Guest Analyst Muhammad Siraj ul Huda Khan assisted in researching and developing this article.

Context

PoliTact periodically invites leading regional and global experts to understand the changing geopolitical situations and significant emerging themes. One such theme is the budding China-Iran economic and security partnership.

China and Iran are entering a $400 billion 25 year economic and security deal that would lead to enhanced military and trade relations. The agreement ensures Chinese investment in Iranian telecommunication, transportation, and military fields. The military cooperation includes exercises, intelligence sharing, and joint research and development of weapons. China will also procure its energy needs from Iran on discounted price for over next 25 years.

On July 28, 2020, PoliTact held a webinar to discuss the potential China-Iran economic deal and its impact on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The panelists analyzed the major developments taking place in the South Asia and Middle East regions and provided perspectives on the evolving situation. The theme has taken on added significance in the aftermath of US elections and with additional Muslim states, such as UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco officially recognizing the state of Israel.

CEO and Chief Analyst of PoliTact, Arif Ansar, moderated the panel discussion. The opening remarks were made by Ikram Sehgal, who is a Chairman of the Karachi Council on Foreign Relations, CEO of Pathfinder Group, and member of the East West Institute’s Board of Directors.

The panel included:

• Ambassador Mustafa Kamal Kazi – Senior Vice Chairman at the Karachi Council on Foreign Relations, former Foreign Secretary and Ambassador of Pakistan to the Russian Federation, the Kingdom of Netherlands, Republic of Indonesia and Republic of Iraq.
• Khaled Almaeena – Former Editor-in-Chief of Arab News and Saudi Gazette, CEO of a PR Firm, and Saudi Television news anchor.
• Claude Rakisits – Honorary Professor at the Asia Pacific College of Diplomacy at the Australian National University. He is also a Director at PoliTact and covers the South Asia and Middle East region.

The Webinar explored the following key questions:

1. What are the implications of the China-Iran economic and security deal on the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)?
2. Assessing Chinese influence in the Middle East region and does the China-Iran deal represent a Chinese pivot to the Middle East? Moreover, how does Chinese sway play out against that of India, Israeli, and the US in the region?
3. How the does the China-Iran treaty correlates with the Quad and Indo-Pacific strategy?
4. Will China use the Iran deal as a leverage in its dealing with the US, just as Russia has done?
5. History informs that Muslim nations or empires have often sided with one or the other global power – and then fought directly with each other. What can be done to prevent such an outcome in the framework of the present regional and global geopolitics?

Implications of the potential China-Iran Deal on China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

There are multiple angles to review this connection; that of Pakistan and Iran, and one cannot ignore the positions of China and the US.

Pakistan sees no negative impact of the potential China-Iran deal on CPEC. Former foreign minister Sartaj Aziz once stated that the Chabahar Port was not competing with the Gwadar port, in fact they were seen as complimentary. Media reports have also indicated that a road was to connect the two closely located ports at some point.

On the other hand, Iran is likely to see the Chinese deal as a blessing in disguise. Fearing US sanctions, Pakistan has been dragging its feet on the Iran Gas pipeline project for years, and India has also been slow in developing the Chabahar Port. In all likelihood, once the deal is finalized, Chinese investments will start flowing in quickly and provide immense relief to the much-penalized Iran. More importantly, the China-Iran deal would provide the strategic counterbalance to the American, Israeli, and Arab pressure.

According to Ambassador Kazi, the US withdrawal from the Iranian deal of 2015, and mismanagement of the multipolar world, is one of the reasons China-Iran economic and security partnership is coming to fruition.

However, for China, the treaty with Iran diversifies the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) providing it with another tributary. This is especially true if the CPEC route runs into trouble, or if the work slows down considerably due to the American, Indian, and Arab pressure on Pakistan.

Chinese Pivot to the Middle East and American, Israeli and Indian Coalition

China has been building strategic ties with the Middle East for some time now – in addition to the Asia Pacific, Middle East represents its other flank. Khaled Almaeena pointed out that the Saudi ties with China got underway in the 90s, as the Gulf region started to balance ties between China and the US. On the other hand, Dr. Claude Rakisits noted that the Chinese push westward is not necessarily a pivot, irrespective, the Iran deal will be seen negatively in both Saudi Arabia and the US.

Speaking at the Saudi embassy in China in July on the occasion of the 30 anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties, Saudi Ambassador Turki M. A. Almadi commented: “our relations are all-round, multi-field, not only about bilateral trade and mutual investment, but also extended to cooperation in the fields of culture, science and technology, and health.”

Zhai Jun, China’s special envoy on Middle East affairs indicated at the occasion that the bilateral trade volume between the two nations stood at $78.04 billion at the end of 2019. He added Saudi Arabia was the largest supplier of crude oil to China, and also the Arab nations largest trading partner.

Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has become an active player in the Middle East with strategic ties with a number of regional players, to include Saudi Arabia. As its influence increases gradually, it could become an active interlocutor between Israel and the Palestinians, and other conflicts of the Middle East. However, it is not clear if China aspires to get involved in the security affairs of the region, like Russia has in Syria.

Chinese analysts present a case that the nation wants to be more active in providing economic support than engaging in security affairs of the Middle East. Nonetheless, China has amicable political and military relations with both Iran and Israel. As part of BRI, China has been extending its trade relations with Israel and lately US has objected strongly to some of them citing security concerns – such as the Chinese company Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) running a container terminal at the Port of Haifa – near an Israeli naval base that is frequently visited by the US Sixth Fleet.

If the China-Israeli economic ties continue to strengthen uninhibited, overtime China will be able to build leverages that can potentially undercut US primacy in the affairs of the Middle East. The Israelis disagree on this possibility, stating that the nature of its ties with China and the US are of totally different nature. Nonetheless, the push under President Trump to normalize ties between Israel and the Arab nations can be seen as an attempt to counter China becoming an influential Middle Eastern player in the future.

When it comes to the Indian alignment with Israel and its growing ties with the Gulf nations, a different question is raised. How do these relations undercut the traditional support Pakistan has generated from the Gulf region?  In November 2018, PoliTact collaborated with the Middle East Institute to examine the political, security, and economic interconnections between South Asia and the Gulf States, and one of the subsets, Pakistan and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The report pointed out to how India was strategically undermining Pakistan, a risk that has matured now.

Commenting on this during the webinar, Khaled Almaaena stated that Pakistan’s position has been undermined by the negative economic and security news consistently emanating from the country. And this has been occurring at a time when India has positioned itself as an information technology and economic powerhouse, and by investing in Saudi Arabia that brought jobs to the Kingdom. He further added, the younger leadership of KSA do not hold the same kind of affinity towards Pakistan as past leaders had.

Irrespective, we can see an attempt to undermine both the Chinese and Pakistan connections in the Middle east as they compete with the American, Israeli and Indian interests.

China-Iran Deal and Quad Strategy

Answering the moderator, and as noted above, Dr. Claude Rakisits noted that the Chinese push westward does not represent its pivot to the Middle East – and how this relates to the Quad strategy is a different angle.

Dr. Claude added that Quad is meant to “keep China within its borders”. And as a counter, China is pushing US away from the first island chain by building artificial islands in the South China Sea. Moreover, China-Iran deal counteracts Quad and the Indo-Pacific strategy by providing China with a key footprint in the Indian Ocean, which together with Gwadar and Djibouti, enhances Chinese naval potential.

While Quad would desire to box-in China, conversely China wants to limit the Indian role in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, by keeping it busy within its borders. This dynamics can be witnessed by the present tensions and skirmishes on the Line of Actual control (LAC) and the Ladakh region.

Biden’s Middle East Policy, Iranian Sanctions, and Chinese Leverage

A related inquiry has to do with sanctions on Iran and how will China navigate them? Previous European attempts to build trade relations with the nation hit numerous roadblocks. As soon as Trump administration took oath in January 2017, within almost a year and a half of signing the Iran nuclear deal (July 2015), US started to build pressure on western companies attempting to build trade relations with Iran. As a result, even the $20 billion aircraft deal Boeing had signed with Iran had to be scrapped.

Under President Elect Biden’s Iran Policy, will these sanctions be eased if US rejoins the treaty? This will all depend on how the Biden administration re-engages Iran. Recently Biden has indicated that it will want to renegotiate the Iran deal to include its missile program, and wider behavior in the region; these were widely seen as major weaknesses of the 2015 deal.

This, however, will likely be a non-starter for Iran. The country has expressed it would not enter fresh negotiations with the US when even the terms and guarantees of the 2015 agreement were not kept.

A parallel concern is, with the ‘Outside In’ approach to the Middle East Peace Process so far along resulting in the Abraham Accords, will President Elect Biden be able to reverse it and thus jeopardize the present Arab-Israeli normalizing process? A more likely approach would be that the normalization process would have to incorporate the two-state solution under Biden – including a more transparent give and take by the Israelis – of the type that is frequently hinted by the Saudi leadership.

Irrespective, Dr. Claude was of the opinion that China will continue its dealings with Iran, despite the sanctions, and will push back on any efforts to restrict the ties between Iran and China. It is also possible that China will use the Iran deal as a leverage in its dealing with the US, just as Russia has done in the past. On several occasions when Russian ties stumbled with the West, it threatened to supply Iran with modern weaponry that could help it withstand any attack on its nuclear program.

The US Iran policy has circled around two approaches recently: the negotiated settlement was adopted by President Obama by signing the JCPOA in 2015, which sidelined the aggressive route against Iran propagated by Israel and Saudi Arabia. Trump took on the more militaristic alternative – moving away from the two-state solution, with wider recognition of Israel from the GCC and Arab States. The assassination of two top Iranian officials recently, Major General Qassim Soleimani and nuclear scientist Mohsin Fakhrizadeh, are linked to this approach.

The challenge is that a military solution towards Iran would be unacceptable for both China and Russia. Similarly, the reenactment of the JCPOA, along with potential China-Iran deal, will make China a stronger player in the Middle East. It could possibly utilize its clout to bring about Israeli-Palestinian agreement, which US has not been able to do alone.

On the one hand this cooperation between China and the US would be an immensely positive development that can bring about peace in the Middle East. However, this directly contradicts with what is transpiring in the Asia Pacific and resulting Indo-Pacific and the Quad strategy. And this also does not factor in Russian role in the whole scenario – and the interplay of the Muslim Middle powers, such as Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.

Islamic World and Global Power Tussles

In the past Muslim nations or empires have often sided with one or the other global power – and then fought directly with each other. And the question becomes what can be done to avert such an outcome in the framework of the present regional and global geopolitics.

Replying to the moderator, Khaled Almaeena pointed out that the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) is unable to fulfill this role. He added this requires strong Islamic leadership to prevent being exploited, commitment to their citizens, and rule of law. Moreover, he stated that ‘if Iran suffers, the Arabs will suffer too’. In his opinion CPEC can play a constructive role by being a bridge, ‘good economics makes good politics,’ he stated.

On the other hand, Ambassador Kazi was critical of the role the GCC nations have played in this regard and pointed to the infighting between the Arab nations. He noted that ‘what happens in the Arab world, impacts the Islamic world’.

Meanwhile, Ikram Sehgal added the role of Turkey is important, and one should not forget the Regional Cooperation for Development Organization (RCD) formed between Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey in 1964, and replaced by Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in 1979. He emphasized that Russia and China have good ties with Pakistan, Turkey and Iran, and that ‘constructive engagement can be a harbinger of peace’.

Conclusion

While Saudi Arabia has delayed recognizing the statehood of Israel, and while Qatar remains closer to Turkey, the shifting alliance of most GCC and Arab nations towards Israel and the US, represents a decisive shift in the balance of power. Adopting the threat perception that centers on Iran, and without any clear give and take from Israel in the context of Abraham Accords, is likely to revitalize the message of non-state actors.

While China has made an economic entry in the Middle East, it has not decided to influence the security affairs – other than under the umbrella of UN and for maritime security purposes. In Syria too, it has adopted a non-interventionist approach and has supported the Assad regime.

However, economic leverages will eventually lead to influences in other areas. And China would have to utilize its sway – especially when it has the most to lose if a conflict breaks out in the region. One measure of if matters are heading in that direction would be the establishment of military bases, like the one in Djibouti, and potential militarization of Gawadar and Chabahar port. And in this context, the China-Iran economic and security deal takes on an added emphasis.

In the long run, US would want to create a wedge between China and Russia. Since attaining self-sufficiency in its energy needs, the US interests in Middle East is primarily to prevent nuclear weapons from falling in the hands of rogue states, or non-state actors, and this this a goal it shares with Israel. At the same time, US would not want to lose its primacy in the Middle East, but to exploit the existing fault lines to further extend its reach – to the detriment of China and Russia.

At the same time, under President Elect Biden, there is an opportunity to move away from the zero-sum approach to world affairs – by reaching out to China for a wider détente and cooperation – and the geopolitics resulting from the Coronavirus related pandemic especially necessitates this. Reaching that stage, however, would require first a smooth transition of power in the US.

The post Biden’s Middle East Policy, China-Iran Ties, and CPEC appeared first on Politact.

By Arif Ansar

Context

In an endeavor to decipher the emerging geopolitical realities, PoliTact occasionally partners with leading thought centers to understand the multi faceted tangents of a particular theme. On November 16, 2018 PoliTact collaborated with the Middle East Institute to examine the political, security, and economic interconnections between South Asia and the Gulf States, and one of the subsets, Pakistan and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). While this interrelationship is not new, it is likely to become more pronounced in the future.

Dr. Marvin Weinbaum, Director for Pakistan, Afghanistan Studies Center at the Middle East Institute, moderated the panel discussion. The panel included:

– Ambassador Gerald Feierstein – Director for government relations, policy and programs, at the Middle East Institute and US ambassador to Yemen from 2010-2013.

– Ambassador Richard Olson – The former US ambassador to Pakistan and Special Representative for Afghanistan, Pakistan. Former ambassador to UAE (2008-2011).

– Shamila Chaudhary – Senior South Asia fellow at the New America Foundation and former director for Pakistan and Afghanistan at the National Security Council, White House (2010-2011).

– Shehryar Fazli is a Political Analyst and Consultant at the World Bank.

This discussion explored the following key questions:

– Can Pakistan play a Mediating role in Yemen and other Middle East conflicts?

– Is Saudi Arabia joining China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and what are the        implications?

– How is Pakistan managing the Saudi-Iran tensions and what is the future of this delicate balancing role?

– How is the GCC influence likely to play out in Pakistan’s policies?

– Do China and Pakistan have a common approach towards the Middle East?

– What is the role of India in this changing dynamics?

– What are the implications for the US policy in the region – and how are US policies impacting Pakistan’s posture?

– How are the policies of PTI led government in Pakistan shaping up towards GCC?

Analysis

The Connection of South Asia and Gulf States

As mentioned above, PoliTact has been analyzing the connection between the political dynamics of the Middle East and South Asia. As the situation of Middle East has been deteriorating gradually, we have contended that sooner or later it is likely to intersect and influence conflicts such as Afghanistan and Kashmir that have been boiling in the South and Central Asian theater.

The key question is what is the direction of this impact – meaning do the affairs of South Asia influence the Middle East more or vice versa? PoliTact has contended that this trajectory flows and is influenced more from the Middle East towards South Asia.

The panelists however had a varied view on the connection between the two regions. Ambassador Olson noted that this interconnectivity is not new but the Imran Khan led government is a new factor in this dynamics. However, Shamila Chaudhary took a slightly different angle to examine the geopolitical significance of this relation, and pointed out that the right questions were not being posed when it comes to this linkage. For example, how does Pakistan look at the Middle East and the role of Non-State-Actors?

But what about the other part of the equation, the influence of Gulf region on Pakistan and India – especially if Iran and Saudi rivalry becomes more intense.

Chaudhary stressed that Gulf region has been very involved in the Afghan issue and to some extent Pakistan desires this. Moreover, she emphasized the role of Pakistan’s Shiite population as a balancing act when it comes to Pakistan’s ties with Iran.

Ambassador Fierestein, however, added that there is no question if tensions continue to grow between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the Saudis would look to Pakistan to protect their interests, and it would become very difficult for Pakistan to balance its domestic pressures and foreign policy. Sheryar Fazli added that Iran Pakistan Pipeline is already one of the causality of this tension. If something major happens between Iran and Saudi Arabia, there are no good options for Pakistan.

Ambassador Olson observed that the recent security changes pose existential threats for the Gulf region and the stakes are much higher, and this will lead to greater pressure on Pakistan to make unpleasant choices. To which Ambassador Feierstein posed a hypothetical question: what could be the situation when Gulf States decide to call on allies like Pakistan. He assumed that it could be when Gulf States think that they cannot handle the circumstances on their own, or with US help.

What is the Role of India? 

Then there are the growing ties between India and the Gulf States and how this might impact Pakistan. Ambassador Olson stated that similar to the approach adopted by the US towards Pakistan-India ties, the Gulf States have also embraced a de-hyphenated approach towards the two nuclear South Asian states. The Gulf States are building economic ties with India – but this is not at the cost of Pakistan.

Shamila Chaudhary laid out how Indian analysts view policy towards the Gulf States, which is based on the principles of being “Non-Intrusive, Non-judgmental, and Not-taking sides”. She went on to add that Pakistan does need to pay attention to the growing nexus between India and the Gulf States, especially when its transitioning from purely economic and in to security and defense domains. Moreover, unlike Pakistan, India has no interventionist or mediatory interests in the Middle East.

Nonetheless, India wants to be a member of any reformed UN Security Council, and that may be one of the reasons for its enhanced ties with the Gulf States. It also assists in building leverage against Pakistan’s good ties with the Gulf States. The panelists overlooked that like India, the ties of Gulf States are also maturing with Israel. This dynamics will push Pakistan to review the nature of its ties with Israel, and long standing point of contentions with India.

Balancing the Saudi-Iran Ties 

Now coming to the issues that represent the fault lines between Iran and Saudi Arabia, primarily Yemen and the extending arc of Iranian influence in the Middle East, accompanied by the threat posed by the Non-State-Actors.

Shamila Chaudhary thought that Yemen was not that big of a deal between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, but Ambassador Feierstein disagreed with this assertion. He complemented Pakistan that it has performed the balancing act between Saudi Arabia and Iran very nicely up to this point.

According to Ambassador Olson, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sarif was vetoed for getting military involved in the Yemen conflict, despite Saudi insistence. Moreover, Pakistan’s military is acutely aware of the sensitivities of its Shite-Sunni composition. So Pakistan would not want to get involved in any conflict with Iran, nor will it want to get in the position of choosing.

However, Chaudhary opined that many of the Non-State-Actors have the support of private networks and are now operating beyond state influence, and their actions have policy implications.

On the other hand, Ambassador Feierstein stated that UAE and the Saudis are taking a more assertive stance and asking its allies to choose sides. In this environment, Pakistan will be forced to choose but it will not want to. And this explains why the new PTI led government in Pakistan wants to mediate in Yemen, and to prevent the eventuality where it will have to choose between Iran and Saudi Arabia. However, Ambassador Feierstein was vehement that Pakistan will not, and neither will be asked, to mediate in Yemen or beyond, because it is seen to have a client status with Saudi Arabia.

Obviously, the interrelated question is how will Iran respond if Pakistan was to completely side with the Saudis. According to Fazli, Iran withdrew its support from Baluchistan based proxies in the past but some level of Iranian support does exist in the Kurram tribal area. Additionally, Pakistan considers its Shiite population getting involved in the Iraq and Syria conflict as a potential threat.

Role of China and Saudi Involvement in CPEC

The South Asia and Gulf connection cannot be fully understood without also considering how these regions fit in the tussles of the emerging and established powers. In this regard while US seems to be withdrawing, China, in addition to its economic partnerships, is also increasing its security role.

However, Ambassador Olson considers Saudi interest in Pakistan and CPEC two distinct matters, and that Chinese Belt and Road Initiative is more about exporting Chinese excess capacity. He commented the US had tried to connect American companies with CPEC during his time as Pakistan’s Ambassador, but the attempts were not fruitful ‘just because of the way CPEC works.’ While the Saudis have decided to help Pakistan financially, it may not want to get involved in opportunities related to CPEC. He added US was unlikely to lend its traditional support for the IMF assistance to Pakistan.

On the contrary, Shamila Chaudhary considered it to be strategic for everyone to be aligning with China. The discussion about the Saudis interest in CPEC was taking place just about the time when Pakistan was considering seeking assistance from IMF. Chaudhary added that US has helped in building regional connectivity in South and Central Asia, and now it is getting less involved in the region, and is watching the developments from outside ‘a little grudgingly.’

However, Ambassador Feierstein thought Pakistan and China ties couldn’t be understood in isolation. China’s security role is increasing in the wider region and Pakistan may facilitate ties between the Gulf States and the Chinese. The Saudi king also visited China in 2017 and efforts are underway to link the Saudi Vision 2030 with the Chinese BRI.

At the same time, China has also been growing its security presence and may develop an airbase in Pakistan, in addition to its support for Gwadar and military facilities in Djibouti. China wants to protect the sea lines of access and routes for the Saudi oil, and the BRI path also passes through the Red Sea.

Meanwhile Sheryar Fazli pointed out to the risks if Saudis were to put the oil refineries close to the border with Iran where Baluch insurgency, Lashkare Jhangvi, and Jundullah could threaten Saudi interests.

The Impact of US Policies on Pakistan’s Approach 

The other important question to examine is how are the policies of the US government impacting Pakistan’s outlook for the Middle East.

According to Ambassador Feierstein, diminishing US role in the Middle East is pushing other global powers to fill the vacuum and has encouraged an enhanced engagement by the Russians and the Chinese. Moreover, this is also acting as a catalyst for more aggressive actions by the Saudis and the UAE, which has been demanded by previous US administrations to counter extremists. And this is where Pakistan’s security engagement with the Saudis fits in. However, the US approach towards Iran, creates a challenge for Pakistan’s balancing role in the Middle East.

On the other hand, Ambassador Olson pointed out that it would be important to watch how US frames its policy towards IMF assistance to Pakistan and address the Chinese influence. And this may be a test case for how US will respond to BRI related indebtedness generally.

He further opined that US’s hard line approach towards Pakistan has peaked and is now probably has to recede – especially when US needs the country to bring about a political settlement in Afghanistan, and that is also a geographic reality.

The moderator, Dr. Weinbaum commented that another scenario to look out for is if the attempts towards Afghan reconciliation fail and how that may play out in the region.

New Government in Pakistan and its Foreign Policy 

Another interesting aspect to consider is what difference will PTI led Pakistan government will make. Will there be continuity in Pakistan’s policies and its posture towards the Gulf region or will there be disruption.

Fazli claimed that Imran has continued the policies of the past, and some of this is dictated by the dire fiscal condition of the country. There was no surprise that Imran’s first official visit was to Saudi Arabia. In his fiscal approach, he wants to lessen the dependence on the West and IMF.

However, a critical point to watch out would be PTI’s relation with the opposition, and political stability in Pakistan, when it has a very narrow majority. Chaudhary added, that what we are realizing is that many of Pakistan’s challenges are systemic and are not going to be solved by one person. When it comes to foreign policy and Middle East, Imran has the least influence.

Ambassador Olson also commented the Prime Minister in Pakistan has more authority in the domain of economic, education, health and social programs, and the least in the arena of foreign policy, where the military dominates. So he contended, and countered Fazli that it’s not the relation with the opposition, but PTI’s relation with the military, or the civilian-military relations, that will be crucial. Because of Imran’s personality, a clash could eventually develop, especially if he asserts independence from the military. As it relates to UAE, the nations was closer to the Bhutto’s, while Nawaz Sharif was nearer to the Saudis, and Imran is an unknown entity. 

Conclusion

One of the significant considerations as it relates to the connection between the Gulf States and Pakistan is the rapid pace of change in the variables that were once considered to be the constants. Now we are seeing diminishing US involvement in the region, independent government in Pakistan, and unpredictable young leadership in Saudi Arabia.

In this environment, the Pakistan’s security connection with the Middle East is likely to take on added significance. The offering of economic aid by Saudi Arabia and UAE to Pakistan is part of the emerging circumstances, where their leverage is growing over Pakistan. And this most likely is also out of concern to mitigate any Pakistani tilt towards Iran.

Recent events indicate that Afghan peace talks now involve UAE and Saudi Arabia, which previously centered around the Qataris. Moreover, the closeness of the Gulf States to the US also creates a unique twist for Pakistan. It was in this context that the author asked the panel about the significance of the potential Arab NATO alliance, seemingly with US support, and how this correlates with the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC). The IMCTC was formed by Saudi Arabia and is headed by Pakistan’s retired military chief. This potentially is a point of convergence between the Gulf States, US, and Pakistan.

The post Examining Saudi-Iran Tensions And Its Impact On South Asia, China appeared first on Politact.

Context

Pakistani officials have stated recently that they will conduct an operation in the North Waziristan Agency, however the country has also emphasized that only it will decide on the timing. Two irritants continue to haunt the relationship between US and Pakistan, which has otherwise improved since the Pakistani military carried out a number of small and large-scale military offensives across the country, mainly against Pakistani Taliban (TTP). The irritants from the Pakistan side have to do with enhancing the capability of its Army to take on additional military operations, while from the US side the annoyance is linked to allegations of duplicity and deceit. These have been leveled at the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies by Western scholars, think tanks and officials.

At an elementary level however, the trouble remains the divergence of threat perceptions of the two countries. As the Afghan war enters a decisive stage, a number of tectonic shifts are taking place, represented recently by the departure of General McChrystal. Apparently, the cause was disrespecting the civilian authority but appearances are often misleading. The main tension boils down to whether the Afghan conflict will require a predominately military or a political solution.

Analysis

The Pakistani forces have been trained for conventional warfare with India in deserts and plains of the Punjab and Sindh provinces. This is the first time that several divisions of the army are engaged in the mountainous areas of the North West Frontier Province, now called the Khyber-Pakhtoonkwa. The fight against the Taliban and other terrorists is mostly unconventional, and the Pakistan army feels it does not have the proper equipment.

According to reports, Pakistan has requested new helicopter gunships and armed helicopters, including AH-1W, Apache-64-D and AH-6, MD-530 Little Bird besides utility and cargo helicopters, such as UH-60 Black Hawk, CH-47 D Chinook and the UH-1Y Huey. Pakistan has also demanded M1A1 tanks, M113A3 armored personnel carriers and air-defense missiles including the Stinger, Javelin and Hawk. The US$2.5 billion list also includes a request for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

Recently, the Pakistani Ambassador to Washington said that military operations against terrorists would have been quicker and much easier to plan and execute if the US had provided the needed military equipment to the Pakistani forces. While the US reluctance or delays in providing the equipment Pakistani military is seeking to fight the Taliban is certainly an irritant, Pakistani officials state the ball is now in the US court.

The Intent of Pakistan Army

The annoyances in the US-Pakistan relations are also the accusations and charges that Pakistan still supports the Taliban. Recently, Matt Waldman, a fellow at Harvard’s Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, claimed in a report that there is “very significant levels of support being provided by the ISI” to the Taliban leadership. He went on to the extent of claiming it is “official policy of that agency” and ISI agents have even attended meetings of the Taliban’s top leadership council, the so-called Quetta Shura. The report also pointed the finger at Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari who, it said, visited senior Taliban prisoners in Pakistan earlier this year. Pakistan Army spokesman Major General Athar Abbas replied to the report stating that the LSE report lacked credibility. “It is baseless. The sacrifices by Pakistan’s army and the ISI and the casualties in the war on terror speak for themselves,” he said.

Some Pakistani experts thought the report, which appeared at the heels of the Indo-US strategic dialogue, seemed a crude attempt to please the Indian lobby. Others wondered if the report was a clear evidence of US and NATO failures in Afghanistan and a reflection of frustration at the mounting casualties.

Pakistan believes that such reports create mistrust between the West and the Pakistani military. They say that for an effective war strategy and its implementation against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, it is imperative that there should be a strong relationship between the Pentagon and the NATO on one side and the Pakistani military on the other side. However, the public support for this war is equally an important variable, which often gets left out.

PoliTact’s observations of the US think tanks have revealed a very hostile attitude developing towards Pakistan’s military. An event held on June 24, 2010 on Capitol Hill organized by the Pakistani American Congress to commemorate the US-Pakistan friendship ironically revealed more criticism of the Pakistan Army by the US based scholars. This was mostly done in connection with sustaining democracy in Pakistan. However, the event also provided two other different viewpoints on Pakistan in the US; one held by the State Department and the other by US Congress. While the views of the think tanks were harsh, the congressional and state department outlook appeared to be much more sympathetic towards the predicament of Pakistan and its Army. (The video footage is available on PoliTact’s website.). It should be noted that Pakistan friendly US politicians mostly attended the event. It should also be pointed out that the opinions of think tanks do ultimately impact the policy makers in Washington.

The views of renowned journalist Landay Jonathan of McClatchy Group on the threat perceptions of Pakistan towards India and the role of the Pakistan Army in the fight against extremists, generally appeared to be out of sync with the traditional perceptions widely held in Pakistan. So much so, that they irritated an official of the Pakistan Army at the Embassy in the US. He objected to these views of Landay and for disrespecting the Pakistani soldiers that have lost their lives in the fight against extremists. Another well-known scholar Stephen Cohan of Brookings joined in support of Landay, and questioned the Army official about whether he had attended the Staff College, perhaps deemed a prerequisite to understand threat perceptions under a nuclear environment of South Asia. Robert Hathaway of the Wilson Center went as far as to suggest that Pakistan has no future if does not deal with the issues and takes responsibility for them. While Marvin Weinbaum of the Middle East Institute clearly pointed out that an adverse outcome for the US in Afghanistan would in no way bode well for the future of Pakistan.

In short the scholars, appeared to have tag teamed in criticizing the role of Pakistan’s military, in an event organized under the auspicious of improving US-Pakistan relations. However, the Deputy Chief of Mission at the Pakistan Embassy Aslam Khan, clarified toward the end of the ceremony that no one should tell Pakistan what its threat perceptions should be and it can only be understood in the historical context. The above illustration clearly depicts how two important allies are clearly at odds with each other, about how they envision the shape of the future after the war has ended.

Conclusion

As alluded to earlier, appearances can be an illusion. The frustration represented at the above-mentioned event boiled down to whether the Afghan conflict will require a predominately military or a political solution, and Pakistan’s role in it. Meanwhile, Pakistan appears to have escalated the political approach and its reconciliation process. There are media reports that General Kiyani may have himself be facilitating the reconciliation between the Haqqani network and Karzai. There definitely appears to be pressures within the Afghan Taliban groups not to be left out of the reconciliation, be it the Hekmatyar led Hizbe Islami or Mullah Omar faction representing the Afghan Taliban. The real goal ultimately is the isolation of Al Qaeda from its supporting network and the question of if this can be best achieved at this stage through the use of force or a political approach.

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