By Naade Ali
South Asia and Middle East Fellow, PoliTact

Context

The recent brief yet intense escalation between India and Pakistan has further exposed the fragile nature of South Asia’s security landscape. The four-day-long tit-for-tat cross-border military confrontation between the two nuclear-armed rivals has significantly undermined prospects for normalization, redefining the rules of engagement and signaling a shift in how both countries may manage their relationship moving forward. What began as a terrorist attack on Indian tourists in the Pahalgam region of the disputed India-administered Kashmir last month, resulting in the deaths of 26 people, quickly escalated into a significant diplomatic and military crisis.

India’s Strategic Shift: Operation Sindoor and the ‘New Normal

India hastily accused Pakistan of orchestrating the terror attacks and used the incident as justification to revise its military doctrine through the launch of Operation Sindoor.

In a public speech highlighting the goals of Operation Sindoor, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced what he described as reaching a ‘new normal,’ signaling a decisive departure from India’s earlier posture of restraint, long shaped by the perceived threat of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent. He emphasized that the new approach centered on firm and unyielding retaliation against terrorist attacks, including cross-border military operations and a deliberate refusal to distinguish between militant groups and their state sponsors—effectively placing direct responsibility on Pakistan for any acts of terrorism on Indian soil. Modi also stated that India would no longer be deterred by the threat of nuclear escalation, signaling a willingness to pursue bold and proactive actions despite potential risks. Having absorbed the initial Indian strikes, Pakistan, in response to the damage inflicted from Operation Sindoor, initiated its own military campaign named Banyan-Marsoos, targeting key Indian military targets to restore deterrence.

A Pause in Hostilities: U.S. Intervention and the Ceasefire

As the two countries climbed the escalation ladder, a surprise ceasefire announcement by U.S. President Trump on social media temporarily halted the hostilities. While the truce continues to hold, prospects for lasting peace remain uncertain. Inflammatory national rhetoric and the unresolved diplomatic deadlock continue to fuel tensions. At the core of the post-ceasefire period is a significant divide between India and Pakistan, each celebrating their military campaigns as a victory and viewing the outcome of their confrontation through a zero-sum lens. This has made the aftermath more complex and contentious than the conflict itself, while also revealing how both sides intend to manage their ongoing disputes moving forward. In this context, key questions have emerged: what does the temporary truce mean for the India-Pakistan rivalry, and what are its implications for the long-term stability of South Asia?

Experts Respond

On May 12, PoliTact hosted a panel discussion under the auspices of recently formed US-Pakistan Policy Forum titled: “India-Pakistan Tensions and the Way Forward,” moderated by its Chief Analyst, Arif Ansar. The session featured a distinguished panel, including Dr. Hassan Abbas, Chair of the Department of Regional and Analytical Studies at the U.S. National Defense University; Dr. Qamar ul Huda, Michael E. Paul Chair in International Affairs and Distinguished Visiting Professor at the U.S. Naval Academy; and Mr. Khaled Al Maeena, former Editor-in-Chief of Arab News and Saudi Gazette. The discussion centered on the implications of the recent ceasefire between India and Pakistan, the roles of international actors, and the significant obstacles to achieving long-term peace.

Will the Ceasefire Hold?

One of the key questions examined was whether the current ceasefire between India and Pakistan is likely to hold.

A cautious optimism emerged from Dr. Hassan Abbas, who expressed confidence that the ceasefire between India and Pakistan would likely hold — at least in the short term. He argued that both nations had achieved what they needed politically and militarily to step back from the brink. India could claim it had struck militant targets, while Pakistan could point to a successful air defense response. He emphasized that U.S. mediation had played a key role in facilitating the agreement and that both governments were likely committed to preventing further military action. However, he warned that unless deeper structural issues — particularly the Kashmir dispute and proxy militancy — were addressed diplomatically, this ceasefire would remain fragile.

Dr. Qamar ul Huda shared a more skeptical view. While not dismissing the ceasefire outright, he questioned its substance, noting the absence of a transparent or structured diplomatic process. The ceasefire, in his view, seemed to have emerged from informal channels — tweets and backchannel phone calls — rather than serious, trackable negotiations. He was concerned that such an approach lacked durability and legitimacy. Dr. Huda stressed that a real ceasefire requires more than silence on the battlefield; it demands diplomatic engagement on the root causes of conflict: Kashmir, water disputes, and terrorism. He also noted the potential influence of third-party actors, from China to Gulf states, and expressed concern over the lack of clarity in the U.S. position. In his view, the region wasn’t yet “ripe” for lasting peace, and without a comprehensive approach, this ceasefire might only be a pause rather than a turning point.

From a media and public sentiment angle, Mr. Khaled Al Maeena brought a grounded and people-centered perspective. He voiced deep concern over the role of Indian media, which he accused of fomenting hate and spreading misinformation that inflamed public opinion and made diplomacy politically costly. Drawing on conversations with people across religious and national lines, he asserted that the majority of Indians and Pakistanis want peace, not war. Mr. Al Maeena emphasized that the region’s pressing need was not military confrontation but economic development and political stability. He also highlighted the proactive role of Gulf states — especially Saudi Arabia — in de-escalating tensions. With ties to both India and Pakistan, and a vested interest in regional peace due to economic interdependence, Mr. Al Maeena saw the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia, as a credible mediator. While hopeful about the ceasefire’s potential, he underscored the importance of media responsibility, regional diplomacy, and leadership that prioritizes stability over nationalist bravado.

The panel discussed the evolving role of the Gulf states—particularly Saudi Arabia—as key international mediator. The panelists agreed that Saudi Arabia, with significant interests in both India and Pakistan, could play a constructive role in easing tensions. Mr. Khaled Al Maeena stressed that Saudi Arabia seeks regional stability, including in South Asia, and could facilitate dialogue, if requested, between the two rivals by encouraging both sides to come to the table and accept international mediation.

The panelists agreed that India and Pakistan must move beyond tactical ceasefires and pursue a comprehensive, long-term peace process—ideally supported by third-party mediation. The speakers emphasized that unless the two countries address their domestic challenges and regional rivalries, their aspirations will remain unmet.

What Role should US Play?

Throughout the discussion, the panelists recognized the United States as a pivotal external actor with the capacity to influence the trajectory of the India-Pakistan ceasefire. However, their assessments revealed a shared caution about the limitations and inconsistencies in the U.S. approach.

Dr. Abbas emphasized that U.S. involvement was instrumental in brokering the initial ceasefire, with both India and Pakistan reaching out to Washington behind the scenes. He argued that this reflected the high-level trust and strategic alignment both countries maintain with the U.S., albeit for different reasons. India is a key partner in the Indo-Pacific strategy and a counterbalance to China, while Pakistan has long-standing security and geopolitical ties to the U.S., particularly in the context of Afghanistan. However, Abbas cautioned that the U.S. influence alone cannot guarantee lasting peace. He urged Washington to move beyond tactical mediation and instead support long-term conflict resolution mechanisms, including structured dialogue on Kashmir and militancy. He also noted that U.S. credibility depends on maintaining a balanced posture, especially when public narratives in India resist outside interference.

Dr. Huda took a more critical and analytical stance on the U.S. role. He noted that while President Trump’s tweet announcing the ceasefire was widely reported, it lacked substantive follow-through or diplomatic backing. From his view in Washington, the ceasefire appeared to be the result of sporadic political gestures rather than coordinated U.S. policy. Huda questioned whether the U.S. is truly committed to sustained mediation or simply reacting to crises. He highlighted the ambiguity in U.S. policy—initially appearing indifferent, then suddenly claiming credit—and argued that this inconsistency undermines its ability to lead serious peace efforts. To sustain negotiations, the U.S. would need to invest diplomatically and involve multilateral partners, such as the EU, China, and Gulf states, in creating a legitimate and lasting peace framework.

Mr. Khaled Almaeena provided a regional and Gulf-centered perspective, acknowledging the U.S. role but emphasizing that regional actors—particularly Saudi Arabia—are just as important. He noted that while the U.S. has diplomatic leverage, it should not attempt to dominate the process unilaterally. Instead, he advocated for a collaborative approach, where the U.S. works in concert with Gulf countries and other stakeholders who maintain strong ties with both India and Pakistan. Mr. Al Maeena viewed President Trump’s announcement of the ceasefire with skepticism, suggesting it may have been more performative than strategic. He argued that the U.S. can help facilitate talks, but its influence must be exercised carefully and in support of locally driven, regionally endorsed initiatives.

In summary, the panelists suggested that while the U.S. remains a necessary actor for de-escalation, its role must evolve from crisis management to sustained diplomacy, ideally in partnership with regional powers who have both legitimacy and proximity to the conflict.

Great Power Rivalry and Peace Talks

In the discussion of whether the ceasefire between India and Pakistan could evolve into lasting peace, all three panelists acknowledged that great power dynamics—particularly involving China—play a critical role in shaping the strategic landscape of South Asia.

Dr. Qamar-ul Huda emphasized the geopolitical complexity introduced by China’s growing influence and the competing interests of major powers. He noted that China, along with the Gulf states, the EU, and the U.S., has shown interest in being involved in conflict resolution efforts between India and Pakistan. However, this multiplicity of actors creates a crowded diplomatic space, making coherent mediation more difficult. Dr. Huda pointed out that China’s strategic alignment with Pakistan and its rivalry with India complicate peace efforts. He also raised a broader concern: if India aspires to be a global leader, as envisioned through its role in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategy and the Quad alliance, it must demonstrate stability and responsible leadership in its own region. Repeated border skirmishes and crises with Pakistan, he argued, undermine India’s credibility as a reliable partner in the great power competition with China.

Dr. Hassan Abbas echoed these concerns, observing that China’s influence is an integral part of South Asia’s strategic fabric, particularly through its economic and military ties with Pakistan. He highlighted how Chinese military technology—especially fighter jets used by Pakistan—played a significant role in the recent skirmishes, which helped Pakistan demonstrate parity in air power despite India’s numerical advantage. Dr. Abbas saw China’s indirect support as a factor that emboldens Pakistan to resist Indian pressure and sustain its strategic posture. However, he also noted that the escalation ladder is becoming dangerously steep due to technological advancements and information warfare, increasing the risk of miscalculation in a region already shaped by great power rivalries.

Mr. Khaled Al Maeena took a broader, more diplomatic view, situating China within a network of powerful states — including the U.S. and Gulf nations — that have vested interests in regional stability. While not delving deeply into China’s military role, Mr. Al Maeena acknowledged that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are increasingly aware of China’s regional footprint, particularly through its economic initiatives like the Belt and Road. He suggested that China, like the U.S., could play a constructive role in diffusing tensions if it acts as a responsible stakeholder. However, he warned that foreign involvement, including by great powers, must be invited and balanced, as unilateral or self-interested interventions could backfire.

Collectively, the panelists agreed that China’s strategic position and the broader great power rivalry intensify the stakes in South Asia. While this rivalry may deter full-scale war, it also raises the risk of prolonged instability unless managed through inclusive and multilateral diplomacy.

Nuclear Environment and the Escalation Ladder

In examining how the India-Pakistan conflict unfolds within a nuclear framework, the panelists offered nuanced perspectives on the risks and realities of escalation.

Dr. Hassan Abbas presented a cautiously optimistic view, asserting that while both nations had indeed tested the boundaries of military engagement—through strikes, counterstrikes, and air skirmishes—they ultimately pulled back due to the overarching presence of nuclear deterrence. He emphasized that both sides were able to claim symbolic victories: India asserted it had targeted militant-linked sites, while Pakistan showcased its military preparedness and air defense capabilities, including the successful use of advanced Chinese aircraft. For Dr. Abbas, this demonstration of strength on both sides created the space for de-escalation, as neither nation was willing to push the conflict into full-scale war, knowing the devastating consequences of nuclear engagement. He remained confident that, despite heightened tensions, both countries were rational actors who understood the mutual destruction that a nuclear exchange would bring.

Dr. Qamar-ul Huda, meanwhile, offered a more cautious and critical interpretation. He characterized the pattern of India-Pakistan escalation as a dangerous cycle—an unending loop of skirmishes, retaliations, and brief periods of calm that lacked any strategic architecture. According to him, this repetitive behavior pointed to a fundamental weakness in regional diplomacy and governance. Despite the presence of nuclear weapons acting as a deterrent, he argued that the failure to address root causes—such as the Kashmir dispute, water-sharing tensions, and cross-border terrorism—meant that both countries continued to climb the escalation ladder in an ad hoc and reactive manner. Without institutional reforms or sustained international engagement, he warned, the region remained vulnerable to miscalculations that could spiral beyond control, even in a nuclear context.

Mr. Khaled Almaeena approached the issue from a societal and media perspective, underscoring how misinformation, media sensationalism, and hyper-nationalist rhetoric often play a more dangerous role in escalation than military strategy itself. Drawing comparisons to the “phony war” period of World War II, Mr. Al Maeena argued that the most recent flare-up between India and Pakistan resembled more of a media-fueled standoff than a genuine military confrontation. He criticized the Indian mainstream media in particular for manufacturing a climate of hostility, which in turn pressured political leaders to take aggressive stances to appease domestic audiences. In this environment, the escalation ladder becomes more volatile—not because of formal military decisions, but because public sentiment, stoked by inflammatory media narratives, compels leaders to act out of fear of appearing weak.

In essence, the three panelists painted a complex picture of escalation in South Asia. While they all agreed that nuclear deterrence plays a restraining role in preventing all-out war, they also highlighted different drivers of danger—be it military miscalculation, diplomatic failure, or media manipulation. The consensus was clear: the region may be protected by the logic of mutual destruction, but without responsible leadership, institutional dialogue, and media accountability, the rungs of the escalation ladder remain all too easy to climb.

Domestic Politics and Sustained Political Dialogue

As the conversation shifted from immediate military de-escalation to the prospect of sustained political dialogue, all three panelists highlighted domestic political dynamics in both India and Pakistan as central to whether the ceasefire could evolve into meaningful negotiations.

Dr. Abbas offered a deep dive into the Pakistani domestic landscape, emphasizing that the ceasefire had inadvertently strengthened the military establishment’s standing at a time when it was under intense public and political criticism—especially over its handling of the Imran Khan-led Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) movement. He noted that the military’s effective management of the immediate crisis had boosted its credibility and given the current coalition government some breathing room. However, he warned that without broader political consensus and constitutional legitimacy, Pakistan could not sustain a serious peace process. He stressed that internal unity, political stability, and inclusiveness—particularly reconciling with PTI’s large support base—would be necessary if Pakistan hoped to engage in long-term diplomacy with India.

Dr. Huda placed domestic politics within a broader governance and institutional context, particularly in Pakistan. He saw the moment as an opportunity for political re-examination, noting that recurring conflict cycles had revealed the deep fractures in the country’s political system. He emphasized the need for Pakistan’s political institutions to commit to constitutionalism and inclusivity, warning that sidelining popular political parties (such as PTI) or suppressing dissent only deepens instability. For Dr. Huda, sustainable negotiations—whether about the ceasefire or Kashmir—would require a bipartisan or multiparty consensus. In his view, the absence of such internal coherence would make Pakistan an unreliable negotiating partner, especially in the eyes of international actors.

Mr. Khaled Al Maeena focused more broadly on the popular mood and societal divide within both India and Pakistan. He warned that rising hate rhetoric, media manipulation, and political polarization—particularly in India—create an environment where leaders are constrained by nationalist pressures. In both countries, he argued, the public appetite for peace exists, but political elites often exploit nationalist sentiment for short-term gain. He called for leadership that could rise above partisanship and media-driven hysteria, emphasizing that economic development and social stability should be the common goals uniting political factions. Mr. Al Maeena also stressed that peace efforts cannot be externally imposed; they must be grounded in domestic political will and legitimacy.

The panelists agreed that no ceasefire or peace process can succeed without strong, credible, and inclusive domestic political foundations. While foreign mediation may help broker talks, lasting peace must come from within, supported by political leadership that reflects the will and aspirations of their people.

Related Research

Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States August 4, 2023
Examining Saudi-Iran Tensions And Its Impact On South Asia, China Jan 4, 2019

The post India-Pakistan Ceasefire And The Way Forward appeared first on Politact.

By Arif AnsarContext

As the global balance power remains in flux, some dramatic changes indicate how complicated this shift has become. The equilibrium is swinging between the established and the emerging powers with both striving to shape the process of change – towards their camp. As the tug and pull continues between US, Russia, and China, the Cold War era alliances can no longer be trusted. The present political and economic ecosystems present different realities that require a fresh formulation of allies.

Analysis

As these partnerships relate to the Middle East and South and Central Asia regions, the middle powers such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey,

Iran, and Pakistan, have emerged as the key players striving to maintain a semblance of stability. While a lot has been written about the policies of these nations, Saudi Arabia is the recent entrant to the fray. The Kingdom is not just an oil powerhouse; it is the anchor of the Islamic world, hosting the most revered of its holy sites. What happens in Saudi Arabia is a matter of grave concern for all.

Like other international players, Saudis also desire to hedge their bets i.e., if something were to go wrong with its existing partnerships. For example, the news of the disappearance of the prominent Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi after visiting the Saudi consulate in Turkey has rattled the otherwise stable US-Saudi relations. Allegedly, Khashoggi was murdered at the consulate due to his strong criticism of the royal family, through his columns in The Washington Post.

The hedging strategy was also evident when after the conclusion of the recent visit of Pakistan’s new premier to Saudi Arabia, came the news about its intent to join one of the tributaries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). According to media reports, Saudis plan to set up an oil city in Gwadar. Apparently Pakistan has invited the Saudis to join CPEC, but it could very well be that the Saudis had asked for an invitation, to solidify the other flank against Iran.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia also appears to be spearheading the formation of US led Arab NATO. There were rumors that US is likely to announce the formation of Arab NATO by January 2019. The members of the alliance include Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, and Egypt.

Significant challenges remain to make this alliance fully operational, mainly due to differences on the aims and objectives of the coalition, and discord amongst GCC nations over the role of Qatar and its backing of Iran. Nonetheless, up until the disappearance of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the Saudis have had the closest relations with the US as compared to the other middle powers like Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran, and this puts the Kingdom in a unique position.

With its military intrusion in Yemen, accompanied by economic and political blockade of Qatar, the role of Saudi Arabia has become increasingly contentious. Its policies are in gradual transformation – from talking about the Ummah to ‘Saudi First’, and possible change in its traditional stances towards Palestine, Kashmir, and Afghanistan. The strongest statements of solidarity on Kashmir have recently come from Iran and Turkey.

These are the shifts that are likely to become more pronounced in the coming days. With Saudi Arabia getting more aligned with the US, and the attempts to form an Arab NATO, will increase the challenges for Pakistan and Turkey. This is especially true if the main objective of the Arab NATO is to counter Iran. Both Pakistan and Turkey want to prevent a direct confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

While Pakistan is already a member of the Saudi led Alliance IMCTC (Islamic Military Counter terrorism Coalition), the nation has maintained that its primary mission is to protect the sovereignty of the Kingdom. This task can become quite complicated if Saudi royal family begins to loose their legitimacy as the custodians of the holy sites.

In this context, the involvement of Saudi Arabia in CPEC, will likely complicate Pakistan’s predicament. The Kingdom will likely use it as a pressure point on Pakistan to steer clear of Iran and stay hooked to them. On the other hand, Pakistan will exploit the Saudi engagement as leverage against India and Afghanistan, and potentially to influence the US. As the Saudi policy shift matures, the tilt seems more towards India and the US, and this will complicate Pakistan’s quandary even more.

While Pakistan has provided security guarantees to the Kingdom, if the push comes to shove, it can hardly sustain an unpopular monarchy. Protecting the holy sites and the royal family are not synonymous. The question at that point would become, who will protect the revered sites?

Conclusion

In this complex landscape, an interplay of three sets of relations are important to understand. One of them is composed of Pakistan, India and the US; the second one constitutes Russia, China and the US; and the third one is made up of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey.

Due to the shifting balance of power, a competition is brewing in all three segments referenced above. As the shift in the global balance of power progresses, there will be a number of reverses that may reflect that the more things change, the more they stay the same. However, these will be merely momentary allusions as the status quo is now impossible to maintain.

The present tensions between the US and the Saudis over the disappearance of Jamal Khoshoggi will prove to be short lived – as there is otherwise complete unanimity of interests between the two. US simply cannot afford to alienate all four middle powers: Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia at the same time. As US contemplates and attempts to correct this dependence and imbalance, Pakistan and Turkey could emerge as the momentary beneficiaries.

The post Emerging Alliances In The Middle East; Connection Between Arab NATO And CPEC appeared first on Politact.

Context
According to media reports Commander of Royal Saudi Land Forces Lieutenant General Abdul Rahman Bin Abdullah Al-Murshid visited General Headquarters (GHQ) and met Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani on March 9. Saudi General also visited with General Khalid Shameem Wynne, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), at the Joint Staff Headquarters in Chaklala. This article examines the significance of the visit as Middle East and increasingly Saudi Arabia, faces civil unrest. Additionally, the article looks at the past and future role of Pakistan’s armed force in the Arab world, and it’s political and economic implications.

Analysis

Pakistan Army’s information wing ISPR (Inter Services Public Relations) released the following statement after the meeting,

“He was also given briefings on various professional issues. The visit signifies the unique and brotherly relations enjoyed by the people and Armed Forces of both the countries.”

Additionally, according to ISPR discussions also took place on the evolving geostrategic environment, to include other professional matters.

Lieutenant General Abdul Rahman’s visit to Pakistan has taken place as public protests have spread in Middle East and there are fears that unrest in Bahrain and Yemen could engulf Saudi Arabia as well. A Day of Rage called for March 11 in the Kingdom, has so far been unable to spur the kind of disturbances seen in Egypt, Tunisia, and other Arab countries.

PoliTact as previously examined the role Pakistan’s armed forces in conflicts in Middle East, they are listed below:

• In 1969, training personnel from Pakistan armed forces helped beat back attack from South Yemen on Sharoora province of Saudi Arabia. South Yemen at the time was under a communist regime, strongly supported by USSR.
• During the Six Day War (1967) and Yom Kippur War (1973), pilots from Pakistan’s air force were involved in helping Jordan, Syria, and Egypt in conflict with Israel. Military advisers and trainers were also helping the armed forces of these countries.
• King Hussein of Jordan used Pakistan’s training mission under Brigadier Zia-ul-Haq to suppress the Palestinian uprising in the 70s.
• More recently, during the Gulf War of 1990, Pakistani forces were deployed along the Saudi-Yemen border, as coalition forces expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
• In 2006, President Musharraf sent a contingent of Army personnel to Lebanon for demining areas bombed by Israel.

PoliTact also evaluated the prospect of Pakistan army deploying to the Kingdom, if requested. Such a request would put Pakistan in a daunting bind: to support either the royal family or the wishes of the people. The circumstances currently existing on Pakistan’s eastern and western flank would make the possibility of assisting other nations of the Gulf region unlikely.

In the recent past, Egyptian military has also been assisting in training Saudi forces. However, due to the continuing unrest in Egypt, it’s unclear what role it would be able to play in the Kingdom. However, if the strife starts to take the Shiite-Sunni line, there is increasing likelihood of the forces from Sunni countries to get involved in the Kingdom. Consequently, this action could lead Iran to counteract in Afghanistan and FATA.
If not directly, retired personnel from Pakistan army could get involved in Middle East. According to a report in Pakistan’s The Tribune Express today, Overseas Employment Service of the Fauji Foundation is recruiting ex-military personnel to serve in Bahrain’s National Guard. The Fauji Foundation was established as a trust for ex-servicemen and their families in 1954 and is run by retired personnel from Pakistan’s armed forces. This trend could easily spread to Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries and become a major source of foreign income. Pakistan’s military is highly regarded in the Middle East, and particularly after the country become a declared nuclear power.

The post Commander of Saudi Arabia’s Land Forces Meets Pakistan Army Chief appeared first on Politact.