<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>Line of Actual Control Archives - Politact</title>
	<atom:link href="https://politact.com/tag/line-of-actual-control/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://politact.com/tag/line-of-actual-control/</link>
	<description>Futurist Advisory Firm - Developing multidimensional strategic insights 2 increasingly asymmetric global political, security, and economic realities</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Sat, 24 Oct 2020 16:46:35 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>
	hourly	</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>
	1	</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=6.7.1</generator>

 
	<item>
		<title>Evolving QUAD And Australian Participation In The Malabar Exercise 2020</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/evolving-quad-and-australian-participation-in-the-malabar-exercise-2020/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 24 Oct 2020 16:30:15 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Asia Pacific]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pivot to Asia and South, Central Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US-China Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vantage Point Analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American elections and QUAD]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Australia and Quad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China and QUAD]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China Australia ties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China India tensions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of QUAD]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics of Asia Pacific]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Implications of Malabar exercise]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India Australia ties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indo Pacific]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indonesia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[its 9-dash claim]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Japan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LAC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ladakh]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Line of Actual Control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Malabar exercise 2020]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Quad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Quad Comprehensive Strategic Partnership]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Quadrilateral Security Dialogue]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South China Sea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.politact.com/?p=9327</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="683" height="1024" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Australian-Navy.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" fetchpriority="high" />Dr Claude Rakisits Context India has formally invited Australia to join the large-scale naval exercises to be conducted in the Bay of Bengal (3-6 November) and the Arabian Sea (17-20 November), involving in addition to the navies of India and Australia naval assets of the US and Japan. This is a very significant development—if not [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/evolving-quad-and-australian-participation-in-the-malabar-exercise-2020/">Evolving QUAD And Australian Participation In The Malabar Exercise 2020</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="683" height="1024" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Australian-Navy.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" /><figure id="attachment_9331" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-9331" style="width: 1024px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-9331" src="https://www.politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/US-India-Navy.jpg" alt="" width="1024" height="682" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-9331" class="wp-caption-text">SASEBO, Japan (June 10, 2016)  Rear Adm. Brian Hurley, center, deputy commander, U.S. 7th Fleet, tours the Indian navy Kora-class corvette INS Kirch (P62) during Malabar 2016.  (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Ryan J. Batchelder/Released)160610-N-EH218-322</figcaption></figure>
<p>Dr Claude Rakisits</p>
<h6><strong>Context</strong></h6>
<p>India has formally invited Australia to join the large-scale naval exercises to be conducted in the Bay of Bengal (3-6 November) and the Arabian Sea (17-20 November), involving in addition to the navies of India and Australia naval assets of the US and Japan.</p>
<p>This is a very significant development—if not militarily, certainly symbolically—for the future of peace and security in the Indo-Pacific. This will be the first time that the navies of the four countries will be participating together in naval exercises.</p>
<p>Australia, India, Japan and the US are members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, better known as the Quad—a grouping of four Indo-Pacific democracies founded in 2007 whose main mission is to ensure a Free and Open Indo-Pacific primarily through the maintenance of the rules-based international order.</p>
<h6><strong>The Timing of India’s Invitation to Australia</strong></h6>
<p>India’s decision to invite Australia to join Exercise Malabar 2020 comes in the wake of three important geopolitical developments.</p>
<p>First, an in-person meeting of the four foreign ministers of the Quad in Tokyo earlier this month—a significant symbolic event given the tight Covid-19 travel restrictions. At this meeting the ministers reinforced their countries’ determination to cooperate in a range of areas, including critically but not solely, in the maritime security domain. Except for US Secretary of State Pompeo, no one mentioned China specifically. But the 800-pound gorilla was very much at the meeting.</p>
<p>Second, India and Australia agreed on the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership on 4 June 2020, an agreement which progresses cooperation in a significant number of fields, including in the military and security spheres.</p>
<p>Third, in April-May this year <a href="https://www.politact.com/china-india-border-skirmishes-brics-versus-quad/">India and China were involved in deadly clashes</a> along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh. Whilst tension has diminished since then, with the holding of several meetings of the corps commanders on both sides and a meeting of the Foreign Ministers last month, this on-going issue with Beijing has been a wake-up call for the Indian defense forces and Prime Minister Narendra Modi—his informal approach to dealing with Chinese President Xi now in tatters.</p>
<p><iframe src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/4EkxkeAk6uU" width="450" height="315" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen"><span style="display: inline-block; width: 0px; overflow: hidden; line-height: 0;" data-mce-type="bookmark" class="mce_SELRES_start">﻿</span></iframe></p>
<h6><strong>Can China Hurt Australia For Participating in Exercise Malabar 2020?</strong></h6>
<p>Canberra has very much welcomed India’s invitation to the Malabar exercise. Australia’s defense minister, Senator Linda Reynolds, stated &#8220;High-end military exercises like Malabar are key to enhancing Australia&#8217;s maritime capabilities, building interoperability with our close partners, and demonstrating our collective resolve to support an open and prosperous Indo-Pacific&#8221;.</p>
<p>Australia last participated in Exercise Malabar in 2007. The then Australian prime minister, mandarin-speaking Kevin Rudd, decided to pull out of the following year’s exercise to avoid offending China. However, this did not prevent a significant deterioration in the bilateral relations down the road.</p>
<p><iframe loading="lazy" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/jeQsfo-bvxw" width="450" height="315" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen"><span style="display: inline-block; width: 0px; overflow: hidden; line-height: 0;" data-mce-type="bookmark" class="mce_SELRES_start">﻿</span></iframe></p>
<p>Bilateral relations were already at an all-time low. In response to Australia’s call for an independent investigation into the origin of the Coronavirus and China’s handling of it, China slapped huge tariffs on Australian barley in May. New tariffs have also been imposed on Australian beef. And wine exports could be next.</p>
<p>Last month China expelled the last two Australian journalists from the country. It’s been almost 50 years since there hasn’t been Australian media in China. Given that China is Australia’s largest export market, taking 30 per cent of all exports, Beijing could start to really hurt Australia’s economy if it wished to do so.</p>
<h6><strong>The Quad is Getting Ready to Resist China</strong></h6>
<p>More broadly, China will not be too worried about the military aspects of the Malabar exercise, however, it will note the significant diplomatic push-back it represents to its aggressive military activities in the region, notably its effective unilateral changing of the LAC in Ladakh, its 9-dash claim over most of the South China Sea and the accompanying massive build-up of military-purposed artificial islands, and its ongoing low-level military harassment of Taiwan.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Put differently, while until relatively recently China was willing to play by the rules of the Western-led international order, this has changed progressively since President Xi took over as the head of the Communist Party of China in 2012. Accordingly, the battle lines are starting to get clearer and the Quad is firming up its resolve to stand up to China.</p>
<p>While not being an alliance per se, the Quad could nevertheless become the key security vehicle for the Indo-Pacific. However, the strengthening of the Quad will really depend on the members’ resolve to stand united in the face of the inevitable Chinese response—military, diplomatic and economic—to what Beijing will perceive as a ganging up on the Middle Kingdom.</p>
<h6><strong>Biden Presidency Might Act Tough on China—Good News for the Quad</strong></h6>
<p>Needless to say, future unacceptable Chinese military activity will not attract equal interest or response from the different Quad members. And Beijing knows this only too well and will accordingly exploit these differences for all its worth.</p>
<p>So what is the future of the Quad? As noted above, much will really depend on the cohesiveness of the grouping and how it responds to future Chinese behavior. A likely Biden administration in Washington would probably be tough on China. This would be good news for the Quad. The display of American political will to fly the flag would reassure the other members of the Quad and make it more worthwhile for others, such as Canada, France, Indonesia, New Zealand and the UK to name some obvious credible candidates, to join the grouping. As Joe Stalin once said, “Quantity has a quality all its own”, a statement President Xi would surely relate to.</p>
<p><em>This piece originally appeared in The Quint.</em></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/evolving-quad-and-australian-participation-in-the-malabar-exercise-2020/">Evolving QUAD And Australian Participation In The Malabar Exercise 2020</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>The Future of Afghan Quagmire</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/the-future-of-afghan-quagmire/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 02 Aug 2020 21:03:05 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Afghan Reconciliation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Analysis of Perception and Perspective]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Campaign Against Extremism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan India Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South and Central Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Pakistan Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Afghan Peace process]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Al Qaeda]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America First doctrine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American Elections 2020]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American elections and Afghan Peace]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AQIS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[BRI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China India tensions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chinese South Asia policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CPEC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FATF]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of Kashmir]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitcs of South Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India and Afghanistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India and Taliban ties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India Iran Ties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indian Afghan Strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran Pakistan ties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Jammu and Kashmir]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kashmir]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kashmir Emergency]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LAC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ladakh]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Line of Actual Control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LOC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East and Afghanistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan India tensions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Taliban]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The Great Game]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The Hindu]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Afghan policy]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.politact.com/?p=9318</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="453" height="406" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/19-12-2013_afghanistan-map-BW.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/19-12-2013_afghanistan-map-BW.jpg 453w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/19-12-2013_afghanistan-map-BW-450x403.jpg 450w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/19-12-2013_afghanistan-map-BW-300x269.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 453px) 100vw, 453px" />Is the Internal or external Dynamics more Important? Context After numerous promising starts and hard stops, Afghan peace process is once again making progress. The initiation of intra-Afghan peace process is now almost certain despite the hick-ups related to the release of last tranche of Taliban prisoners held by the Ashraf Ghani’s government. While many [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-future-of-afghan-quagmire/">The Future of Afghan Quagmire</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="453" height="406" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/19-12-2013_afghanistan-map-BW.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/19-12-2013_afghanistan-map-BW.jpg 453w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/19-12-2013_afghanistan-map-BW-450x403.jpg 450w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/19-12-2013_afghanistan-map-BW-300x269.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 453px) 100vw, 453px" /><p class="yiv2581944387ydpfe0ce78cMsoNormal"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-6458 alignnone" src="https://www.politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/02-05-2013_Pakistan_Afghanistan_border1-291x300.gif" alt="" width="291" height="300" /></p>
<p class="yiv2581944387ydpfe0ce78cMsoNormal">Is the Internal or external Dynamics more Important?</p>
<p class="yiv2581944387ydpfe0ce78cMsoNormal"><b>Context</b></p>
<p class="yiv2581944387ydpfe0ce78cMsoNormal">After numerous promising starts and hard stops, Afghan peace process is once again making progress. The initiation of intra-Afghan peace process is now almost certain despite the hick-ups related to the release of last tranche of Taliban prisoners held by the Ashraf Ghani’s government. While many challenges have been overcome, several intricate obstacles remain. Such as the status of foreign troops withdrawal, the shape of future government, women rights, and the role of Sharia in governance etc.</p>
<p class="yiv2581944387ydpfe0ce78cMsoNormal">However, the internal dynamics of Afghanistan is only one aspect of the puzzle. At this juncture, the external environment tied to the fast moving regional and global dynamics appears more critical. PoliTact has long contended that while there is an overemphasis on understanding the Afghan quagmire in a compartmentalized way, it is very much intertwined to the tussles of the regional and global balance of power. And this external context may prove to be more consequential. In this, the rise of China and affairs of Middle East are paramount, where some key Arab nations are on a trajectory of normalizing ties with Israel.</p>
<p class="yiv2581944387ydpfe0ce78cMsoNormal">China and India are central to many changes taking shape in the regional geopolitics, whether it be the tension on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the potential China-Iran economic and security deal, or the China-Pakistan economic corridor (CPEC). In all of these, the outcome impacts India adversely, and the US by association.</p>
<p class="yiv2581944387ydpfe0ce78cMsoNormal">How the American elections play out and impact the Afghan future, and the associated US-Pakistan relations, is equally critical. After a rocky start, during the Trump administration US-Pakistan ties have remained normal and absent the tumult witnessed during the Bush and Obama administrations.</p>
<p class="yiv2581944387ydpfe0ce78cMsoNormal"><b>India and Afghanistan</b></p>
<p class="yiv2581944387ydpfe0ce78cMsoNormal">India has most to lose if there is a resolution to the Afghan conflict. It benefits from the long-term entanglement of Pakistan &#8211; but this also means US has to expend substantial blood and treasure to maintain its presence there. With Pakistan preoccupied in dealing with Afghanistan and extremism, India could ensure that the thorny issue of Kashmir can be resolved as it wishes.</p>
<p class="yiv2581944387ydpfe0ce78cMsoNormal">However, that premise has tumbled ever since US and Taliban agreed on a peace deal in February<b>.</b> India perceives the treaty as not addressing its concerns and interests in Afghanistan, and the growing influence of AQIS (Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent) in India and Kashmir. In the emerging scenario, Taliban are likely to become a partner and bulwark against ISIS and AQ inspired extremism, a goal shared by US, Taliban and Pakistan.</p>
<p class="yiv2581944387ydpfe0ce78cMsoNormal">On the other hand, the abolishment of the special status of Kashmir on August 5 last year, and the brutal lock-down that ensued, India has further aggravated the situation. Through such draconian steps, India has exhibited that it has little respect for UN resolutions or human rights and this will play right in the hands of extremists.</p>
<p class="yiv2581944387ydpfe0ce78cMsoNormal">Nonetheless, to placate Indian concerns, US Afghan Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad stated in May that India should establish direct talks with the Taliban to address concerns. While talking to The Hindu, he added, “India is an important force in Afghanistan and it would be appropriate for that [India-Taliban] engagement to take place”.</p>
<p class="yiv2581944387ydpfe0ce78cMsoNormal">India is caught in a quandary on whether to establish direct talks with the Taliban, which it believes it to be the proxy of Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan is improving its ties with the Afghan government in earnest. It is not clear at this point if India has bought in to the emerging Afghan peace process. Meanwhile the nightmare of being blacklisted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) still hangs in balance for Pakistan – as its efforts to bring Madrassa’s in the mainstream are making headway.</p>
<p class="yiv2581944387ydpfe0ce78cMsoNormal"><b>China-India-Iran Dynamics</b></p>
<p class="yiv2581944387ydpfe0ce78cMsoNormal">The tensions between China and India along the LAC escalated in June when 20 Indian soldiers were killed in a clash in Ladakh. Numerous rounds of talks have failed to alleviate tensions. If the standoff extends to India taking steps in the South China Sea, then it is likely to complicate matters in Afghanistan and along the Line of Control (LOC) as well. But one thing is clear, Chinese actions along the LAC has shown that India cannot act with impunity and compromise Chinese interests in Afghanistan or Pakistan – and that is where CPEC comes in the picture.</p>
<p class="yiv2581944387ydpfe0ce78cMsoNormal">While India has been attempting to globally isolate Pakistan, CPEC has provided the nation a much need shot in the arm. The country has paid a heavy economical and societal price for more than a decade of war against extremism.</p>
<p class="yiv2581944387ydpfe0ce78cMsoNormal">China also wants to bring Afghanistan in to its One Belt One Road Initiative and the economic benefit of that far outweigh anything India can offer to the war-ravaged country. Afghanistan has hedged its bets, but with India being asked to pack-up its much-delayed infrastructure, rail, and energy projects in Iran, that dynamics is changing. Iran is instead moving forward with economic and security deal with China, that will bring $400 billion investments over 25 years. Afghanistan’s strategic calculation will obviously shift as a result of these developments.</p>
<p class="yiv2581944387ydpfe0ce78cMsoNormal">Simply put, from the Chinese perspective it can no longer afford Indian shenanigans on the LAC, LAC, and in Afghanistan without India paying a price for it.</p>
<p class="yiv2581944387ydpfe0ce78cMsoNormal"><b>The Dynamics of Middle East</b></p>
<p class="yiv2581944387ydpfe0ce78cMsoNormal">In addition to putting pressure on Pakistan through organizations such as FATF, India has consistently work to undercut its traditional ties with the Gulf region &#8211; and in turn weaken its position on Afghanistan and Kashmir. Through its newfound economic clout, and alliance with Israel and the US, India has had success in this.</p>
<p class="yiv2581944387ydpfe0ce78cMsoNormal">Not only that, this unified juggernaut has also resulted in pushing some key Arab nations on a path to normalize ties with Israel &#8211; while the non-Arab nations of Turkey and Iran stand in stark contrast.</p>
<p class="yiv2581944387ydpfe0ce78cMsoNormal">In theaters like Libya, Turkey and Qatar are backing the UN supported unity government, while Khalifa Haftar has the blessing of UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. This is pretty much the same configuration that applies to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Will this alignment also be matched in the South and Central Asian theater of operations, and Afghanistan, is yet to be seen – but the telltale signs point in that direction. And in this is the reason why the potential China, Iran security and economic deal carries serious repercussions.</p>
<p class="yiv2581944387ydpfe0ce78cMsoNormal">Iran and Pakistan are two nations that are close Chinese allies and significant part of its One Belt One Road Initiative. Iran, including Turkey, are also strongly opposed to any normalizing of ties with Israel without the resolution of Palestinian conflict, and are vocal about India atrocities in Kashmir.</p>
<p class="yiv2581944387ydpfe0ce78cMsoNormal"><b>The Great Game</b></p>
<p class="yiv2581944387ydpfe0ce78cMsoNormal">Afghanistan is a high-stake proposition. Like in the past, it will be the regional and global balance of power tussles that will play an instrumental role in determining its future. If the Afghan government assesses that they gain more by going along with the One Belt and One Road initiative, like Pakistan and Iran, then its game over. And in such an eventuality, Indian role will be relegated.</p>
<p class="yiv2581944387ydpfe0ce78cMsoNormal">The question becomes why would US want to leave Afghanistan to other powers. Under the American First doctrine, perhaps it wants to focus on other flanks where it enjoys an advantage, such as the South China Sea and the Middle East. Plus, US is extremely perturbed with its allies that desire it to lead the fight to protect their interests but are unwilling to commit resources and troops – whether it be NATO or India.</p>
<p class="yiv2581944387ydpfe0ce78cMsoNormal">If elections all go well, will this change if Biden wins? Will Americans once again start to lead where the allies are unwilling? Will the world return to the form of globalization where the allies benefit more at the cost of US? The fate of these inquiries will be settled first in the elections &#8211; and the Americans are going to base their vote on their economic prospects and not on the foreign policy premises.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-future-of-afghan-quagmire/">The Future of Afghan Quagmire</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>The Causes of Tension on the China India Border – What’s Next?</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/the-causes-of-tension-on-the-china-india-border-whats-next/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 11 Jul 2020 04:08:43 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[South and Central Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vantage Point Analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Askai chin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China India tensions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China Pakistan Economic Corridor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CPEC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gilgit Baltistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Jammu and Kashmir]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kashmir]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LAC and LOC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ladakh]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Line of Actual Control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Special status of Kashmir]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.politact.com/?p=9272</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="640" height="393" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Xi-and-Modi.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Xi-and-Modi.jpg 640w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Xi-and-Modi-300x184.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Xi-and-Modi-356x220.jpg 356w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Xi-and-Modi-600x368.jpg 600w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 640px) 100vw, 640px" />PoliTact’s Chief Analyst Arif Ansar discusses China-India border skirmishes and the regional and global implications with Dr. Claude Rakisits, PoliTact’s Director of Strategic Initiatives, and Honorary Associate Professor at the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy, Australian National University. &#160;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-causes-of-tension-on-the-china-india-border-whats-next/">The Causes of Tension on the China India Border – What’s Next?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="640" height="393" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Xi-and-Modi.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Xi-and-Modi.jpg 640w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Xi-and-Modi-300x184.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Xi-and-Modi-356x220.jpg 356w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Xi-and-Modi-600x368.jpg 600w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 640px) 100vw, 640px" /><p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-9274 alignnone" src="https://www.politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ModiXi-300x168.jpeg" alt="" width="300" height="168" /></p>
<p>PoliTact’s Chief Analyst Arif Ansar discusses China-India border skirmishes and the regional and global implications with Dr. Claude Rakisits, PoliTact’s Director of Strategic Initiatives, and Honorary Associate Professor at the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy, Australian National University.</p>
<p><iframe loading="lazy" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/jeQsfo-bvxw" width="500" height="315" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="allowfullscreen"></iframe></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-causes-of-tension-on-the-china-india-border-whats-next/">The Causes of Tension on the China India Border – What’s Next?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
