigadier (Rtd.) Imran Malik

The strategic environment in Pakistan is evolving at a frenetic pace. There are multiple scenarios that could unfold. Is Pakistan re-assessing the multifarious threats it faces and repositioning itself accordingly? Is it choosing its enemies anew? Is the Pakistan Army in the throes of a strategic re-orientation? Or is it the subtle but sure consummation of an Indo-US grand strategic design for South Asia?

The chapter on Sub-Conventional Warfare in the Green Book appears to have generated a great deal of discussion and debate. The general perception is that the Pakistan Army may have initiated a basic paradigm shift in its strategic orientation. Its doctrine now apparently implies that the militants within pose a greater threat than India. The implication then would be that its enemy number one has ostensibly changed, that India is no longer the primary existentialist threat to Pakistan; that the internal threat posed by the militants has acquired greater dimensions than the one posed by nuclear India!

And that would make for a massive paradigm shift in our strategic orientation by any standards!

Analysis

The quantum and quality of threats posed by our enemies are assessed by their respective intents and capabilities. It is always prudent to base the threat perceptions on their capabilities rather than their intents, which can change very quickly. India holds strong well equipped nuclear capable armed forces; anywhere between eighty to ninety percent of which are either deployed or poised against Pakistan. To date there has been no discernible paradigm shift in India’s strategic orientation away from Pakistan. There has been no mitigation of threat from India whatsoever. And there appears to be little reason for Pakistan to volunteer to do so.  Thus far Pakistan Army’s strategic orientation has been rightly focused on the more ominous threat – India. And that is where it should stay.

Of the two major threats to Pakistan, India poses the clearer and more potent one; it has the nuclear and conventional capability to back it up and the political will and intent to do so. The militants on the other hand could match India in the ferocity of intent but certainly not in capability. The issue then boils down to both threats being real with one (militants) being the present, immediate and tangible one and the other (Indian) being the clearer, more potent yet latent one.

So, a threat with matching intent but a far inferior capability is emerging as the primary one. Will it be prudent and justifiable for a nuclear Pakistan (with more than half a million strong army) to go in for a massive strategic re-orientation just because of the threat posed by a few thousand rag tag heretics? At best they could be considered a more immediate threat and dealt with accordingly.

However, it is critically imperative for Pakistan to retain strategic balance at all times.

As a matter of fact the Pakistan Armed Forces have the intent and capability to squash this militant threat as they have so valiantly demonstrated in Swat, South Waziristan Agency, Malakand, Dir, Khyber Orakzai, Kurram Agencies and elsewhere in Pakistan. Only the Pakistan Government must continue to demonstrate a matching political will.

If this strategic re-orientation is manifested in letter and spirit then it may have other enormous and far reaching implications for the Pakistan Armed Forces. It could well be the first step towards Pakistan’s capitulation to the US grand strategic design for South Asia.  If India were not deemed to be the primary threat then Pakistan may find it difficult to justify maintaining such large conventional and nuclear forces! It may be pressurized by the vested western interests to “right size” them to match the declared primary threats! It would certainly raise questions on the necessity of a nuclear arsenal. That will tantamount to attacking Pakistan’s center of gravity, its bedrock! And that in effect will be the manifestation of the real, the strongest existentialist threat to Pakistan!

It could also be the consummation of a deep strategic maneuver by the Indo-US Combine. If a change in Pakistan Army’s doctrine forces it to take its eyes off India and start looking inwards it would be exactly in line with what the US has always demanded of Pakistan. It was and is in the US’ larger interest that Pakistan should concentrate its total energies in combating the militant threat within even at the cost of denuding its eastern borders. This would free up India to concentrate on counter balancing China and not be distracted by Pakistan who in turn would be kept embroiled with the militants. Pakistan Army’s balance will shift westwards and away from India. And that will be to the abiding benefit of India and the US.

A reduction in Pakistan’s conventional and nuclear prowess will also confer upon India the unchallenged leadership of the South Asian region and may eventually reduce Pakistan to the status of a vassal state of India. This will then create the conditions for implementing further US designs like the New Silk Road Project (NSRP) – which is already practically operational though in a disjointed manner.  The Afghans are already trading (exporting only) with India through Torkham and Wagah, while India is exporting to Afghanistan and beyond from Karachi and Torkham/Chaman. All that needs to be done now or soon is to allow India to export goods through Wagah instead of Karachi and it will have its and the US’ dream of manifesting the NSRP fulfilled – out maneuvering Pakistan clinically without any matching quid pro quo!

COAS General Kiyani has done well to clear the air by declaring that the armed forces will cater for the full threat spectrum – India as well as the militancy. A balanced approach in our strategic orientation is the order of the day. The militants may be the more immediate and bothersome threat but India is certainly the more potent and genuinely existentialist one.

Sure as the sun rises from the East so does our primary threat!

The author is a retired Brigadier and Pakistan’s former Defence Attache’ to Australia and New Zealand and currently a Faculty Member at National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST) – NUST Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (NIPCONS). This is article was previously published in The Nation, Pakistan. Reprinted with permission.

The post Pakistan’s Strategic Environment And Its Threat Perception appeared first on Politact.

Context

Introduction

The Pew Research Center’s Global Attitude Project recently released the findings of its 2010 survey on the attitude of Pakistani public on extremism and terrorism. The study was conducted in April of 2010, questioning thousands of respondents across the country. In the aftermath of the catastrophic floods in Pakistan, this survey could become a critical baseline to measure the public attitudes on extremism before and after the devastating floods. However, it should be pointed out that the study was mainly designed to gauge Pakistan’s public opinion particularly from the vantage point of United States. The survey, for example, does not cover public attitudes on the causes of religious extremism in Pakistan.

The Pew Research Centre’s Global Attitude Project recently released the findings of its 2010 survey on the attitude of Pakistani public on extremism and terrorism. The survey also covers people’s perceptions on Pakistan’s economic condition and foreign relations, particularly with the US. The survey was conducted in April of 2010, questioning thousands of respondents across the country.

The study provides insight into the evolving perceptions that ordinary Pakistanis hold regarding extremist and terrorist organizations. Moreover, the results of the investigation clearly convey that when it comes to the fight against militant organizations, the government of Pakistan is failing in the most important battlefield of all: the hearts and minds of Pakistani people. In the aftermath of the catastrophic floods in Pakistan, this survey could become a critical baseline to measure the public attitudes before and after the devastating floods.

Although surveys cannot be termed as exact representation of reality they do provide significant insight into prevalent attitudes that exist in the social setting where they are carried out. The Global Attitude Project surveys in Pakistan are generally reflective of the divergent public perception on Taliban and Al Qaeda as well as religious extremism and terrorism in the country.

Analysis

Perceptions of the Pakistani Public on Religious Extremism

Will Extremist Take Over Pakistan?

One of the most important questions of the survey covers whether the respondents were worried about extremist groups taking control of Pakistan. In response to this question 51 percent said that they were quite worried about the unfolding of such a scenario; 31 percent of the people surveyed said that they were not very worried, or not at all worried about extremists taking over of the country. If 51 percent of the respondents-a representative sample of Pakistani population-think that militants could take over Pakistan, it reflects on the low level of confidence the people have in the capability of the state and its apparatus to prevent such an eventuality. An alarming 84 percent of the respondents were unhappy about the state of affairs in Pakistan.

Views on Al Qaeda

The second important question of the survey relates to public’s view on Al Qaeda. As compared to 63 percent last year, 53 percent of the survey respondents had negative attitudes towards Al Qaeda this year. This represents a decrease of 10% from last year.

The somewhat favorable attitude of Pakistanis towards Al Qaeda is an indication of the failure of nations media as well as state agencies in building a case against the extremists and Al Qaeda. This may also be reflective of the backlash against Pakistan’s continued cooperation with the US in the fight against terror. Many Pakistanis equate the war against terror with more drone attacks, which occur with Pakistani acquiescence and are believed to cause civilian causalities.

Views on Pakistani Taliban

As far as the views about the Taliban are concerned, 65 percent of the respondents had unfavorable views while only 15 percent had a positive attitude. In comparison, last year 70 percent held negative views on Taliban while 10 percent had a sympathetic opinion.

Increase in the favorable attitudes towards Taliban is alarming considering they have continued their devastating attacks in Pakistan, bringing death and destruction to ordinary Pakistan citizens across the country. Furthermore, the fact that the Taliban have a political agenda for the whole state of Pakistan, which ultimately focuses on the imposition of their version of ‘Islamic’ system in the country, increasing favorable attitudes towards Taliban should be a cause of serious concern.

Views on Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT)

Questions measuring public attitudes on LeT were added to the survey for the first time this year: confirming the rise of danger posed by the group on the American radar while also reflecting Indian pressure and influence on US policy. In response to the question about LeT, 25 percent of people responded favorably and 35 percent unfavorably when questioned. On the other hand, 40 percent were not familiar with the existence of the group. As no comparison point exist, it is difficult to draw any conclusions. However, it does appear that popularity of the group is concentrated in particular parts of the country. With 40 percent of the respondents not recognizing LeT could be interpreted to mean that the group is not believed to pose a threat to Pakistan, which could translate into more public and financial support.

Greatest Threat to Pakistan

Yet another important question of the survey asked about the greatest threat to Pakistan. Not to anyone’s surprise, 53 percent of Pakistanis view India as the biggest threat. On the other hand 23 percent considered Taliban the greatest risk and a negligible 3 percent thought Al Qaeda to be the acute hazard for the country. Interestingly 5 percent named all the three of the above as the biggest threat. On the other hand, 6 percent thought none of above posed a serious threat.

The above data clearly demonstrates the majority of Pakistani’s still consider India to be its archenemy. This is despite the recent official rhetoric that the main threat to the state comes from within. Many Pakistan’s believe the Taliban and the insurgency in Balochistan are supported by India, which in collusion with Afghanistan are attempting to destabilize Pakistan. Moreover, the survey results highlight the fact that when it comes to the strategic threat perception of the country, the danger from India continues to supersede any risk posed by local militant and extremist groups.

Perceptions of Pakistani Political Leadership and Media on the Causes of Extremism

 It should be also be pointed out that the survey is mainly designed to gauge Pakistan’s public opinion and its implication for US policies in the region. The survey, for example, does not cover the public perception on the causes of extremism in Pakistan, which tremendously impacts its effort to formulate a response to the fight against terrorism.

This is where PoliTact has focused its attention for the last two years in a row. PoliTact has taken upon a longitudinal study to study the perspectives of a whole array of Pakistanis on the causes of present predicament of Pakistan. As part of this examination, PoliTact teamed up with APPJD (American Pakistani Physicians for Justice and Democracy). APPJD uses ‘discussion forums’ to build a basic framework around which political thought process and consensus building can be developed. In July 2009, PoliTact analyzed the views of the major political parties of Pakistan. This year another panel discussion was organized by APPJD on July 4, 2010 to discuss the role of media in-fighting extremism.

Up to now what has been observed in our study is the inability on the part of the country’s civil, political, and military intelligentsia to develop a consensus on not only who the enemy is, but also what are the roles of different institutions of Pakistan to fight this menace. Most of the focus usually revolves around: 1) the basic causes of extremism in Pakistan; 2) ethnic tensions; 3) the role of the Pakistani Army; 4) rampant corruption of the politicians; and 5) military or political solution.
Pakistan’s different institutions pay more emphasis on the present geopolitical and religious factors as opposed to understanding the current crises in the context of economic, social, cultural and historical underpinnings. They approach the problem as being linear and fail to take in to account the interconnection of the above listed variables, which requires taking a multidimensional view of the reality being confronted.

Conclusion

PoliTact has previously pointed out the key impediments in carrying out successful transformation in an organization. These according to a well known organizational transformational doctrine called the Blue Ocean strategy are; resources, cognitive, political and motivational. The authors of the strategy W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, claim the hardest challenge for a leader to bring about transformation is cognitive i.e., “…. to make people aware of the need for a strategic shift and to agree on its causes.”

While Pakistani public, intelligentsia, political and military leadership realizes the need and urgency for a strategic shift to tackle the multitude of challenges confronted by the country, they do not agree on the causes of the problems. As referenced above, without agreement on the causes and merely examining the attitudes of the people on extremism, is not going to assist in tackling the gradual radicalization of the Pakistani society and bring about a change.

This is where surveys conducted by Pew Research Center are most lacking, as they study the attitudes but not the causes behind the attitudes. On the other hand, as mentioned above, Pakistanis have focused most of their discussions on the causes of extremism.

PoliTact has highlighted the role of media in helping to build consensus and educating the masses on the causes of religious extremism in Pakistan, as majority of the political leadership lacks credibility in the public eye while the military leadership can often be myopic in its strategic outlook. We will continue to analyze the attitudes and perceptions of Pakistani pubic, leadership and institutions and examine not only the outcomes but also the possible causes for increasing religious extremism.

The post Perceptions of Pakistani Public, Media and Leadership on Extremism and its Causes – Analysis of the Pew Research Centers 2010 Survey on the Attitude of Pakistani Public on Extremism appeared first on Politact.