All the pieces are slowly falling in place; Indian election is over and that of Afghanistan is also moving towards a closure. Whoever is the new Afghan president, the candidates have indicated they will sign the Bilateral Security Agreement with the US. And President Obama has also finally announced the level of American troops that will remain there from 2014 to 2016, contingent upon the signing of the security agreement. Gen Martin E. Dempsey also stated a few days earlier that Pakistan and Afghan counterparts were informed of the US decision and both were satisfied.

A number of questions, however, have been raised; are the number of US and NATO troops to remain sufficient to secure the country in the next two years. Particularly, when Afghanistan has long maintained its security is linked to the cross border movement of Taliban from their refuge in FATA. On the other hand, Pakistan often says that stable Afghanistan is of utmost importance for the return of normalcy to their country.

In this context, the US gradual drawdown, the recent Pakistan military strikes in North Waziristan, the nations attempt to negotiate with TTP, and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit to India to participate in Modi’s inauguration, have all taken on added emphasis. Missing from this equation is the talk of Afghan reconciliation. These are obviously all interrelated events, and attempt to understand them independently will not be sufficient to grasp the overall situation.

Analysis

Status of Pakistan’s Talks with TTP

In this correlation, the first question that pops up is the status of Pakistan talks with TTP. Different interpretations have come to the fore in this regard. Have they completely failed and thus resulting in the military strikes? Or, is it related to the fight/talk strategy that appears to be a part of Pakistan’s national security strategy.

According to statements from the TTP side, the recent military strikes in North Waziristan indicate that the nation is moving towards a much-expected full-scale operation. On the other hand, Pakistan’s army has clarified the air strikes, and other actions recently conducted, are part of the retaliation to attacks carried out by the Taliban. Certainly ever since Gen Raheel Sharif assumed power, every TTP attack has been met with an immediate response. Meanwhile, western media sources are consistently pointing to the civil-military tensions on the talks with TTP, and that the military has all but decided to go ahead with a full scale offensive.

Another argument indicating that this may actually be the much-hyped operation has to do with the recent splintering of TTP. This has long been a goal of Pakistan’s strategy, including that of the US i.e., to weaken the connections between the various extremist groups constituting the AQ and associates. While some of these associates are involved in India and Middle East, others (ETIM) are linked to disturbances in Xingjian province of China. In May a series of violent events caused the death of about 79 people in this resource rich region that borders Central Asia.

Good, Bad, and Punjabi Taliban

An aspect connected to the stabilization of FATA has to do with the Afghan reconciliation and the classification Pakistan has used in applying kinetic force: the ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ Taliban. Recent events seem to suggest that Pakistan has now dropped this classification. If true, this represents a game changer. There is ground evidence to indicate that some of this is actually materializing, such as the comments made by the Hafiz Gul Bahadur after the May 20th airstrikes in North Waziristan. In the aftermath of this action, he was quoted by media as saying that his group was evaluating the peace treaty with the Pakistan government. Clearly implying his group had come under attack from the military.

According to media reports appearing on May 23rd that quoted unnamed security official, the target of the strikes on this date were the members of ETIM. The same report also states the air attack was in retaliation for the killing of security personnel and civilians across the country. On May 19th, A Chinese tourists was also abducted in DI Khan apparently by TTP linked extremists.

When it comes to Punjabi Taliban or India oriented jihadist, the ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ Taliban terminology does not apply, they have also facilitated and assisted the Afghan Taliban. The ties with India and the future behavior of Modi’s government will likely determine Pakistan’s strategy towards these groups. This is one of the key reasons India has been so involved in shaping the outcome of Afghanistan. The victory of Afghan Taliban there can translate in their reciprocity towards India oriented jihadists in the future, as events of the past suggest.

The Status of Afghan Reconciliation

A critical question related to the US/NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan has to do with the status of Afghan reconciliation. Will US withdraw irrespective of the political reconciliation between those fighting and the elected? The Afghan elections and the delay in signing the Bilateral Security Agreement have pushed back the political settlement even further.

Afghan Taliban has already reacted to the US status of forces announcement negatively. “Now that Obama has announced that he will keep around 10,000 troops until the end of 2016 and continue their occupation, Afghanistan Islamic Emirate condemns it and considers it a violation of sovereignty, religion and human rights,” a Taliban statement reported in the media said.

Coming back to Pakistan’s operation in North Waziristan

Pakistan’s operation there may not be the full-scale version with bells and whistles, as was witnessed in Swat in 2009. Obviously the terrain and dynamics of Waziristan is different. It could very well be the action-reaction format that we are presently seeing. Plus, the Taliban have already had enough notice to escape across the border. And in this regards, the future intent of Afghanistan and India towards Pakistan will become more critical. Meaning, will they assist in preventing this from happening, or will they provide refuge and then use them against Pakistan at a later time.

Thus the most important component of what and how Pakistan moves forward is dependent on the Afghan political settlement. Until the TTP is pressured, Afghan Taliban are unlikely to sit down on the table. At the same time, TTP will not settle politically before the Afghan Taliban do. Nonetheless, the political and military pressure on TTP may either lead to more infighting between various groups, as being witnessed presently, or it may simply cause the group to disintegrate into more splinter factions. This outcome is not without its own inherent risks. TTP is more of a fighting machine and never had the political acumen to build consensus amongst it various factions.

It is quite possible that US and Pakistan have agreed on the broad contours of the Afghan settlement. By which Pakistan is free to decide on what format to employ to achieve the objectives in North Waziristan and FATA. The stoppage of drone attacks may also be part and parcel of this understanding.

The weakest link in this process may be the present political setup, which may have to deal with the political blowback. This is especially true if the above strategy leads to a serious backlash from the extremists, with further impact on the economic prospects of the country. As Pakistan drops the good and bad Taliban distinction, the reaction could also become more versatile. This may be in the form of Chinese interests increasingly being hit in Pakistan, as it targets ETIM.

On the other hand, American talks with Iran related to its nuclear program are also moving ahead. With Iran potentially on board in the future, stability in Afghanistan can be achieved. This only leaves Pakistan-India equation and the dynamics of US-China relations to worry about.

The post Making Sense; North Waziristan Operation, Talks With TTP, Afghan Reconciliation appeared first on Politact.

Context

The decision of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) to lead a march next month to the notorious Waziristan area is generating quite a buzz. Especially, after details of the interview given by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Spokesperson Ihsan Ullah Ihsan to AP came out.

It is intriguing that TTP has felt the visit significant enough to arrange an interview with AP with all the risks this maneuver may have entailed. Moreover, the flip-flopping statements that have emanated ever since reflect on TTP’s confusion over what PTI may be attempting to accomplish. And, from this derives another critical question; what is Imran actually trying to achieve by his visit to this forsaken, drone afflicted, the so-called extremist haven.



Analysis

PTI’s intent for this trip to the dreaded epicenter of terror can be analyzed from a domestic and international perspective. Equally essential is to first study PTI’s stand regarding drone strikes and the war on terror.

PTI’s Position

The party claims the objective of the planned march is to protest the drone strikes that are carried out in FATA and that are, according to the interpretation it has adopted, causing significant civilian casualties. PTI has led an international campaign against drone strikes, asserting its blowback brews more extremism, and are a violation of international law and sovereignty of the country.

PTI has consistently maintained that Pakistan should distance itself from the NATO/US-led war in Afghanistan that has caused acute loss of blood and treasure to the nation. The party is vehemently against the use of Pakistan’s military in operations against its own people.

Moreover, PTI believes that as long as there is the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan, the Pashtun resistance against them will not only continue in Afghanistan but also across the border in Pakistan. In this regards, PTI’ s position is similar to the one propagated by TTP, and for that matter even by Afghan Taliban. In essence, PTI is against military operations and is a political solution.

PTI’s Strategy And TTP

Turning to the domestic context under which Imran will be visiting South Waziristan. As the debate on new provinces has raged in Pakistan, discussions have also revolved around how to best manage FATA, after all, it is part of the country. For this purpose, a number of propositions have been circulated. According to Abdul Qayyum Khan Kundi, who is a member of PTI’s advisory committee, “PTI’s domestic policy is that no part of Pakistan should be beyond the reach of government. PTI is working on policy proposals to convert FATA into a province of Pakistan to bring them under the constitution of Pakistan. This will enable the people of FATA to have access to resources for infrastructure development, job creation, and better education. We are aware of the international implications of this approach and are confident it is in the best interest of Pakistan.”

Kandi goes on to state, “By threatening the march of PTI, TTP is trying to legitimize itself as a force in Waziristan and to establish it as their area of influence. People of Waziristan want to be a part of the political process and have shown enthusiasm to participate in the protest march of PTI to support their cause.”

The above PTI position explains the ferocious response by Ihsan Ullah Ihsan, who clearly differentiated Imran as being a liberal. The point is that TTP may have sensed that using its public appeal, PTI may threaten its exclusive domain and political agenda. While Imran’s stances on the drones and war against terror are generally considered supportive of Taliban’s, the recent tit-for-tat responses have laid bare the differences between TTP and PTI.

The host of the popular TV show, Kamran Khan, glaringly missed these divergences in his August 10th program. Mr. Kamran seemed to have picked the wrong premise when he interviewed two experts on the Taliban, Saleem Safi, and Rahimullah Yusufzai. It’s futile to examine which political party TTP may have the affinity with as it does not believe in the western democratic model.

Saleem Safi correctly noted this while reading out from the recent letter sent by TTP to Muslim scholars. TTP is an extremist group with an anti-Pakistan agenda. On the other hand, Imran and PTI are working within the democratic system to bring about change, using non-violent means. PTI is a conservative political party with a nationalistic agenda.

Waziristan And War Against Terror

Like Yemen and Somalia, Waziristan occupies a prominent place on the global terror radar. The US has been after Pakistan for quite some time to conduct a military operation in North Waziristan, where Al Qaeda, Haqqani network, and other brands of international and local extremists are believed to hobnob and cross-pollinate their tactics and strategies. For example, the Shura-e-Makeba reportedly came into existence after meetings between TTP, Al-Qaeda, and Afghan Taliban last November and December in Wanna and Data Khel.

The US has, on a number of occasions, threatened to conduct a unilateral operation in the area if Pakistan fails to act. The topic was a key agenda item in the recent high-profile meeting between Lt-Gen Zaheerul Islam and Gen David Petraeus. Since the meeting, a couple of western media outlets have claimed that US and Pakistan have agreed to joint operations in Waziristan. Pakistan was quick to refute these claims and clarified what was meant by joint operations was a coordinated action on each of side of the border, to be conducted by the respective forces.

Clearly, PTI’s position is at odds with the present premise of US policy towards Afghanistan and FATA.

Pakistan’s Political Landscape And Extremism

Whether Pakistan likes it or not, extremism and the war on terror has become a reality through which the western world views its relations with the country. The prominent political parties of Pakistan have found it difficult to incorporate and reconcile this fact in within their domestic and international political strategy. At the time Musharraf left, a majority of the parties contested elections talking about distancing themselves from the war. The unfolding events proved that it was easier said than done.

In the upcoming elections, the war on terror and will remain an overarching challenge. Whichever party can holistically shape a policy on how to deal with extremism is likely to gain the invincible advantage over the others. PTI appears to be positioning itself to do just that, and in that sense, its ambition will clash with the prerogative Pakistani Taliban claim to have.

The post Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, Tehreek-e-Insaf And Waziristan appeared first on Politact.

The Awami National Party (ANP) demanded a merger of FATA within Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) on Sunday. A FATA jirga held at Nishtar Hall welcomed ANP KP President Senator Afrasiab Khattak’s proposal to award Provincially Administrative Tribal Areas (PATA) status to FATA.

Khattak also welcomed the presidential order of extending the Political Parties Act to FATA and said the demand is feasible and will appease the tribesmen, and will result in restoring communication links between different agencies.

At the jirga, KP Information Minister Mian Iftikhar Hussain expressed resentment over the secret peace dialogues between US and Taliban, and stated, it would fail.

The post ANP Demands Merger Of FATA With Khyber Pakhtunkhwa appeared first on Politact.

16 militants were killed, and another 12 injured in Upper Orakzai in clashes between Pakistani security forces and militants. The troops launched an attack in Dabori, Gokamar and Shadala targeting six hideouts.

Officials warned that the operation would continue till peace prevailed in the tribal belt; “We have been chasing militants and (will) continue it until we eliminate them and bring back peace to the once peaceful area,” officials said.

Security personnel earlier also captured Swat Taliban leader, Hazrat Bilal and one of his counterparts from Mardan.

The post 16 Militants Killed In Upper Orakzai Operation appeared first on Politact.

Indian Home Secretary G.K. Pillai lashed out at Pakistan’s Interior Minister Rehman Malik on Tuesday for saying that Dawood Ibrahim, India’s most wanted man, wasn’t present in Pakistan. Pillai argued, “If the minister (Rehman Malik) is so sure that Ibrahim is not in Pakistan, he should tell us where is he…. According to our information, Ibrahim is in Pakistan.” Pillai made this claim based on the information given by the Indian intelligence. Security sources claim that several Pakistani passports have been issued to Ibrahim and his family and whenever a passport of Ibrahim or his relatives is tracked down by the Indian intelligence, they are issued a new one.

To put pressure on Pakistan, India today released a list of 50 most wanted fugitives.

The post Pillai Lashes Out at Rehman Malik, Claims Ibrahim Is In Pakistan appeared first on Politact.

Context

Introduction
In a series of articles, PoliTact is examining the status of Taliban insurgency in each one of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Any realistic assessment of this region has to rely on objective and first hand access to the facts on the ground, to draw any meaningful conclusions or projections. In previous studies, we have examined the dynamics of Orakzai, Mohmand and Kurram and this article looks at Khyber Agency. 

Analysis

Location

 The Khyber tribal territory of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Agency (FATA) has since ancient times served as a doorway to invaders of India and traders from Central Asia and Afghanistan.

The total area of this tribal land is 2,756 Square Kilometers with a total population of 546,730. According to Statistics Department of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province, the literacy rate for males is 57.2% while for females it runs around 10.1%, with a total of 34.2% for the Khyber agency.

A prerequisite to understand the dynamics of Taliban insurgency in Khyber is to grasp the occurring of the surrounding tribal areas. Khyber is bordered by Kurram Agency towards the South West; Orakzai lies to the South while Mohmand is situated towards the north. One of the most strategically vital supply routes for NATO forces passes through the border down of Torkham in the West, leading into Nangarhar province of Afghanistan. To the East, lies Peshawar, the provincial capital of KP province of Pakistan.

Administrative Composition and Tribal Affiliations

Khyber Agency is composed of three subdivisions (Tehsils); Bara, Landi Kotal and Jamrud, and four main tribes of Afridi, Shinwari, Mullagori and Shimani inhabit Khyber. With the exception of Shinwari tribe that is situated in few areas of Landi Kotal subdivision, Afridi tribe and sub-tribes predominantly occupy all other areas of Khyber Agency.

Afridi tribe in Khyber Agency is subdivided into eight branches or sub-tribes: Adamkhel, Akakhel, Kamarkhel, Qamberkhel, Malikdikhel, Kukikhel, Zakakhel, and Sipah.

Militants belonging to extremist groups such as Lashkar-e-Islam and (LI) and Ansar-ul-Islam, including Pakistani Taliban groups (TTP) started to become active in Khyber around 2004. The makeup and orientation of LI is quite similar to Taliban.  LI is based in Afridi areas and most prominent in Bara sub-division of Khyber Agency. LI chief, Mangal Bagh, belong to Sipah sub-tribe, which is the least influential amongst Afridi clans. Recently the Tirah Valley has emerged as the emerging flash point in Khyber.

In order to understand the political and strategic significance of Khyber, one has to consider it from the perspective of:

• Khyber Agency for Pakistan
• The value of the tribal territory for Afghanistan and NATO forces there
• The criticality of Khyber for Afghan Taliban, TTP, and Al Qaeda strategy

Khyber Agency for Pakistan

For Pakistan, there is perhaps no other tribal area as valuable as Khyber, where it would want to maintain its influence. It can also be thought of as the heart of FATA, due to its proximity to Peshawar. It is also the tribal region that is most closely assimilated with Pakistan, brought about by not only its location but also the trade route which passes through it and connects Pakistan to Afghanistan. Additionally, running north to south, it is nearly the midsection, where Mohmand and Bajaur tribal territories lies to the north, and Orakzai, Kurram, North and South Waziristan, lying to the south of Khyber Agency.

Peshawar is exposed and is surrounded by tribal territories on three sides: north, west, and south. The mountain ranges provide some natural immunity to Peshawar. However, It’s connection with mainland Pakistan run towards the East. Therefore, Pakistan’s strategic imperatives in Khyber are twofold:

•  Build and maintain a buffer around Peshawar and keep Khyber relatively free of Taliban, and from any single group to dominate.
• To keep a key trade link between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and supply route for NATO forces, open, and to preserve this leverage over NATO.

Due to the current geopolitical realities of the region and history, Pakistan has traditionally considered the tribal area as a buffer zone and is sensitive to not alienate its people.

Like many other parts of Pakistan, the tribal territory, including Khyber, is also engulfed in a complex web of religious and ethnic tensions. Some of this is connected with the tussles of Deobandi and Barelvi schools of thought. Although LI is closer to Taliban, as they both subscribe to Deobandi orientation, however, this commonality has still prevented LI from forming an alliance with Pakistani Taliban (TTP). Nonetheless, it is widely believed that TTP is making steady inroads in Khyber despite inter-factional differences. In 2009, Khyber Agency encountered the highest number of terrorist attacks, including death and injuries, in all of FATA (see chart below).

It could be hypothesized that from Pakistan’s point of view, the center piece of its counter insurgency strategy in FATA, is to prevent Khyber from becoming fully embroiled in insurgency. Operations in Swat and South Waziristan and US drone attacks have had the effect of moving the extremists close to Khyber, such as in Orakzai and Kurram Agency, including Tirah Valley of Khyber. The two principal trade routes between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Chaman and Torkham, are likely to be impacted adversely if Pakistan does take on the much demanded North Waziristan Operation. Particularly, if it is combined with US pressure around Kandahar and other flash points along the border. Furthermore, it is also likely that terrorist activities and insurgency in Bajaur, Mohmand, and Swat in the north, would once again increase.

Khyber Agency for NATO and Afghan Forces

The NATO forces and Afghanistan share a common interest in Khyber Agency, which they share with Pakistan. For an example:

• To prevent militants and Pakistani Taliban from disrupting supply lines for military operations in Afghanistan.
• Avert any firm partnership to develop between Afghan Taliban, Pakistani Taliban and other militants, which could be against US and Indian interests in the region.

However, the interest of US, Afghanistan, and India diverge markedly, on which groups should have influence in the tribal areas of Pakistan, and in turn project their power in Afghanistan. Recent overtures from US towards a negotiated peace have also emboldened Karzai government to bring Afghan Taliban on board. Now the matter appears to be stuck on which faction of Afghan Taliban. However, US has mostly focused its attention on North and South Waziristan and this is where most of the drone attacks have taken place. If Pakistan conducts an operation in North Waziristan, the militants and terrorist there are likely to disperse and cause further problems for the state of Pakistan.

In the past, military pressure in Afghanistan has resulted in extremists moving to FATA. Similarly, facing operations in tribal areas of Pakistan, the militants either move to less active tribal regions or to Afghanistan.

In the long run, it would seem to be in Indian, US, and Afghan interests to develop a strategic leverage and influence in Khyber Agency and other tribal areas, to counter the traditional influence of Pakistan.

Khyber Agency for Al Qeada, Afghan, and Pakistani Taliban Strategy

The Al Qaeda grand strategy for the region is to keep the focus of Pakistani authorities divided so that it is unable to muster it’s forces at one point, as NATO and US would want. The Mumbai incident almost resulted in a war between Pakistan and India. Warnings have once again emerged from Western capitals, on the likelihood of another Mumbai style happening in India. The goal of any such incident would be to avert any operation in North Waziristan.

However, Al Qaeda strategy is not limited to Pakistan and the tribal areas. It also wants to divert the attention of NATO, US, and its allies in the region to many different fronts. Thus, Yemen and Somalia are increasingly becoming a focal point of global threats related to terrorism. Furthermore, like witnessed in Iraq, AQ would want to use local militant and extremist groups, to promote ethnic and religious upheaval in the rest of Middle East and South Asia.

The new US strategy envisions using local allies, and to build there capability to take on a majority of the combat role against extremists. On the other hand, AQ is relying on local extremists groups to target the local allies of US, and to turn the war against terror in to a war against Islam. Pakistani Taliban has repeatedly targeted lashkars created against extremists in tribal areas. For example, the suicide attack in Darra Adam Khel on November 5 claimed the lives of 60 people.

As far as the Khyber Agency is concerned, Pakistani Taliban would like to become a serious player there and be able to control the supply line for NATO forces in Afghanistan. Although Afghan Taliban would also want to damage the supply lines, it has attempted to keep its focus limited to Afghanistan and has not attempted to damage Pakistan’s interests.

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The post The Status of Taliban Insurgency in Khyber Agency appeared first on Politact.