Context 

For many President Trump’s decision to move the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem came as a surprise. However, the changes in the political, economic and security landscape of the Middle East have been pointing in this direction for a number of years now. PoliTact had noted this trajectory in July 2015 as the emerging ‘Outside In Approach’ to the Middle East peace process and Kashmir. The variables influencing this move involve the dynamics associated with War against Extremism, Arab Spring, Iran-Saudi tussles, and the ongoing Syrian conflict.

The December 6th US declaration to transfer its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, under the influence of its America First Doctrine, has marked a new phase for the shift in the balance of power from the Core to the Peripheral Islamic world, a theory that has been discussed in detail in this space. It has reinforced the path that is bringing the peripheral Muslim nations represented by Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, closer. These states have harshly criticized the American move.

This may have been one of the reasons why Pakistan’s military and security assistance is now in jeopardy. President Trump had threatened to penalize those countries that opposed the American decision to recognize Jerusalem as the Israeli capital in the December 21st UN General Assembly vote. The US ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, had commented that Washington will not forget the countries which “disrespected” America by voting against its unilateral recognition.

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s ambassador to the UN, Lodhi, had stated that the American move was a serious violation of international law and had gravely dented the Middle East peace process. She went on to add the US should refrain from using undiplomatic and threatening moves to garner support for its decision. On the other hand, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan had warned before the US decision that Jerusalem is the red line for Muslims. He clarified that considering Jerusalem as belonging only to Israel will result in Turkey ending ties with Israel.

The Sunni Arab nations, with the focus on GCC, reflect the other side of the equation. These Arab nations are steadfastly holding on to the western powers whose support is critical for their survival. Media reports indicate that Saudi Arabia and Egypt may have privately consented to the American move.

The key question now is how the dramatic changes in the political dynamics of the Core Islamic world, represented by Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Yemen, Syria etc., will now impact the fate of the Peripheral. Our previous assessment had noted how the predicament Middle East finds itself in would impact South and Central Asia, including Afghanistan conflict. We are now entering a stage where that distinction will be harder to maintain, as it will represent one wide theater of operations, one on the West of Iran (South and Central Asia), and the other to the East (Middle East).

Analysis

Implications of the Jerusalem Decision

The Core versus Periphery theory also stipulated that under threat the Core Muslim nations, which carry exclusive religious significance, will likely reach out to the Peripheral nations for support and protection. This has now manifested in the form of Saudi Arabia seeking Pakistan’s assistance for the alliance formulated to counter Daesh. The former chief of Pakistan’s Army, General Raheel Sharif, now heads the Saudi led military alliance called Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC).

While the liberal global order is itself going through modification, Pakistan appears to be on a gradual slide out, and so is NATO member Turkey, while Iran departed a long time ago. Ironically, Saudi Arabia has reaffirmed it membership to the liberal order. But what does the America First Doctrine, mean for the Core versus Peripheral Muslim world theory? Following is a list of some key implications of the American decision to move its embassy to Jerusalem.

Countering the Ideological Narrative

With the recent US decision to move its embassy, and now deteriorating relations with Pakistan, the perception is taking hold that the US, and the War against Terror, is against Islam. Previous US administrations have gone to great length to avoid strategies that convey or strengthen the perception that War against Extremism is against Islam. On the other hand, the extremists have used this narrative to convert the war against extremism in to a religious war.

To recruit and motivate, extremists have claimed that Muslim governments for the most are not credible as they achieve power with Western support, are corrupt, and serve there interests at the cost of their citizens. This lack of credibility was what sparked the Arab Spring which resulted in the removal of many of the authoritarian rulers in the Middle East.

The Jerusalem decision will pose acute challenges in the way of countering the ideological narrative being used by the extremists. The extremist groups will utilize this against the role of UN and its failure to peacefully resolve long simmering Palestinian issue. While Daesh has been physically defeated in Iraq and Syria, reports indicate they are strengthening in Afghanistan, posing an emerging threat to the reconciliation efforts, and to the wider South and Central Asia region. Deash and Associates are also likely to exploit Muslim resentments related to Kashmir and Rohingya genocide. On the other hand, AQ in the India Subcontinent (AQIS) is making in roads in Kashmir. This scenario was explored in PoliTact’s April 2015 assessment: Can IS Jeopardize Afghan Peace Process and Pakistan India ties?

Decreasing Private Space for American Allies to Cooperate

As indicated above, the US relations are already under stress with other major Islamic nations, such as Turkey and Iran. Now worsening ties with Pakistan will further decrease American leverage in the Islamic world, which will be, and is being exploited by China and Russia. Thus the liberal order will be further weakened.

The Jerusalem decision will shrink the private space for Muslim nations and their civilian and military leadership, including Pakistan, to continue their cooperation with the US in the war against extremists. The loss of credibility is likely to trigger Arab Spring 2.0 in the Middle East, especially if the two-state solution is eroded any further. If the variance in the Public and Private stances of the Muslim leaders widens too much, naturally it will become untenable to the point where the narrative of the extremists will look more realistic.

In case of Pakistan, tensions are likely to mount. There is a difference of opinion between US and Pakistan on how to approach the Afghan peace process. At this juncture, US wants to pressure the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network with the assistance of Pakistan, before attempting the peace process.

On the other hand Pakistan thinks the military tactics and strategies have not worked up to this point, and thus it’s time to put more emphasis on reconciliation. Moreover, Russian, China, and Iran consider Afghan Taliban to be the bulwark against the spreading influence of groups like Daesh with global ambitions. The Jerusalem decision implies that America is not interested in negotiated settlement of long simmering conflicts, to include Afghanistan and Kashmir.

With the deteriorating US-Pakistan ties and sanctions, the American position is likely to be weakened. Especially when China is also attempting to pull Afghanistan in to its One Belt One Road economic vision. In this, the significance of Saudi Arabia will increase, and it will attempt to create divisions between the Peripheral nations, and to keep Pakistan from drifting too far from the liberal order.

The Role of Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is increasingly caught in a quandary. It needs the support of Peripheral nations, especially Pakistan, to counter the spreading forces of extremism. However, as pointed out earlier, these Peripheral nations are in the process of moving out of the liberal world order. This poses unique challenges for the Kingdom.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia is entangled in a bitter regional rivalry with another Peripheral nation, Shiite Iran. The Saudis are also not on the same page with Turkey when it comes to the matters of Palestine, Iran, Lebanon, Libya, and to some extent Syria. These reasons resulted in rupturing of its relations with Qatar. Furthermore, these factors have pushed Saudis closer to Israel and the US, and inadvertently to India, at the cost of its ties with Core and Peripheral Muslim nations.

Convergences and Risk Mitigation

While there are differences along the lines pointed to above, there are also areas where convergences exist and which can be exploited if there is a will. At the same time, if these common interests are not built upon they also pose serious risks. At this stage of the War against Extremism, if these threats are not mitigated, they can now cause interstate conflicts.

Now that the US has taken the decision on moving its embassy to Jerusalem, there is an urgency to understand the wider peace plan being envisioned by the Trump Administration and for preserving the two-state solution. Delaying the unveiling of this plan can cause extremists to exploit the circumstances, especially against the Muslim allies of the US. This will make it impossible for them to cooperate in the campaign against extremists.

There is consensus amongst all players that extremist groups with global ambitions, like AQ and Daesh, need to be countered. The disparity exists on the next level of non-state actors that are known as Associates of AQ and Daesh. The variance also persists when it comes to the third kind of non-state actors, such as Kurds that have nationalist aspirations.

No one wants the extremist groups with local ambitions to become fully integrated with groups with global agenda and transform into a much bigger and lethal threat. Dealing with the grievances of these associates with local aspirations can deliver the biggest blow to groups like AQ and Daesh. This remains the best strategy to win the war against extremists. Furthermore, the strategy has the capacity to bring the global powers, including the Core and the Peripheral Muslim nations, on the same page. However, this would have to be on a case by case basis. The first step remains to eliminate the reasons which motivate these groups.

The post Jerusalem Declaration And The Future Of US Islamic World Ties appeared first on Politact.

Context

From what one can gather, Jinnah supported Great Britain in both World Wars. This should not be interpreted as a reflection of his belief in colonial causes and interests. Rather, these positions reflected the meaning of these wars for him and for the future of the people he represented. Some historians and critics take a simplistic approach in evaluating Jinnah’s stance: he was helping the British in their time of need, but Jinnah positioned himself to gain some reciprocity and sympathy when the opportunity presented itself. Great Britain was the victorious power in both World Wars, and it always helps to side with wining party.

It also could be that Quaid-e-Azam believed more in Sir Syed’s vision refined after the Indian Rebellion of 1857; the British were not going away any time soon and salvation and success depended on learning from and working with them, mimicking the Hindus. Jinnah’s attitude was in stark contrast to that of Mowlana Azad, Mowdudi, Mohammad Ali and Showkat Ali, Ghaffar Khan, and other Pan-Islamists of the time. He was against the Khilafat Movement, which was formed to pressure the British against the breakup of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, and considered it a religious exaggeration. Gandhi, ironically, had supported this movement. Some Pan-Islamists later resisted the formation of Pakistan, as it would divide the Muslims of the subcontinent.

In the present nation-state context, Pakistan stance on the campaign against extremists presents resemblance to that of Jinnah’s position in dealing with the British. However, as the Middle East and North Africa increasingly get unsettled under the overlapping forces related to extremism, Arab Spring, and the tussles of the global players, Muslims of the subcontinent, are once again being required to form a response. The better they understand what is taking place in the present day Middle East, the more prepared they will be to not repeat the mistakes of the past.

Analysis

Afghan Jihad and Iranian Revolution

Pakistan itself seems to be passing through one of it toughest phases, with turmoil internally and in the neighborhood. Since the dismemberment of the country in 1971, the region has gone through four decades of continuous warfare. This has included the Iranian revolution of 1979, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq War of the 80s, the Afghan civil war of the 90s, and the present phase that began since 9/11.

Between the period of 1947 to 1971, Pakistan and Iran enjoyed very close ties. In both the 1965 and 1971 wars against India, Iran supported Pakistan diplomatically, militarily and financially. The country also offered military equipment, training and intelligence to Pakistan in suppressing the Baloch insurgency in the mid 70s.

Iran-Iraq War

The Khomeini led rebellion effectively transformed the nature of the pro-American regime. Only a year later, in 1980, Iran-Iraq war commenced and lasted until 1988, almost up to the time when Soviets started to withdraw from Afghanistan. During this phase, while Iran was moving out of the American influence, Pakistan was getting fully embedded in to it. The nation helped facilitate the Jihad against the Soviets with assistance of the Arabs and the US. The role of Pakistan in the Iran-Iraq war, however, was premised on maintaining a delicate balance.

Pakistan went out of its way in helping protect the Gulf States, and according to some estimates, Zia-ul-Haq placed close to 40,000 military personnel in Saudi Arabia for security and training purposes. This, however, did not occur at the cost of Iran. Reportedly, Pakistan also supplied weapons to Iran, and both neighbors supported the Afghan Jihad, albeit different factions. The global powers were applying a similar strategy; while Russians were intermittently supplying weapons to Iraq, the Iran-Contra affair illustrated that US was also equipping the Iranians.

While Saddam’s decision to invade Iran in 1980 is believed to be a miscalculation, he feared that a strong religiously oriented Iran would disturb the Shia-Sunni balance of Iraq. Saddam repeated his misjudgment when he invaded Kuwait in August 1990, but was met with a different western response. Ever since Iraq has come under American led intervention twice, and despite all past attempts to contain Iran, its sway has grown. In the end, it was the western intervention that disturbed the ethnic balance of Iraq.

Emerging Dynamics

The rather simultaneous events of the Iranian revolution in 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Iran-Iraq war of the 80s, altered the dynamics of Middle East. Western policies during this time frame were primarily meant to prevent South Asia and Middle East to fall under the complete Russian influence.

The present situation of Syria and the American turnabout there, followed by the budding détente between the West and Iran, has placed the region at the precipice of another historic transformation. The Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia, are now deeply worried about western intentions related to the Arab Spring and the campaign against extremists. While they were happy at the removal of rogues like Saddam and Qaddafi, the way Mubarak was shown the door, deeply troubled the Saudis. Speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on Feb 19, Deputy Secretary of State William Burns laid out these worries in the following words:

“The reality is that in our conversations with our Gulf partners, we don’t always see eye-to-eye on what has caused the revolutions and transitions spurred by the second Arab Awakening. We don’t always see eye-to-eye on the direction these transitions should take. And we don’t always see eye-to-eye on how best to respond to them.”

The Saudis in particular are now convinced that it cannot sit ideally by as everything else around them changes at an alarming pace. Meanwhile, recent reports indicate that Pakistan has changed its posture on Syria in the aftermath of recent high-level exchanges between the military and political leadership of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. However, what does this change signify?

In the past, Pakistan’s ties with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have been defined mostly by the policies of the global powers, especially the West and the US. As the American support moved away from Iran in the 80s, so did Pakistan’s direction. The question now becomes, as the West’s détente with Iran progresses, will it translate in to a similar switch for Pakistan, away from the Arabs and closer to Iran. The present atmosphere presents several challenges in this regard.

Because of the war against terror and card blanche support for Israeli policies in the past, the US and the West have suffered considerable loss of popular support in the Islamic regions. This has produced two obvious consequences: on the one hand major Muslim nations have started to diversify their ties with the emerging powers of BRICS. On the other hand, negative western perceptions have allowed Russia and China space to make inroads. For example, Russia is attempting to reestablish defense ties with its former allies Iraq and Egypt. In case of Pakistan, worries related to Afghanistan, volatile situation of FATA and Baluchistan, and US-India strategic ties, have convinced Pakistan to tie the strategic knot with China.

While Turkey remained independent when it came to matters of Iraq in the past, this stance has been difficult to maintain over the affairs of Syria. Like the Gulf nations, Turkey also wants Assad removed, but at the same time, it has maintained and expanded economic ties with Iran, unlike Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, Turkey has supported Mursi and Palestinian Hamas, in stark contrast to Saudi policies and in support of Iranian posture. While Turkey is a NATO member, it has also been opening up to Chinese and Russian dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

The potential change in Pakistan’s position over Syria places it at odds with the non-intervention stance of China and Russia. Moreover, it creates friction with Iran, whose assistance will be needed for the full materialization of Pakistan’s regional vision. In effect, by recruiting Pakistan, Saudi Arabia is building pressure on the US for the removal of Assad, who is backed by Iran and Russia, whether it requires diplomatic or military means. While India had also maintained a non-intervention position previously, it had to revert in consideration of its strategic ties with Israel and the US, and growing economic interests in the Gulf region.

Moving forward, and in historical perspective, three strategic priorities of the West need to be considered and evaluated.

• Is it more important for the West to contain Iran’s nuclear program, or to remove Assad? The Syrian leader has already agreed to eliminate the chemical weapons under a Russian engineered agreement.
• Moreover, to achieve Israeli-Palestinian peace, whose role is more important: Iran or Saudi Arabia? It’s Iran that has sway over Syria, Hezbollah and increasingly Hamas.
• Furthermore, while China and Russia have ties with both the Sunni and Shia regimes; the West has greatly undermined its maneuverability by not having relations with Iran.

What to do?

Pakistan’s response to the changing Middle East is the regional cooperation with India, Afghanistan, Iran, China, and Central Asia. However its economic dependence means it would have to once again play a balancing act. The challenge being if the security and viability of Saudi Arabia, and GCC, is indeed threatened by forces linked to AQ, Arab Spring, or Iran, will it be able to maintain its neutrality.

As a result of risks being faced by the Core Arab Islamic region, these nations will seek the assistance of periphery. The same can also be said of the West, which is attempting to build strategic ties with Indonesia and India, as part of the pivot to the Pacific. There is continuity in the western policy of both propping Iran’s influence, and at the same time, preventing it from becoming a dominant power in the Middle East. In Afghanistan, this has translated in to checking any single player from overshadowing, whether that is Iran or Pakistan. And, lately Indian influence has been introduced as a balancing factor.

However, its best for the periphery to serve as a bridge to develop understanding between the differing stakeholders, Iran and Saudi Arabia, as oppose to serve a military wing for one or the other power. The past experience in this regard has proven to be devastating.

So, if the security risks envisioned by the Saudis do come true, will Pakistan once again follow the precedence set by Jinnah, is too early to say. As far as Turkey is concerned, it is very careful not to make the mistake of choosing the wrong side as it did in World War I, or get caught in a wedge between Iran and Saud Arabia. This is also a good lesson for Pakistan, irrespective of its economic pressures; it should join hands with the Turks in preventing the Shia-Sunni proxy war from engulfing the entire region.

Looking back, 1979 proved to be a watershed year; with the insertion of religion in both the Iranian revolution and Afghan jihad, secularism took a back seat. To this date, the two events have transformed and divided the politics of the region, and also resulted in the birth of Al Qaeda that now plaques pretty much the entire Islamic world. Sunni and Shia extremist forces now bedevil the whole landscape. While Hezbollah enjoys the support of Iran, since 9/11, AQ is a disowned child but the same cannot be said about some of its affiliates. In places like Syria, the finale of the phenomena appears to be a confrontation between Hezbollah and the AQ linked extremists. The regions concerned need to first of all prepare to prevent this, and secondly, to deal with its consequences if they are unable to avert it.

The post Tackling The Emerging Middle East; Managing Saudi And Irani Influences appeared first on Politact.

Context

As the US withdrawal from Afghanistan slated for late 2014 approaches, the politics of South and Central Asia is entering a particularly peculiar stage. Aside from the recent incidents on the Line of Control (LoC), matters appeared to be lining up as it relates to traditionally tense Pakistan-India ties. Until the full release of Pakistan’s new doctrine, there will remain ambiguity about the thrust of its new threat perception. On the surface, it seems like the consistent and exhaustive US lobbying has ultimately produced dividends, with the country changing its focus from external to internal enemies. Admiral Mullen will be happy to learn that his numerous late night discussions with General Kayani were not all in vain.

With the Afghan reconciliation picking the pace, Pakistan also appears to have dropped the good and bad Taliban classification. Evidently, the elimination of Mullah Nazir in a recent drone strike was an outcome of this shift. It is too early to tell how this tectonic change and the reaction to it will manifest across the country. Nonetheless, even if Pakistan’s ties with Afghanistan, India, and the US stabilize, the conflict over Iran can undo these gains.

Analysis

Security and Economics

As Pakistan implements its new security doctrine, the incidents over the disputed LoC are already demonstrating how challenging the ground reality is. It is mainly because in today’s interconnected world matters are neither fully a consequence of external circumstances nor wholly internal. They lie somewhere in the middle. Philosophically put, any given entity has its internal set of properties, but these characteristics are usually shaped by constant interaction with the surrounding environment.

Pakistan’s challenges are multifaceted; not only has the balance between the internal good and bad elements changed, there is no shortage of external threats either.

The shift in Pakistan’s threat perception is probably based on a close examination of the interplay of political, economic and security interests. For example, in the case of India, the argument is that the economic benefits of normalized ties can help overcome the contentious issues between the two, and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a proxy battleground. In the larger framework, Pakistan can help India look West for the energy resources, and in turn, it can be a bridge for Pakistan’s Look-East policy. Reportedly, it was the Indian pressure that caused the postponement of President Putin’s visit to Pakistan in October 2012. As Pakistan-India ties improve, it would be easier for Russia to move closer to Pakistan.

The model in this regard can be the India-China ties. While the two countries are competitors geopolitically, by 2015, trade between India and China is expected to hit $100 billion. On the other hand, the trade volume between US and India is estimated to reach $150 billion during the same time frame.

Can India-Pakistan Cooperate and Compete?

So, can Pakistan and India compete and cooperate like the other players. The answer depends on a few other variables. For instance, the interconnection of ties between Pakistan, US, and China, including the interplay of relations between China, US and Russia on matters like Iran and Syria.

To cooperate, India and Pakistan will have to look at the region from an entirely different lens. Even if Pakistan normalizes its ties with India and Afghanistan stabilizes, the situation of Iran can spill over and spoil the regional economic and security gains. Moreover, if the balance starts to tilt more towards competition, as opposed to cooperation in the US-China relations, as is expected from the American pivot towards the Pacific, Pakistan-India ties will be impacted as well. Pakistan is already under considerable American pressure on its improving ties with Iran, especially as it relates to Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline project.

The Balancing Act and Regionalism

If tension over Iran’s nuclear program escalates further, Pakistan and India will be both caught balancing their economic, political and security ties between the Gulf States and NATO, on the one hand, and China and Russia on the other. To some extent, this is already occurring. There is a great deal of similarity between the stances both have adopted on the recent crises in the Middle East, ie non-intervention and safeguarding the sovereignty and integrity of the states involved. With the exceptional case of Syria, Turkey’s position has also been close to Pakistan and India.

If we consider the economic computations, it is not going to be an easy task for these states.

According to public sources, in the fiscal year 2012-13, Pakistan’s remittances from the Gulf region are expected to reach $10 billion, which constitute about 61% of its total remittances. Its remittances from Saudi Arabia alone stood at $3.68 billion during 2011-12. Based on an interview that Pakistan’s ambassador to UAE Jamil Ahmed Khan gave to Khaleej Times in 2011, the volume of Pakistan’s trade with GCC is expected to increase from $59 billion to $350 billion by the year 2020. However, trade volume between Pakistan and Iran is presently quite low and is estimated to reach $5 billion by 2015. This obviously will change if IP project is factored in.

On the other hand, before the imposition of sanctions, India’s trade with Iran was projected to reach $30 billion, while its business with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is expected to hit $150 billion in 2012-13. In the case of Turkey, in the next five years, its economic dealings with Iran are estimated to approach $30 billion despite US sanctions, and its trade with the Arab world will be around $130 billion.

In addition to the energy corridors, these states have also attempted to build infrastructure links with each other, but due to American, Arab and Israeli concern over Iran’s nuclear program, they have had limited success.

In November 2009, Pakistan and Turkey signed the Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA). At that time, the trial operation of a freight train service had also commenced, connecting Pakistan and Turkey via Iran. The train service is 6,506 kilometers long, 1,900 km of which passes through Pakistan, 2,570 km through Iran, and 2,036 km through Turkey. At an event held at the Washington-based Atlantic Council on January 9th, former Afghan ambassador to US Said Jawad commented that in addition to the energy network, Afghanistan also desires to link-up with the widening train network. He conveyed concern about the risk associated with Afghanistan’s southern access points through Iran and Pakistan. To counter this, the country is working to improve its access and integration to the north with the Central Asian republics.

Conclusion

Pakistan, India, and Turkey thus have a key diplomatic role to play in preventing Iranian tensions to escalate any further, which can jeopardize their attempts to delicately juggle the political, security and economic interests. With Europe and North America in recession, any disability in the Gulf region will have a negative impact on the growth trajectory of India and Turkey. More than economics, for Pakistan, the consequences will be felt in terms of ethnic strife, which is already spreading throughout the country.

In this context, with Pakistan’s surroundings in turmoil, it will be extremely difficult to stabilize the country internally. The situation of Middle East is another example of this point. The Arab Spring now has spread to many other countries, and even the stable and rich Gulf States are worried about the future of the phenomena.

Moreover, the Iran crisis will put to test the mantra that economic dealings and interdependence can over time resolve political conflicts. If Iran crisis worsens, the message for the region will be: avoid economic dealings before resolving security concerns and political conflicts.

(Note: A version of this article also appeared in The Friday Times)

The post The Correlation Between Pakistan’s Threat Perception And Regional Economics appeared first on Politact.

Context
According to statements from Pakistan’s top leadership, the country remains fully intent on proceeding with the IP gas pipeline project despite US apprehensions. On the other hand, President Ahmadinejad presented his commitment towards the project when he visited Pakistan to attend the D8 Summit in November 2012. Meanwhile, President Zardari’s trip to Iran scheduled for December 7th got postponed at the last minute. The purpose of his tour was to finalize the details and financing of the Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline project and to discuss the Afghan reconciliation.

Immediately following Ahmadinejad’s visit, a delegation of Iran’s parliamentary committee on national security and foreign policy, headed by Alaeddin Borojourdi, visited Pakistan on December 3rd. He held talks with the Chairman of Pakistan’s Senate Committee on Defense and Defense Production, Mushahid Hussain Syed. Mushahid had stated at the time that Iran and Pakistan have common views and concerns on the Afghan reconciliation,

“It is imperative that Pakistan and Iran work closely in the wake of the US pullout from Afghanistan by 2014”. According to media reports, during the meeting decision was made to increase cooperation and coordination between the defense ministries of the two countries.

Mushahid also offered support to Iran by stating that Pakistan rejects double standard on Iranian nuclear program, and that the issue should be resolved peacefully and without threats of force or intervention. Soon afterwards, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud-Al Faisal invited Hina Rabbani Khar to visit the Kingdom. The above developments must have raised alarm bells in Riyadh especially now that Pakistan takes on the rotating presidency of the UN Security Council.

According to reports, Khar’s two-day visit to the Kingdom that started on January 1st was meant to strengthen the strategic relations between the two countries. During her visit, in addition to the Saudi Foreign Minister, Khar also met Crown Prince and Minister of Defense Salman bin Abdul Aziz.

Talking to Arab News after her meetings, Khar commented the talks “focused mainly on the roadmap and on a range of bilateral and regional issues including Syria and Afghanistan.” She went on to add, “I have intensive discussions on the roadmap that will set out a new vision of relationship between the two (Pakistan and Saudi Arabia) countries.”

Clearly, Khar’s visit was meant to smoothen Saudi anxieties towards improving Pakistan-Iran relations and bringing the Kingdom on board on the evolving Afghan reconciliation. Little was said about the substance of the new road map inferred to by Foreign Minister Khar. However, so far as Middle East remains in flux, managing Iranian, Turkish and Saudi anxieties regarding Pakistan’s new regional vision, will be an on-going and a delicate process.

The post FM Khar Presents New Road Map For Ties With Saudi Arabia appeared first on Politact.

Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi stated that the Syrian conflict could only be resolved through serious talks between the opposition and the government. Moreover, Salehi warned of catastrophic consequences if Assad fell from power.

Delegations from 28 nations participated in the meeting. Among others, the countries in attendance included Russia, China, Iraq, Pakistan, Jordan, and India. These states, like Iran, have neither backed the Syrian opposition nor have demanded Assad to resign.

During the meeting, Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar explained why Pakistan had abstained in the recent UN Security Council vote on Syria. She emphasized that principles of territorial integrity and national sovereignty should by respected in dealing with the Syrian crisis, as it will set a precedent for dealing with future conflicts. Pakistan has used the same argument in opposing drone strikes conducted by US in FATA. Additionally, she reiterated the need for finding a mutually acceptable solution to end the impending crisis, which poses serious implications for the entire Ummah.

Meanwhile, US Secretary of State visited Turkey to speed up preparations for dealing with the Syrian challenge, and the possible use of chemical weapons by it. UK and US both have increased aid to the Syrian opposition

The post Iran Builds Support Against Regime Change In Syria Prior To OIC Meeting appeared first on Politact.

Context

Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal made a surprising and alarming announcement last week. He declared that King Abdullah has called for an emergency session of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in Mecca on August 14-15. Reportedly, the purpose of the meeting is to discuss critical issues facing the Islamic world.

King Abdullah has summoned “an extraordinary Islamic solidarity meeting to ensure… unity during this delicate time as the Muslim world faces dangers of fragmentation and sedition,” Prince Faisal was quoted as saying by the Saudi Press Agency.

Given the precarious situation of the Middle East, it certainly is a significant development. However, the news was not picked up and widely reported by the international media. The question firstly is why was the conference summoned at this juncture, around the 27th of Ramadan, and secondly why was the news not considered important.

Analysis

The 2005 Special Session

This is only the fourth emergency meeting of OIC since its inception in 1969. The previous special summit was held in 2005 and was presented as a turning point in Islamic history. Its main thrust was to examine and promote the compatibility of Islam in modern times. It advocated political participation, equality and social justice for the masses of the Islamic world and called for studying the political, economic, cultural and scientific challenges.

In preparation for the 2005 session, three panels were formulated. One of them studied the political and media issues, the other one looked at the economic, scientific and technological hurdles, while the third one reviewed the Islamic culture, thought, and tradition. The panelists provided their astonishing findings in a report.

The group on political and media issues noted that the Islamic concept of good governance is “compatible with democracy, equality, freedom, social justice, transparency, accountability, anti-corruption and the respect for human rights”. The panel on Islamic culture was highly critical of people who have been passing irresponsible fatwas but are not qualified to do so.

Clearly, the panelist failed to see the distinction between theory and practice, or ‘Qol’ and ‘Fayl’. Moreover, the issue has never been about the compatibility of Islam. The astute and seasoned Saudi royal family, and other leaders that attended, clearly understood what was amiss; it’s the will that seems to be absent. In a couple of years after the 2005 summit, the lack of values such as equality, freedom, social justice, and human rights triggered the revolt on the Arab street.

Agenda For The 4th Emergency Session

The upcoming 4th emergency meeting of OIC is likely to be another exercise in rhetoric. Talking to Saudi newspaper Okaz, President Zardari, who will be attending the special session, commented, “We hope the emergency summit will not only identify most critical issues facing the Ummah but also suggest practical ways to address them.”

However, there are many issues that can be considered a priority. According to Arab media, OIC’s Secretary-General, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, met with Egyptian President Muhammad Mursi in Cairo on July 21st and discussed the agenda for Mecca Summit. Although not much was disclosed, it must have a lot to do with Syria, Iran and the escalating Shia-Sunni tensions.

An invitation has been extended to Iran to attend the summit, which it has accepted. Although, the country made clear that it wants Bahrain high on the list. The spokesman for the nations foreign ministry had recently commented, “We will welcome any meeting that brings together Muslim countries and will actively participate in it. But the crises are obvious, and it is also clear which countries are taking interventionist measures. If such a meeting is supposed to be held, resolving the issue of Bahrain” should be on the top of the agenda.

The Saudis and the Qataris are both playing with fire by supplying weapons to rebels in Syria with Turkish assistance and western backing. There is a great deal of worry that the tensions over Syria will escalate into a regional conflict, with NATO and GCC countries on the one side and Iran, Syria, Russia and China on the other. This has created an unprecedented situation where Muslim countries, including Pakistan, and others such as India, are being hard pressed to side with one or the other grouping. The emergency session will likely attempt to create unanimity of views on Iran.

The Timing Of The Summit

The emergency session is taking place when the Arab Spring has spread to many countries. Although other than Bahrain, the revolt has so far spared the Gulf countries. Nonetheless, the small riots have continued on and off in eastern Saudi Arabia, in the Shia-populated areas. Moreover, the activities of Al Qaeda in Yemen and Horn of Africa are progressively more alarming.

This situation in the Arab world is not without precedent. Studying the causes of the fall of Ottoman Empire, historian Paul Kennedy reflected on the Shia-Sunni dynamics in his book The Rise and Fall of the Great Empires,

“However, across the border, the Shia kingdom of Persia under Abbas the Great was quite prepared to ally with European states against the Ottomans, just as France had worked with the ‘infidel’ Turks against the Holy Roman Empire” (p.10).

It seems the opposite is occurring now, where the Sunni’s are prepared to ally with West to handle the Iranian threat. Fearing each other, Shias and Sunnis adopted extreme measures that proved detrimental in the long run. For example, Paul Kennedy goes on to write, “To a distinct degree, the fierce response to the Shia religious challenges reflected and anticipated a hardening of official attitudes towards all forms of free thought. The printing press was forbidden because it might disseminate dangerous opinions” (p. 12).

Nonetheless, the present threatening outlook for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries is probably the reason behind the call for the emergency session.

Speaking at the December GCC Summit, King Abdullah while proposing a Gulf union had commented: “History and experience have taught us not to stop and watch the status quo as whoever follows such a behavior will find himself at the end of the queue facing loss and weakness….”

Unfortunately, preserving the status quo is exactly what the special session may strive for. And, in this sense, it hardly represents a break from the past.

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Context

During the World Wars the region of South Asia, especially modern day India and Pakistan, were responding in their own peculiar way to the changes that were shaping the Middle East, such as the break-up of Ottoman Empire. The responses were taking the form of Deobandism and Khilafat Movement etc. The purpose here is not to go in the detail of what each one of these movements represented. More importantly, the intent here is to present how the Muslim states of the periphery, including the emerging and established global powers, are responding to the present day transformation underway in nations that embody the Islamic core.

Analysis

Islamic Spheres And Arab Spring

The classification of the Islamic core and periphery helps in understanding the different characteristics of these regions. For example, the core is dominated primarily by the Arab speaking countries, while the peripheries includes the Turks, Persian, and other nations of South Asia and the Asia Pacific. The more traditional and literalist interpretations of the Islamic teachings have emerged from the core, while the contemporary understanding of Islam originated in the peripheries and have Turkish and Iranian roots. Additionally, autocratic rulers have mostly dominated the Islamic core while the peripheries have had a more mixed result and evolution.

While the West has shifted its support over the years from one school of thought to the other based on its needs, 9/11 changed it decisively against the traditionalists. However, the Afghan and Iraq wars, and the arrival of Arab Spring, have complicated the ground reality of the Arab world as well as the peripheries. Moreover, the West was forced to abandon its support of dictators that had become a symbol of the status quo.

As the Arab world passes through this transformation, the transition process in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt have thus far presented mixed results. On the one hand, as the scope and reach of the war against extremists has spread, Islamists have gained grounds. On the other hand, the Arab awakening has crept inward towards the core, and it has turned bloodier in states like Syria, Yemen and Bahrain. Customarily, it’s the developments of Egypt that have profound ideological influence on the rest of the Islamic world and the changes there are being closely watched.

This sea change that continues to unfold in the Islamic core, has implications for the emerging and establishing powers, and the Islamic peripheries, and they are all in a bind to adjust to these fast moving events of the region.

The Islamic Spheres And Emerging, Established Powers

Whatever the causes, the established players are attempting to temper the change and prevent the extreme Islamists from gaining influence in the Islamic core and the periphery. On the other hand, the emerging nations of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, China, India, and South Africa) are striving to ensure their interests in the energy rich states of the Islamic core and the peripheries vis-à-vis the West.

The interplay of the above dynamics has resulted in hardening the position of Russian and China on what these uprisings have come to represent. While these powers, including India, had abstained on the vote of imposing a no-fly zone in Libya. Russia in particular regretted it and subsequently opined that the resolution was used by the West as a pretext for military intervention, regime change, and in gaining security, economic and political gains.

This has further complicated the situation in Syria that can now be termed as a proxy war. The rebels are being supplied by Western powers using Qatar and Saudi Arabia as intermediaries while Russia continues to back the Assad regime. Now, the Syrians have finally employed the support of Kurds on its side of the border, to be used against Turkey, from where most of the interference in Syria is believed to be occurring. The shape of emerging alliances is represented by NATO, Turkey and GCC countries on the one side, while Russia, China, Iran and Syria on the other. This is somewhat similar to how during World War I and II, Muslim regions and colonies were either allying with the Central or the Etente, and the Axis or the Allied powers respectively.

The Dynamics Of Islamic Core Vs. Periphery

Now the question is, what do these changes in the Islamic core mean for the periphery states?
 As the core countries of the GCC ally with NATO and Turkey, the periphery countries are under pressure to select one or the other grouping.

In the emerging alliances, however, the Gulf countries have the most precarious position, as they are dependent on the West and the peripheral powers for their defense and security needs. On the other hand, the peripheral powers of Turkey and Iran are not dependent in a similar fashion. Moreover, the Gulf countries have a credibility issue that Turkey and Iran do not have, when it comes to their affairs with Israel.

With Turkey putting itself squarely in the middle of the Syrian crisis by supporting the rebels there, some in the country are questioning if Turkey has unnecessarily placed itself in the cross winds of the brewing storm. Perhaps it wants to position itself correctly this time, and to undo the loss it suffered when the Ottoman Empire went under.

This unprecedented situation in the Islamic core has also put peripheral power of Pakistan under pressure to decide one or the other grouping. This was amply visible in the recent vote in the UN Security Council on Syria that was vetoed by Russia and China for the third time, while Pakistan and South Africa abstained. On the other hand, India, including 11 other nations, voted in favor of the resolution that threatened tougher sanctions against Assad regime. India appears to be leaning more and more towards the NATO, GCC, and Turkey alliance.

The call from Saudi Arabia last week for the 4th emergency meeting of the OIC in August can be better understood under this context. It’s a panic call from the GCC countries for support from the periphery, as they fear the Syrian crisis is about to spill over.

The post The Evolving Dynamics Of Islamic Spheres Of Influence appeared first on Politact.

Context

Tit-for-tat events have started to unfold in Pak-US relations, and if they are allowed to escalate unchecked, both nations will end up on the losing side. Since the Chicago stalemate, the US has restarted drone strikes and has curtailed Pakistan’s aid while the country has persisted in blocking NATO’s Afghan supply lines.

At this juncture, third party intervention may be needed to salvage the relation. Many think Turkey may be one of those countries that not only can play a role but also serve as an example. This analysis looks at how Turkey is dealing with key challenges it faces in its relations with the West.

Analysis

According to media reports, Pakistan’s invitation to the NATO summit came at the behest of Turkey. While the meetings were going on in Chicago, PM Erdogan was in Pakistan meeting with the nation’s civilian leadership. Several reasons have been mentioned for his visit at this critical time.

Firstly, PM Gilani wanted to demonstrate that despite the contempt ruling against him, foreign leaders do not consider the matter serious enough to not visit the country, or meet with him. Secondly, his visit showed that like Turkey, Pakistan aspires to democratic principles and civilian control of military. Thirdly, news in the media indicated Erdogan’s mission included friendly advice on the role of opposition in a democratic system.

Turkish Demand For Israeli Apology

However, the visit also had not so positive symbolism associated with it. For example, the Turkish demand of an Israeli apology for the May 2010 peace flotilla incident is similar to Pakistan’s insistence on US admission of guilt for the Salala tragedy.

Consider the Turkish actions vis-à-vis Israel for not rendering an apology. According to Turkish media sources, the country prevented Israel from attending the NATO summit in Chicago, despite pressure from US and other European powers.

Additionally, Turkey has vetoed Israeli attempts to deepen its relations with NATO and to open an office in Brussels. Turkey’s foreign minister had earlier stated, “The army of a country which you call a partner killed our citizens upon a political order given by its administration. We do not call this kind of country a partner.”

American Drones And Turkey

On the other hand, there is also something to be learned from US-Turkey ties. The potential deal on drones between the two countries presents an interesting model for the resolution of drone issue between US and Pakistan i.e. if the trust deficit can be tackled.

The Turkish President Abdullah Gul met President Obama on the sidelines of the Chicago summit to discuss the supply of armed drones, which Turkey has wanted to fight Kurdish rebels. The US administration is trying to convince Congress to allow the sale of these drones to Turkey. One would think that with Turkey allowing the placement of radars for the NATO missiles defense system on its ground, at the expense of alienating Iran and Russia, this matter would have been a no brainer. Turkey’s policy on Syria, and earlier in case of Libya, is also closely aligned with NATO. However, Congress is likely to oppose the move due to Turkey’s tense relations with Israel.

The issue has been complicated by a recent article in The Wall Street Journal. The article revealed that American drones provided the original intelligence to Turkey that subsequently led to the death of 34 Kurdish smugglers. These smugglers were mistaken as the insurgents belonging to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The incident has caused an intense debate inside Turkey about the level of American involvement in Ankara’s fight against PKK.

US drones have supported Turkish military efforts since 2007, the time when the US established a Combined Intelligence Fusion Cell to jointly monitor live drone feeds. The cooperation was stepped up over the last year as US moved a squadron of Predators from a base in Iraq to Turkey’s Incirlik airbase.

Turkey And European Union

Aside from friction with Israel and matters of trust, Turkey also has a tense relation with France. While Turkey and France have an important and lucrative trading relationship, estimated to be in the region of $14 billion, it has not been smooth sailing all along for the two nations. The latest souring of ties with regards to the Armenian genocide bill is a dramatic shift, but one which was not without predecessor. Warning signs of a difficult time between the two countries first emerged from French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s strong objection to Turkey entering the European Union (EU), and building strong bonds with two nations with which Turkey is in conflict: Cyprus and Armenia.

Sarkozy’s opposition to the Turkish bid for EU membership is thought to stem from the fear that Turkey’s entry into the organization would weaken French influence. There is also the question over how the largely Muslim country would fit into the EU, especially given the rise in Islamaphobia that has been seen in the last few years in many EU countries, not the least France.

Turkey is at somewhat of a crossroads, and while it is not as simple as choosing to look to the Middle East or the EU, the prospects in the Middle East (despite the turmoil) are perhaps better for Turkey to take advantage of.

It is with this realistic context that one needs to view the Turkish role and experience.
Even after being a staunch NATO ally, Turkey is still struggling to be accepted and trusted by the West. This does not present a remarkably optimistic picture for Pakistan at this point. And, at the same time, it raises serious questions for the West to ponder over.

The post The Symbolism Behind PM Erdogan’s Visit To Pakistan appeared first on Politact.

Context
Most conflicts arise from differences of perspectives as to how to view the world, which spring from historical contexts and interests, which in turn also frames threat perceptions. Power enables an international actor to impose its will and perspective on other actors, via coercion, the exercise of influence, diplomacy, or any combination of these. Power, of course, does not remain constant and most often it is assumed that there is a zero-sum dynamics involved. That is to say, one actor’s gain is another’s loss.  Historically, during periods of shifts in power dynamics, tremendous upheavals have taken place; such areas are the settings of potential future threats. Such disruptions of the balance of power are usually settled decisively by wars. For example, the present system of governance came out of World War II: the United States became the preeminent world power, succeeding Great Britain and the victorious powers subsequently established the United Nations and the Security Council, with its five permanent veto-holding members.

At present, we are now witnessing the emergence of new centers of power, located in various spheres of influence: for example, the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China). This has led to disturbances to the existing balance of power, resulting in realignments to counter budding threats in today’s global and interconnected world.

Analysis

The Middle East is currently witnessing a rapid power shift. The creation of the state of Israel and the unresolved issues of Palestine and the status of Jerusalem dating to the post-World War II era have remained burning issues, with huge repercussions spanning the Muslim world. Numerous Islamic movements and revivalist groups were energized by the Palestinian hardships and loss of Al Aqsa Mosque and Dome of the Rock, including the forefathers of AQ in Egypt.

The United States has long been the chief protector of the oil-rich sheikdoms of the Arab world, as well, of course, of the state of Israel. Saudi Arabia, on whose soil stands the holiest of holy places of Islam, is governed by a monarchy, which is not a system of government prescribed by Islam. The sheikdoms of the Middle East have been vehement on the Palestinian issue, which has given them substantial credibility in the Islamic world, but on a practical level, their dependence on the U.S. meant they could hardly do anything meaningful vis-a–is Israel’s policies regarding the Muslims of Palestine.

Historically, Saudi Arabia and even Saddam Hussein have provided substantial financial support to the Palestinian people’s jihad against Israel. After 911, Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian Authority splintered, resulting in the emergence of the Fatah and Hamas groups.  The pro-Western Arab countries reacted by supporting the moderate Fatah group, located on the West Bank, while Iran sponsored the Hamas, headquartered in Gaza, which favors military action. Egypt’s recent support has been critical to Israel’s attempts to block the border to Gaza and reduce support for Hamas. Furthermore, in 2006, Iran and Syria supported Hezbollah’s successful efforts to stand up to the might of Israel; many in the Muslim world applauded what they perceived as Hezbollah’s ability to humiliate Israel via small rocket showers.

Thus, the influence of Shiite Iran has increased incrementally at the expense of Sunni Saudi Arabia and its allies in the Middle East and South Asia. There has been a subtle shift in the Islamic public opinion regarding who genuinely stands up for its interests.  Iran’s unwavering support of the militant Shiite Hezbollah and Sunni Hamas in the face of Israeli and American opposition has only increased the favorable images of Iran and the Shiite sect of Islam, while making pro-West Arab countries appear impotent. This was further illustrated in Iraq, where the United States had to rely on Iran to reduce tensions, at the cost of increasing Shiite influence in Iraq, which had been historically ruled by Sunnis, even though they are a minority.  Another tension point is Lebanon, where Iran- and Syrian-supported Shiite groups (the Hezbollah) are far more influential then Saudi-sponsored Sunni groups.

Largely as a result of Israel’s harsh policies in Gaza and America’s Global War on Terror (GWOT), the military approach to the Palestinian issue gained ground and pro-Western Arab governments supporting negotiated settlement of the Palestinian conflict lost credibility among the Muslim public. Reacting to this situation, Prince Turki al-Faisal recently wrote in The Financial Times on January 22nd:

“So far, the Kingdom has resisted these calls, but every day this restraint becomes more difficult to maintain. When Israelis deliberately kill Palestinians, appropriate their lands, destroys their homes, uproot their farms and impose an inhumane blockade of them; and as the world laments once again the sufferings of the Palestinians, people of conscience from every corner of the world are clamoring for action. Eventually, the Kingdom will not be able to prevent its citizens from joining the worldwide revolt against Israel. Today, every Saudi is a Gazan, and we remember well the words of our late King Faisal:

“‘I hope you will forgive my outpouring of emotions, but when I think that our Holy Mosque in Jerusalem is being invaded and desecrated, I ask God that if I am unable to undertake the Holy Jihad, then I should not live a moment more.’ ”

These public pressures on – and historical rivalries between – Turks, Arabs and Persians have also exacerbated Turkey’s dilemma. Turkey’s Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, recently walked out of a panel discussion held in Davos, Switzerland. He also severely criticized Israeli President Shimon Peres for killing innocent people and children in Gaza. Turkey’s relationship is currently improving with Iran while deteriorating with Europe; some experts call this a symptom of Neo-Ottomanism.

With respect to Afghanistan, the U.S. need Iran’s help to pacify that country, just as in Iraq. In Afghanistan, the conflict is between the Sunni AQ, aided by the Taliban and the pro-Western Sunni Pakistani and Saudi governments allied to the U.S.

In Afghanistan, as in the Middle East, the Sunni Saudi government stands to lose if Iran’s sphere of influence grows. This prospect of the shift in the historic balance of power from Sunnis to Shiites is causing increasing concern to Sunni countries. This is part of the threat perception that is currently shaping the thinking of the establishment in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Pakistan has a double whammy to worry about: India, its traditional rival, is flirting with U.S., Pakistan’s ally. If U.S./Iran relations improve as a result of efforts to resolve the situation in Afghanistan, Sunni and Saudi influence may diminish even further.

This context explains why the Saudis have switched to fast mode in Afghanistan and Pakistan, using its influence with the Sunni groups and political parties who are open to negotiation. This is a challenge, for two reasons. The first is that these groups have long subscribed to the very different ideology propagated by the U.S., Pakistan and Saudi Arabia itself during the time of the Soviet Jihad. The second is that Iran is gaining new spheres of influence by adopting a militant policy and supporting clans hostile to the U.S., regardless of what Islamic sect they belong to.  The latter factor explains why AQ and other affiliated Sunni groups, (for example, the Taliban), are gaining ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan, disseminating a militaristic approach against the West, the so-called pro-Western, puppet Muslim governments and the Shiites. These Sunni “terrorist” groups are filling the vacuum, increasingly viewed by the Sunni Muslim masses as their champions and enemies of Iran, to the great cost of pro-Western Sunni governments.

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