Context

Voting began on April 19^th in India and the results will be announced in the first week of June. With over 986 million eligible voters, elections in India have been described as the largest democratic exercise in the world. However, despite all the fanfare, the results of the Indian balloting seem all but a foregone conclusion. Prime Minister Modi has perfected the art of turning India into an ethno-majoritarian state over his past two terms in office. Modi continues to subjugate the minorities, while simultaneously working to turn India into a powerful Hindu state.

Modi is now seeking to secure a third term in office using the same playbook which enabled him to secure a landslide victory in 2019, namely by stifling dissenting voices, undermining the political opposition, terrorizing religious minorities, and acting tough against neighboring China and Pakistan.

Under Modi, India has rapidly undermined its credentials of being a secular democracy. Just because the country holds elections regularly, and its military does not intervene in politics, does not make the Indian polity automatically tolerant. In recent years, Modi has expedited economic growth, but inequality remains a major problem since the top 10% of the population now owns 77% of the nation’s wealth. Modi deflects economic disgruntlement of the masses by infusing in them a xenophobic sense of Hindu pride, which undermines the rights of all other religious minorities.

The inauguration of the Ram temple on the site of the razed mosque in Ayodhya, and the operationalization of the controversial Citizenship Amendment Act of 2019, have become overt symbols of Modi’s continued desire to repress India’s sizeable Muslim population. The Supreme Court’s decision this past December to endorse Modi’s revocation of Kashmir’s autonomous status has further boosted his image as a decisive leader who will not allow any insurgent movement, especially one spearheaded by Muslims, to threaten India’s territorial integrity.

Nonetheless, despite once being considered an international pariah for his role in the Gujrat communal massacre, Modi now rubs shoulders with the most powerful leaders in the world. Under his leadership, India became the first nation to land a spacecraft on the south pole of the moon. To top it all, Modi is now actively working with the US to help contain Chinese influence across South Asia. With these impressive credentials, most political pundits agree that Modi is likely to make a comeback in the next round of elections.

Pakistan-India Rapprochement

With India most likely remaining under the grip of Modi’s ultranationalism for another five years, and Pakistan struggling with multiple domestic security and economic challenges, as well as a crisis of political legitimacy, it is worth taking stock of how these two largest South Asian countries may respond to each other in coming years.

In the emerging geopolitical environment due to the ongoing Gaza crisis, the future of Pakistan India ties appears more challenging. Learning from Israel, India may also take on more heavy-handed policies and unilateral approaches.

The new leadership in Pakistan has at least demonstrated its intent to attempt rapprochement with India. The foreign minister appointed by the Sharif brothers recently hinted at the possibility of resuming trade with India, even though the Foreign Office then quickly reiterated Pakistan’s stance of not resuming trading with India till its government restores Kasmir’s special status. Despite these mixed signals, trying to improve trade relations with India is plausible. Cross-border tensions have not flared up between the two neighboring rivals since the past three years.

Pressure from Gulf States

The Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have strong ties with both India and Pakistan, also seem keen to help mend ties between these neighboring rivals. The UAE, is reported to have helped broker the 2021 ceasefire between India and Pakistan, and it has also been engaging in backchannel diplomacy to help improve ties between India and Pakistan.

The Saudi Crown Prince has also explicitly stressed the need for an India-Pakistan dialogue, during Prime Minister Shabaz Sharif’s visit to Saudi Arabia, in the bid to secure more Saudi financial support and investments. In addition to the desire to broker a dangerous conflict between two close allies, the Saudis want Pakistan to focus on economic growth and regional cooperation, instead of expending further energies on contending with India’s growing military might.

Kashmir and Cross Border Militancy

Indian repression in Kashmir continues to persist, and Pakistan has little chance of pressing India to walk back on its Kashmir policy, even if this mistreatment of Kashmiri Muslims remains a major source of friction. Moreover, on the heels of Canadian and American accusations of India sanctioning targeted killings of Sikh dissidents on their soil, Pakistan has also accused India of engaging in extraterritorial killings of Kashmiri and other extremist militants based within Pakistan.

The fact that India has moved swiftly to build ties with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and its suspected ability to continue aiding Baluch insurgents and TTP terror attacks on Pakistani soil via Afghanistan, also remain issues of major concern for Pakistan  While its recent hostilities with Iran did not escalate, Pakistan does need to focus more on its western border to prevent cross-border militancy to spark another crisis with Iran. Due to the broader insecurity emanating from the Israeli war on Gaza, Iranian sensitivity regarding the activities of Jaysh ul-Adl (formerly Jundallah) have increased tremendously.

On the other hand, regional experts have warned American policy makers to be wary of exacerbating Pakistani insecurities in the bid to bolster Indian military capabilities meant to stand up to China. The US is no longer considered a neutral arbitrator by Pakistan, which increases the risk of another cross-border crisis between India and Pakistan escalating into a catastrophic conflict. The danger of a terror attack in India, which is blamed on Pakistan, could quickly re-escalate tensions between the nuclear armed neighbors.

Economic Dimension

Besides these emergent security challenges on its other borders, which would make it very difficult for Pakistan to simultaneously cope with renewed tensions with India, the Pakistani economy is also experiencing major problems. Improving economic conditions in the country may in fact be the biggest priority for the country’s establishment and politicians, due to which resuming trade with India has become a more palatable option.

Pakistan was importing around $2 billion worth of Indian imports and exported neared $500 million worth of goods back in 2018. The countries suspended trade in 2019 after the suicide attack on Indian soldiers in Pulwama district which led India to revoke Pakistan’s most favored nation status – granted back in 1996.

Pakistan then cut trade ties completely after India revoked Kashmir’s special status a few months later. Thus, formal trade between the two countries came to a grinding halt and all cross- border goods must now be funneled through neutral places like Dubai, which significantly increases costs. Research by entities such as the World Bank suggests that fully opening up trade with India could increase Pakistani exports by as much as 80 percent, which could do wonders for its slugging economy.

India now has a much larger economy, and it is well integrated with other South Asian states, so it also has less need to normalize trade ties with Pakistan. Yet, given that India could significantly increase its exports by trading with Pakistani’s burgeoning market is also a reasonably attractive incentive. Currently, Modi is too preoccupied with the elections, but he may be willing to try improving ties with Pakistan under the Sharifs again, as was attempted during the last Nawaz Sharif premiership, over a decade ago.

Critical Pathways to Improving India and Pakistan Ties

In the prevailing geopolitical environment, India is unlikely to bolster the economy of its arch-rival without a wider rapprochement with Pakistan which would include Kashmir. Irrespective of who is to blame, the cross border threats from non-state actors to Pakistan, India, Iran, and Afghanistan – pose the single most potent risk to the region – and to the mutual ties of these nations. The recent spat between Pakistan and Iran involving Jaysh -ul-Adl, attack on a music concert hall in Russia in March linked to ISIS-K, and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) affiliated strikes in Pakistan, are prime examples.

In the context of great power rivalry, there seem to be two significant mutually exclusive pathways – with one leading to the improvement in Pakistan-India ties and the other towards deterioration.

1 The continuation of CPEC and Iran Pakistan Gas Pipeline Projects are unlikely to produce improvement in Pakistan-India ties – unless there is US-China detents of some sorts.

2. In the aftermath of the on-going Gaza conflict, the future of Abraham Accords is uncertain. However, if the two-state solution prevails – pressure on Pakistan will likely increase in the future to recognize Israel. With the close trade ties between GCC and India, this will likely improve chances of India-Pakistan détente as well.

However, if there is a direct conflict between Iran and Israel and the Abraham Accords dismantle, the pressure will increase on the GCC and Arab nations to either side with Iran or Israel. This quandary will be the same for Pakistan and India. However, the role of China and Russia would become paramount to preserve the Saudi-Iran détente reached in March this year. This is the context which makes the upcoming visit of the Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi to Pakistan all the more consequential.

The post Indian Elections, Future of Pakistan-India Ties And Centrality of Iran appeared first on Politact.

Naad-e-Ali Sulehria – South Asia Fellow, PoliTact

The ongoing cross-border military escalation between Hezbollah and Israel has taken a more aggressive and provocative turn, bringing them dangerously close to an imminent and highly destructive all-out war and a wider regional conflict. In a recent incident, an Israeli drone strike in Southern Lebanon resulted in the deaths of two more Hezbollah fighters with a total of 140, and over 195 Lebanese civilians causalities since October 7.

With ongoing tensions, Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, has conditioned any negotiations with Israel on ending the Gaza war, linking the ongoing escalations to the situation in Gaza. Last Friday, Hezbollah issued a stern warning that Israel “would receive a real slap in the face,” asserting its readiness to counter Israeli aggression endlessly. On the other hand, Israel has threatened to replicate its Gaza offensive in Lebanon.

If hostilities reach that point, it could potentially draw the US and Iran into the conflict. For Biden’s administration, a full-scale Israel-Hezbollah war would be a significant diplomatic and political failure with repercussions for his upcoming presidential elections. For Iran, the stakes would be too costly, as it would not only lose its strategic deterrence asset in the form of Hezbollah, but may also bring a full-scale war home, which it cannot afford to fight.

Recognizing the sensitivity of the situation, the U.S. is engaging in diplomatic efforts to avert war, proposing a preliminary solution involving Hezbollah withdrawing its fighters from the border with Israel and the Lebanese army establishing a buffer zone. However, Hezbollah has rejected this proposal, as sheltering its fighters near the Israel border has given it strategic leverage. Notably, Israeli authorities have managed to evacuate over 96,000 residents who live near the Lebanon border. Most of these individuals are hesitant to return to their homes, fearing the possibility of Hezbollah crossing into Israel and taking hostages.

With all signs indicating the expansion of the conflict and apparently no bargaining chips for negotiations in hand, the likelihood that Hezbollah and Israel would come to a peaceful agreement on Gaza in the coming days is diminishing,

According to the latest reports, Hezbollah is expanding its footholds in the region and has its forces on the ground in Yemen, helping to direct and oversee Houthi confrontations with Israel in the Red Sea. Through its regional expansion, Hezbollah has demonstrated its capability to open several war fronts against Israel. Siding with the Houthis, Hezbollah has delivered a message that they would not stop confronting Israel until it ends its offensive in Gaza. Israel has indicated that the window for diplomacy is closing, and if no negotiated agreement is reached by the end of January, it will escalate its confrontation with Hezbollah. This undesirable scenario could result in widespread destruction and civilian suffering, regardless of who claims victory.

The post Hezbollah-Israel Tensions Escalate, Threatening Wider Conflict appeared first on Politact.

Saudi-Israel Normalization and Beyond

Context

In a previous article we focused on understanding the changing geopolitics of the Middle East. Especially, the political, security, and economic interconnections between South Asia and the Gulf States, and one of the subsets, Pakistan and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This relationship has taken on added significance in the context of ongoing great power rivalry and China’s wider engagement with the Middle East, which resulted in the Saudi-Iran détente in March.

On July 28, 2020, PoliTact held a webinar to discuss the potential China-Iran $400 billion economic deal and its impact on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). China-Iran defense cooperation has been growing in the aftermath of President Trump’s decision in 2018 to unilaterally withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal reached in 2015 – which was a hallmark achievement of the Obama administration.

Moreover, additional Muslim states, such as UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco officially recognizing the state of Israel as a consequence of Abraham Accords, reached during the Trump’s presidency in 2020.These developments resulted in deepening of the contradictory pressures for Pakistan. On the one hand, the nation is China’s closest strategic partner, which was also expanding its ties with Iran. On the other hand, Pakistan’s other Arab allies, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar were moving closer to Israel.

In an event held on May 22 in collaboration with the Middle East Institute, the growing role of China in the Middle East was examined. The panelists had made the policy recommendations that US should not completely disengage or overreact to Chinese influence in a state of anxiety. Instead, the US should adopt a clearer approach to its political, economic, and security interests in the Middle East. Viewing US relations with its partners in the Middle East and Asia within the framework of great power competition with China may negatively impact the US approach and its interests.

Saudi-Israel Normalization

Progressively alarmed by the fast-moving dynamics of the Middle East and growing Chinese involvement has meant that the US administration could not sit idly. President Biden has launched an aggressive diplomatic engagement with Saudi Arabia, the country being seen as acting ever more unpredictably. At the same time, the changing politics of Israel is also a complicating factor as Netanyahu loses interest with the two-state solution.

According to New York Times, in at least two trips taken in the last couple of months by the national security adviser Jack Sullivan, Saudis have demanded a civil nuclear program in which they could enrich their own Uranium, not like UAE where they are shipped enriched material. In addition, they want a NATO style mutual security agreement in return for recognition of Israel. On the other hand, China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) has proposed to Saudi Arabia building a nuclear plant near its borders with Qatar and UAE. The move is to pressure the US to be more flexible in aiding its nuclear program.

According to a White House statement, Sullivan traveled to Jeddah:

“to discuss bilateral and regional matters, including initiatives to advance a common vision for a more peaceful, secure, prosperous, and stable Middle East region interconnected with the world.”

The gist of the Biden administrations diplomatic blitzkrieg is to keep Saudi’s from moving closer to China or Russia, build its ties with Israel, and coordinate against Iran. In the BRICS conference held in Johannesburg, Saudi Arabia and Iran were both invited to join BRICS. UAE and Egypt are also set to become BRICS members from January 2024.

Wider Implications

The normalization of Saudi ties with Israel would be the extension of the Abraham Accord. The recognition of Israel by Saudi Arabia would be a titanic event in the Islamic world – especially as it relates to the Core versus the Peripheral Islamic world. It would bring tremendous pressure on the peripheral Islamic nations, especially Pakistan which takes clues from Saudi Arabia when it comes to the maters of Palestinians. According to the polls conducted by the Washington Institute in 2022, public opinion in Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain that were initially favorable towards Abraham Accords have become less so ever since.

If a such a transformation is indeed achieved, a lot will depend on the scope of concessions provided to the Palestinians as part of the deal. Will it include a statehood for the Palestinians and cessation of settlements? With the right-wing government in Israel, why would it agree to any of such demands, especially when the outside-in approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has largely proven to be successful.

While most of the GCC nations are autocratic – a broken democracy still exists in Pakistan. Irrespective, under the present circumstances, Saudi recognition of Israel anytime soon, will gravely unsettle the political and security situation of the country, particularly if it were to be accompanied by economic and political pressure from Saudi Arabia, and other GCC nations, to follow suit. As for the timeline, President Biden would want an agreement before the US elections next year.

Pakistan is overwhelmed by domestic affairs presently, there is little bandwidth for a public debate on this fast-moving situation of the Middle East. Pakistan’s traditional position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was reiterated by its former Prime Minister Imran Khan presently in incarceration:

“Whatever any country does, our position is very clear. And our position was made clear by [Pakistan’s founder] Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah … in 1948: that we cannot ever accept Israel as long as Palestinians are not given their rights and there is no just settlement.”

Moreover, such a transformational step will also have a direct effect on the narrative of extremist organizations such as AQ, Daesh and their Associates. After all, the Palestinian predicament was one of the primary motivation behind why founders of these groups lobbied for violent means to achieve justice.

These extremist organizations targeted governments of the Islamic nations because they were believed to be complicit with the West, and with their support Israel was committing atrocities against Palestinians. Thus, if the justice is delivered, and is seen as such, this could pose far reaching consequences for the future of Islamic extremists – and for the relations of the Islamic world with Israel and the West.

It could also convince those groups that are active on the Kashmir front, that the rise of China could force peaceful resolution of long-standing conflicts – seen to be the unfinished business from when the balance of power shifted last. However, if the deal if reached without much public support or debate and is perceived as a sell off, it would pose tremendous risks for the future of normal governance in the Islamic regions.

This is what happened in the case of Libya recently, when its foreign minister Najla Mangoush met secretly with Israeli counterpart in Rome to normalize ties. The news of the meeting was made public by Israeli foreign minister Eli Cohen and ignited strong street protests in Libya. This caused Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah to suspend Mangoush claiming that she has acted individually and Libya feels strongly for the Palestinian cause.

The post Will The Fear Of China Aid Middle East Peace? appeared first on Politact.

Great Power Rivalry in the Middle East – What it means for South Asia?

Context

The New Cold War paradigm and great power rivalry framework is settling in and beginning to define international affairs. After Europe and Pacific, Middle East is emerging as another hotly contested theater between the global powers. While Ukraine has been consuming most of the media bandwidth, matters related to Iran’s nuclear program and Israeli-Palestinian conflict had taken more of a back seat. Nonetheless, after the War Against Terror, Ukraine has become the new pivot increasingly defining geopolitics, and meanwhile galvanizing NATO and EU.

President Biden’s visit to Israel and Palestinian territories in July, and then to Saudi Arabia, signaled that US aspires to reinvigorate its traditional ties with the Arab world – as it attempts to harness their support against Russia and China. And this was stated by none other than the President himself while speaking to the GCC during his visit to Saudi Arabia,

“We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia or Iran … We will seek to build on this moment with active, principled, American leadership.”

US withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, and from Afghanistan in 2021, gave the impression that America was no longer interested in the Middle East – a perception that was reinforced by mantras such as ‘Pivot to Asia’ used during the Obama administration (2009-2017). Moreover, Iran nuclear deal (also known as JCPOA) reached in July 2015 had greatly unnerved the Israelis and the Gulf States regarding the balance of power in the region and US intent.

After coming to power, one of the first nation visited by former president Trump in 2017 was Saudi Arabia. However, he withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018. During his tenure, US once again established cordial ties with Israel that have been damaged during the Obama presidency. One of the common themes that brought the Arabs and Israel closer has been the expanding influence of Iran in the region. Trump also applied maximum pressure on Iran. In a drone strike in January 2020, Iranian intelligence chief Qasem Soleimani was eliminated in Baghdad. On the other hand, Israel also kept the pressure on the country to stall its nuclear ambitions. The chief of Iran’s nuclear program, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, was assassinated in November 2020.

In parallel and on the diplomatic front, Trump administration worked towards improving ties between the Arabs and Israel, which culminated in Abraham Accords in August 2020. As a result, UAE, Bahrain, and subsequently Sudan and Morocco, also normalized ties with Israel. It was believed that Saudi Arabia will also soon follow, and according to some analysts, other key non-Arab nations, like Pakistan, are also being pressured towards this reorientation of the regional threat perception. The other key Muslim state, Turkey, already has normal ties with Israel.

Revitalized NATO

While Trump was exerting pressure on Iran, pulling out of the nuclear deal also alienated American European allies who had strived greatly to secure the deal. Moreover, not contributing enough towards NATO has also been a persistent source of tension between the US and its European allies. The Ukraine crisis has helped reverse this while attracting new aspirants, like Sweden and Finland, for NATO membership. Just before travelling to the Middle East, Biden was in Europe attending the NATO and G7 gatherings. One of the top-most agenda during the NATO meetings was to come up with a new concept that unites and define the NATO alliance for the future. NATO’s updated mission statement for the first time mentions Russia as the greatest threat and China-Russian alliance as a counter to its values.

While NATO looks to thwart Russia in Ukraine, Middle East represents the other flank. There is less consensus on how much time and resources it will take to achieve the goals in Ukraine and elsewhere. Disruption of supply chains and rising energy costs are some of the direct consequences of the conflict, including inflation, when nations were just beginning to come out of Covid-19 induced economic woes.

China- Russia and Middle East

China and Russia both have been extending their influence in the Middle East. The $400 billion China–Iran treaty signed in March 2021 must have been an ominous development from the perspective of the Gulf Arabs and the US. However, the talks have been proceeding for a while, as has been the ‘Outside-In Approach’ to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has become an active player in the Middle East with strategic ties with a number of regional players, to include Saudi Arabia. As its influence increases gradually, it could become an active interlocutor between Israel and the Palestinians, and other conflicts of the Middle East. However, it’s not clear if China desires to get involved in the security affairs of the region, like Russia has in Syria – as far as the Middle East is concerned. Soon after Biden’s visit to the Middle East, Putin and Erdogan visited Iran and discussed the evolving situation in Syria, and allowing shipment of Ukrainian grain through the Black Sea. According to media reports, Khamenei called for long-term cooperation between Russia and Iran and to guard against ‘Western deception’.

Chinese analysts present a case the nation wants to be more involved in providing economic support than engaging in the security affairs of the Middle East. Nonetheless, it has good political and military relations with both Iran and Israel. As part of BRI, China has been extending its trade relations with Israel and lately US has objected strongly to some of them citing security concerns – such as the Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) running a container terminal at the Port of Haifa – near an Israeli naval base that is frequently visited by the US Sixth Fleet. The Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had warned Israel in 2019 to reduce its economic and security ties with China or risk reduced security cooperation from US.

If the China-Israeli economic ties are allowed to strengthen uninhibited, overtime China will be able to build leverages that can potentially undercut US primacy in the affairs of the Middle East. The Israelis disagree on this, stating the nature of its ties with China and the US are of totally different nature.

Conclusion

Thus, Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia represents a push to counter China and Russia and meanwhile providing continuity to the policy undertaken by Trump, which resulted in Abraham Accords. At the same time, engaging and supporting the Palestinian authorities, and reiterating that two-state solution remains the best way forward to resolving the conflict.

The fresh engagement also envisions a new security architecture for the region that some have called the Arab NATO. During the G7 meeting held in the Bavarian Alps, the leaders also announced the $600 billion Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment program, seen as an alternative to Chinese BRI.

With their energy resources UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, have also come to play an increasingly critical role when it comes to the affairs South Asia, most recently exhibited in Afghanistan. Then there are the expanding Indian ties with the Gulf nations that have overshadowed the traditional Pakistan’s influence. And this change has undercut the financial support from the region Pakistan had relied upon in the past. PoliTact had covered this shift in a joint event with the Middle East Institute in November 2018.

The reoriented US engagement with the Arab world will also have a profound impact on the affairs of South Asia – and the present political and economic turbulence in Pakistan could be the direct result of this flux in Middle East – and surge of great power tussles there.

The post What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply? appeared first on Politact.

Guest Analyst Muhammad Siraj ul Huda Khan assisted in researching and developing this article.

Context

PoliTact periodically invites leading regional and global experts to understand the changing geopolitical situations and significant emerging themes. One such theme is the budding China-Iran economic and security partnership.

China and Iran are entering a $400 billion 25 year economic and security deal that would lead to enhanced military and trade relations. The agreement ensures Chinese investment in Iranian telecommunication, transportation, and military fields. The military cooperation includes exercises, intelligence sharing, and joint research and development of weapons. China will also procure its energy needs from Iran on discounted price for over next 25 years.

On July 28, 2020, PoliTact held a webinar to discuss the potential China-Iran economic deal and its impact on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The panelists analyzed the major developments taking place in the South Asia and Middle East regions and provided perspectives on the evolving situation. The theme has taken on added significance in the aftermath of US elections and with additional Muslim states, such as UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco officially recognizing the state of Israel.

CEO and Chief Analyst of PoliTact, Arif Ansar, moderated the panel discussion. The opening remarks were made by Ikram Sehgal, who is a Chairman of the Karachi Council on Foreign Relations, CEO of Pathfinder Group, and member of the East West Institute’s Board of Directors.

The panel included:

• Ambassador Mustafa Kamal Kazi – Senior Vice Chairman at the Karachi Council on Foreign Relations, former Foreign Secretary and Ambassador of Pakistan to the Russian Federation, the Kingdom of Netherlands, Republic of Indonesia and Republic of Iraq.
• Khaled Almaeena – Former Editor-in-Chief of Arab News and Saudi Gazette, CEO of a PR Firm, and Saudi Television news anchor.
• Claude Rakisits – Honorary Professor at the Asia Pacific College of Diplomacy at the Australian National University. He is also a Director at PoliTact and covers the South Asia and Middle East region.

The Webinar explored the following key questions:

1. What are the implications of the China-Iran economic and security deal on the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)?
2. Assessing Chinese influence in the Middle East region and does the China-Iran deal represent a Chinese pivot to the Middle East? Moreover, how does Chinese sway play out against that of India, Israeli, and the US in the region?
3. How the does the China-Iran treaty correlates with the Quad and Indo-Pacific strategy?
4. Will China use the Iran deal as a leverage in its dealing with the US, just as Russia has done?
5. History informs that Muslim nations or empires have often sided with one or the other global power – and then fought directly with each other. What can be done to prevent such an outcome in the framework of the present regional and global geopolitics?

Implications of the potential China-Iran Deal on China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

There are multiple angles to review this connection; that of Pakistan and Iran, and one cannot ignore the positions of China and the US.

Pakistan sees no negative impact of the potential China-Iran deal on CPEC. Former foreign minister Sartaj Aziz once stated that the Chabahar Port was not competing with the Gwadar port, in fact they were seen as complimentary. Media reports have also indicated that a road was to connect the two closely located ports at some point.

On the other hand, Iran is likely to see the Chinese deal as a blessing in disguise. Fearing US sanctions, Pakistan has been dragging its feet on the Iran Gas pipeline project for years, and India has also been slow in developing the Chabahar Port. In all likelihood, once the deal is finalized, Chinese investments will start flowing in quickly and provide immense relief to the much-penalized Iran. More importantly, the China-Iran deal would provide the strategic counterbalance to the American, Israeli, and Arab pressure.

According to Ambassador Kazi, the US withdrawal from the Iranian deal of 2015, and mismanagement of the multipolar world, is one of the reasons China-Iran economic and security partnership is coming to fruition.

However, for China, the treaty with Iran diversifies the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) providing it with another tributary. This is especially true if the CPEC route runs into trouble, or if the work slows down considerably due to the American, Indian, and Arab pressure on Pakistan.

Chinese Pivot to the Middle East and American, Israeli and Indian Coalition

China has been building strategic ties with the Middle East for some time now – in addition to the Asia Pacific, Middle East represents its other flank. Khaled Almaeena pointed out that the Saudi ties with China got underway in the 90s, as the Gulf region started to balance ties between China and the US. On the other hand, Dr. Claude Rakisits noted that the Chinese push westward is not necessarily a pivot, irrespective, the Iran deal will be seen negatively in both Saudi Arabia and the US.

Speaking at the Saudi embassy in China in July on the occasion of the 30 anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties, Saudi Ambassador Turki M. A. Almadi commented: “our relations are all-round, multi-field, not only about bilateral trade and mutual investment, but also extended to cooperation in the fields of culture, science and technology, and health.”

Zhai Jun, China’s special envoy on Middle East affairs indicated at the occasion that the bilateral trade volume between the two nations stood at $78.04 billion at the end of 2019. He added Saudi Arabia was the largest supplier of crude oil to China, and also the Arab nations largest trading partner.

Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has become an active player in the Middle East with strategic ties with a number of regional players, to include Saudi Arabia. As its influence increases gradually, it could become an active interlocutor between Israel and the Palestinians, and other conflicts of the Middle East. However, it is not clear if China aspires to get involved in the security affairs of the region, like Russia has in Syria.

Chinese analysts present a case that the nation wants to be more active in providing economic support than engaging in security affairs of the Middle East. Nonetheless, China has amicable political and military relations with both Iran and Israel. As part of BRI, China has been extending its trade relations with Israel and lately US has objected strongly to some of them citing security concerns – such as the Chinese company Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) running a container terminal at the Port of Haifa – near an Israeli naval base that is frequently visited by the US Sixth Fleet.

If the China-Israeli economic ties continue to strengthen uninhibited, overtime China will be able to build leverages that can potentially undercut US primacy in the affairs of the Middle East. The Israelis disagree on this possibility, stating that the nature of its ties with China and the US are of totally different nature. Nonetheless, the push under President Trump to normalize ties between Israel and the Arab nations can be seen as an attempt to counter China becoming an influential Middle Eastern player in the future.

When it comes to the Indian alignment with Israel and its growing ties with the Gulf nations, a different question is raised. How do these relations undercut the traditional support Pakistan has generated from the Gulf region?  In November 2018, PoliTact collaborated with the Middle East Institute to examine the political, security, and economic interconnections between South Asia and the Gulf States, and one of the subsets, Pakistan and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The report pointed out to how India was strategically undermining Pakistan, a risk that has matured now.

Commenting on this during the webinar, Khaled Almaaena stated that Pakistan’s position has been undermined by the negative economic and security news consistently emanating from the country. And this has been occurring at a time when India has positioned itself as an information technology and economic powerhouse, and by investing in Saudi Arabia that brought jobs to the Kingdom. He further added, the younger leadership of KSA do not hold the same kind of affinity towards Pakistan as past leaders had.

Irrespective, we can see an attempt to undermine both the Chinese and Pakistan connections in the Middle east as they compete with the American, Israeli and Indian interests.

China-Iran Deal and Quad Strategy

Answering the moderator, and as noted above, Dr. Claude Rakisits noted that the Chinese push westward does not represent its pivot to the Middle East – and how this relates to the Quad strategy is a different angle.

Dr. Claude added that Quad is meant to “keep China within its borders”. And as a counter, China is pushing US away from the first island chain by building artificial islands in the South China Sea. Moreover, China-Iran deal counteracts Quad and the Indo-Pacific strategy by providing China with a key footprint in the Indian Ocean, which together with Gwadar and Djibouti, enhances Chinese naval potential.

While Quad would desire to box-in China, conversely China wants to limit the Indian role in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, by keeping it busy within its borders. This dynamics can be witnessed by the present tensions and skirmishes on the Line of Actual control (LAC) and the Ladakh region.

Biden’s Middle East Policy, Iranian Sanctions, and Chinese Leverage

A related inquiry has to do with sanctions on Iran and how will China navigate them? Previous European attempts to build trade relations with the nation hit numerous roadblocks. As soon as Trump administration took oath in January 2017, within almost a year and a half of signing the Iran nuclear deal (July 2015), US started to build pressure on western companies attempting to build trade relations with Iran. As a result, even the $20 billion aircraft deal Boeing had signed with Iran had to be scrapped.

Under President Elect Biden’s Iran Policy, will these sanctions be eased if US rejoins the treaty? This will all depend on how the Biden administration re-engages Iran. Recently Biden has indicated that it will want to renegotiate the Iran deal to include its missile program, and wider behavior in the region; these were widely seen as major weaknesses of the 2015 deal.

This, however, will likely be a non-starter for Iran. The country has expressed it would not enter fresh negotiations with the US when even the terms and guarantees of the 2015 agreement were not kept.

A parallel concern is, with the ‘Outside In’ approach to the Middle East Peace Process so far along resulting in the Abraham Accords, will President Elect Biden be able to reverse it and thus jeopardize the present Arab-Israeli normalizing process? A more likely approach would be that the normalization process would have to incorporate the two-state solution under Biden – including a more transparent give and take by the Israelis – of the type that is frequently hinted by the Saudi leadership.

Irrespective, Dr. Claude was of the opinion that China will continue its dealings with Iran, despite the sanctions, and will push back on any efforts to restrict the ties between Iran and China. It is also possible that China will use the Iran deal as a leverage in its dealing with the US, just as Russia has done in the past. On several occasions when Russian ties stumbled with the West, it threatened to supply Iran with modern weaponry that could help it withstand any attack on its nuclear program.

The US Iran policy has circled around two approaches recently: the negotiated settlement was adopted by President Obama by signing the JCPOA in 2015, which sidelined the aggressive route against Iran propagated by Israel and Saudi Arabia. Trump took on the more militaristic alternative – moving away from the two-state solution, with wider recognition of Israel from the GCC and Arab States. The assassination of two top Iranian officials recently, Major General Qassim Soleimani and nuclear scientist Mohsin Fakhrizadeh, are linked to this approach.

The challenge is that a military solution towards Iran would be unacceptable for both China and Russia. Similarly, the reenactment of the JCPOA, along with potential China-Iran deal, will make China a stronger player in the Middle East. It could possibly utilize its clout to bring about Israeli-Palestinian agreement, which US has not been able to do alone.

On the one hand this cooperation between China and the US would be an immensely positive development that can bring about peace in the Middle East. However, this directly contradicts with what is transpiring in the Asia Pacific and resulting Indo-Pacific and the Quad strategy. And this also does not factor in Russian role in the whole scenario – and the interplay of the Muslim Middle powers, such as Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.

Islamic World and Global Power Tussles

In the past Muslim nations or empires have often sided with one or the other global power – and then fought directly with each other. And the question becomes what can be done to avert such an outcome in the framework of the present regional and global geopolitics.

Replying to the moderator, Khaled Almaeena pointed out that the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) is unable to fulfill this role. He added this requires strong Islamic leadership to prevent being exploited, commitment to their citizens, and rule of law. Moreover, he stated that ‘if Iran suffers, the Arabs will suffer too’. In his opinion CPEC can play a constructive role by being a bridge, ‘good economics makes good politics,’ he stated.

On the other hand, Ambassador Kazi was critical of the role the GCC nations have played in this regard and pointed to the infighting between the Arab nations. He noted that ‘what happens in the Arab world, impacts the Islamic world’.

Meanwhile, Ikram Sehgal added the role of Turkey is important, and one should not forget the Regional Cooperation for Development Organization (RCD) formed between Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey in 1964, and replaced by Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in 1979. He emphasized that Russia and China have good ties with Pakistan, Turkey and Iran, and that ‘constructive engagement can be a harbinger of peace’.

Conclusion

While Saudi Arabia has delayed recognizing the statehood of Israel, and while Qatar remains closer to Turkey, the shifting alliance of most GCC and Arab nations towards Israel and the US, represents a decisive shift in the balance of power. Adopting the threat perception that centers on Iran, and without any clear give and take from Israel in the context of Abraham Accords, is likely to revitalize the message of non-state actors.

While China has made an economic entry in the Middle East, it has not decided to influence the security affairs – other than under the umbrella of UN and for maritime security purposes. In Syria too, it has adopted a non-interventionist approach and has supported the Assad regime.

However, economic leverages will eventually lead to influences in other areas. And China would have to utilize its sway – especially when it has the most to lose if a conflict breaks out in the region. One measure of if matters are heading in that direction would be the establishment of military bases, like the one in Djibouti, and potential militarization of Gawadar and Chabahar port. And in this context, the China-Iran economic and security deal takes on an added emphasis.

In the long run, US would want to create a wedge between China and Russia. Since attaining self-sufficiency in its energy needs, the US interests in Middle East is primarily to prevent nuclear weapons from falling in the hands of rogue states, or non-state actors, and this this a goal it shares with Israel. At the same time, US would not want to lose its primacy in the Middle East, but to exploit the existing fault lines to further extend its reach – to the detriment of China and Russia.

At the same time, under President Elect Biden, there is an opportunity to move away from the zero-sum approach to world affairs – by reaching out to China for a wider détente and cooperation – and the geopolitics resulting from the Coronavirus related pandemic especially necessitates this. Reaching that stage, however, would require first a smooth transition of power in the US.

The post Biden’s Middle East Policy, China-Iran Ties, and CPEC appeared first on Politact.

Context

By Arif Ansar

PoliTact has previously noted that since 9/11 the threat perception of the Middle Eastern nations have transferred from being fixated on Israel to dealing with and countering violent extremism. A similar shift also occurred in South Asia, where the debate has continued if the threat Pakistan faces is primarily external or internal. More specifically, should Pakistan focus its defense and security strategies towards dealing with India, or fighting extremist groups that are specially targeting the country.

Despite years of effort, in the absence of political roadmap and deadlock on the diplomatic front, reaching a peaceful settlement to the perennial Arab-Israeli and Kashmir conflicts, appear remote. However, a new ‘Outside In’ approach is emerging in the Middle East that is equally applicable towards the Kashmir conflict and the Afghan political reconciliation. And it has to do with the change in the ecosystem in which these conflicts persist. Moreover, what appear to be the key challenges in the campaign against extremists, are also the key facilitators for the emerging approach.

At an event hosted by Atlantic Council on May 7 (video link), the author asked the former US special envoy for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the present executive vice president of Brookings Institution, Martin Indyk, about how the Iranian nuclear deal and the US-Gulf partnership can help or hinder the Middle East Peace Process. And now that a nuclear deal with Iran has been reached, this linkage is no longer just a hypothetical construct. His answer, and our research, points to the emerging approach.

Analysis

Understanding the Concept

Martine Indyk replied that the prospects of a solution emerging from an ‘Inside Out’ approach i.e., from with in Israel and Palestine, and independent of whatever else is going on in the Middle East, are not good. However, the potential for an ‘Outside In’ solution which has emerged because of the possible Iran nuclear deal and Israeli and Arab countries being on the same side, might emerge with positive response because of the new strategic alignment in the region.

Speaking at the Heritage Foundation, Israeli envoy to the US, Ron Dermer, recently commented along the same line:

“They used to believe the key to that [a rapprochement with the Arab word] was solving the Palestinian question, and there is no doubt that issue cannot be ignored,” Dermer said.

He continued: “But as the prime minister said a few months ago, I’m not so sure the reverse won’t be true, meaning that I don’t know if Israel and Palestinian peace will unlock wider rapprochement with the Arab world. It might be broader rapprochement with the Arab world will unlock Israeli-Palestinian peace. We should be focusing the next few years on how we can take advantage of this historic aligning of interests between Israel and our Arab neighbors.”

Key Elements of ‘Outside In’ Method In South Asia

As the theater for the war against terror expands unabated, the environments in which extremism persists in South Asia, Middle East and North Africa are also evolving. There are two particular impediments that are forcing the state actors to change their past policies towards non-state actors. These challenges ironically are also serving as the key facilitators for the evolving ‘Outside In’ method.

Multilateral Approaches

Firstly, without adopting a multilateral approach, it is difficult for any individual state to deal with extremism comprehensively. For example, in the context of South Asia, pressure on extremist groups in Afghanistan had made them slip over to the Pakistan side of the border. Now that Pakistan has acted forcefully through its operation Zarb-e-Azb, the extremists have crossed over to Afghanistan.

This reality has forced both nations to cooperate; especially when along with Afghanistan, the economic and security situation of Pakistan has also dwindled overtime. And if the trend continues, it would become very difficult for Pakistan to maintain its posture against its regional rival India.

Islamic State, Al Qaeda and their Associates

The other aspect has to do with the introduction of a new player in the extremist ecosystem of the region that goes by the name Islamic State (also known as ISIS, ISIL and Deash). While mixed reviews have emerged regarding the IS penetration in South Asia, the group does appear to be adding the pressure on different factions of Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. IS is aligning itself with those factions of Taliban that are against any kind of reconciliation in Afghanistan and the ones that are acting against the state of Pakistan.

If this pattern holds, IS is likely to undercut and weaken Al Qaeda’s (AQ) connection with its associates in the region. The associates are known to include Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, sectarian outfits, including jihadist groups oriented towards Kashmir and India. Allegedly, some of these entities are also under the influence of Pakistan.

In essence, IS can disrupt the traditional hierarchies and influences under which the extremist ecosphere has operated in the region and steal their long held platforms.

Transplanting the Circumstances of Middle East on South Asia

This can lead to a lot of infighting in a fashion similar to what is unfolding in the Middle East where the Sunni IS and AQ and associates are fighting with each other, and at the same time targeting governments of the region. On the other hand, Sunni nationalist groups such as Kurds and Shia non-state actor, Hezbollah, are proving quite effective in countering IS and AQ. Many claim that without the support of Hezbollah, Assad’s regime in Syria would not have survived as long as it has.

Recent reports indicate that IS has now also threatened and challenged Hamas in Gaza. Under pressure from Egypt and US, Hamas has cracked down on the jihadist that oppose reconciliation with Fatah and Israel. “We will uproot the state of the Jews [Israel] and you [Hamas] and Fatah, and all of the secularists are nothing and you will be overrun by our creeping multitudes,” an IS member was quoted as claiming in a video release.

While Hamas itself is a jihadist group, its struggle against Israel has been under the umbrella of Palestinian nationalism, unlike IS and AQ that have global ambitions and do not affiliate with nationalist causes.

There is a real prospect for a similar dynamics playing out in the South Asia region as part of the ‘Outside In’ process. In such a scenario, AQ and IS, including their associates, are likely to target the state of Afghanistan and Pakistan while at the same time attacking at each other. Some of this is already in play. As this evolves, and as is occurring in the Middle East, IS will attempt to steal the platform of Afghan Taliban, including Kashmir oriented jihadist groups.

On the other hand, India oriented jihadist groups may come to the defense of Pakistan, in the same way Hezbollah is now focused on protecting the Syrian regime and distracted from its concentration on Israel. In this context, the concept of non-state actors that are under some sort of state influence, and those that do not listen to anyone, as has been previously discussed in this space, has taken on an added emphasis.

In this picture, Sunni nationalist Baloch insurgents, would target both the state and IS and AQ. Moreover, the Baloch insurgents are likely to gain western support, as have the Kurds, in their fight against the extremists. This situation can add pressure on Pakistan and Iran to not target Baloch fighters, as they will be viewed as partners in the fight against extremists. This is the same predicament Turkey has found itself in vis-à-vis the Kurds in the Middle East.

As the sectarian angel deteriorates, the groups that formerly formed the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan could also return to action.

All of this will, however, shift the orientation of Pakistan’s policies and will make it view India and Afghanistan as allies against non-state actors. This is similar to how the threat perception of Arab states have shifted away from Israel, while at the same time made them share Israel’s fear from Iran and the extremist groups.

Conclusion

As this scenario and ‘Outside In’ approach unfolds, and faced with a common threat, is likely to change how the obstacles in the way of settling the Kashmir issue and Afghan reconciliation are viewed. During the first phase of the process, confronted with existential threats, will obviously result in transformation of long-held positions and policies of the states in question. However, its unlikely this would suspend the dynamics that would have been unleashed.

At the end of World War II, the insurgencies and other religiously oriented militancies that opposed the colonial powers, and their allies, were absorbed by the new nation-state structure, while giving birth to the irredentist claims that presently pose a risk.

Now that the concept of nation state is threatened, and as the extremist phenomenon undergoes fission and fusion, the question is what kind of new order will be able to absorb and deflect their energies. While infighting amongst extremist groups weakens them in the short term, in the long run, one or the other group may start to domineer. As was the case in the past, how these religious and insurgent groups intermingle with regional and global powers, will provide clues towards understanding the future direction.

Note: The above analysis is based on a scenario that explores the possibilities based on the trajectory of present circumstances in the Middle East. PoliTact will continue to monitor the situation and adjust the scenarios according to the developing reality.

The post The Emerging ‘Outside In’ Approach To Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Afghan Reconciliation, And Kashmir Issue appeared first on Politact.

Context
The events of the Islamic world seem to have come full circle. Major western powers are now talking about negotiating peace as it relates to the long simmering Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in Afghanistan, and perhaps Kashmir as well. The most obvious question is, why now.

The aforementioned conflicts are not the only ones to be concerned about. Many off shoots of the Arab Spring connected revolts can now also be added to the list, which includes Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Tunisia etc.

Previously, the Cold War pretty much consumed the Islamic world. In recent times, War on Terror, Arab Spring, and the risk posed by rogue dictators have emerged as the chief worries emanating from the Islamic regions. While the Muslim world has its own demons to deal with, the West has tremendous stakes in how these tussles turnout.

Over the years, western security institutions, such as NATO, have devised far-reaching strategies to deal with the broad spectrum of these emergent threats. The opposing forces, represented by the informally connected extremists, have similarly created their primitive and deadly across the board responses. Caught in between these crosswinds are the moderate, western allied, but dwindling nation-states of the region.

Lest we forget, this dynamics is evolving as western economic prowess continues to diminish, while those of others, keeps growing. This has serious implications for western allies in the region that may not be able to rely on the same level of financial backing as they once did, and despite their lackluster performance. At the same time, this creates challenges for the West on who to support next: the liberals, conservatives, or the moderate Islamists.

Analysis

 Why Now

The timing of this wave of peace initiatives from the Middle East to Afghanistan is peculiar. One of the reported explanations is; because Netanyahu’s new administration is more moderate than the past, and thus it’s more opt to make the necessary compromises. The other being, the application of force has not finished the job, and in fact non-state actors have now replaced the state actors as the adversary, producing even more unpredictability.

However, the most significant reason may have to do with the changing landscape of the Middle East. The transformation is so complete that what used to be an Arab-Israeli conflict is now simply termed as an Israeli-Palestinian one. This has been accompanied by a change in the threat perception of the region as well. While in the past most of Arab fears were associated with Israel and to settle the score of humiliations suffered at its hand, it has now shifted towards Sunni extremists and Shiite Iran.

In the past, Arab nations stood up against aggressive Israeli campaigns towards Palestinians, by merely rhetoric or by providing financial support. Since 9/11, the threat posed by extremists to these regimes, have changed the fundamental nature of the political landscape. The alarm from extremists and Iran has made the Arabs more dependent on the West, making their interests more aligned with Israel.

This caused Sunni Arab states to gradually loose credibility on the issue and this was most remarkably visible during the peace flotilla incident in 2010. The event fundamentally shifted the balance of perceptions in favor of Turkey as the champion of Muslim causes. The country subsequently terminated defense ties with Israel. However, the debacle of Syria has now pitched Turkey and Gulf States against Iran in Syria, and in favor of Israel and the West. In essence, the weakened and isolated Shiite Iran now stands as the only hurdle in the way of the peace process.

Political Solution, Use of Force, and Credibility

Other than Iran, Sunni state actors of the region literally abdicated, especially when Israel was unleashing its air campaigns on Gaza. Using its proxies, such as Hezbollah, Iran was perceived as attempting to counter Israeli aggression. Moreover, Iran also jumped the isle and started supporting Sunni Hamas when its traditional backing from the Gulf States was dwindling. The dynamics of the Syrian crisis, however, jumbled that. The new lines are drawn between Shiite and Sunni non-state actors.

The Sunni non-sate actors are the ones against which the war on terror is being fought. On the other hand, Iran is classified as state sponsor of terror while EU also recently added Hezbollah to its list of terrorist organizations. With extremist and religious forces gaining ground in Syria, northern Africa, and AfPak, there is a risk they may gain the credibility lost by Sunni moderate states. And, this is most likely to happen in the absence of any peace process.

Added to this scenario is the transformation underway in Egypt, where Muslim Brotherhood was recently booted out. Egypt has played a pivotal and key interlocutor role when it comes to matters between Israel and the fractured Palestinian representation: Hamas on the one hand and Fatah on the other. Just before being kicked out of office, Mursi had declared support for Sunni jihadist elements in Syria. This posed a dangerous prospect for Israel, as the tide could have easily turned against it in the future.

Conclusion

In the midst of this, the West is increasingly confused about who to back next. It cannot obviously support the extremists and it is therefore relying on the liberal moderate allies to sort things out. Moreover, the West no longer has the wherewithal to deal with the emerging threats directly or to support its allies in the same fashion it used to. This makes the alliances with Gulf States, India, Turkey and China etc. even more crucial.

The challenge is the liberal moderates have come to represent the force of status quo. This leaves the moderate Islamists to take the lead, but they are unlikely to fight the extremists in a manner the West wants. Jumpstarting the long stalled peace processes gives credibility to the secular and moderates and at the same time weakens the argument of the extremists. But, it is hard to imagine how peace will be achieved in 9 months when we may actually not have many of the existing states in a year.

The post Pushing For Peace In The Islamic World appeared first on Politact.

Context
According to media reports, the truce between Hamas and Israel is close at hand. These reports were emanating from Egypt even before Hamas and Israel stated anything about it. In fact, as of yet, Israel has not even confirmed it is negotiating and continues to threaten a ground operation.

Since Egypt is playing a lead role in coordinating the truce between Hamas and Israel, it is obviously the source of the truce hype. However, there is more to it.

The present Gaza crisis has put Egypt, including Qatar and Turkey, under considerable pressure. If the crisis prolongs, their credibility will be on the line. Israel knows this very well, so it will, and is, trying to delay reaching a truce. This will help it get more favorable terms. Moreover, as more players are involved in assisting the parties reach an agreement, Israel will use this to its benefit and will want to have a guarantor to monitor the terms of the agreement.

This puts Egypt in a tricky position. On the one hand, it wants the truce swiftly, and on the other hand it may end up bearing the responsibility for ensuring that the terms of agreement are not violated. Israel will want the country to use its influence over Hamas to stop the rocket attack from Gaza. Furthermore, Egypt will also have to guarantee that its territory is not used for resupplying rockets to Gaza. And, for this the American role may become even more important.

This is not to say that Israel is devoid of any pressure. Despite differences with Hamas, Hezbollah has offered to come to its help.

The post The Delaying Tactics And Gaza Truce appeared first on Politact.

Context

Iran was the central theme of a meeting between US President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on March 5, 2012. The two leaders exchanged reassurances of support each for the other; however their biggest difference of opinion remains how to tackle Iran.

The Iranian issue remains a strong point of convergence as well as divergence for the Israel and the US. US President Barack Obama met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for an extended talk at the White House, but neither appeared to budge from their underlying positions: Obama that a sequential, ideally diplomatic solution is best. Netanyahu that Israel will strike, the only variable is at what time.

While the Israeli leader did not back down on his talk of a strike against Iran, he did say it was no longer a ‘matter of weeks’ that the event will take place. He curbed this, however, by also stating that it was also not ‘a matter of years.’ So no action in the immediate future, but there is the distinct possibility in a relatively short time.

Analysis

First Things First

For the US, dealing with Syria, specifically getting rid of Bashar al Assad is a premium objective before tackling Iran. Not only is the Syrian situation more pressing, but ridding Syria of al Assad is also removing a staunch ally of Iran. With no view of a stable government being formed in Syria quickly, a country in disarray will serve US interests in Iran, especially as a country in chaos is perhaps more palatable than the possibility of a new government with the same sentiments toward Iran and Israel as the al Assad government.

The US is also keen to wind things up in Afghanistan before turning fully to the Iranian problem, particularly if that will require use of military force. The US will want to prevent being military engaged in more than one area, and thus being overstretched as well as overtaxing the American population’s stomach for war. There would also have to be a clear and distinct approach to any action in Iran, as Pakistan has avowed to side with Iran in the event of an attack, and so the US would no doubt be denied the supply routes and presence it has enjoyed in Pakistan to support the Afghanistan war.

Furthermore, the US and the EU are putting a lot of effort into their sanctions regimes against Iran, so they will be calling for a stay of any military action to determine how effective these new sanctions can be in coercing Iran into cooperation on the nuclear issue. Already some positives have come out of it, with a positive response from Iran to the EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton letter of invitation back to negotiations.

Ashton wrote in her reply to Iranian chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili “Our overall goal remains a comprehensive negotiated, long-term solution which restores international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program, while respecting Iran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.” Iran has also allowed UN nuclear investigators into facilities where they were previously barred.

This movement on the diplomatic side of the Iranian problem would be cause for Obama to offer very stern suggestions of patience to Israel.

Israel Not Convinced

Israel, however, remains unconvinced of the sincerity of Iran on any of the diplomatic avenues or overtures. And they have support from many in the Republican Party in the US as well. They are more convinced of the negotiations and inspections as merely being a ploy to buy more time for Iran, than a true step toward conciliation or understanding.

The question is, how long is Israel prepared to wait. For its part, the US has staunchly vowed to support Israel, and to support Israel’s right to self defense. Prime Minister Netanyahu reiterated this at a speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC): “I think that above and beyond that there are two principles, longstanding principles of American policy that you [Obama] reiterated yesterday in your speech – that Israel must have the ability always to defend itself by itself against any threat; and that when it comes to Israel’s security, Israel has the right, the sovereign right to make its own decisions,” Netanyahu said.

He further added “That’s the very purpose of the Jewish state – to restore to the Jewish people control over our destiny. And that’s why my supreme responsibility as prime minister of Israel is to ensure that Israel remains the master of its fate.”

For Israel this realization remains tied to Iranian nuclear capacity. Because of the anti-Israel rhetoric of Iran, Israel views their achieving nuclear weapon technology and the destruction or attempted destruction of Israel as synonymous.

While the Washington talks may have cooled the threat of immediate military action on Iran, perhaps the most telling element of the meeting was the gift Netanyahu gave to President Obama: A copy of the “Megillah of Esther,” a scroll detailing the story of the Persian Jews who overcame a plot by the Persian Vizier Haman to destroy them. This story is read to celebrate the Jewish holiday Purim, but its theme, at such a time is all too pertinent. Israel means, like the Jews of ancient Persia to overcome the Persian plot against them.

The post The Future of Iran Strategy As Obama, Netanyahu Meet appeared first on Politact.

The deal is being seen as a major breakthrough after four years of separate governments in West Bank and Gaza. The division has also been a source of complication in progress towards the stagnant Middle East Peace Process. Meshaal has stated that both parties are committed to ending the hostilities of the past, to resist the enemy, and achieve national goals.

The post Fatah, Hamas Sign A Reconciliation Deal In Doha appeared first on Politact.