By Arif Ansar

Context

Since the removal of Imran Khan’s government in April 2022 through a no confidence vote, Pakistan’s interim government finally held the election of the 16th National Parliament on February 8^th. This was significantly past the constitutional requirement to conduct balloting three months after the government had been dissolved. According to one estimate, nearly 60 million voters participated to elect 266 representatives for the National Parliament and 749 representatives for the four provincial assemblies.

However, the election results are widely seen to be rigged, raising doubts about the legitimacy of the whole process. This has further exacerbated political polarization, as the events before and after the elections appear to be particularly designed for keeping Imran Khan and his party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) out of power. The circumstances align well with what is informally known as the London Plan.

The controversial nature of Pakistan’s recent elections has also raised international concerns, particularly from the US, UK, and European Union, prompting calls for investigations into reported irregularities. In the US alone, bipartisan lawmakers, including Democrats and Republicans, have urged President Joe Biden not to recognize Pakistan’s election results until allegations of irregularities are thoroughly investigated.

Though Pakistan’s government has defended the conduct of elections as fair and free and downplayed the concerns of the international community.

The Evolving Political Landscape

PTI

According to reports, the PTI-backed independents secured 93 seats. However, PTI claims victory in over 180 seats, alleging that the total vote counts were tampered with by the Election Commission. This has prevented it from attaining a simple majority and forming the government. Challenging the elections results, PTI has resorted to legal action against the alleged rigging, flooding Pakistan’s courts with petitions seeking judicial intervention as a last resort.

As political maneuvering intensifies in the quest for power, army chief Gen. Munir has urged politicians to form a unified government, stressing that the nation needs “stable hands and a healing touch to move on from the politics of anarchy and polarization.” In response to the army chief’s remarks, PTI leadership has emphasized the release of political prisoners, including Imran Khan, and the acceptance of its mandate to rule as crucial steps towards national reconciliation.

PTI leader Imran Khan has signaled a willingness to mend relations with the military establishment, asserting no ill-will towards any party while cautioning against allowing Nawaz Sharif to lead another coalition government. He has announced plans to form governments in the provinces of KPK and Punjab, as well as at the federal level, having secured a lead in the elections.

PML-N and PPP

In contrast, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), with 75 and 54 seats respectively, has chosen to accept the election results. Despite engaging in heated exchanges and running vengeful political campaigns against each other, both agree on the urgent need to move on, claiming that reconciliation is necessary to address the current political instability.

After much political wrangling and theatrics, PML-N and PPP announced forming a united coalition government on February 20, akin to their earlier Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) alliance government. However, their reluctance to compromise on key political demands has complicated the durability of such an alliance. Moreover, it’s not clear how they can formulate the government while the results of so many seats are controversial.

Future Government

According to the results that are known, not a single political party secured the simple majority of 169 seats required to form a government, making the formation of a coalition government inevitable.

Much depends on the actions of the PTI-backed independents. The process of wooing independents by the PML-N and PPP is underway, with at least four already expressing interest in joining these parties. The challenge for the PTI is twofold: to reclaim its lost mandate and to safeguard its candidates from shifting allegiances.

Should the PML-N form the government, as it did on February 20, the PTI has threatened to initiate country-wide agitation, sparking fears of a recurrence of the riots witnessed on May 9th last year. At the same time, PTI also appear to be settling in to take on the strong opposition role. Meanwhile, PTI has announced Alliance with Islamic Parties such as Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC) and Muslim Wahdate-i-Muslimeen (MWM).

Dealing with Challenges

As PML-N and PPP announced an agreement to form the government – with Shahbaz Sharif nominated for the Prime Minister and Asif Ali Zardari for the President, it’s not clear how they plan to address the formidable economic, security, and political challenges. Pakistan will soon have to approach the IMF to enter in to a new program and manage the $25-$30 billion in annual external debt, which will require making a number of unpopular decisions. One thing is clear, without political stability there can be little headway on the economic front. Dismal economic prospects are sure to further polarize society, escalating ethnic fissures and finger pointing.

None of the political parties have provided a clear roadmap on how they will tackle the serious foreign policy issues. The nation is entangled in an acute great power rivalry in which China and Russia stand as strategic partners at one end of the pole, while US, Europe and India occupy the other pole. In this, the Gulf nation, which are the major financial backers of the last resort for Pakistan, are also swaying between the Great Powers.

Two of Pakistan’s neighbors Iran and archenemy India are not only involved in the Middle East but are players in the regional proxy war, which involves Afghanistan. This led to the recent unprecedented tit for tat strikes Iran and Pakistan launched at each other. This dynamics could easily pull in Pakistan to the intricate non-state actors playhouse of the Middle East.

The October 7 Hamas attack and the subsequent Israeli operation in Gaza has further complicated the international environment. Israeli offensive has brought larger scale human loss with close to 30,000 Palestinians dead, and destruction of Gaza. Any future ceasefire will be accompanied by rebuilding phase – likely to be led by Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. On the other hand, the Ukraine conflict has consumed quite a bit of the European and American financial bandwidth – and this will have a direct impact on what kind of attention and assistance may be available for others.

As the election cycles heat up in the US, there are indications that what transpired in Pakistan could become a hot topic between the Democrats and Republicans, further eroding credence for the local set-up there.

Policy Implications

The domestic turmoil in Pakistan is directly connected to the great power rivalry presently playing out. The election results indicate the gradual shift in the societal balance in Pakistan towards the nationalist and conservative forces. As noted by PoliTact in 2014, the organic political alliance that would emerge from the changing ecosystem is between the nationalists and the conservatives of different colors – an outcome not seen favorably in the West.

Ironically, the campaign against extremism has played a significant role in altering the traditional societal balance. It resulted in the shrinking space for the liberals in the Islamic world, and the steady rise of the nationalists and conservatives. The nationalists and conservatives have become increasingly vocal on the supremacy of state sovereignty and noninterference of external players in other countries, a cause championed by China and Russia as well.

This poses serious implications; Western allies cannot hold on to power long while being oblivious to the popular feelings and worsening economic prospects. Their interests, and those of the West, are served better by accommodating the change in the societal balance as opposed to holding on to what is archaic and the customary.

PoliTact’s South Asia Fellow Naad-e-Ali Sulehria contributed to this article.

The post Pakistan Post Election Crisis, Great Power Rivalry, and Societal Imbalance appeared first on Politact.

Pakistan has been in a political and economic downward spiral since Imran Khan’s government was removed in April 2022 through a no-confidence motion. The traditional civil-military tensions have also peaked – the nation faces grave human rights violations, and serious concerns regarding the rule of law are being raised. The future of nuclear-armed state with a population of nearly two hundred and fifty million stands in peril. The nation is also on the front-line of climate crisis – and floods in 2022 cost the country close to $30 billion in losses.

Since gaining independence in 1947, Pakistan has remained aligned with the West. It was a close U.S. ally during the Cold War and during the global war against terror and violent extremism – undertaken in the aftermath of 9/11. However, due to various geopolitical reasons, U.S.-Pakistan relations have stagnated. Some experts argue that the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 created a misalignment of interests between the U.S. and Pakistan. Others state that the growing U.S.-India strategic ties and the economic and security initiatives by India with Gulf nations further altered the calculus for Pakistan.

There are two goals for the one-day seminar:

1. To critically examine reasons for the decline of democratic rule, freedom of the press, human rights, and civil liberties in Pakistan, focusing on frayed military-civilian relations, national security and extremism, and internal political-economic factors.
2. To examine the current and future trajectory of U.S.-Pakistan relations with a focus on upcoming elections, the role of the Pakistani diaspora in democracy promotion, and areas of economic development.

Please join us as our assembled scholars and speakers discuss and present their insights into Pakistan’s present political and economic turmoil and deliberate on how to navigate the way forward.  Moreover, they will explore policy options for the U.S. to build a long-term strategic partnership with Pakistan by promoting and upholding shared values and mutual interests.

Speakers

Uzair Younus is a Director of Pakistan Initiative at the Atlantic Council and VP at The Asia Group. He was also a director at Albright Stonebridge Group’s South Asia practice. In this role, he helped clients develop strategies for long-term growth in the region and assess political and economic developments.

Dr. Hassan Abbas is a Distinguished Professor of International Security Studies, Chair of the Department of Regional and Analytical Studies (CISA) at US National Defense University. He was the Distinguished Quaid-i-Azam Chair Professor at Columbia University before joining CISA and has previously held fellowships at Harvard Law School and Asia Society in New York.

Dr. Qamar-ul Huda is a Michael E. Paul Distinguished Visiting Professor of International Affairs, United States Naval Academy (USNA). Formerly Dr. Huda was a Senior Policy Advisor for U.S. Department of State Secretary’s Office for Religion and Global Affairs (S/RGA) where he focused on civil society, religious communities, and diplomacy with non-government organizations. He was also selected as The World’s 500 Most Influential Muslims from 2016-2023, published by The Royal Islamic Strategic Centre, Amman, Jordan.

Arif Ansar is a CEO and Chief Analyst at PoliTact. Arif has over 20 years of consulting experience with various branches of the US government, including USAID, the Department of State, US Geological Survey, and the Department of Defense. His cross industry experience includes Defense-Security, International Development, and Information Technology sectors. From 1998-2000, he was also involved with the Water Rights sub-committee of the Middle East Peace Process (Israel, Jordan, Palestine).

The event is scheduled for August 19, 2023 from 12:00-2:30 pm – and will be held at the Oval Theater, Marshall Student Center, University of South Florida, 4202 E Fowler Ave, Tampa, Fl 33620.

The seminar is being co-organized by PoliTact and The Friends of Pakistan, Tampa, Florida. The is an in-person event, to receive a link for virtual attendance, please send an email to info@politact.com.

The Friends of Pakistan is a community organization made up of professionals which include medical doctors, influential businessmen, and entrepreneurs. The group members are involved in supporting several education and social welfare programs in Pakistan – and increasingly aspire to contribute towards climate resilience related initiatives.

For further information, email: info@politact.com.

Related Articles:

Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States

Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP
Great Power Rivalry in South Asia and Ukraine
Emerging US Policy Towards Afghanistan After Withdrawal

US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden

The post Examining U.S.-Pakistan Relationship, Current Status Of Human Rights, Civil Society, And Democracy In Pakistan appeared first on Politact.

Context

Historical parallels are important in developing perspectives on present-day conundrums. They provide an illustration of where matters were and what were the important events and considerations at the time. Deciphering this helps to ascertain where matters stand and navigate the future.

The November article last year had examined the division of British subcontinent in 1947 and compared the US August 2021 withdrawal to that. Since then, two other significant events have unfolded on the global scene. The invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February and the removal of Imran Khan’s government in April through a no confidence motion. And the two events seem to be interlinked as well. Apparently, Imran Khan’s decision to visit Russia and meet Putin had angered Western powers including the US.

Analysis

Pre-Partition Dynamics

How does the arrival of new Cold War with Russia and removal of Imran’s government fit with the earlier balance of power tussles that led the British to leave the Sub-Continent – and the birth of India and Pakistan in 1947? Moreover, how does Imran’s stance differ from those adopted by previous leadership including Mohammad Ali Jinnah.

Clearly, both, Jinnah in the past, and Imran in the present, are dealing with a different set of circumstances. Jinnah was attempting to carve out a new nation and had to work with the colonial power. And the best chance for him to achieve success was by not being a revisionist. Moreover, he realized that the time of empires had passed, and the nation-state trend was the one he needed to conform to – not Pan-Islamism.

Another important consideration is an assessment of alternative political thoughts that existed at the time to deal with the challenges. Acuteness of obstacles, especially economic, often cause strong divergent views – where it is difficult to bring consensus.

For example, Jinnah’s attitude was in stark contrast to that of Mowlana Azad, Mowdudi, Mohammad Ali and Showkat Ali, Ghaffar Khan, and other Pan-Islamists of the time. He was against the ‘Khilafat Movement’ (which was formed against the breakup of the Ottoman Empire) and considered it a religious exaggeration; Gandhi, ironically, had supported this movement. Some Pan-Islamists later resisted the formation of Pakistan, as it would divide the Muslims of the subcontinent, and inadvertently became Gandhi’s staunch supporters.

The critical point in Jinnah’s position was his differentiation between the importance of local and regional interests vis-a-vis global ones. The local and regional interests translated into nationalistic interests, in the post-World War II nation-state environment. In Jinnah’s assessment, more importance was given to what was attainable; he complied with the nation-state trend in opposition to Pan-Islamism — the time for empires had passed. Not to forget, the transformation of Turkey to a State at the end of Ottoman Empire. And, it was not just Turkey. Virtually all the European empires had converted to nation-states toward the end of World War II.

Post-Independence Alignments

After gaining independence from Great Britain, Pakistan solidly remained in the Western block. The final battle of the previous Cold War was fought and won with Pakistan assistance in Afghanistan. It was, therefore, more than ironic that as the new Cold War got underway, and Russia invaded Ukraine in February, leader of Pakistan Imran Khan was seen standing next to Putin in Russia. And as Imran proclaimed his desire to establish and maintain independent foreign policy – his stances are perceived as Pan-Islamic and nationalist, with the undertones of revisionism.

When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the then ruler and chief martial law administrator, Gen Zia-ul-Haq, squarely sided with the US in organizing jihad against the godless Soviets. Subsequently, after 9/11 when US launched the War against Extremism, the then military ruler of Pakistan Gen Musharraf also decided to side with the US in carrying out the Campaign against Extremism. In both instances, the nation gained US economic and military support – despite the fact that both leaders had unceremoniously removed elected civilian governments, of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif respectively.

Irrespective, as the new Cold War gets underway Imran Khan appeared to be a misfit. To conform with the past trajectory would have meant for him to quickly fall in line – and avail the opportunity presented by the change in global political landscape for the betterment of the country – as had occurred during the Zia and Musharraf’s time. Alternatively, even if that was not possible, then Jinnah presents an ideal depiction of how to operate as a pragmatist with a weak hand. While Jinnah had to carve out an Muslim nation state, the present political, economic and security imperatives translate into no-less than existential threat.

Imran’s idealism is requiring him to alter the very conditions that are taking the nation to brink of extinction again and again – namely corruption and an opportunism. Whenever matters have taken a turn for the worse, the country has waited things out for the global context to change, and surely time never stays the same. This, by any definition, can hardly be called a policy or a strategy.

Societal Outlook

When we look at the past for examples, a question is also raised: did Jinnah align with the West because he believed the Allied powers were winning. Or – was it that he felt their values matched closely with his and what he was trying to achieve. After all, he spent a lot of time in Britain, like Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Imran Khan.

And this question remains relevant today. As Pakistan has remained an ally of the West and the US since Independence, naturally its people are also connected to the West when it comes to people-to-people contacts and commercial ties.

While the nation claim’s strategic friendship with China, the social contacts are no way near like what Pakistan has with the US. But which segment of the society are we talking about is also pertinent; the upper middle class, business elites, and top brass of the military have always been tied to the West, as can be said for many other nations.

More importantly, and otherwise less talked about, is how close are Pakistan’s value system to that of the West – at least in aspiring democratic form of government and sharing customized version of liberal world view. While its true that the West and the US have been losing their soft power – still Russia and China are no match when it comes to the cultural appeal.

When Imran Khan gives an example of what systems inspires him, other than ‘Riyasat-e-Medina’- he usually quotes the British system – not the Russian or Chinese. Although he has praised Chinese successes in poverty alleviation.

The fact of the matter is that Pakistan is politically, socially, and economically still connected to and dependent on the West and the US. However, this connection is deeper the higher one goes in the class system. This poses serious implications. Moreover, the disoriented youth have been galvanized and empowered by Imran’s narrative – which rhymes with their world view. Additionally, this world view inadvertently has been facilitated by the West: by supporting political leadership that falls short of its own standards and is seen as corrupt – and by not living up to the moral high ground in recent conflicts.

The non-revisionist class and leadership, in whose hands the British left the power, has lost credibility over time. Although that system is still attempting to maintain status quo – it would be increasingly difficult to do so.

The post New Cold War; Leadership Challenges For Middle Powers And Societal Imbalance appeared first on Politact.

Does The Road To Peace In Afghanistan Originate In Kashmir?

By Arif Ansar

Context

The conflict in Afghanistan has been continuing for the last 30 years or so. The present phase got underway after the tragic incident of 9/11. US launched a campaign against the perpetrators of the attack, Al Qaeda, and those that provided them refuge, the Afghan Taliban.

While the Al Qaeda menace has been controlled for the most part in the region, the Taliban have remained a lethal force even after billions of dollars were spent to counter them. Under the Obama administration’s troop surge, more than 100,000 soldiers were deployed in Afghanistan.

The question though remains, why have Taliban not been managed even after spending so much in blood and treasure. An inaccurate answer to this question can and have caused many new complications, while prolonging the war.

The causes for this not only lie inside Afghanistan but also relate to the India-Pakistan rivalry, including the impact of Iran-Saudi tussles in the Middle East. In addition, the global power tensions between US, China, and Russia have escalated the tugs of the global balance of power. There is also a need to understand the transformation of the extremism phenomenon that has lead the emergence of Daesh to replace Al Qaeda.

In this complicated dynamics, the Indian motives in Afghanistan are the least understood, and perhaps hold the key to make progress on lasting Afghan peace.

Lack of Afghan Purpose

If we look at the reasons internal to Afghanistan, there are factors connected to the Afghan political, economic, and security capacity to continue to fight this seemingly endless war. In January, President Ashraf Ghani himself admitted that without US support, Afghan Army couldn’t be sustained for six months.

Any army needs to have clear-cut goals and purpose in order to put up a decisive fight; this is especially true when the Afghans are fighting their fellow countrymen. The Afghan Army is fighting Taliban, including extremists like Al Qaeda and Daesh, with limited military capability, and has to rely on air and advisory support to conduct operations.

On the other hand, Afghan Taliban have a transparent message that they are conducting a jihad against foreign occupiers, historically an honorable Afghan occupation. Their most apparent demands for peace talks include complete withdrawal of foreign troops, and to negotiate directly with the Americans, and not its ‘puppet’ Afghan government.

As opposed to this, the coalition demands from Taliban a clear break with global jihadists like Al Qaeda. Furthermore, to renounce violence and accept the present Afghan constitution and government. On the surface, all major external stakeholders have demanded that peace process should be Afghan owned and Afghan led, a noble aim indeed.

Who Can Bring About Afghan Reconciliation?

Many talk about the Afghan Reconciliation in simplistic terms. Since the kinetic approaches have not worked, it is automatically assumed the next step should be the peace process. There are many limitations to that. At this point, Afghan Taliban have splintered into many groups and it’s not clear who can politically represent them, and has the sway over all groups.

Another premise that accompanies the above argument is that while there are many stakeholders to the conflict, the peace process should be Afghan owned and Afghan led. Put it more succinctly, the Western backed Afghan government should be spearheading the peace initiative. With the interests of many regional and global stakeholders at stake, to expect the weakest partner to perform this job is hoping for the impossible.

The Afghan reconciliation is an auxiliary to Afghan Peace Process. Meaning that the Afghan reconciliation by itself will not bring peace to Afghanistan – in absence of settlement between the regional and global stakeholders, particularly India and Pakistan, and the US and China.

A successful approach to Afghan peace should first involve careful scrutiny of the interests of the key stakeholders, starting from the Afghan government and different factions of Afghan Taliban. The motives of the fragile Afghan government are not clear on why it would want to share power with Afghan Taliban. They lack credibility and are corrupt. The political leadership benefits the most from the continuing infighting in Afghanistan as it attracts millions of dollars of military and economic support, which provides opportunities for more corruption.

The turmoil that resulted from the 2014 Afghan election was only settled after former US Secretary of State John Kerry assembled a Unity Government and developed a power sharing formula between the CEO and the President. This provides one example of how a facilitated wider power-sharing model, which includes the Afghan Taliban, could work.

The uncertainty regarding the much-delayed parliamentary elections has continued. Many of the election reforms are still not in place and there is little time left to do that. The presidential elections scheduled for mid-2019 could very well result in another phase of political chaos while the security situation of the country dwindles further. This is one more reason to quicken the pace of finding a peace formula for Afghanistan.

Understanding the Indian Position on Afghan Reconciliation

The media attention is usually fixated on the American interests and that of Pakistan as they are linked with the Afghan reconciliation. However, this debate lacks assessment of those players that do not want Afghan peace process to be successful, for example India. How does it benefit or lose from peace in Afghanistan? To talk about reconciliation in Afghanistan in the absence of this analysis will not be doing justice with the objective of achieving peace.

The country is perhaps the least interested in Afghan reconciliation. And we only need to look at the pre 9/11 Afghanistan to understand the reasons for that.

This was the time when militants and extremists with regional and global ambitions were cross-pollinating in Afghanistan after they had fought the jihad against the Soviets in the 80s, and this resulted in several attacks inside India, and ultimately leading to 9/11.

For India the nightmare scenario would be the return of the Afghan Taliban and other religious zealots, which would be the outcome of any kind of Afghan reconciliation. It fears this will have a direct impact on the insurgency in Kashmir. While India provides economic aid to Afghanistan and supports development projects to improve its soft image, the main aim of India would be to prevent any kind of Afghan patch-up that puts the Afghan Taliban back in the government. Instead, it has focused all its efforts to malign the image of Pakistan as a supporter of extremists in Kashmir and Afghanistan.

Indian objective would be to weaken Pakistan to such an extent that it abandons any claim on Kashmir, or accept a resolution of the conflict based on Indian terms. This is not much different than what just transpired in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The politics of the Middle East has changed to such an extent, that the traditional supporters of the Palestinian cause like Saudi Arabia and Egypt have moved their position closer to that of Israel. This changing political landscape recently resulted in the Trump administration’s decision to move the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

Based on this assumption, Indian strategy has been to use its increasing clout to sideline Pakistan in the international arena, and to short-circuit channels through which Pakistan has traditionally garnered support, such as the GCC and the US. And in this endeavor, it has allied with Israel. In this context, the emerging Indian Middle East posture is interesting to watch and quite risky for Pakistan.

India’s Emerging Middle East Posture

Pakistan-India tensions are tied to the Kashmir issue and the associated skirmishes on the LOC. This rivalry has now fully engulfed the Afghan conflict, where Pakistan blames India for using the turmoil in Afghanistan as a stepping-stone to destabilize and weaken Pakistan. It does this by carrying out terrorist activities within Pakistan, and by supporting Baloch separatist. On the other hand, India blames Pakistan for supporting the Kashmiri militants and Afghan Taliban.

Despite years of dialogue between US and Pakistan, US has gradually given more credence to the argument presented by India. Moreover, the maturing US-India strategic ties are a source of great concern for Pakistan.

In addition to the US, Pakistan has also enjoyed strong support from the Middle East nations, especially from the GCC. In times of emergencies and political crises, Pakistan has always been able to harness political and financial support from its oil rich Islamic brethren.

However, due to the tremendous change being brought upon by the campaign against extremism, the Iran-Saudi tensions, and the transformation in the energy industry, the geopolitics of the Middle East is changing dramatically. India is positioning itself to exploit the opportunities being created to undermine the customary support Pakistan has enjoyed in the region.

This was recently at display when Prime Minister of Israel visited India in January for six days, followed by Modi’s trip to Palestine in February. In his meeting with the Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas, he ironically backed the cause of independent Palestine. India has historically supported the Palestinians but its extra-ordinary close ties to Israel makes a mockery of this claim. And these trips have taken place in the aftermath of highly controversial US decision to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. During his trip, he also visited UAE, Oman, and three nations of West Africa.

The Indian analysts projected the nations Middle East diplomacy as an attempt to balance its ties with the Arab states that employ a large number of Indian workers. However, this is hardly digestible when other Arab nations such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt have themselves moved closer to the position of Israel. Reportedly, it was due to their private consent that emboldened President Trump to take the decision of moving the embassy to Jerusalem.

Needless to say, during this timeframe Pakistan was itself busy with hosting President Abdullah II of Jordan. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s Army Chief visited Saudi Arabia in early February and met with Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman. On February 20^th came the decision to post a contingent of Pakistani troops to the Kingdom for training and advisory mission.

The reasons for aggressive Indian Middle East diplomacy are multidimensional. With large Muslim population, India desires to project its suitability for the seat on the reformed UN Security Council, and as a credible future arbiter in the almost dead Middle East Peace Process. Moreover, to undercut the customary support for Pakistan in the Arab world for the Kashmir cause and matters related to Afghanistan.

Conclusion

The above assessment provides several clues on how to approach the Afghan peace process. Firstly, the motives of the Afghan government need to be looked at closely. The reason Obama administration gave a timeline for the American withdrawal was not to alert the enemy but recognizing history. Without Afghan’s taking responsibility for their country, the nation will remain dependent on the West and billions will continue to be wasted. And as soon as the aid dries up, the infighting will start.

Second, the missing component on Afghan reconciliation has to do with India. India should be expected to clearly lay out a minimal acceptable formula for Afghanistan. And it cannot be that it wouldn’t accept Afghan Taliban in any potential power sharing formula. Moreover, without entering into a dialogue with Pakistan on the resolution of Kashmir, it risks a wider conflagration.

Thirdly, to achieve Afghan Peace, will require Western facilitation like the power sharing model crafted in 2014 with the active US support.

On the flip side, Afghan Taliban would have to accept any power sharing formula that results from the negotiations, and that their religious aspirations would have to be attained through a consultative mechanism. Moreover, they would have to break ties with global extremists. They should recognize the leverage of being a bulwark against the aims of Deash in the region.

The post Afghan Peace Process And Kashmir appeared first on Politact.

Media reports indicate that Prominent Pakistani Taliban commanders have held meetings with Al Qaeda leaders and Afghan Taliban on November 27 in Wanna – South Waziristan, and on December 11 in Datta Khel – North Waziristan. Reports further indicate that Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban leaders tried to convince Pakistan Taliban to set aside their differences and assist in their fight against US and NATO forces in Afghanistan.

The gatherings appeared to have taken place as US drone strikes were on hold in the aftermath of the November NATO Mohmand strike, and were attended by senior Al Qaeda leader Abu Yahya al-Libi, as well as de facto head of Haqqani network, Siraj-ud-din Haqqani. Other leaders reported to have attended included Hakimullah Mehsud and his deputy Waliur Rehman of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Spokesperson for TTP, Ehsanullah Ehsan stated that Maulvi Nazir and Haji Gul Bahdur, that Pakistan considers as Good Taliban, also attended. Afghan Taliban were also represented by Zabiullah Mujahid and Maulvi Sangeen.

The congregations has produced the following outcomes:

• A 4 member consultative body was formed, know as Shura-e-Murakeba
• Avoid the unnecessary killings and kidnappings for ransom
• End attacks on Pakistani military and refocus efforts on US led coalition in Afghanistan

The post Al-Qaeda, Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Taliban Agree On A New Alliance: Shura-e-Murakeba appeared first on Politact.

Commenting on the recent visit of Marc Grossman, Crocker informed that he engaged in a comprehensive discussion with Karzai and the leaders of High Peace Council to map the way forward.

Updating on the Qatar talks, ambassador Crocker stated that Karzai has given support for opening Taliban’s office in Qatar and that it is imperative that Afghans talk to Afghans for the success of the peace process. He said meetings in Qatar are underway and there is support for a central government and its efforts to build a strong, stable and secure state.

US special envoy for Pakistan and Afghanistan, Marc Grossman, is trying to mitigate tensions between Afghanistan and Qatar to facilitate peace talks with the Taliban. Grossman has stated that Afghanistan and Qatar need to be in direct contact with each other. Tensions between the two mounted when Qatar agreed to open Taliban liaison office, while Afghanistan felt sidelined for not being consulted.

On the other hand, Taliban recently announced that they are opening office in Qatar, however added that holding talks does not mean that they accept Afghan constitution.

The post Ambassador Crocker Updates On Afghan Reconciliation And Grossman’s Visit appeared first on Politact.

Context

From what one can gather, Jinnah supported Great Britain in both World Wars. This should not be interpreted as a reflection of his belief in colonial causes and interests. Rather, these positions reflected the meaning of these wars for him and for the future of the people he represented. Some historians and critics take a simplistic approach in evaluating Jinnah’s stance: he was helping the British in their time of need, but Jinnah positioned himself to gain some reciprocity and sympathy when the opportunity presented itself. Great Britain was the victorious power in both World Wars, and it always helps to side with wining party.

It also could be that Quaid-e-Azam believed more in Sir Syed’s vision refined after the Indian Rebellion of 1857; the British were not going away any time soon and salvation and success depended on learning from and working with them, mimicking the Hindus. Jinnah’s attitude was in stark contrast to that of Mowlana Azad, Mowdudi, Mohammad Ali and Showkat Ali, Ghaffar Khan, and other Pan-Islamists of the time. He was against the Khilafat Movement, which was formed to pressure the British against the breakup of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, and considered it a religious exaggeration. Gandhi, ironically, had supported this movement. Some Pan-Islamists later resisted the formation of Pakistan, as it would divide the Muslims of the subcontinent.

In the present nation-state context, Pakistan stance on the campaign against extremists presents resemblance to that of Jinnah’s position in dealing with the British. However, as the Middle East and North Africa increasingly get unsettled under the overlapping forces related to extremism, Arab Spring, and the tussles of the global players, Muslims of the subcontinent, are once again being required to form a response. The better they understand what is taking place in the present day Middle East, the more prepared they will be to not repeat the mistakes of the past.

Analysis

Afghan Jihad and Iranian Revolution

Pakistan itself seems to be passing through one of it toughest phases, with turmoil internally and in the neighborhood. Since the dismemberment of the country in 1971, the region has gone through four decades of continuous warfare. This has included the Iranian revolution of 1979, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq War of the 80s, the Afghan civil war of the 90s, and the present phase that began since 9/11.

Between the period of 1947 to 1971, Pakistan and Iran enjoyed very close ties. In both the 1965 and 1971 wars against India, Iran supported Pakistan diplomatically, militarily and financially. The country also offered military equipment, training and intelligence to Pakistan in suppressing the Baloch insurgency in the mid 70s.

Iran-Iraq War

The Khomeini led rebellion effectively transformed the nature of the pro-American regime. Only a year later, in 1980, Iran-Iraq war commenced and lasted until 1988, almost up to the time when Soviets started to withdraw from Afghanistan. During this phase, while Iran was moving out of the American influence, Pakistan was getting fully embedded in to it. The nation helped facilitate the Jihad against the Soviets with assistance of the Arabs and the US. The role of Pakistan in the Iran-Iraq war, however, was premised on maintaining a delicate balance.

Pakistan went out of its way in helping protect the Gulf States, and according to some estimates, Zia-ul-Haq placed close to 40,000 military personnel in Saudi Arabia for security and training purposes. This, however, did not occur at the cost of Iran. Reportedly, Pakistan also supplied weapons to Iran, and both neighbors supported the Afghan Jihad, albeit different factions. The global powers were applying a similar strategy; while Russians were intermittently supplying weapons to Iraq, the Iran-Contra affair illustrated that US was also equipping the Iranians.

While Saddam’s decision to invade Iran in 1980 is believed to be a miscalculation, he feared that a strong religiously oriented Iran would disturb the Shia-Sunni balance of Iraq. Saddam repeated his misjudgment when he invaded Kuwait in August 1990, but was met with a different western response. Ever since Iraq has come under American led intervention twice, and despite all past attempts to contain Iran, its sway has grown. In the end, it was the western intervention that disturbed the ethnic balance of Iraq.

Emerging Dynamics

The rather simultaneous events of the Iranian revolution in 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Iran-Iraq war of the 80s, altered the dynamics of Middle East. Western policies during this time frame were primarily meant to prevent South Asia and Middle East to fall under the complete Russian influence.

The present situation of Syria and the American turnabout there, followed by the budding détente between the West and Iran, has placed the region at the precipice of another historic transformation. The Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia, are now deeply worried about western intentions related to the Arab Spring and the campaign against extremists. While they were happy at the removal of rogues like Saddam and Qaddafi, the way Mubarak was shown the door, deeply troubled the Saudis. Speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on Feb 19, Deputy Secretary of State William Burns laid out these worries in the following words:

“The reality is that in our conversations with our Gulf partners, we don’t always see eye-to-eye on what has caused the revolutions and transitions spurred by the second Arab Awakening. We don’t always see eye-to-eye on the direction these transitions should take. And we don’t always see eye-to-eye on how best to respond to them.”

The Saudis in particular are now convinced that it cannot sit ideally by as everything else around them changes at an alarming pace. Meanwhile, recent reports indicate that Pakistan has changed its posture on Syria in the aftermath of recent high-level exchanges between the military and political leadership of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. However, what does this change signify?

In the past, Pakistan’s ties with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have been defined mostly by the policies of the global powers, especially the West and the US. As the American support moved away from Iran in the 80s, so did Pakistan’s direction. The question now becomes, as the West’s détente with Iran progresses, will it translate in to a similar switch for Pakistan, away from the Arabs and closer to Iran. The present atmosphere presents several challenges in this regard.

Because of the war against terror and card blanche support for Israeli policies in the past, the US and the West have suffered considerable loss of popular support in the Islamic regions. This has produced two obvious consequences: on the one hand major Muslim nations have started to diversify their ties with the emerging powers of BRICS. On the other hand, negative western perceptions have allowed Russia and China space to make inroads. For example, Russia is attempting to reestablish defense ties with its former allies Iraq and Egypt. In case of Pakistan, worries related to Afghanistan, volatile situation of FATA and Baluchistan, and US-India strategic ties, have convinced Pakistan to tie the strategic knot with China.

While Turkey remained independent when it came to matters of Iraq in the past, this stance has been difficult to maintain over the affairs of Syria. Like the Gulf nations, Turkey also wants Assad removed, but at the same time, it has maintained and expanded economic ties with Iran, unlike Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, Turkey has supported Mursi and Palestinian Hamas, in stark contrast to Saudi policies and in support of Iranian posture. While Turkey is a NATO member, it has also been opening up to Chinese and Russian dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

The potential change in Pakistan’s position over Syria places it at odds with the non-intervention stance of China and Russia. Moreover, it creates friction with Iran, whose assistance will be needed for the full materialization of Pakistan’s regional vision. In effect, by recruiting Pakistan, Saudi Arabia is building pressure on the US for the removal of Assad, who is backed by Iran and Russia, whether it requires diplomatic or military means. While India had also maintained a non-intervention position previously, it had to revert in consideration of its strategic ties with Israel and the US, and growing economic interests in the Gulf region.

Moving forward, and in historical perspective, three strategic priorities of the West need to be considered and evaluated.

• Is it more important for the West to contain Iran’s nuclear program, or to remove Assad? The Syrian leader has already agreed to eliminate the chemical weapons under a Russian engineered agreement.
• Moreover, to achieve Israeli-Palestinian peace, whose role is more important: Iran or Saudi Arabia? It’s Iran that has sway over Syria, Hezbollah and increasingly Hamas.
• Furthermore, while China and Russia have ties with both the Sunni and Shia regimes; the West has greatly undermined its maneuverability by not having relations with Iran.

What to do?

Pakistan’s response to the changing Middle East is the regional cooperation with India, Afghanistan, Iran, China, and Central Asia. However its economic dependence means it would have to once again play a balancing act. The challenge being if the security and viability of Saudi Arabia, and GCC, is indeed threatened by forces linked to AQ, Arab Spring, or Iran, will it be able to maintain its neutrality.

As a result of risks being faced by the Core Arab Islamic region, these nations will seek the assistance of periphery. The same can also be said of the West, which is attempting to build strategic ties with Indonesia and India, as part of the pivot to the Pacific. There is continuity in the western policy of both propping Iran’s influence, and at the same time, preventing it from becoming a dominant power in the Middle East. In Afghanistan, this has translated in to checking any single player from overshadowing, whether that is Iran or Pakistan. And, lately Indian influence has been introduced as a balancing factor.

However, its best for the periphery to serve as a bridge to develop understanding between the differing stakeholders, Iran and Saudi Arabia, as oppose to serve a military wing for one or the other power. The past experience in this regard has proven to be devastating.

So, if the security risks envisioned by the Saudis do come true, will Pakistan once again follow the precedence set by Jinnah, is too early to say. As far as Turkey is concerned, it is very careful not to make the mistake of choosing the wrong side as it did in World War I, or get caught in a wedge between Iran and Saud Arabia. This is also a good lesson for Pakistan, irrespective of its economic pressures; it should join hands with the Turks in preventing the Shia-Sunni proxy war from engulfing the entire region.

Looking back, 1979 proved to be a watershed year; with the insertion of religion in both the Iranian revolution and Afghan jihad, secularism took a back seat. To this date, the two events have transformed and divided the politics of the region, and also resulted in the birth of Al Qaeda that now plaques pretty much the entire Islamic world. Sunni and Shia extremist forces now bedevil the whole landscape. While Hezbollah enjoys the support of Iran, since 9/11, AQ is a disowned child but the same cannot be said about some of its affiliates. In places like Syria, the finale of the phenomena appears to be a confrontation between Hezbollah and the AQ linked extremists. The regions concerned need to first of all prepare to prevent this, and secondly, to deal with its consequences if they are unable to avert it.

The post Tackling The Emerging Middle East; Managing Saudi And Irani Influences appeared first on Politact.

While Nawaz Sharif was still in the US and had not even met President Obama, some prominent analysts declared the visit a success. It was really intriguing how they arrived at this conclusion so early, and when little was known about what was transpiring in some of these discussions’. The media pundits jumped on the bandwagon as well to decide the puzzle in two to three days after the trip. The simple fact is that actions speak louder than words, and it takes a little bit of time to fully assess the outcome.

To some the visit was indeed a success. Despite efforts by some quarters to isolate Pakistan in the world, the leadership of both nations was engaging. To others, the trip was an embarrassment, judging from the body language of the Prime Minister. But the points of agreement and disagreement were never made public. The success of the visit is obviously dependent on the objective of the summit. It’s not clear why the Prime Minister make certain claims which could not be substantiated and thus set himself up, especially as it relates to the drone strikes.

Nawaz Sharif wanted to demonstrate his government is close to the US and has its backing. It delayed the talks with TTP and unveiling the new national security and counter terror strategy. Moreover, Nawaz deferred announcing the names for the top military spots. Some media reports suggested that the slots would be filled after consultation with the US. The question is why he wanted to convey this perception?

Domestic Politics

In the past, political governments have behaved in this manner when they were domestically unpopular or when they feared being outflanked by the omnipotent military. In the present circumstances, General Kiyani has already announced he does not intend to continue, and seemingly the civil and military leadership is also on the same page, when it comes to negotiating with the Taliban and Pakistan’s role in the campaign against extremists. But the government does appear to be fumbling with its popular mandate.

Nonetheless, stung by the military in the past, it would be naïve to think that anxiety is not at all at play. One of the outcomes of this paranoia is the centralization of power and the bizarre absence of the foreign and defense ministers. In the present circumstances, PML-N perhaps feels more threatened by Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), in power in the KPK province.

The dilemma PML-N faces is it won the elections by criticizing the closeness of PPP to the US, and questioning Pakistan’s role in the war against terror that crippled its economy. Now that PML-N is at the helm, its predicament is turning out to be the same as that of its predecessor, and this will sooner or later put it at odds with the people. Mainly because without law and order, economy will continue to be fragile and the energy shortages will persist.

PML-N wants to show it is sticking to its pre-election stances. However, the elimination of Hakimullak Mehsud has put his government to the test; it cannot pretend to be an innocent bystander.

On the other hand, PTI chairman Imran Khan recognizes the present situation creates an opportunity for his party. As the trajectory of events unfold, all Imran has to do is to take a stronger stance on the drones, which is its customary position. He has already warned of blocking the NATO supplies in retaliation for the drone strike on Nov 1 that killed the TTP leader. As the nationalist fervor develops, and the reaction to potential retaliation from TTP manifests, it’s a matter of time Nawaz government gets fully engulfed in a crisis. To avert this eventuality, PML-N will likely be forced in to adopting a tougher line.

Regional Dynamics

In addition to the domestic political angle, the present situation also has to be looked at from the prism of the evolving Afghan political settlement. PoliTact had noted in December 2012, if the Afghan reconciliation goes well, TTP has the most to loose, and it will struggle to remain relevant. For this purpose, it would gravitate even more towards Al Qaeda and other Jihadists. To minimize the chances of becoming obsolete, TTP is likely to do whatever it can to disrupt the Afghan reconciliation and to destabilize Pakistan.

On the other hand, if Afghan reconciliation and US withdrawal are not managed well, TTP might attempt to exploit the circumstances. The capture of Latif Mehsud in Afghanistan, disturbances in Gilgit Baltistan and Swat resulting in the martyrdom of senior military officials, suggested that it was attempting to do just that. If Afghan negotiations go well or not, either way TTP poses a danger.

Moreover, any semblance of unity between Afghan Taliban and TTP represents a bad omen for both Afghanistan and Pakistan. In this context, the nature and future of TTP and Afghan Taliban ties, will have a key impact on not only the Afghan settlement but also on the future security situation of Pakistan.

With this background, it would have been far better for the Prime Minister to take public in to confidence on what really transpired in his US meetings as it relates to the drone strikes, talks with TTP, and Afghan reconciliation. While it is still not too late to do that, the message would have to balance domestic politics with the regional and global perceptions about Pakistan.

When addressing the domestic audience, rather than saying all is good, he could have said, and still can, that US is not fully convinced on Pakistan’s point of view, and this remains work in progress. The Prime Minister could have added, which he cannot now, that he himself was not fully swayed on the sincerity of TTP, but was willing to give them one last chance.

In the conduct of international relations, not putting across one’s position clearly comes at a price. While ambiguity often has its advantages, it can also prove to be dangerous, as Pakistan and US both may be realizing. Assuming or conveying something that did or did not occur, is even worse.

The post Nawaz Sharif’s US Mission And Death Of Hakimullah Mehsud appeared first on Politact.

Context

Since Nawaz Sharif came to power, he has consistently talked about improving ties with India and Pakistan’s other neighbors. However, the otherwise calm situation on the LoC is increasingly getting tense. The good intentions do not seem to be aligned with the ground reality.

Allegedly, Pakistani troops crossed the LoC and attacked Indian Chakanda Bagh check post in the Poonch sector on August 6 and as a result six Indian soldiers were reportedly killed. A similar incident had taken place in January, in which an Indian soldier was decapitated. Pakistan’s military promptly denied carrying out any such assaults. According to reports, in both instances the intruders were wearing Pakistan army’s uniform. The reaction from the Indian political and military leaders to the latest attack has evolved to become quite harsh, with casualties being reported daily on Pakistan’s side of LoC.

The similarities between the two cases have raised the possibility of jihadi elements being involved. Since the latest ambush, India has alleged that Pakistan’s Special Forces have carried out these attacks in conjunction with extremist elements, forming what it calls the Border Action Team (BAT).

On the other hand, Indian Consulate in Jalalabad also came under attack on August 3, which Indian authorities believe was instigated by Pakistan. The occurrence caused nine causalities, mostly ordinary civilians and security guards protecting the outpost. It is difficult to understand why Pakistan would want to harm relations with India at this juncture. The economic and security perils of the nation dictate otherwise. The question though remains: who was responsible?

Analysis

Jihadi Groups

It could be the militant jihadi groups, trying to circumvent the resumption of Pakistan-India talks, aimed at normalizing relations. The dialogue has remained limited since the 2008 Mumbai incident. Equally, it could be the hardliners and nationalist forces on the Indian or Pakistan sides that do not want increased trade between the two nations. It could also be a third hand that benefits from the extension of status quo and tensions in the region. It should be noted that continued wrangling between India and Pakistan benefits the global powers strategically.

Perceived from the Indian angle, a suspicion may linger about the possible connection between Chinese intrusions in the Ladakh region and the LoC attacks. Despite the jingoism and media euphoria displayed at the time of Chinese intrusions in the Ladakh region, India has resorted to diplomatic channels to calm things down. With Pakistan, India cannot afford to appear weak, as it did in the case of China. It should be added that in the aftermath of the Ladakh incidents there is increase traffic of senior US officials to India, including recently US VP Joe Biden. PM Manmohan Singh is also slated to meet President Obama on his upcoming trip to US in September.

Post US Withdrawal Afghanistan

Moreover, both Afghanistan and India share apprehension about how the state of affairs may evolve in the post US Afghan withdrawal regional scenario. India has calculated that if the jihadi network remains intact after the withdrawal, Kashmir may become active once more. On the other hand, Afghanistan fears that Afghan Taliban, with the help of Pakistan based comrades, may try to dominate once more. In essence, it may be a return to the pre 9/11 conditions, which did not bode well for both nations.

Through these border attacks, and strikes against Indian interests in Afghanistan, there may be an attempt to revert the American focus on these jihadi groups. With the US trying the speed up the Afghan reconciliation and withdrawal, India fears US has once more gone lenient on these extremist groups. India may also be looking closely at what is transpiring in Syria.

The Arab Factor in Indo-Pak Politics

The Arab Spring and the War on Terror has produced a new alignment of interests in the Middle East where former adversaries have now become undeclared allies.

The emerging configuration includes Gulf States, Israel, Turkey and the West, aligned on the one side. The other loose arrangement constitutes, China, Russia, Iran, and Syria. It is hard to miss the Shia-Sunni divide in the unfolding alignment of interests. The other undercurrent to keep in perspective is the state versus non-state actors. While the Sunni state actors are aligned with Israel and the West, the Sunni non-state actors are not. This divergence is likely to produce the most volatile turbulence in the region and beyond.

While US appears to be mostly backing Sunni states, Russia and China maintain ties on both sides of the isle. Pakistan shares this strategy with Russia and China, and does not unnecessarily want to make an enemy out of Iran. However, due to its strategic ties with Israel and the US, and fear of China, establishing this balance has become quite difficult for India.

As the relations tense up between Russia and the US on the one hand, and China and US, on the other, militant and religious proxies could once again become important. Some of this is already at display in Syria and to which Russia has repeatedly pointed out. Other than AQ, US is becoming more accommodating to nationalist and religious militant groups, as evident in the case of Afghan Taliban as well. If this outlook continues, it is highly threatening for not only the monarchs of the Gulf, but also for India and Afghanistan.

The unfolding situation of Syria, and the evolving American position, may push Gulf States and India closer, at the cost of Pakistan. This first became apparent in 2012 when Saudis handed one of the prime suspects of 2008 Mumbai attack, LeT affiliated Sayed Zabiuddin Ansari, to India.

So while Nawaz Sharif and Manmohan Singh wish for good ties, much inertia exists to such a prospect on both sides, and beyond. In Egypt, tables turned on the Islamists with the decisive role of its military. In the coming days and months, the ambiguity about the connection between the state and non-state actors, is likely to be tested in South Asia.

The post What’s Behind Pakistan-India Border Tensions? appeared first on Politact.

Context
The South Asian chess game is unfolding in quite an intriguing way. Despite the rhetoric on both sides, the interdependence of Pakistan and India is only increasing. India needs Pakistan for its Look West policy to work, while the continuing quagmire in Afghanistan makes it is imperative for Pakistan to focus towards the East, and to benefit from the economic dynamism there.

This is not all; China and US both have tremendous stakes in the Asia Pacific and how the South Asian equation plays out. As an emerging power, China is pushing zealously to secure its influence in the immediate neighboring regions. On the other hand, US being an established player, is unlikely to relent easily. The recent high-level traffic from US and China to the region needs to be examined with in this context. In addition to other variables, the temperature of US-China ties will have no less of an impact on the Pakistan-India ties, and by this connection, even Afghanistan.

Will Pakistan and India go all the way in the interests of their respective strategic partners, China and the US, will be interesting to watch. Moreover, to what extents are these interests perceived as win-win or zero-sum, will pretty much define the next stage of these interlinked ties.

Analysis

The High Level Traffic

US Vice President Joe Biden’s completed a four-day visit to India in late July. The items discussed included trade, environment, and security. Biden’s visit to India took place soon after John Kerry visited the country in June. Presently Kerry is on a much-delayed two-day visit to Pakistan.

There is continuity of high-level exchanges between India and the US. A number of the think tanks in Washington have taken it as their mission to move the strategic partnership between the two nations along. The most US and Pakistan could pull together was the meagerly Dubai trade conference held in June, mostly attended by US embassy officials and businessmen from Pakistan, including Pakistani businessmen of American origin. The traders that did attend complained why the conference was not organized in Pakistan or the US and why the lack of a broad business interest from the US. The answer to this question, pretty much lays it all.

The recent high level American visits to India are matched by similar leadership contacts between China and Pakistan. The new Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif completed a five-day official visit to China in early July. During the trip, deals worth billions of dollars were reportedly signed between the two, including the development of China Pakistan Economic Corridor and the associated Kashgar-Gwadar project. The project includes developing of rail and road links between Gwadar port and Kashgar. Pakistan had previously handed over the management of the strategic Gwadar port to China.

The Chinese Message

Earlier, in late May, the new Chinese premier visited the region, and before coming to Pakistan he first went to India. The trip took place soon after the confrontation between the two militaries in the Ladakh region. By visiting India first, and while Karzai was also there demanding Indian military help, China conveyed to all three nations it gives more importance to economic and trade relations as oppose to primarily security concerns. While Pakistan and China have a strategic partnership, China has also been deepening its economic and trade ties with both India and Afghanistan.

The implied message was likely meant to positively influence Pakistan’s ties with India and Afghanistan. However, the Chinese point is likely to be only valid as long as India does not play a countering role being part of the American pivot to the Pacific. If India does take on that role, the fate the fate of BRICS, and its full membership to SCO, will both be jeopardized.

The American Posture

On the other hand, US is increasingly looking at India to get involved in Afghanistan’s security affairs, and to maintain this prospect as a leverage against Pakistan’s alleged inaction. The country is, however, reluctant to take on this task wholeheartedly for obvious reasons. Acting as a strategic partner to distant powers and at the cost of adverse ties with immediate neighbors, is never a wise strategy.

Without improvement in India Pakistan ties, Indian economic or military role in Afghanistan, will continue to be looked upon with much suspicion in Pakistan. The dilemma for India remains; in absence of improved ties with Pakistan, it cannot allow Pakistan to be the beneficiary of what transpires in Afghanistan, and after having spent about $2 billion dollars in economic assistance.

Moreover, included in the Indian consideration is the impact of Afghan reconciliation on the rest of the jihadist panorama in Pakistan. After dilly-dallying for a while, the emerging American policy appears to have delinked the two for the time being. How India digests this American decision would probably decide if Indian political help towards Afghanistan would be forthcoming. Meanwhile, India may link its assistance in Afghanistan with the role US wants it to play in the Pacific.

Conclusion

In essence, how the US-China equation evolves will have a significant impact on Pakistan-India ties, and by that link, Afghanistan as well. In Afghanistan, US has allowed Chinese to invest, and has simultaneously been pushing for improvement in the Pakistan-India ties. However, when it comes to the Pacific, intentions are not as transparent. And, now China appears to be reciprocating in kind by getting more economically involved in Latin America.

As Singapore’s legendary leader Lee Kuan Yew puts it, “Peace and security in the Asia Pacific will turn on whether China emerges as xenophobic, chauvinistic force, bitter and hostile to the West because it tried to slow down or abort its development, or educated and involved in the ways of the world, more cosmopolitan, more internationalized and outward looking.”

As far as South Asia is concerned, the worse part is that both Pakistan and India have allowed themselves to be played and taken for a ride. The cost of this strategy has been much steeper for Pakistan than India, especially considering its security and economic perils. The two nations have much more at stake in creating win-win scenarios in the region, and to not allow their future to be relegated to the interests of other powers.

On the other hand, if US and China apply a concerted approach towards the Indo-Pak, the region can go through a transformation, where all developments are not perceived in the zero-sum context. This obviously will also make the American exit from Afghanistan much smoother. However, if we add the dynamics of Middle East and Africa to the mix, a more complex picture emerges.

The post China, US And The Balancing Act In South Asia appeared first on Politact.