Policy Brief – Analysis of Perceptions and Perspectives

Navigating India, Pakistan, Iran, and U.S. Pressures

Context

Afghanistan’s strategic outlook is undergoing a dramatic overhaul amid escalating connectivity disputes, geopolitical realignments, and regional conflicts. The combined pressures of India–Pakistan instability, U.S. trade friction with India, Iran-Israel hostilities, and Pakistan’s rising diplomatic leverage are forcing Kabul into a balanced posture—nurturing Indian, Iranian, Chinese, and Pakistani ties while maintaining neutrality in broader conflicts.

Fallout from the India–Pakistan Escalation

The recent missile and drone escalation between India and Pakistan, while brief, sent strong ripples across Afghanistan’s strategic thinking. For Kabul, the clashes underscored both the volatility of its neighborhood and the fragility of its trade lifelines. Afghanistan’s heavy dependence on Pakistani corridors for access to Indian markets became immediately apparent when border closures stranded hundreds of trucks and brought transit under the Afghanistan–Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement to a halt. This economic disruption has reinforced the Taliban government’s determination to diversify its trade routes and reduce over reliance on Pakistan, with particular focus on accelerating use of Iran’s Chabahar port—an initiative backed by India and bolstered by Kabul’s recent investment in the facility.

Diplomatically, Afghanistan responded with a careful balancing act, calling for restraint on both sides while deepening engagement with India. Meetings earlier in 2025 between Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi and Indian officials signaled a renewed willingness to explore closer economic ties, particularly through the Chabahar route, which would allow Afghanistan to bypass Pakistani territory entirely. This outreach also served to assert Kabul’s independence in regional diplomacy, reducing the perception of Pakistan as the sole gateway for Afghan connectivity.

At the same time, China seized the moment to mediate and position itself as an economic partner. Through Chinese facilitation in June 2025, Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed to restore ambassador-level diplomatic ties, with Kabul invited to formally participate in the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This not only offered Afghanistan access to infrastructure funding and regional integration but also came with commitments from the Taliban to address Pakistan’s concerns over cross-border militancy—particularly activity by the Pakistani Taliban (TTP). While Afghan officials have long denied harboring such groups, the inclusion of security assurances in the deal signaled a cautious willingness to engage on this sensitive issue.

However, the credibility of these pledges remains under scrutiny. Pakistan continues to voice concerns about militant sanctuaries on Afghan soil, and incidents of TTP-linked violence persist. For Afghanistan, managing this security profile will be central to sustaining the diplomatic thaw with Islamabad and maximizing the economic benefits of regional projects like CPEC.

In the end, the India–Pakistan conflict served as both a warning and an opportunity for Afghanistan. It highlighted the risks of over-dependence on a single trade corridor, incentivized diversification through Iranian and Indian partnerships, and opened doors for Chinese-backed connectivity initiatives. Yet, it also reinforced that regional credibility is not solely a function of military capability but also of sustained economic reliability and security cooperation.

US-India Economic Tensions

Against this backdrop, rising trade tensions between the United States and India are adding another layer of complexity to South Asia’s connectivity politics. Washington’s imposition of tariffs of up to 50% on Indian exports—including textiles, jewelry, and footwear—is expected to slow India’s growth, intensify pressure on its export industries, and strain the once-warm personal rapport between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and former President Donald Trump. The tariff amount includes 25% penalty for importing Russian oil and military equipment – and thus energizing its war machine in Ukraine. In response, India has delayed certain U.S. defense procurements, expanded outreach to BRICS partners, and signaled a more assertive, independent foreign policy stance.

For Afghanistan, this shift may mean a more determined Indian push to limit Kabul’s integration into China-led connectivity projects like CPEC. In the aftermath of the May 2025 India–Pakistan clashes, Indian strategists are reportedly concerned that closer Afghan–China ties could deepen Pakistan’s leverage in the region. New Delhi’s outreach to Kabul—centered on expanding trade via Chabahar—fits within this broader effort to offer alternatives to Chinese-backed corridors.

Yet, India’s evolving stance is not entirely about containment. Modi is expected to travel to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin from August 31 to September 1—his first visit since the deadly 2020 Galwan Valley clashes. The visit comes amid signs of a tentative thaw in relations, including the resumption of direct flights, new pilgrimage agreements, and eased Chinese export restrictions to India. While Modi’s presence at the SCO will be closely watched, Indian analysts stress this is not a wholesale pivot toward Beijing but rather an exercise in strategic autonomy—leveraging engagement with China to balance U.S. pressure without committing to China’s broader geopolitical vision.

For Pakistan, India’s maneuvering presents a mixed picture. On one hand, a more China-friendly India could soften some of the sharpest India–Pakistan tensions in multilateral forums. On the other, if India doubles down on keeping Afghanistan out of CPEC’s orbit, Islamabad could see increased competition for influence in Kabul. For Afghanistan, the outcome will likely hinge on whether New Delhi’s engagement translates into viable alternatives to Chinese-backed connectivity—or whether it remains largely symbolic in the face of China’s economic weight.

In short, the twin developments of India–Pakistan border tensions and U.S.–India trade frictions are accelerating New Delhi’s pursuit of a multi-vector foreign policy: resisting over-dependence on Washington, engaging with Beijing when tactically useful, and asserting itself more forcefully in regional connectivity debates involving Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Iran and Tensions in the Middle East

The June Iran–Israel war and the continuing Gaza crisis have spilled into Afghanistan’s neighborhood in very tangible ways. Iran’s internal security clampdown after the twelve-day war coincided with a surge in forced returns of Afghans from Iran—UNHCR estimated average daily deportations jumped to roughly 30,000 per day during the fighting—creating new humanitarian strain on western Afghanistan and exposing Kabul’s dependence on cross-border labor flows.

Politically, the Taliban sought a posture of guarded alignment with Tehran without direct entanglement: Kabul condemned Israeli strikes (and later U.S.) on Iran while calling for regional restraint—signals aimed at maintaining Iranian goodwill for trade and transit via the Chabahar route, but also at avoiding open confrontation with larger powers.

Against this volatile backdrop, a rare and highly symbolic development occurred: Pakistan Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir was invited for a private lunch at the White House—a groundbreaking move that was quickly interpreted as a U.S. outreach toward Islamabad during rising Middle East tensions. As Trump reportedly praised Munir for helping avert an outright war with India, he also acknowledged Pakistan’s crucial insight into the Iran–Israel conflict—signaling potential U.S. interest in leveraging Pakistani mediation efforts in a region on the brink of broader conflict.

Munir’s meeting—and Pakistan’s positioning—reflect Islamabad’s growing role as an interlocutor in the Iran–Israel standoff, balancing ties with both Tehran and Washington while contending with regional instability. Islamabad has publicly condemned Israeli strikes on Iran and underscored the need for diplomatic solutions, deepening its appeal as mediator.

At the same time, the Iran-Israeli tensions and Pakistan’s growing diplomatic role complicates Afghanistan’s reliance on the Chabahar Port as an alternative trade route to Pakistan, which US had previously exempted from sanctions on Iran. The Port is being developed by Iran in partnership with India. President Trump has already conveyed his dismay to India for buying oil from Russia, benefiting the country in sustaining its policies towards Ukraine. Some experts claim that if the high-stake meeting between President Trump and Putin goes well on August 15, the pressure on India will likely ease as well.

Conclusion

As Afghan Taliban celebrate 4^th year in power, the nation now finds itself at a crossroads of competing currents. The net effect is a cautious, multi-prong stance: keep Iranian channels open for trade and energy, nurture Indian economic alternatives through Chabahar, avoid burning bridges with Pakistan as it courts Washington, and remain pragmatically receptive to Chinese infrastructure where it serves Afghan interests. In practice, that means neutral rhetoric on Middle East tensions, practical cooperation with Iran on border management amid deportations, and transactional engagement with India, Pakistan, and China to keep multiple corridors viable despite shifting great-power winds. However, as it stands now, U.S. pressure on Iran and India have restricted options for Afghanistan.

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Policy Brief – Vantage Point Analysis

Context

The recent meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Field Marshal Asim Munir, has stirred considerable global attention in particularly regarding what led to the meeting and what could have been discussed. It marks the first-ever instance of a sitting U.S. president holding a one-on-one meeting with Pakistan’s top military leader—an unprecedented move that reveals deeper shifts in regional strategy and global alignments.

Great Power Rivalry

U.S.-Pakistan relations have always been shaped by broader global dynamics, and the context now is the intensifying great power rivalry, primarily between the U.S., China, and Russia. The escalating Iran-Israel conflagration has added to this.

One of the persistent suggestions coming out of some DC based think-tanks is to avert pushing Pakistan into the full embrace of China. On the other hand, Pakistan has been messaging insistently that it wants to maintain close ties to the US despite its strategic ties to China. The meeting between President Trump and Field Marshal Asim Munir – and what follows – will likely test this. In the unfolding international relations maintaining a balance between great powers is becoming increasingly untenable.

Another critical dimension is the ongoing Iran-Israel conflict. In the post October 7, 2023, Hamas led attack on Israel, the geopolitics of Middle East is fast evolving. This has been accompanied by the loss of Hamas and Hezbollah leadership and the fall of Assad regime in Syria in December 2024, as part of what many consider the Outside-in Approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The likelihood of a broader conflict between Iran and Israel hangs in balance as President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have forged a strong strategic alignment. Netanyahu has tried to ensure that U.S. policy remained closely aligned with Israel’s objective of weakening Iran’s defense capabilities, particularly preventing it from ever acquiring nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Iran had hoped that Trump would adopt a pragmatic approach and revive nuclear talks leading to easing of economic pressure. To Iran’s disappointment, Trump pursued the reinstatement of “maximum pressure” policy on Tehran – culminating into an attack on its nuclear sites on June 22.

Pakistan has maintained the policy of siding with Iran. In his speech to the diaspora in Washington DC, Field Marshal Asim Munir reportedly cited Pakistan’s ‘clear and strong support’ for Iran in war against Israel. President Trump would have likely discussed Pakistan’s intent and the scope of its support in the background of expanding Israeli-Iran conflict, especially if US gets engaged, as it did on June 22, in eliminating Iran’s nuclear program – or any endeavors to change the regime.

From what has been reported since the meeting, Pakistan has offered to mediate with Iran and to assist President Trump pursue a negotiated solution, as he did with its recent short war with India. After meeting with Field Marshal Asim Munir, Trump had given two weeks window to arrive at a decision on if the US will get directly involved in the war against Iran. However, the attack on Iran’s nuclear sites occurred much before the window for negotiated solution was to expire.

According to some estimates, about 15%-20% of Pakistan’s population belong to Shia sect. Any attack on Iran, regime change, or any subsequent insurgency can have serious consequences for the ethnic and religious harmony in Pakistan and the Islamic regions. A foreign policy alignment too closely with Western military actions against Iran could inflame sectarian tensions at home. It would also put Pakistan and Chinese strategic alignment to the test – as Iran is also an ally of China and Russia. Additionally, the aforementioned nations shared membership in the China dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

US Pakistan Relations

Under President Biden, Pakistan was often viewed critically and often through an India-centric lens, particularly in the context of counter-terrorism. In contrast, the Trump administration was initially expected to adopt a hardline stance toward Pakistan, recent events suggest a pragmatic recalibration driven by strategic needs. Moreover, Pakistan’s government has carried out an active trade and security outreach with the U.S. administration to demonstrate its economic and security potential. In remarks by CENTCOM Commander Gen. Michael Kurilla, or Trump’s own statements, there’s been notable recognition of Pakistan’s role beyond the narrow counterterrorism framework.

The performance of the Pakistani military during the brief conflict with India in May has raised its global stature. While both sides de-escalated after Trump administration negotiated a cease fire, Pakistan’s ability to outmaneuver a much larger adversary, despite its plaguing political and economic challenges, captured international attention and enhanced the credibility of its defense establishment. This strengthened perception has also prompted the US to reconfigure its engagement with Pakistan’s power centers—primarily its military—based on shared regional interests, particularly as tensions in the Middle East escalate.

Allied with the U.S., Pakistan has played a decisive security role in the Cold War and the Campaign Against Extremism. Due to this partnership, it received western economic and military assistance. Pakistan once again stands at the juncture of another critical role involving the change in global balance of power. U.S. would once again desire security relation with Pakistan and furthering of the future envisioned under the Abraham Accords. As the security situation related to Iran worsens, it’s possible that different brands of non-state actors operating from the region and beyond attempt to exploit the situation. Pakistan’s experience in managing extremists could become very useful. For this cooperation, U.S. could potentially assist in dealing with India, undo the suspension of Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), while moving forward with the trade deals.

Civil-Military Imbalance: A Familiar Pattern

While the Trump-Munir meeting may elevate Pakistan’s global profile, it also underscores a persistent internal challenge: the civil-military imbalance. The fact that such a high-level bilateral meeting involved the military chief—and not the elected civilian leadership—highlights the dominance of Pakistan’s military in both foreign policy and national security.

This imbalance perpetuates a troubling precedent in which strategic decisions of national consequence have to be made in private without discussion, consensus, or public ownership. Such secrecy has historically resulted in policies with long-term political, economic, and social consequences—often to the detriment of public trust and national cohesion.

The Trump-Munir meeting is emblematic of a shifting global landscape in which Pakistan finds itself once again at a strategic crossroads. The potential for a renewed, multifaceted partnership with the U.S. is real, but it hinges on careful diplomacy, a balance between competing alliances, and a rethinking of how power is exercised at home. As great power competition intensifies and both the Subcontinent and the Middle East become more volatile, Pakistan may well reemerge as a pivotal actor—if it can navigate both its external relations and internal governance with foresight and integrity.

The post What Does Trump-Munir Meeting Means for US-Pakistan Relations – As Iran-Israel Conflict Escalates? appeared first on Politact.

Context

The saga of the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline project is a stark illustration of how geopolitical complexities can impede critical infrastructure development, even when the need is dire. For Pakistan, a country grappling with chronic energy shortages, this pipeline has long represented a beacon of hope for economic stability and growth. Yet, for decades, it has remained tantalizing out of reach, a victim of international pressures, regional rivalries, and economic challenges.

The story begins in 2010 when Pakistan, facing an escalating energy crisis, signed a landmark deal with Iran to construct a 2,750-kilometer pipeline. Initially valued at $7.5 billion, the project promised to be a game-changer for Pakistan’s energy sector. The potential impact was significant: according to a USIP report, Pakistan’s persistent power crisis was trimming off about 2 percent of the country’s annual domestic product[1]. Furthermore, a World Bank study estimated that power shortages in developing countries like Pakistan could reduce business profitability by up to 40 percent[2]. These figures underscored the critical nature of the project for Pakistan’s economic well-being and future growth prospects.

Economic and Geopolitical Realities

From its inception, the project has been shadowed by the looming threat of U.S. sanctions. Unlike India, which received exemptions for its involvement in Iran’s Chabahar port, or Afghanistan, which was granted allowances for trade through Iran, Pakistan has consistently faced stern warnings from Washington about the consequences of proceeding with the pipeline. This disparity in treatment reflects the complex web of U.S. strategic interests in the region. India is viewed as a potential counterweight to China’s growing influence, while for Afghanistan Chabahar represents and alternative for its dependence on Pakistan. Pakistan, with its complex relationship with the U.S. and close ties to China, finds itself in a less favorable position.

The US policy towards Pakistan, Iran, and India have different ambitions. The situation demonstrates the complexity of international relations, where strict policy adherence often gives way to strategic exceptions based on broader geopolitical goals. The American approach has been criticized for its inconsistency, but from the U.S. perspective, it reflects a nuanced balancing of various strategic interests in the region. Using exceptions and restrictions as tools allows U.S, to influence foreign policy choices of regional players.

The geopolitical landscape has further complicated Pakistan’s position. Historically, tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran meant that Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations were hesitant to support a project that could increase Iran’s influence and decrease Pakistan’s financial dependence on them. Especially because Iran’s influence in the Middle East has consistently been increasing. China and Iran also signed $400 billion-dollar strategic economic agreement in 2021.

While the Chinese facilitated Saudi-Iran détente reached in 2023 offered a glimmer of hope, it has not significantly altered the dynamics surrounding the pipeline project. This hesitation from traditional allies has left Pakistan in a precarious position, caught between its energy needs and its diplomatic relationships. Moreover, the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel has further hardened positions against Iran.

Pakistan’s economic instability has added another layer of difficulty. The country’s frequent need for IMF bailouts and its struggle to finance large-scale infrastructure projects have made the pipeline’s completion seem increasingly elusive. As years passed, the project’s costs escalated, and the global political and security environment became even more convoluted, making it more challenging for Pakistan to move forward. In August 2023, Pakistan announced the suspension of the project due to the threat of U.S. sanctions, highlighting the ongoing pressures and uncertainties surrounding the initiative.

The failure of alternative energy projects has exacerbated Pakistan’s predicament. Initiatives like TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline) and CASA 1000 (Central Asia-South Asia power project) have stalled, often citing security concerns in Afghanistan and Baluchistan. Consequently, Pakistan remains heavily reliant on expensive Independent Power Producers (IPPs), a situation that undermines the competitiveness of its exports in the global market. This dependence on costly energy sources creates a vicious cycle, hampering economic growth and making it even more difficult for Pakistan to invest in long-term energy solutions.

Meanwhile, regional dynamics have shifted dramatically. India has made significant strides in enhancing its connectivity to Central Asia through the Chabahar port, effectively bypassing Pakistan. In May 2024, India signed a 10-year agreement to develop and operate Iran’s strategic Chabahar Port, committing $120 million, along with an additional $250 million loan credit facility for related projects. This development not only provides India with strategic advantages but also highlights the opportunities Pakistan is missing due to its inability to complete the pipeline project. The Chabahar port offers India an opportunity to reestablish its presence in Afghanistan and enhance its access to Central Asian markets, areas where Pakistan could have played a pivotal role had the pipeline project moved forward.

The Opportunity Cost

The opportunity cost for Pakistan is substantial and multifaceted. Economically, the completion of the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline could have significantly reduced Pakistan’s energy import bill. Conservative estimates suggest that access to Iranian natural gas could have saved Pakistan billions of dollars annually in energy costs[3]. This reduction in energy expenses would have had a cascading positive effect on the economy, potentially boosting GDP growth by 1-2% per annum[4].

Moreover, the availability of reliable and affordable energy would have been a boon for Pakistan’s industrial sector. Many industries, particularly textiles – a key export sector for Pakistan – have suffered due to inconsistent power supply. With a steady supply of natural gas, these industries could have operated at full capacity, potentially increasing export revenues by 15-20% annually[5].

The pipeline could have also played a crucial role in reducing Pakistan’s dependence on the IMF. By stabilizing energy costs and boosting industrial output, Pakistan could have improved its foreign exchange reserves and reduced its current account deficit. Economic projections suggest that over a 10-year period, the pipeline could have contributed to reducing Pakistan’s external debt by 20-25%, significantly altering its financial landscape and reducing the need for frequent IMF interventions[6].

Furthermore, the project had the potential to transform Pakistan into an energy corridor, linking Iran to the vast markets of South Asia. This role could have brought in significant transit fees and positioned Pakistan as a key player in regional energy dynamics. Conservative estimates put potential transit fee earnings at $500 million to $1 billion annually, a substantial boost to Pakistan’s foreign exchange earnings[7].

The environmental impact is another overlooked aspect. Natural gas, being a cleaner fuel compared to oil and coal, could have helped Pakistan meet its climate change commitments more effectively. The shift to gas could have reduced carbon emissions by 15-20% in the power sector alone, contributing to global climate goals while also improving local air quality[8].

Navigating the Future

As Pakistan grapples with these lost opportunities and ongoing challenges, it finds itself at a critical juncture. The country must navigate the escalating great power rivalry between the United States and China while addressing its pressing energy needs. In this context, Pakistan could consider a multi-faceted approach to move forward.

Firstly, Pakistan should intensify its diplomatic efforts with the United States, emphasizing the project’s importance for regional stability and economic development. Framing the pipeline as a crucial element for broader international goals in the region might help in securing exemptions or finding a middle ground. This approach could involve highlighting how energy security in Pakistan contributes to overall regional stability, a key U.S. foreign policy objective. A more economically stable Pakistan could be a more effective partner in fighting extremism and promoting regional security.

Engaging with Iran through economic projects could provide more diplomatic leverage for the international community in negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program. While the pipeline would benefit Iran, it would also make Iran more dependent on its neighbors for economic stability, potentially increasing leverage in nuclear negotiations.

Secondly, Pakistan could leverage the improved Saudi-Iran relations to garner support from GCC countries. This diplomatic outreach should be coupled with a renewed focus on diversifying energy sources, including accelerating the development of domestic resources and exploring alternative gas import options. The recent geopolitical shifts in the Middle East offer a unique opportunity for Pakistan to reposition itself in regional energy dynamics.

Thirdly, Pakistan should consider a phased implementation of the pipeline project, starting with sections less likely to trigger immediate sanctions. This approach could be complemented by exploring technical solutions that might mitigate sanctions risks, such as processing Iranian gas at the border. By breaking the project into smaller, more manageable phases, Pakistan might be able to demonstrate progress and build momentum while navigating complex international regulations.

Furthermore, Pakistan needs to reduce political polarization and strengthen its economic foundations through structural reforms. Improving the investment climate to attract foreign investment in the energy sector and reducing dependence on external financial support would put Pakistan in a stronger position to pursue its energy security goals. These reforms could include streamlining bureaucratic processes, enhancing transparency in the energy sector, and developing a clear, long-term energy policy that prioritizes sustainable and affordable energy sources.

In the broader context of great power rivalry, Pakistan should maintain a balanced approach between the U.S. and China. Leveraging relationships with both nations, while also exploring multilateral forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and potentially BRICS, could open new avenues for support and cooperation on energy projects. This balanced approach could involve positioning the pipeline project as part of a broader regional connectivity initiative that benefits multiple stakeholders, potentially making it more palatable to international partners.

The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline project remains a symbol of unfulfilled potential in regional cooperation and energy security. Its completion could catalyze a transformation in Pakistan’s economic landscape, potentially adding 2-3% to annual GDP growth, creating hundreds of thousands of jobs, and significantly reducing the country’s carbon footprint. The ripple effects would extend beyond Pakistan’s borders, fostering regional integration and potentially contributing to stability in a volatile region.

As Pakistan continues to navigate the complex interplay of domestic needs and international pressures, the path forward requires astute diplomacy, economic resilience, and strategic foresight. By addressing these challenges head-on and adapting to the evolving geopolitical landscape, Pakistan may yet find a way to turn this long-delayed project into a reality. The stakes are high – not just for Pakistan’s energy security, but for its economic future and its role in an increasingly interconnected region.

The coming years will be crucial in determining whether Pakistan can overcome the hurdles that have long delayed this project. Success would not only secure a more stable energy future for its people but could also redefine Pakistan’s position in the regional and global economic order. The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline, therefore, represents more than just an energy project; it is a test of Pakistan’s ability to navigate complex geopolitical waters and emerge as a key player in the changing dynamics of South and Central Asia.

References:

[1] United States Institute of Peace (USIP) report on Pakistan’s energy crisis (2023)

[2] World Bank study on power shortages in developing countries (2022)

[3] Asian Development Bank (ADB) report on South Asian energy trade (2021)

[4] International Monetary Fund (IMF) country report on Pakistan (2023)

[5] Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Annual Export Data (2023)

[6] Economic projections by Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) (2022)

[7] Estimates from Pakistan’s Ministry of Energy (Petroleum Division) (2021)

[8] Pakistan’s Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to the Paris Agreement (2021)

Related Links:

Iran-Pakistan Cross-Border Clashes And Deep-Rooted Challenges

Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States

The Future and Politics of Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project

The post The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities appeared first on Politact.

Context

As Israel continues its military campaign and air bombardments on the Gaza Strip and retaliates against Palestinians for the October 7 Hamas ambush, fears are mounting the conflict was widening to include Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and beyond. According to media reports, to date close to 26,000 Palestinians have been killed and 70,000 wounded.

For its part, it’s not clear if Israel is trying to contain or widen the conflict – towards its declared aim of eliminating Hamas and getting the hostages released. The strategic puzzle is, how to eliminate Hamas without also eradicating its backer, and that of Hezbollah as well, Iran. Israel has recently targeted Hezbollah commanders in Lebanon. Not only that, Israel has also gone after Iranian military advisors in Syria. These are seen as highly provocative actions.

Meanwhile, Iran backed Houthis are making the Red Sea unusable for cargo ships. Houthis have declared they are especially targeting merchant ships belonging to Israel and the powers supporting it in the Gaza operation. To address the deteriorating situation, US and UK launched missile and air raids against Houthi targets in Yemen that are continuing.

Iran has also seen increased attacks on the domestic front. On January 4, two bombs exploded at the memorial service for Qassem al Soleimani in Kerman in which about 80 people died. The Afghanistan based ISIS-K claimed responsibility for the attack. In December last year, 11 Iranian policemen were killed in an assault on a police station in Sistan-Balochistan province, and claimed by Jaish al-Adl.

However, the most dramatic escalation occurred when Iran launched counter strikes not only in Syria and Iraq, but also in its nuclear powered neighbor Pakistan, striking Jaish-al-Adl hideouts. These raids essentially connected the conflict that was mainly pestering the Middle East – to South Asia. Pakistan retaliated next day on January 18, by attacking Baloch nationalist groups operating from Iran and launching attacks against its security forces.

No one had expected the tentacles of Gaza conflict to reach as far as Pakistan, and entangle two proxy-war powers, one belonging to South Asia and the other, Middle East. Several angles have thus emerged, why did Iran strike Jaesh al-Adl in Pakistan at a time when it has so much to focus on in the Middle East.

While the ties have not always been amicable, often because of the cross-border activities of the non-state actors, neither Iran, nor Pakistan, consider each other an enemy. The puzzle becomes even more complex since the attacks at the memorial for the former intelligence chief, Qassem Soleimani, were claimed by ISIS-K based in Afghanistan. It is also noteworthy, the Iranian strikes in Pakistan came soon after the visit of Indian foreign minister, S. Jaishunker, to Iran.

Analysis

ISIS-K, Taliban, And Jaesh al-Adl,

There are some key plausible reasons why Iran may have decided to strike Jaesh al-Adl in Pakistan.

For some time, the risk has been growing regarding the level of collaboration that exists between Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Balouch separatist groups, as they both have been targeting the security forces of Pakistan. Pakistan has been consistently pressurizing Afghan Taliban to act against TTP that has taken refuge in Afghanistan. While the Afghan Taliban has acted against ISIS-K, as demanded by the US too, they have not exerted such pressure against TTP. This has strained the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The apprehension on the Afghan Taliban side is: if they operate against TTP, it is likely to drift towards ISIS-K.

At the same time, there is also the possibility that Jaesh al-Adl is receiving support from ISIS-K for attacks against Iran. ISIS-K has been expanding its reach and is responsible for a number of deadly attacks in Pakistan, and some in Iran as well. This is especially true when ISIS-K claimed responsibility for the bombings at the Qassem Soleimani’s commemoration. Iran must have deliberated on targeting ISIS-K in Afghanistan or Jaesh al-Adl in Pakistan.

In the past, Jaesh al-Adl, and it earlier version, Jundullah, was allegedly receiving support from US, Israel, and other Gulf nations. In the aftermath of the bombings at the Soleimani’s memorial, Iran gave less credit to ISIS-K claim and more to the involvement of US and Israel. In a tweet on X, Iranian president’s political deputy, Mohammad Jamshidi, wrote:

“Make no mistake. The responsibility for this crime lies with the US and Zionist regimes (Israel) and terrorism is just a tool.”

By striking Jaesh al-Adl, the impression emerges that the organization is once again enjoying some level of outside support. It could also be a signal to Pakistan to not extend any assistance towards targeting Iran.

The Role of India

Although a brief escalation, this recent episode has underscored the fundamental challenges Iran and Pakistan face in countering terrorism, with mutual distrust playing a significant role.

Both nations have long accused each other of providing safe havens to their respective enemies. Pakistan consistently maintains that India’s intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), is operating from Iranian soil, orchestrates attacks in Pakistan’s Balochistan region – and supports the anti-Pakistan Baloch separatist movement. Conversely, Iran blames Pakistan for its inaction against anti-Iran terrorist sanctuaries in the Balochistan bordering region, and for not taking decisive action against infiltrators into its territory through human trafficking and smuggling of weapons.

In 2016 Pakistan had arrested what it clams to be an Indian spy, posing as an Iranian businessman. There are different versions of how and where Kulbhusan Yadav was captured.  Indian media had claimed, Kulbhushan was abducted by Jaesh al-Adl and handed over to Pakistan’s intelligence organizations. However, in a confession statement made under Pakistan’s custody, Kulbushan stated his main task was to sabotage CPEC (China, Pakistan Economic Corridor) and create unrest in Karachi and Balochistan. For this mission, he was in touch with leaders belonging to Baloch separatist groups. Thus, India has already been a player when it comes to regional proxy games involving Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan.

Recently, for its support of Israel, Indian cargo ships have come under attack in the Red Sea, threatening its energy supplies. This has pulled India into the conflict as well and has caused it to send three guided missile destroyer ships to the Arabian Sea.

Conclusion

As the Gaza conflict unfolds, the focus has mainly been on the Shiite and Sunni non-state actors in the Middle East. The Iranian strike on Jaesh al-Adl reflects the complexity of the non-state actor landscape that exist in South Asia, particularly as it relates to the politics of Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and Iran. However, the Iranian raids and Pakistan’s response have connected the geopolitics of Middle East and South Asia – in a way that it did not in the past. This obviously will have far reaching consequences.

Sunni religious leaders have been voicing support for Hamas in Pakistan, and the group leadership has also appeared virtually in different rallies organized in support of Gaza. Speaking at a conference in Islamabad in December via video link, Ismail Haniyah stated: “If Israel faced resistance from Pakistan, the perpetration of cruelty could cease.”

The leader of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI-F) Mowlana Fazl-ur-Rehman even travelled to Qatar last November to meet with Hamas leader Ismail Haniyah and Khaled Mashal. He was quoted as commenting: “Palestinians are not only fighting for their own land but on behalf of the Muslim Ummah, are fulfilling their duty by fighting for the freedom of the first Qibla.”

The crackdown against Muslim Brotherhood under Sisi in Egypt has meant that Sunni Hamas has had to rely on Shiite Hezbollah and Iran for support, especially when Hamas and Salafi jihadist, like ISIS, hate each other. In the aftermath of October 7 attack, Israel has attempted to showcase Hamas to be the same as ISIS – but this carries dangerous consequences. Moreover, since Abraham Accords were reached, Palestinians also appear to be losing hope with the Gulf Arabs. In this context, Hamas reaching out to religious groups in Pakistan is significant. How will Iran, India, Israel, and other western powers interpret such outreach by Hamas is not clear. The longer the Gaza crisis lasts the greater will be the blow back – while also allowing for the potential reconfiguring of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The post Pakistan-Iran Cross Border Strikes, Gaza Conflict, And Expanding Proxy Wars appeared first on Politact.

Arab-Israel Normalization of Ties and US Middle East Policy

Context

With the normalization of ties between UAE, Bahrain and Israel, the so-called ‘Outside-In Approach’ to the Middle East Peace Process is now in full swing. Most GCC and Arab nations are on the way to normalizing of ties with Israel. This was predicted as regional situation dramatically shifted during the war against extremism, and as a consequence of Arab Spring. During this time, the threat perceptions of the Arabs have also gradually shifted away from Israel and towards Iran. What was the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, transformed in to an Arab-Israeli conflict, and now appears to have become Arab-Israeli versus Iran conflict.

At an event hosted by Atlantic Council on May 7, 2015, PoliTact’s Chief Analyst Arif Ansar asked the former US special envoy for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations Martin Indyk, about how the Iranian nuclear deal and the US-Gulf partnership can help or hinder the Middle East Peace Process.

Martine Indyk replied that the prospects of a solution emerging from an ‘Inside Out’ approach i.e., from within Israel and Palestine, and independent of whatever else is going on in the Middle East, are not good. However, the potential for an ‘Outside In’ solution which has emerged because of the possible Iran nuclear deal and Israeli and Arab countries being on the same side, might emerge with positive response because of the new strategic alignment in the region.

The regional and global shift in the balance of power have also played a key role in this evolution – and caries critical implications for the South and Central Asia – and the strategic ties of India and Pakistan with the Gulf region – and for Afghan reconciliation and Kashmir quagmire by association. While there is a time during which the balance of power is in transition, obviously, there comes a time when the power shifts decisively and a new alignment starts to manifest. This is exactly what has transpired.

While PoliTact has been writing about the waning American influence in the non-Arab Islamic world, it had continued to maintain its sway in the Middle East and GCC. PoliTact has also recently contemplated and examined a scenario that explores why US would even want to maintain its presence in the Middle East – as it is now self-sufficient when it comes to energy needs. Moreover, if the region was left to implode, the global adversaries of China and Russia are likely to be more impacted.

And as such there is no direct threat from the region to the US, whether it be in the form of extremism or WMD. While no such weapons were discovered in Iraq, any such threat from Iran was curtailed as a result of Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) reached in 2015 but later scuttled by President Trump. An argument can be made that the US policy towards Middle East now is mainly driven by protecting its regional ally Israel – and in turn its present and future allies. These new Arab allies will now likely take the frontal role in protecting Israel and could also become the main battlefield.

Future of War Against Extremism

The most used term during the Bush and Obama administrations that is no longer as popular is the War against Extremism. Several questions can be raised on why that is the case. Was the campaign won, the extremist ideologies that led to 9/11 eliminated, or were the organizations such as Al Qaeda (AQ) and Daesh (ISIS) dismantled. Moreover, what happened to the allies that were leading the fight against terrorists? The examination of these inquiries reveals clues about the emerging scenarios.

While the war against extremism has transformed, the risks to the Israel’s Arab allies are only quadrupling. The threats posed by the global extremists, such as AQ and ISIS and their associates, are only going to magnify after normalizing of their ties with Israel. After all the very premise these groups have used to inspire is their lack of action on the causes such as Palestine – along with allowing western military presence.

In addition, the dynamics of Arab Spring have been further aggravated by circumstances created by the Coronavirus pandemic and has limited the maneuvering space for many Arab states. Decreasing reliance on US for energy resources have left them further vulnerable and amenable to external pressures.

Nearly two decades of war against extremism has transformed societies and galvanized them towards nationalistic and conservative leaderships, such as Tayyab Erdogan in Turkey and Imran Khan in Pakistan. The political leaders close to the West, or needing their support, are no longer considered viable.

Global Power Dynamics

While the extending regional threat from Iran has been playing out in places like Yemen, Lebanon and Syria, the prospective China-Iran economic and security deal is a different ball game altogether. It has indicated that like Russia backed the Syrian regime, China appears willing to do that for Iran. And this is occurring at a time when Trump administration has completely reversed course on the Iran nuclear deal. It has exerted maximum pressure on the country to renegotiate the deal; now to encompass its missile program, accompanied by stricter monitoring, and wider behavior in the region.

The potential $400 billion China–Iran treaty must have been an ominous development from the perspective of the Arabs and the US. However, the talks have been proceeding for a while, and as has been the ‘Outside-In Approach’ to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has become an active player in the Middle East with strategic ties with a number of regional players, to include Saudi Arabia. As its influence increases gradually, it could become an active interlocutor between Israel and the Palestinians, and other conflicts of the Middle East. However, it’s not clear if China desires to get involved in the security affairs of the region, like Russia has in Syria.

Speaking at the Saudi embassy in China in July on the occasion of the 30 anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties, Saudi Ambassador Turki M. A. Almadi commented: “our relations are all-round, multi-field, not only about bilateral trade and mutual investment, but also extended to cooperation in the fields of culture, science and technology, and health.”

Zhai Jun, China’s special envoy on Middle East affairs indicated at the occasion that the bilateral trade volume between the two nations stood at $78.04 billion at the end of 2019. He added Saudi Arabia was the largest supplier of crude oil to China, and also the Arab nations largest trading partner.

Chinese analysts close to the government present a case the nation wants to be more involved in providing economic support than to get involved in security affairs of the Middle East. Nonetheless, it has good political and military relations with both Iran and Israel. As part of BRI, China has been extending its trade relations with Israel and lately US has objected strongly to some of them citing security concerns – such as the Chinese company Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) running a container terminal at the Port of Haifa – near an Israeli naval base that is frequently visited by the US Sixth Fleet.

If the China-Israeli economic ties are allowed to strengthen uninhibited, overtime China will be able to build leverages that potentially can undercut US primacy in the affairs of the Middle East. The Israelis disagree on this, stating that the nature of its ties with China and the US are of totally different nature.

Conclusion

While Saudi Arabia has delayed recognizing the statehood of Israel, and Qatar remaining closer to Turkey, the shifting alliance of most GCC and Arab nations towards Israel and the US represents a decisive shift in the balance of power – that has serious costs associated with it. Adopting the threat perception that centers on Iran, and without any clear give and take on the Middle East Peace Process yet, is likely to revitalize the non-state actors.

While China has made an economic entry in the Middle East, it has not decided to influence the security affairs – other than under the umbrella of UN and for maritime security purposes. In Syria too, it has adopted a non-interventionist approach and has supported the Assad regime.

However, economic leverages will eventually lead to influences in other areas. And China would have to use its sway especially when it has the most to lose if a conflict breaks out in the region. One measure of if it’s heading in that direction would be the establishment of military bases, like the one in Djibouti, and potential militarization of Gwadar port. And in this context, the Iran-China economic and security deal takes on an added emphasis.

The post The Future Of Middle East Peace Process, Extremism, And China-Iran Deal appeared first on Politact.

Context

Since 911, and even before, the world affairs are often linked to significant events that force upon a change from routine, while moving them towards a different direction. The often-quoted assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 is a case in point that directly led to World War I. Then there are natural catastrophes that can have dramatic results on the conduct of human affairs. The dinosaurs are believed to have been made extinct 65 millions years ago by either an asteroid impact or a comet shower. Our universe itself was created as a result of an accumulation of reactions that caused the big bang 13.8 billion years ago.

While the natural catastrophes are beyond human control, human beings can plan events to have certain impacts and outcomes. The risk is that sometimes such instances have the desired outcomes with known side effects, but at other times, there can be unintended consequences. The killing of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani was just such an event. The question becomes that while Qasem Soleimani, a state actor, had been conducting the activities he is known for a while, why take him out now?

While there are different angles to assess this, PoliTact has attempted to grasp it from the perspective of Core versus Peripheral Islamic world theory. What risks did Qasem Soleimani particularly, and Iran generally, posed at this juncture as it relates to the affairs of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. May be it was not what he had done up to this point that mattered, but what he could have potentially assembled as an experienced player – to challenge the newly unveiled Trump’s Middle East Peace Process.

Analysis

As previously noted that the continuing war against terror, plus the situation of Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Libya, have played havoc in the regions of South and Central Asia, Middle East, and Islamic Maghreb. This has led to ever escalating political, security and economic flux and instability. In this, the multidimensional relations of Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have taken on an added significance. As the chart demonstrates, the following four segments of this diagram need to be further examined, and juxtaposed vis-à-vis the influences of other global powers.

1. Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia

These three Sunni states have much in common. However, there views diverge when it comes to important matters of the region and beyond, to include Kashmir and Palestinian issue.

In fact, Saudi Arabia, including UAE, is competing with Turkish interests in Syria and Libya. As it relates to the Middle East Peace Process, Turkey, Iran, and Qatar have opposed the Israeli blockade of Gaza and provided economic support to the Palestinians. On the other hand, Egypt, backed by Saudi Arabia, facilitated the blockade by closing the crossing points for the Palestinians.

Turkey, in addition to Malaysia, has spoken out against the Indian decision to impose emergency and unilaterally revoking the special status of Kashmir on August 5, 2019. On the contrary, Saudi Arabia and UAE have not taken such a stance and have in fact increased their investments in India.

Reportedly, the Saudis exerted tremendous pressure on Pakistan to keep the nation away from the Islamic Summit held in Malaysia last December. Saudi Arabia feared that the conference of Islamic nations was an attempt by Malaysia and Turkey to develop an alternative body to the Saudi dominated OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference). The Islamic Summit organized by Malaysia, and backed by Qatar, Turkey and Iran, indicated a preliminary attempt to present an alternative forum. This endeavor was opposed by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt.

“We are attempting to start small, and if these ideas, proposals and solutions are acceptable and prove workable, then we hope to take them up to the larger platform for consideration,” Malaysian Prime Minister Dr Mahathir stated. He added, I have suggested that we re-visit the idea of trading using the gold dinar and barter trade among us.

While US ties with Pakistan have improved recently because of its active facilitation of Afghan reconciliation; US-India alignment continues to be a source of tension, to which now Saudi Arabia and UAE have also been added. Turkish-US ties are also not well despite it being a NATO member. This is mainly because of US support of Kurdish forces in Syria, which Turkey considers as terrorists. Moreover, acquiring defense equipment from Russia (S-400 anti aircraft defense system) has further aggravated the ties with the US.

Turkey’s relations with China and Russia can best be described as need based. China and Russia have both supported the Assad regime in Syria while Turkey had initially wanted to remove him power. Turkey has also been critical of the Chinese treatment of Uighurs, however, it looks favorably towards Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the One Belt and One Road (OBOR) Initiative. Pakistan is a full member of SCO and one of the critical tributaries of OBOR, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passes through Pakistan. Media reports indicate Pakistan has attempted to get the Saudis and Turkey involved in the CPEC related projects, while Iran has already indicated its interest on joining.

Comparatively the Saudi-US ties are at the best level, especially why when the Saudis and UAE have complete alignment of interests, to include their recent shift towards Israel.

2. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran

On the other hand, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have had very close and mutually beneficial relationship, especially in the post Iranian revolution era. Economically weak Pakistan has relied on Saudi Arabia to bail it on a number of occasions. On its part, Pakistan has provided security assistance to the Kingdom and presently is heading the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC), founded by the Saudis.

However, the direction of influence is more towards Pakistan. Saudis have used their economic wherewithal, and increasing closeness to the US, to keep Pakistan away from Iran, and now from Turkey. Moreover, it appears that Saudi Arabia and UAE and are now acting in coherence when it comes to the matters of Pakistan, which involves a growing tilt toward India. In all likelihood, the CPEC project, and the development of Gwadar port, will decrease Pakistan’s dependence on the Gulf State and this is likely perceived as a threat. However, the Gulf States will benefit indirectly from the Gwadar port since it would ensure the uninterrupted energy supplies from these states to China – incase of tensions in the Indo-Pacific theater.

Any conflict involving Iran will put Pakistan in highly vulnerable position, and force it to choose sides, and therefore it’s actively pursuing to avert war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. This picture, however, cannot be fully grasped without understanding what is at play in the greater Middle East.

3. Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia – The Middle East

Managing tensions over Iran, and preventing a conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran, entails matter more than just Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Both Iran and Turkey are nations born out of former empires, while the Gulf States were the outcome of opportunist positioning during the World Wars. Nonetheless, the competition between the Persians and the Arabs is nothing new. The Ottoman’s took the brunt of what transpired during the World Wars, and now Erdogan is attempting to reclaim its lost status.

Then there are the left over issues of the Kurds and the fate of Palestine that are complicating the situation. Kurds are divided between Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria and are the very center of the present conflict brewing in Syria and Iraq. According to some estimates, 12 million Kurds are living in Turkey, 6 million in Iran, about 6 million in Iraq, and close to 2 million in Syria. All of these states, especially Turkey, are worried about the future of Kurds and their own national integrity, especially because of the US support they have enjoyed.

Then there is growing influence of Iran across the region to include Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria. Irrespective of the Shia-Sunni divide, the Iranians have provided support to both the Shia Hezbollah and Sunni-Hamas. At the same time, Iran has also assisted in the fight against ISIS.

Thus, there is an overlay of pressures and tensions in the Middle East that are being exploited by the global powers. In this the Gulf Arabs, to include Egypt – and minus Qatar, have been worried about losing face when it comes to sensitive issues of the Middle East Peace Process. They are also concerned about the growing influence of Iran and Erdogan’s Ottomanist ambition that now extends to Africa. In Libya, UAE and Saudi Arabia are supporting Khalifa Haftar while Turkey is backing the UN backed Government of National Accord (GNA).

4. Pakistan, Turkey and Iran

This is the segment with the most interoperability with in the nations that compose it. Pakistan and Iran are both close to China, while Turkey is increasingly developing cordial ties with it. Pakistan has been a strong ally of the US during the Cold War and in the War against Terror, while Turkey is a NATO member. And one would suppose that this would make US, Turkey, and Pakistan natural allies – but that is hardly the case.

Ironically, during the early days of Cold War, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Iraq were all part of CENTO (Central Treaty Organization), also known as Baghdad Pact, created in 1955 and dissolved in 1979. Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran are also part of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), founded in 1985 to promote trade and investment opportunities. ECO was preceded by the Regional Cooperation and Development Organization (RCD) – founded in 1965. To deal with the energy crisis, Pakistan-Iran Gas Pipeline was supposed to alleviate some of the energy shortages, but due to sanctions from the US on Iran and pressure from the Gulf nations, the project has hit numerous obstacles and is held in abeyance presently.

While Iran has tense ties with the US and Saudi Arabia, it does not have such issues with Pakistan and Turkey. However, the ties between Turkey and Iran are not ideal, but they are better than Iran has with any Arab nation. Turkey has continued to receive its energy supplies from Iran – and if the Syrian conflict can be managed, this would significantly decrease their divergences. 

Conclusion

It is clear from the above discussion that the contiguous Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey segment of the chart has the most potential, and they are increasingly aligned with China. Iran is the lynchpin of this alignment, and other than its nuclear program, that is perhaps the reason for the consistent focus on Iran.

The removal of Qasem Soleimani is likely associated with this apprehension. Iran has developed a network of proxies throughout the region and has supported them across the Sunni Shiite-Sunni divide. Recent media reports indicate that there may have even been attempts to build bridges with the Muslim Brotherhood. And this would have been ominous for the freshly unveiled Middle East Peace Plan. Iran is likely to pose the most serious challenge to the new plan.

Ironically, the Gulf States of Saudi Arabia and UAE now represent the other side that are opposing any convergences to develop in the Islamic world along the above lines, while failing to take a balanced position on the Middle East Peace Process or Kashmir. Increasingly the nations have to mitigate the tussles between Saudi Arabia/UAE and Iran on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia/UAE and Turkey on the other.

The post What’s Next In The Growing Saudi, UAE Power Tussles With Turkey, Iran appeared first on Politact.

A media discussion on Voice of America (Urdu Service) program Jehan Rang, hosted by Behjat Gilani on January 31, 2017. The discussion examined the circumstances surrounding Pakistan’s decision to put Hafiz Saeed under house arrest. Hafiz Saeed is the alleged mastermind of 2008 Mumbai terror attacks. He is also the cofounder of banned group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and amir of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD).

Some analysts have interpreted the decision was taken under pressure from the incoming Trump administration, fearing imposition of sanctions. Others have cited Chinese involvement, which has been more involved in these matters at the United Nations Security Council – and previously blocked efforts to declare the chief of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) Masood Azhar a terrorist. China is preparing and positioning itself to deal with the dramatic change in the American political landscape. This step also addresses Indian demands to remove hurdles in the path of stalled Pakistan-India dialogue.

Strategic Insight

However the following angles are equally critical:

The arrest of Hafiz Saeed symbolizes continuity in Pakistan’s policy towards non-state actors, including those that are focused towards Kashmir and India. Pakistani officials have repeatedly conveyed to the US that it cannot target all the non-state actors at the same time, and its strategy is premised on sequencing. And this has been a consistent topic under the security and counter-terrorism strategic dialogue between the two nations.

The growing threat of IS/Deash in Afghanistan is raising concerns for China, Russia, Pakistan and increasingly Iran. Because of its involvement in Syria and Yemen, Iran is worried that IS/Daesh may attempt to open another front against it in Afghanistan.

This, in turn, accompanied by the uncertain US policy and growing Russian influence, is also pressuring the Afghan government and Afghan Taliban to reach some kind of agreement. After all, the continuing war there impacts the Afghans more than anyone else.

To reap the maximum benefits of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), it’s imperative that Pakistan establishes some level of normalized ties with India, and progress is made towards Afghan reconciliation.

The discussion panel included:

Dr. Yasmin Aftab Ali – Professor of Law
Arif Ansar – Chief Analyst, PoliTact
Mir Wais Afghan – Afghan Analyst

Listen to the Interview

The post Detention of Hafiz Saeed, Afghan Reconciliation, And Pakistan’s War Against Terror appeared first on Politact.

All the pieces are slowly falling in place; Indian election is over and that of Afghanistan is also moving towards a closure. Whoever is the new Afghan president, the candidates have indicated they will sign the Bilateral Security Agreement with the US. And President Obama has also finally announced the level of American troops that will remain there from 2014 to 2016, contingent upon the signing of the security agreement. Gen Martin E. Dempsey also stated a few days earlier that Pakistan and Afghan counterparts were informed of the US decision and both were satisfied.

A number of questions, however, have been raised; are the number of US and NATO troops to remain sufficient to secure the country in the next two years. Particularly, when Afghanistan has long maintained its security is linked to the cross border movement of Taliban from their refuge in FATA. On the other hand, Pakistan often says that stable Afghanistan is of utmost importance for the return of normalcy to their country.

In this context, the US gradual drawdown, the recent Pakistan military strikes in North Waziristan, the nations attempt to negotiate with TTP, and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit to India to participate in Modi’s inauguration, have all taken on added emphasis. Missing from this equation is the talk of Afghan reconciliation. These are obviously all interrelated events, and attempt to understand them independently will not be sufficient to grasp the overall situation.

Analysis

Status of Pakistan’s Talks with TTP

In this correlation, the first question that pops up is the status of Pakistan talks with TTP. Different interpretations have come to the fore in this regard. Have they completely failed and thus resulting in the military strikes? Or, is it related to the fight/talk strategy that appears to be a part of Pakistan’s national security strategy.

According to statements from the TTP side, the recent military strikes in North Waziristan indicate that the nation is moving towards a much-expected full-scale operation. On the other hand, Pakistan’s army has clarified the air strikes, and other actions recently conducted, are part of the retaliation to attacks carried out by the Taliban. Certainly ever since Gen Raheel Sharif assumed power, every TTP attack has been met with an immediate response. Meanwhile, western media sources are consistently pointing to the civil-military tensions on the talks with TTP, and that the military has all but decided to go ahead with a full scale offensive.

Another argument indicating that this may actually be the much-hyped operation has to do with the recent splintering of TTP. This has long been a goal of Pakistan’s strategy, including that of the US i.e., to weaken the connections between the various extremist groups constituting the AQ and associates. While some of these associates are involved in India and Middle East, others (ETIM) are linked to disturbances in Xingjian province of China. In May a series of violent events caused the death of about 79 people in this resource rich region that borders Central Asia.

Good, Bad, and Punjabi Taliban

An aspect connected to the stabilization of FATA has to do with the Afghan reconciliation and the classification Pakistan has used in applying kinetic force: the ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ Taliban. Recent events seem to suggest that Pakistan has now dropped this classification. If true, this represents a game changer. There is ground evidence to indicate that some of this is actually materializing, such as the comments made by the Hafiz Gul Bahadur after the May 20th airstrikes in North Waziristan. In the aftermath of this action, he was quoted by media as saying that his group was evaluating the peace treaty with the Pakistan government. Clearly implying his group had come under attack from the military.

According to media reports appearing on May 23rd that quoted unnamed security official, the target of the strikes on this date were the members of ETIM. The same report also states the air attack was in retaliation for the killing of security personnel and civilians across the country. On May 19th, A Chinese tourists was also abducted in DI Khan apparently by TTP linked extremists.

When it comes to Punjabi Taliban or India oriented jihadist, the ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ Taliban terminology does not apply, they have also facilitated and assisted the Afghan Taliban. The ties with India and the future behavior of Modi’s government will likely determine Pakistan’s strategy towards these groups. This is one of the key reasons India has been so involved in shaping the outcome of Afghanistan. The victory of Afghan Taliban there can translate in their reciprocity towards India oriented jihadists in the future, as events of the past suggest.

The Status of Afghan Reconciliation

A critical question related to the US/NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan has to do with the status of Afghan reconciliation. Will US withdraw irrespective of the political reconciliation between those fighting and the elected? The Afghan elections and the delay in signing the Bilateral Security Agreement have pushed back the political settlement even further.

Afghan Taliban has already reacted to the US status of forces announcement negatively. “Now that Obama has announced that he will keep around 10,000 troops until the end of 2016 and continue their occupation, Afghanistan Islamic Emirate condemns it and considers it a violation of sovereignty, religion and human rights,” a Taliban statement reported in the media said.

Coming back to Pakistan’s operation in North Waziristan

Pakistan’s operation there may not be the full-scale version with bells and whistles, as was witnessed in Swat in 2009. Obviously the terrain and dynamics of Waziristan is different. It could very well be the action-reaction format that we are presently seeing. Plus, the Taliban have already had enough notice to escape across the border. And in this regards, the future intent of Afghanistan and India towards Pakistan will become more critical. Meaning, will they assist in preventing this from happening, or will they provide refuge and then use them against Pakistan at a later time.

Thus the most important component of what and how Pakistan moves forward is dependent on the Afghan political settlement. Until the TTP is pressured, Afghan Taliban are unlikely to sit down on the table. At the same time, TTP will not settle politically before the Afghan Taliban do. Nonetheless, the political and military pressure on TTP may either lead to more infighting between various groups, as being witnessed presently, or it may simply cause the group to disintegrate into more splinter factions. This outcome is not without its own inherent risks. TTP is more of a fighting machine and never had the political acumen to build consensus amongst it various factions.

It is quite possible that US and Pakistan have agreed on the broad contours of the Afghan settlement. By which Pakistan is free to decide on what format to employ to achieve the objectives in North Waziristan and FATA. The stoppage of drone attacks may also be part and parcel of this understanding.

The weakest link in this process may be the present political setup, which may have to deal with the political blowback. This is especially true if the above strategy leads to a serious backlash from the extremists, with further impact on the economic prospects of the country. As Pakistan drops the good and bad Taliban distinction, the reaction could also become more versatile. This may be in the form of Chinese interests increasingly being hit in Pakistan, as it targets ETIM.

On the other hand, American talks with Iran related to its nuclear program are also moving ahead. With Iran potentially on board in the future, stability in Afghanistan can be achieved. This only leaves Pakistan-India equation and the dynamics of US-China relations to worry about.

The post Making Sense; North Waziristan Operation, Talks With TTP, Afghan Reconciliation appeared first on Politact.

These are interesting times indeed. Many of the international relations global norms and systems that have come to be accepted as the bedrock of stability, are in flux. Consider this for example; the Security Council (UNSC) in particular is being blamed for its inability to deal with the existing and emerging conflicts. President Obama himself criticized the body for its paralysis in tackling contemporary challenges, which are mostly intrastate, not interstate, and involve non-state actors.

On the other hand, the principle of state sovereignty and integrity are increasingly in the limelight, especially as they relate to the war on terror. Pakistan itself has taken the matter of drone strikes to the United Nations, and the issue was discussed in the recent meeting between Nawaz Sharif and Obama. Annoyed at the sudden turn of events in Syria, and the surprising US-Iran thaw, Saudi Arabia has blamed the UNSC for being dysfunctional and practicing double standards, citing principally the issue of Palestine.

The just concluded European Union summit raised serious concerns and resentment on US spying on its leaders. France and Germany have gone as far as to comment that the special EU-US ties are at stake as a result. The two countries, including Brazil, are hinting at taking the matter to the UN in efforts to establish new laws on spying and intelligence sharing.

As a result of the recent understanding between Russia and the US, the risk of a wider war over Syria has been averted for the time being, and direct contact between the Iranian and American leadership was also established during the recent UN General Assembly session. As the voices for reforming the Security Council grow, the shift of balance of power in favor of Iran has presented its own unique risks and opportunities for the Middle East and South and Central Asia.

Changing Middle East

While it’s too early to tell if Iran will join the Genève II peace talks, slated to take place in late November, and in efforts to find a political solution for the civil war in Syria. Nonetheless, John Kerry has stated that if Iran did, it would have to accept a transitional government in Syria. Or in other words, Iran would have to agree that Assad has to go. The US-Iran thaw, and the prospect of Iran joining the political talks over Syria, has greatly unnerved the Gulf States, so much so that the Saudis refused to accept the coveted non-permanent rotating seat on the Security Council. The Saudis are now posturing to take the hard line and using its leverages, including oil, to protect its interests.

What It Means for AfPak?

In this respect, Pakistan stands at an interesting crossroad. The country has played a delicate balancing act in managing the Iranian and Saudi tussles playing out in the wider region. In light of the recent shift in positions, the scenarios to ponder over are how will the US-Iran thaw impact Pakistan’s approach towards Afghanistan, India, and Central Asia. Will Pakistan’s react similarly to the Saudis, at the prospect of Iran getting involved in the Afghan reconciliation? The US has usually objected the most on Iran getting involved in Afghanistan.

Moreover, what will the betterment in US-Iran relations do to the Pakistan-Saudi ties? While one hopes Saudi Arabia does not take the shift in US position in a zero-sum context, early indications do not look positive. To them, the change in US position confirms its worse kept fears. The scare was first triggered when US pulled its support from Hosni Mubarak and then backed the Morsi government, albeit reluctantly. The Saudis now seemed to have confirmed the broad western strategy is actually about removing autocratic rulers in the Arab world.

While it’s early to say how quickly and how far US-Iran détente progresses, the Saudis could pressure Pakistan, and others, to choose a side. They can always use the religious card, which supersedes any political inclinations anyone may have. Saudis could push for its own nuclear program with the assistance of Pakistan, a matter of concern in the West. Moreover, Saudis could speed up the process of Gulf unification and defense cooperation. Pakistan has previously helped Bahrain in putting down the uprising there.

The Opportunities

For Pakistan, such a situation would present several opportunities. The nation may actually exploit tension in the American ties with Saudi Arabia and Turkey, to prevent Iranian involvement in Afghanistan, if it so desire. Turkey’s decision to buy the Chinese long-range air and defense missile system has raised alarm bells from NATO and US, with both registering their protests at the move. Using its good offices, Nawaz Sharif can play an intermediary role to ease Saudi concerns, in the very same fashion Saudis did when the US-Pakistan ties had nose-dived. Fearing adverse consequence, Egypt has already offered to conduct this role between GCC and Iran.

On the other hand, and contrary to what many may think, improvement in US-Iran ties could prove to be economically productive for Pakistan. Firstly, once the matter of rates are tackled, the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline could finally be completed. With Iran onboard, we could see a much more stable Afghanistan emerge, which in turn would have a positive impact on regional trade. Additionally, Iran could help the rapprochement of India and Pakistan. This, however, assumes delinking the region from what transpires in the Middle East, and reverting to pre-Iranian revolution and pre-Soviet occupation of Afghanistan kind of environment. This practically is not possible now.

Some rumors suggest that the ultimate aim of Saudi raucous on the Security Council performance has to do more with securing a permanent position for OIC on the reformed body. The Security Council coming under criticism from such influential voices suggests the process of reform may be about to speed up. And in this Pakistan could readily assist Saudi Arabia, worried itself about Indian efforts to secure a Security Council seat. However, for this to happen, the Shiite-Sunni tussles would have to be settled first, and this is no easy task.

The post Resurgent Iran; Implications for Middle East, AfPak, And Security Council appeared first on Politact.

Context
According to media reports President Zardari is planning to visit Iran starting December 7. The purpose of the trip is to finalize the details of financing the Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline project and to discuss the Afghan reconciliation. The two leaders also recently met at the D8 summit in Islamabad.

During his visit, President Ahmedinejad told Pakistani media that Iran has completed the infrastructure for the pipeline and the delay is mostly on Pakistan’s side. Iran has also offered Pakistan $500 million in loans and financial assistance for completion of the pipeline. In the past, US has strongly opposed the project and has instead pushed Pakistan to focus on the TAPI project.

On the other hand, a delegation of Iran’s parliamentary committee on national security and foreign policy, headed by Alaeddin Borojourdi, also visited Pakistan on December 3rd. He held talks with the Chairman of Pakistan’s Senate Committee on Defense and Defense Production, Mushahid Hussain Syed.

According to Senator Mushahid Hussain, Iran and Pakistan have common views and concerns on the Afghan reconciliation. “It is imperative that Pakistan and Iran work closely in the wake of the US pullout from Afghanistan by 2014,” Mushahid commented. Moreover, the decision was also made to increase cooperation and coordination between the defense ministries of the two countries.

Mushahid Hussain also offered support to Iran by stating that Pakistan rejects double standard on Iranian nuclear program, and that the issue should be resolved peacefully and without threats of force or intervention.

These dramatic developments have not gone unnoticed. Israeli media reported on December 3rd, the presence of a Pakistan nuclear armed naval ship Shamshir, at Port Sudan. According to news, the ship was to rendezvous with two Iranian vessels and conduct drills on the Red Sea. However, the alarming joint maneuver was averted under pressure from US, including Saudi Arabia and Israel.

These events took place as there are increasing indications that US and Iran will be holding direct talks. Some analysts believe that Iran is attempting to strengthen its leverages before these talks.

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