Guest Analyst Muhammad Siraj ul Huda Khan assisted in researching and developing this article.

Context

PoliTact periodically invites leading regional and global experts to understand the changing geopolitical situations and significant emerging themes. One such theme is the budding China-Iran economic and security partnership.

China and Iran are entering a $400 billion 25 year economic and security deal that would lead to enhanced military and trade relations. The agreement ensures Chinese investment in Iranian telecommunication, transportation, and military fields. The military cooperation includes exercises, intelligence sharing, and joint research and development of weapons. China will also procure its energy needs from Iran on discounted price for over next 25 years.

On July 28, 2020, PoliTact held a webinar to discuss the potential China-Iran economic deal and its impact on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The panelists analyzed the major developments taking place in the South Asia and Middle East regions and provided perspectives on the evolving situation. The theme has taken on added significance in the aftermath of US elections and with additional Muslim states, such as UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco officially recognizing the state of Israel.

CEO and Chief Analyst of PoliTact, Arif Ansar, moderated the panel discussion. The opening remarks were made by Ikram Sehgal, who is a Chairman of the Karachi Council on Foreign Relations, CEO of Pathfinder Group, and member of the East West Institute’s Board of Directors.

The panel included:

• Ambassador Mustafa Kamal Kazi – Senior Vice Chairman at the Karachi Council on Foreign Relations, former Foreign Secretary and Ambassador of Pakistan to the Russian Federation, the Kingdom of Netherlands, Republic of Indonesia and Republic of Iraq.
• Khaled Almaeena – Former Editor-in-Chief of Arab News and Saudi Gazette, CEO of a PR Firm, and Saudi Television news anchor.
• Claude Rakisits – Honorary Professor at the Asia Pacific College of Diplomacy at the Australian National University. He is also a Director at PoliTact and covers the South Asia and Middle East region.

The Webinar explored the following key questions:

1. What are the implications of the China-Iran economic and security deal on the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)?
2. Assessing Chinese influence in the Middle East region and does the China-Iran deal represent a Chinese pivot to the Middle East? Moreover, how does Chinese sway play out against that of India, Israeli, and the US in the region?
3. How the does the China-Iran treaty correlates with the Quad and Indo-Pacific strategy?
4. Will China use the Iran deal as a leverage in its dealing with the US, just as Russia has done?
5. History informs that Muslim nations or empires have often sided with one or the other global power – and then fought directly with each other. What can be done to prevent such an outcome in the framework of the present regional and global geopolitics?

Implications of the potential China-Iran Deal on China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

There are multiple angles to review this connection; that of Pakistan and Iran, and one cannot ignore the positions of China and the US.

Pakistan sees no negative impact of the potential China-Iran deal on CPEC. Former foreign minister Sartaj Aziz once stated that the Chabahar Port was not competing with the Gwadar port, in fact they were seen as complimentary. Media reports have also indicated that a road was to connect the two closely located ports at some point.

On the other hand, Iran is likely to see the Chinese deal as a blessing in disguise. Fearing US sanctions, Pakistan has been dragging its feet on the Iran Gas pipeline project for years, and India has also been slow in developing the Chabahar Port. In all likelihood, once the deal is finalized, Chinese investments will start flowing in quickly and provide immense relief to the much-penalized Iran. More importantly, the China-Iran deal would provide the strategic counterbalance to the American, Israeli, and Arab pressure.

According to Ambassador Kazi, the US withdrawal from the Iranian deal of 2015, and mismanagement of the multipolar world, is one of the reasons China-Iran economic and security partnership is coming to fruition.

However, for China, the treaty with Iran diversifies the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) providing it with another tributary. This is especially true if the CPEC route runs into trouble, or if the work slows down considerably due to the American, Indian, and Arab pressure on Pakistan.

Chinese Pivot to the Middle East and American, Israeli and Indian Coalition

China has been building strategic ties with the Middle East for some time now – in addition to the Asia Pacific, Middle East represents its other flank. Khaled Almaeena pointed out that the Saudi ties with China got underway in the 90s, as the Gulf region started to balance ties between China and the US. On the other hand, Dr. Claude Rakisits noted that the Chinese push westward is not necessarily a pivot, irrespective, the Iran deal will be seen negatively in both Saudi Arabia and the US.

Speaking at the Saudi embassy in China in July on the occasion of the 30 anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties, Saudi Ambassador Turki M. A. Almadi commented: “our relations are all-round, multi-field, not only about bilateral trade and mutual investment, but also extended to cooperation in the fields of culture, science and technology, and health.”

Zhai Jun, China’s special envoy on Middle East affairs indicated at the occasion that the bilateral trade volume between the two nations stood at $78.04 billion at the end of 2019. He added Saudi Arabia was the largest supplier of crude oil to China, and also the Arab nations largest trading partner.

Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has become an active player in the Middle East with strategic ties with a number of regional players, to include Saudi Arabia. As its influence increases gradually, it could become an active interlocutor between Israel and the Palestinians, and other conflicts of the Middle East. However, it is not clear if China aspires to get involved in the security affairs of the region, like Russia has in Syria.

Chinese analysts present a case that the nation wants to be more active in providing economic support than engaging in security affairs of the Middle East. Nonetheless, China has amicable political and military relations with both Iran and Israel. As part of BRI, China has been extending its trade relations with Israel and lately US has objected strongly to some of them citing security concerns – such as the Chinese company Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) running a container terminal at the Port of Haifa – near an Israeli naval base that is frequently visited by the US Sixth Fleet.

If the China-Israeli economic ties continue to strengthen uninhibited, overtime China will be able to build leverages that can potentially undercut US primacy in the affairs of the Middle East. The Israelis disagree on this possibility, stating that the nature of its ties with China and the US are of totally different nature. Nonetheless, the push under President Trump to normalize ties between Israel and the Arab nations can be seen as an attempt to counter China becoming an influential Middle Eastern player in the future.

When it comes to the Indian alignment with Israel and its growing ties with the Gulf nations, a different question is raised. How do these relations undercut the traditional support Pakistan has generated from the Gulf region?  In November 2018, PoliTact collaborated with the Middle East Institute to examine the political, security, and economic interconnections between South Asia and the Gulf States, and one of the subsets, Pakistan and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The report pointed out to how India was strategically undermining Pakistan, a risk that has matured now.

Commenting on this during the webinar, Khaled Almaaena stated that Pakistan’s position has been undermined by the negative economic and security news consistently emanating from the country. And this has been occurring at a time when India has positioned itself as an information technology and economic powerhouse, and by investing in Saudi Arabia that brought jobs to the Kingdom. He further added, the younger leadership of KSA do not hold the same kind of affinity towards Pakistan as past leaders had.

Irrespective, we can see an attempt to undermine both the Chinese and Pakistan connections in the Middle east as they compete with the American, Israeli and Indian interests.

China-Iran Deal and Quad Strategy

Answering the moderator, and as noted above, Dr. Claude Rakisits noted that the Chinese push westward does not represent its pivot to the Middle East – and how this relates to the Quad strategy is a different angle.

Dr. Claude added that Quad is meant to “keep China within its borders”. And as a counter, China is pushing US away from the first island chain by building artificial islands in the South China Sea. Moreover, China-Iran deal counteracts Quad and the Indo-Pacific strategy by providing China with a key footprint in the Indian Ocean, which together with Gwadar and Djibouti, enhances Chinese naval potential.

While Quad would desire to box-in China, conversely China wants to limit the Indian role in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, by keeping it busy within its borders. This dynamics can be witnessed by the present tensions and skirmishes on the Line of Actual control (LAC) and the Ladakh region.

Biden’s Middle East Policy, Iranian Sanctions, and Chinese Leverage

A related inquiry has to do with sanctions on Iran and how will China navigate them? Previous European attempts to build trade relations with the nation hit numerous roadblocks. As soon as Trump administration took oath in January 2017, within almost a year and a half of signing the Iran nuclear deal (July 2015), US started to build pressure on western companies attempting to build trade relations with Iran. As a result, even the $20 billion aircraft deal Boeing had signed with Iran had to be scrapped.

Under President Elect Biden’s Iran Policy, will these sanctions be eased if US rejoins the treaty? This will all depend on how the Biden administration re-engages Iran. Recently Biden has indicated that it will want to renegotiate the Iran deal to include its missile program, and wider behavior in the region; these were widely seen as major weaknesses of the 2015 deal.

This, however, will likely be a non-starter for Iran. The country has expressed it would not enter fresh negotiations with the US when even the terms and guarantees of the 2015 agreement were not kept.

A parallel concern is, with the ‘Outside In’ approach to the Middle East Peace Process so far along resulting in the Abraham Accords, will President Elect Biden be able to reverse it and thus jeopardize the present Arab-Israeli normalizing process? A more likely approach would be that the normalization process would have to incorporate the two-state solution under Biden – including a more transparent give and take by the Israelis – of the type that is frequently hinted by the Saudi leadership.

Irrespective, Dr. Claude was of the opinion that China will continue its dealings with Iran, despite the sanctions, and will push back on any efforts to restrict the ties between Iran and China. It is also possible that China will use the Iran deal as a leverage in its dealing with the US, just as Russia has done in the past. On several occasions when Russian ties stumbled with the West, it threatened to supply Iran with modern weaponry that could help it withstand any attack on its nuclear program.

The US Iran policy has circled around two approaches recently: the negotiated settlement was adopted by President Obama by signing the JCPOA in 2015, which sidelined the aggressive route against Iran propagated by Israel and Saudi Arabia. Trump took on the more militaristic alternative – moving away from the two-state solution, with wider recognition of Israel from the GCC and Arab States. The assassination of two top Iranian officials recently, Major General Qassim Soleimani and nuclear scientist Mohsin Fakhrizadeh, are linked to this approach.

The challenge is that a military solution towards Iran would be unacceptable for both China and Russia. Similarly, the reenactment of the JCPOA, along with potential China-Iran deal, will make China a stronger player in the Middle East. It could possibly utilize its clout to bring about Israeli-Palestinian agreement, which US has not been able to do alone.

On the one hand this cooperation between China and the US would be an immensely positive development that can bring about peace in the Middle East. However, this directly contradicts with what is transpiring in the Asia Pacific and resulting Indo-Pacific and the Quad strategy. And this also does not factor in Russian role in the whole scenario – and the interplay of the Muslim Middle powers, such as Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.

Islamic World and Global Power Tussles

In the past Muslim nations or empires have often sided with one or the other global power – and then fought directly with each other. And the question becomes what can be done to avert such an outcome in the framework of the present regional and global geopolitics.

Replying to the moderator, Khaled Almaeena pointed out that the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) is unable to fulfill this role. He added this requires strong Islamic leadership to prevent being exploited, commitment to their citizens, and rule of law. Moreover, he stated that ‘if Iran suffers, the Arabs will suffer too’. In his opinion CPEC can play a constructive role by being a bridge, ‘good economics makes good politics,’ he stated.

On the other hand, Ambassador Kazi was critical of the role the GCC nations have played in this regard and pointed to the infighting between the Arab nations. He noted that ‘what happens in the Arab world, impacts the Islamic world’.

Meanwhile, Ikram Sehgal added the role of Turkey is important, and one should not forget the Regional Cooperation for Development Organization (RCD) formed between Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey in 1964, and replaced by Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in 1979. He emphasized that Russia and China have good ties with Pakistan, Turkey and Iran, and that ‘constructive engagement can be a harbinger of peace’.

Conclusion

While Saudi Arabia has delayed recognizing the statehood of Israel, and while Qatar remains closer to Turkey, the shifting alliance of most GCC and Arab nations towards Israel and the US, represents a decisive shift in the balance of power. Adopting the threat perception that centers on Iran, and without any clear give and take from Israel in the context of Abraham Accords, is likely to revitalize the message of non-state actors.

While China has made an economic entry in the Middle East, it has not decided to influence the security affairs – other than under the umbrella of UN and for maritime security purposes. In Syria too, it has adopted a non-interventionist approach and has supported the Assad regime.

However, economic leverages will eventually lead to influences in other areas. And China would have to utilize its sway – especially when it has the most to lose if a conflict breaks out in the region. One measure of if matters are heading in that direction would be the establishment of military bases, like the one in Djibouti, and potential militarization of Gawadar and Chabahar port. And in this context, the China-Iran economic and security deal takes on an added emphasis.

In the long run, US would want to create a wedge between China and Russia. Since attaining self-sufficiency in its energy needs, the US interests in Middle East is primarily to prevent nuclear weapons from falling in the hands of rogue states, or non-state actors, and this this a goal it shares with Israel. At the same time, US would not want to lose its primacy in the Middle East, but to exploit the existing fault lines to further extend its reach – to the detriment of China and Russia.

At the same time, under President Elect Biden, there is an opportunity to move away from the zero-sum approach to world affairs – by reaching out to China for a wider détente and cooperation – and the geopolitics resulting from the Coronavirus related pandemic especially necessitates this. Reaching that stage, however, would require first a smooth transition of power in the US.

The post Biden’s Middle East Policy, China-Iran Ties, and CPEC appeared first on Politact.

Dr Claude Rakisits

Context

India has formally invited Australia to join the large-scale naval exercises to be conducted in the Bay of Bengal (3-6 November) and the Arabian Sea (17-20 November), involving in addition to the navies of India and Australia naval assets of the US and Japan.

This is a very significant development—if not militarily, certainly symbolically—for the future of peace and security in the Indo-Pacific. This will be the first time that the navies of the four countries will be participating together in naval exercises.

Australia, India, Japan and the US are members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, better known as the Quad—a grouping of four Indo-Pacific democracies founded in 2007 whose main mission is to ensure a Free and Open Indo-Pacific primarily through the maintenance of the rules-based international order.

The Timing of India’s Invitation to Australia

India’s decision to invite Australia to join Exercise Malabar 2020 comes in the wake of three important geopolitical developments.

First, an in-person meeting of the four foreign ministers of the Quad in Tokyo earlier this month—a significant symbolic event given the tight Covid-19 travel restrictions. At this meeting the ministers reinforced their countries’ determination to cooperate in a range of areas, including critically but not solely, in the maritime security domain. Except for US Secretary of State Pompeo, no one mentioned China specifically. But the 800-pound gorilla was very much at the meeting.

Second, India and Australia agreed on the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership on 4 June 2020, an agreement which progresses cooperation in a significant number of fields, including in the military and security spheres.

Third, in April-May this year India and China were involved in deadly clashes along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh. Whilst tension has diminished since then, with the holding of several meetings of the corps commanders on both sides and a meeting of the Foreign Ministers last month, this on-going issue with Beijing has been a wake-up call for the Indian defense forces and Prime Minister Narendra Modi—his informal approach to dealing with Chinese President Xi now in tatters.

Can China Hurt Australia For Participating in Exercise Malabar 2020?

Canberra has very much welcomed India’s invitation to the Malabar exercise. Australia’s defense minister, Senator Linda Reynolds, stated “High-end military exercises like Malabar are key to enhancing Australia’s maritime capabilities, building interoperability with our close partners, and demonstrating our collective resolve to support an open and prosperous Indo-Pacific”.

Australia last participated in Exercise Malabar in 2007. The then Australian prime minister, mandarin-speaking Kevin Rudd, decided to pull out of the following year’s exercise to avoid offending China. However, this did not prevent a significant deterioration in the bilateral relations down the road.

Bilateral relations were already at an all-time low. In response to Australia’s call for an independent investigation into the origin of the Coronavirus and China’s handling of it, China slapped huge tariffs on Australian barley in May. New tariffs have also been imposed on Australian beef. And wine exports could be next.

Last month China expelled the last two Australian journalists from the country. It’s been almost 50 years since there hasn’t been Australian media in China. Given that China is Australia’s largest export market, taking 30 per cent of all exports, Beijing could start to really hurt Australia’s economy if it wished to do so.

The Quad is Getting Ready to Resist China

More broadly, China will not be too worried about the military aspects of the Malabar exercise, however, it will note the significant diplomatic push-back it represents to its aggressive military activities in the region, notably its effective unilateral changing of the LAC in Ladakh, its 9-dash claim over most of the South China Sea and the accompanying massive build-up of military-purposed artificial islands, and its ongoing low-level military harassment of Taiwan.

Put differently, while until relatively recently China was willing to play by the rules of the Western-led international order, this has changed progressively since President Xi took over as the head of the Communist Party of China in 2012. Accordingly, the battle lines are starting to get clearer and the Quad is firming up its resolve to stand up to China.

While not being an alliance per se, the Quad could nevertheless become the key security vehicle for the Indo-Pacific. However, the strengthening of the Quad will really depend on the members’ resolve to stand united in the face of the inevitable Chinese response—military, diplomatic and economic—to what Beijing will perceive as a ganging up on the Middle Kingdom.

Biden Presidency Might Act Tough on China—Good News for the Quad

Needless to say, future unacceptable Chinese military activity will not attract equal interest or response from the different Quad members. And Beijing knows this only too well and will accordingly exploit these differences for all its worth.

So what is the future of the Quad? As noted above, much will really depend on the cohesiveness of the grouping and how it responds to future Chinese behavior. A likely Biden administration in Washington would probably be tough on China. This would be good news for the Quad. The display of American political will to fly the flag would reassure the other members of the Quad and make it more worthwhile for others, such as Canada, France, Indonesia, New Zealand and the UK to name some obvious credible candidates, to join the grouping. As Joe Stalin once said, “Quantity has a quality all its own”, a statement President Xi would surely relate to.

This piece originally appeared in The Quint.

The post Evolving QUAD And Australian Participation In The Malabar Exercise 2020 appeared first on Politact.

Is the Internal or external Dynamics more Important?

Context

After numerous promising starts and hard stops, Afghan peace process is once again making progress. The initiation of intra-Afghan peace process is now almost certain despite the hick-ups related to the release of last tranche of Taliban prisoners held by the Ashraf Ghani’s government. While many challenges have been overcome, several intricate obstacles remain. Such as the status of foreign troops withdrawal, the shape of future government, women rights, and the role of Sharia in governance etc.

However, the internal dynamics of Afghanistan is only one aspect of the puzzle. At this juncture, the external environment tied to the fast moving regional and global dynamics appears more critical. PoliTact has long contended that while there is an overemphasis on understanding the Afghan quagmire in a compartmentalized way, it is very much intertwined to the tussles of the regional and global balance of power. And this external context may prove to be more consequential. In this, the rise of China and affairs of Middle East are paramount, where some key Arab nations are on a trajectory of normalizing ties with Israel.

China and India are central to many changes taking shape in the regional geopolitics, whether it be the tension on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the potential China-Iran economic and security deal, or the China-Pakistan economic corridor (CPEC). In all of these, the outcome impacts India adversely, and the US by association.

How the American elections play out and impact the Afghan future, and the associated US-Pakistan relations, is equally critical. After a rocky start, during the Trump administration US-Pakistan ties have remained normal and absent the tumult witnessed during the Bush and Obama administrations.

India and Afghanistan

India has most to lose if there is a resolution to the Afghan conflict. It benefits from the long-term entanglement of Pakistan – but this also means US has to expend substantial blood and treasure to maintain its presence there. With Pakistan preoccupied in dealing with Afghanistan and extremism, India could ensure that the thorny issue of Kashmir can be resolved as it wishes.

However, that premise has tumbled ever since US and Taliban agreed on a peace deal in February. India perceives the treaty as not addressing its concerns and interests in Afghanistan, and the growing influence of AQIS (Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent) in India and Kashmir. In the emerging scenario, Taliban are likely to become a partner and bulwark against ISIS and AQ inspired extremism, a goal shared by US, Taliban and Pakistan.

On the other hand, the abolishment of the special status of Kashmir on August 5 last year, and the brutal lock-down that ensued, India has further aggravated the situation. Through such draconian steps, India has exhibited that it has little respect for UN resolutions or human rights and this will play right in the hands of extremists.

Nonetheless, to placate Indian concerns, US Afghan Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad stated in May that India should establish direct talks with the Taliban to address concerns. While talking to The Hindu, he added, “India is an important force in Afghanistan and it would be appropriate for that [India-Taliban] engagement to take place”.

India is caught in a quandary on whether to establish direct talks with the Taliban, which it believes it to be the proxy of Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan is improving its ties with the Afghan government in earnest. It is not clear at this point if India has bought in to the emerging Afghan peace process. Meanwhile the nightmare of being blacklisted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) still hangs in balance for Pakistan – as its efforts to bring Madrassa’s in the mainstream are making headway.

China-India-Iran Dynamics

The tensions between China and India along the LAC escalated in June when 20 Indian soldiers were killed in a clash in Ladakh. Numerous rounds of talks have failed to alleviate tensions. If the standoff extends to India taking steps in the South China Sea, then it is likely to complicate matters in Afghanistan and along the Line of Control (LOC) as well. But one thing is clear, Chinese actions along the LAC has shown that India cannot act with impunity and compromise Chinese interests in Afghanistan or Pakistan – and that is where CPEC comes in the picture.

While India has been attempting to globally isolate Pakistan, CPEC has provided the nation a much need shot in the arm. The country has paid a heavy economical and societal price for more than a decade of war against extremism.

China also wants to bring Afghanistan in to its One Belt One Road Initiative and the economic benefit of that far outweigh anything India can offer to the war-ravaged country. Afghanistan has hedged its bets, but with India being asked to pack-up its much-delayed infrastructure, rail, and energy projects in Iran, that dynamics is changing. Iran is instead moving forward with economic and security deal with China, that will bring $400 billion investments over 25 years. Afghanistan’s strategic calculation will obviously shift as a result of these developments.

Simply put, from the Chinese perspective it can no longer afford Indian shenanigans on the LAC, LAC, and in Afghanistan without India paying a price for it.

The Dynamics of Middle East

In addition to putting pressure on Pakistan through organizations such as FATF, India has consistently work to undercut its traditional ties with the Gulf region – and in turn weaken its position on Afghanistan and Kashmir. Through its newfound economic clout, and alliance with Israel and the US, India has had success in this.

Not only that, this unified juggernaut has also resulted in pushing some key Arab nations on a path to normalize ties with Israel – while the non-Arab nations of Turkey and Iran stand in stark contrast.

In theaters like Libya, Turkey and Qatar are backing the UN supported unity government, while Khalifa Haftar has the blessing of UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. This is pretty much the same configuration that applies to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Will this alignment also be matched in the South and Central Asian theater of operations, and Afghanistan, is yet to be seen – but the telltale signs point in that direction. And in this is the reason why the potential China, Iran security and economic deal carries serious repercussions.

Iran and Pakistan are two nations that are close Chinese allies and significant part of its One Belt One Road Initiative. Iran, including Turkey, are also strongly opposed to any normalizing of ties with Israel without the resolution of Palestinian conflict, and are vocal about India atrocities in Kashmir.

The Great Game

Afghanistan is a high-stake proposition. Like in the past, it will be the regional and global balance of power tussles that will play an instrumental role in determining its future. If the Afghan government assesses that they gain more by going along with the One Belt and One Road initiative, like Pakistan and Iran, then its game over. And in such an eventuality, Indian role will be relegated.

The question becomes why would US want to leave Afghanistan to other powers. Under the American First doctrine, perhaps it wants to focus on other flanks where it enjoys an advantage, such as the South China Sea and the Middle East. Plus, US is extremely perturbed with its allies that desire it to lead the fight to protect their interests but are unwilling to commit resources and troops – whether it be NATO or India.

If elections all go well, will this change if Biden wins? Will Americans once again start to lead where the allies are unwilling? Will the world return to the form of globalization where the allies benefit more at the cost of US? The fate of these inquiries will be settled first in the elections – and the Americans are going to base their vote on their economic prospects and not on the foreign policy premises.

The post The Future of Afghan Quagmire appeared first on Politact.

PoliTact’s Chief Analyst Arif Ansar discusses China-India border skirmishes and the regional and global implications with Dr. Claude Rakisits, PoliTact’s Director of Strategic Initiatives, and Honorary Associate Professor at the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy, Australian National University.

The post The Causes of Tension on the China India Border – What’s Next? appeared first on Politact.

What Is Pushing India to Extreme Policies?
Context
In the COVID-19 environment, the Asia Pacific is increasingly an active theater. A number of inquiries are being contemplated on the role and policy of China as the world grapples on how to deal with the pandemic. Then there is the angle of how China was able to tackle the virus quickly while others are faltering? And thus perhaps indicating Beijing is the net beneficiary so far – as others are being economically weakened.
The focus had shifted to the Pacific long before the arrival of Coronavirus. With a pre COVID-19 annual growth rate of more than 6%, China has been on the trajectory to challenge the US for a while now. And that is the reason substantial intellectual capital has been committed to devise approaches to counter its rise. These discussions have revolved around coexistence to competition, and containment.
During the Obama administration the emphasis was on economic collaboration with allies through trade deals like TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) and emphasis on the military Pivot to Asia. Under the American First doctrine, Trump quickly annulled TPP and increased economic pressure on China. On the other hand, Pivot to Asia has morphed into the Indo-Pacific strategy.
And then there is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that China has launched to reconfigure the world based on its vision – and is perceived as highly threatening by the West. The scientific and technological advancement is another dimension of the risk, such as the next generation 5G technologies. US is vehement in impressing upon its allies to avoid these Chinese technologies as that would create vulnerabilities for the western economic and security alliances.
Weakened America
The increasing tension in the Asia Pacific is a reflection of the COVID-19 related defense and security reassessments that different players are conducting. The perception that China was able to deal with the Coronavirus early on – has reinforced the impression that it has emerged a little unblemished under the changing geopolitical and geostrategic context. On the other hand, the inept handling of the pandemic, followed by inter-racial riots, has created an image that US is imploding and losing its global preeminence. And thus the American allies are recalibrating on how to position and place their bets, while other powers consider what a weakened and inward-focused America would mean for the world.
China-India Border Tensions
If it is assessed that US has indeed been weakened by the Coronavirus, it represents an opportunity for other players to exert and test new scenarios. And this may be what has transpired on the China, India border as it relates to the broader disputed region of Kashmir. However, it was India that triggered the recent action-reaction cycle.
In August 2019, India had revoked the special status of Jammu and Kashmir, granted under article 370 and 35A of the constitution, and divided it into union territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh. Following the move, India sent additional troops and placed Jammu and Kashmir in a complete lockdown, cut-off telecommunications and Internet, and jailed political leaders. India removed the ‘permanent status’ clause demonstrating it wanted to change the facts on the ground to bring about the desired outcome.
Since revoking the special status of Kashmir, Indian officials repeatedly made claims regarding the Pakistan administered Kashmir, suggesting it was ready to tackle it head on. The neighbors of India wearily looked on these aggressive Indian actions, especially China. To them the message was clear; under the garb of Quad and its strategic alliance with the US, India was trying to change the status of these border disputes in violation of previous treaties and historical understandings.
Why is India Provoking its Neighbors?
The question becomes why is India acting rashly? The nation has recently suffered a series of humiliating setbacks to economically and militarily punish Pakistan for its role in Kashmir.
In February 2019, India claimed to have carried out a preemptive attack inside Pakistan while destroying the terrorist training camp located there. This was after it blamed Pakistan for the Pulwama attack. International media widely discrediting the Indian claims that any such camp was hit in Balakot. Subsequently, Modi government continued the jingoism even in the face of a dogfight with Pakistani jets that resulted in two of Indian fighter planes crashing – and a pilot being captured.
Before this escalation, in 2016 India asserted to have carried out surgical strikes, a term usually reserved for the US in its campaign against extremism, on Pakistan’s side of the Kashmir. These claims were mostly unverifiable. India attempts to link instability on its side of Kashmir with Pakistan supported terrorism, while Pakistan claims it to be a locally supported insurgency against Indian brutality – and recognized by UN as the unsettled business of the 1947 partition.
New Delhi has also been unable to globally isolate and economically marginalize Pakistan, though it made inroads to put distance between Pakistan and its traditional support emanating from the Gulf States. However, Pakistan was mostly able to counter that via China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a major tributary of the BRI. Moreover, despite considerable efforts India was unsuccessful in diminishing the centrality of Pakistan in the Afghan peace process.
All of this is pushing India towards riskier steps and behavior– example being the disastrous step of revoking the special status of Jammu and Kashmir- that possibly led to the deadly June 15^th skirmishes in Galwan Valley with China.
Indian Strategic Narrative and China
As the events unfold, Indian strategic narrative is revealing. It portrays the border skirmishes with China as a consequence of its brazen regional and global policy, which includes Hong Kong and Taiwan. India attempts to link the cause of the clashes with China with the raison d’être for the Indo-Pacific strategy and Quad alliance, which includes US, Japan, and Australia. While this may benefit the full stake membership of India to the Quad, it will make Indian economic outlook less diversified – while firmly pegging its dependence.
For China it is hard to understand why India would continue to undermine its interests while they have considerable convergences. India and China have significant economic stakes with bilateral trade expected to cross $100 billion in 2020. More importantly, they both are members of the club of emerging nations known as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). India, like Pakistan, is also now a full member of the China and Russia dominated SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization).
Despite the convergences, India rattled China by toying with the idea of supporting Taiwan for an observer status in the World Health Organization (WHO) in May. New Delhi has also been contemplating linking Chinese support for Kashmir in the Security Council – to lending more support for Taiwan and challenging the ‘One-China’ policy. Moreover, India has backed calls for WHO to investigate Chinese role in the spread of Coronavirus.
And thus, just like in the US Coronavirus related vilifying of China has impacted the Wall Street and started a larger debate about reorienting the supply chains – India may be heading in the same direction – leading to internal polarization regarding its future outlook.
In changing the status of Ladakh, India miscalculated and seriously provoked Beijing. While India has played macho on border disputes with smaller neighbors like Pakistan and Nepal, China is a different ball game altogether. The Israeli style annexations only work when there is no big party with direct involvement in the conflict. Through its unilateral action on August 2019, India has linked LOC with LAC like never before, and for this it has no one else to blame.
In the aftermath of the present border skirmishes, India may question the efficacy of the Quad alliance and the significance of Russia is likely to be escalated, which Putin will surely leverage against the US. According to the media reports, President Trump is likely to invite Russia, including India, Australia, and South Korea, to the expanded G7 meeting in September. Trump has proposed extending the grouping to G10 or G11 – for dealing with China. President Trump revealed his intentions to invite Russia after Angela Merkel had declined to attend the G7 meeting mentioning Coronavirus concerns. Canada and UK have also resisted the inclusion of Russia. It’s also questionable if Russia would want to play any role to counter China – when it’s one of its closest strategic ally.
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