Context

By Arif Ansar

In earlier articles different facets and phases of the ‘war against terror’ since it got underway, have been discussed. The terminology has almost become defunct as the balance of power in Middle East stands at a tipping point. Why that has happened is instrumental towards understanding the present status of the campaign against extremists.

For all intents and purposes, the first phase can be classified as the time frame between 9/11 and the demise of Osama bin Laden. The period between Operation Geronimo to the ignition of Yemen conflict can be termed as the second phase. While Yemen has been in the limelight for a while as a strong seat for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the departure of US Special Forces in March this year represented a turning point. The eruption of Yemen conflict in its current form, and the growing Saudi and Gulf involvement there, marks the beginning of the third phase.

Each period of the campaign was accompanied by its own sets of assumptions and characteristics that have been previously discussed. They are being summarized to recollect and help us understand the Stage III. Obviously, each one these patterns pose unique implications.

Phase III of the campaign against terror may see more direct interstate conflict which risks involving one or the other global power. And this will fundamentally change the nature of the conflict that was initially deemed as the war against Islamic extremists.

Mitigating far-flung security threats is one thing, risks that can imperil influence in the home sphere and economic lifeline of an aspiring or an established global power, is a different matter altogether.

Analysis

Character I – The growth of Non-State Actors of different colors accompanied by Asymmetric Warfare, which the conventional militaries were not trained to engage in.

These include Sunni Islamic State (IS, ISIL, ISIS, Daesh) and AQ that apparently do not listen to anyone. Since 9/11 many affiliates of AQ have also sprung up in the extremism inflicted regions. Some are loosely attached while others are more directly linked with AQ. In some instances, these associates are also perceived to be under the influence of a state entity.

On the other hand, there is the Shia Hezbollah acting as a proxy of Iran.
The third kind of non-state actors are nationalist in character such as the Kurds and Houthis, and moderate forces like Free Syrian Army (FSA) supported by the West, and others, against the extremists.

Character II – Future of extremism as represented by Fission and Fusion of Sunni extremists and the emergence of IS. The harmonization or divisions have resulted in new alignments amongst extremist posing ominous risks for the nation-states of the region and beyond. For examples the tussles between AQ and Associates against IS and Associates.

Character III – Societal transformation of extremist inflicted regions with increased polarization, growing religious conservatism, decreasing secular space and respect for minorities, with difficulty in achieving political consensus. The election results are narrow; power sharing formulas and unity governments are the outcome as witnessed in places like Iraq, Afghanistan and Tunisia.

In addition, this transformation has created a fear that religious parties may make it to the helm of power using the system, as occurred in Egypt. Preventing this is requiring constitutional amendments.

Character IV – The application of military force against extremists appears to have not worked and the political reconciliation is proving to be equally difficult; there are no clear winners or losers. The agenda of the extremists is often too harsh to reach any settlement. On the other hand, there is lack of ingenuity in crafting an alternative approach.

Character V – The tactics and strategies employed against extremists are mostly event/incident driven. Strategically, the emerging focus is on regional approaches and the onus is shifting towards western allies to take the lead in the fight against extremists and applying kinetic tactics. In many theaters of the war against terror, civil war like scenarios are now ripe, and Urban Warfare the likely outcome

Character VI – The weakening Nation-State structure is under dual economic and security pressures. The governments of the regions concerned are finding it harder and harder to govern as the multidimensional internal and external security risks intermingle and manifest. Internal divisions make it harder to deal with the external enemies, while those that pose external threats exploit internal risks. This dynamics produces a circular threat perception for the subject.

Character VII – Globalization and interconnectivity is being hindered by security apprehensions whether it be Trans Pacific Partnership, Kashgar-Gwadar Economic Corridor, Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project, or New Silk Road.

Economic aspirations now stand face to face with security concerns in many parts of the world, and the individual identity hangs in balance between the national, global, religious, tribal, and ethnic loyalties. The forces of religion and globalization are both acting against the nation-state structure and are often perceived as exploitive.

Character VIII – The cross-pollination of global power tussles, Arab Spring, and extremism has made the war against terror even more complex and motives confusing. This is amply visible in Syrian conflict. Moreover, weakening Europe and emerging BRICS have created a flux in the international systems, making the balancing act very stressful for international players.

Character IX – The future role of religion and the crisis of identity is brewing as nation states become weaker. Two key questions are emerging in this context:
one of them is equally applicable to the West and has to do with the settled debate of the separation of church and state. The other question is related to the extremist inflicted regions, in terms of who represents Islam.

Character X – The emergence of virtual soft weapons of mass destruction: Information and Cyber Warfare. The use of Social Media for radicalization, recruitment, and countering extremist messages and ideologies is an example. While the access to physical WMD’s is limited, these virtual soft weapons are freely available.

Arab and Western Perspectives

In essence, the campaign that was initially directed primarily against the perpetrators of 9/11 and their collaborators, have now spread to the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia. Afghanistan and Iraq, which were the focus of the Phase I and II, have remerged as a threat and have complicated western withdrawal strategies.

In Phase II, we saw other nations such as Syria, Libya and Yemen join the widening ring of instability. The beginning of Phase III is marked by gradual destabilization of the more secure states of the region, to include Egypt, Saudi Arabia and GCC, Jordan, Pakistan, and potentially India.

While the primary threat posed to these states initially came from the Sunni AQ and Associates, over time, the sectarian dimension and nationalist non-state actors (such as Kurds) have joined the fray. While the Western nations have remained supportive in the fight against Sunni extremists, when it comes to the sectarian angle and nationalist forces, their postures are more ambiguous. This has magnified the headaches for the respective states in question.

The present paranoia exhibited by Saudi Arabia and GCC nations is stemming from these contradictions. While the Sunni Arab nations have been fighting the war against Sunni non-state actors, the influence of Iran and Hezbollah has increased in places like Iraq and Syria. In contrast to opposing Hezbollah and Iran, the West entered in to negotiations with the country related to its nuclear program. According to the GCC nations, Iran’s behavior has been rewarded and this will embolden it. Imagine if Saudi Arabia was to do the same; back AQ and IS and then build a nuclear program, while at the same time threaten Israel and the West.

From the Western perspective, Sunni Arab nations have not led a spirited fight against Sunni extremists like Iran, Hezbollah, and Kurds have. Moreover, Western policy is premised first of all on preventing weapons of mass destruction falling in to the hands of extremists, or rogue and autocratic leaders that can threaten Israel or the West. Secondly, to prevent the extremists attacking Western targets again or becoming a proxy for an adversarial power in the future, along the lines of Afghan Jihad of the 80s.

As it stands now, Arab states are left with no leverage other than using the religious card. Even on the sensitive issue of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is Iran, Turkey, and to some extent Qatar, that took the lead. For its role, Qatar faced serious opposition with in the GCC.

In essence, the Iran deal, if finalized, contains its nuclear program, reduces the risk to Israel and the West, and thus strengthens it to become a strong ally in the fight against Sunni extremists. Additionally, it can help in pushing the Middle East Peace Process forward.

The Emerging Approach to the Middle East Peace

At an event hosted by Atlantic Council on May 7, the author asked the former US Special Envoy for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the present Executive Vice President of Brookings Institution, Martin Indyk, about how the Iranian nuclear deal and the US-Gulf partnership can help or hinder the Middle East Peace Process. Martine Indyk commented that the prospects of a solution emerging from an ‘inside out approach’ i.e., from with in Israel and Palestine, and independent of whatever else is going on in the Middle East, are not good. However, the potential for an ‘outside in’ solution which has emerged because of the possible Iran nuclear deal and Israeli and Arab countries being on the same side, might emerge with positive response because of the new strategic alignment in the region.

Speaking at the Heritage Foundation, Israeli envoy to the US, Ron Dermer, recently commented along the same line:

“They used to believe the key to that [a rapprochement with the Arab word] was solving the Palestinian question, and there is no doubt that issue cannot be ignored,” Dermer said.

He continued: “But as the prime minister said a few months ago, I’m not so sure the reverse won’t be true, meaning that I don’t know if Israel and Palestinian peace will unlock wider rapprochement with the Arab world. It might be broader rapprochement with the Arab world will unlock Israeli-Palestinian peace. We should be focusing the next few years on how we can take advantage of this historic aligning of interests between Israel and our Arab neighbors.”

(Note: It’s too early to tell if a similar ‘Outside In’ approach is applicable towards other festering hot spots, such as Afghanistan and Kashmir. However, despite differences, parallels do exist, and PoliTact will be researching this comparison further.)

The US Elections and Middle East

From the Arab and GCC perspective, the shift in the regional balance of power towards Iran is an additional danger to their security, perhaps even bigger than that posed by Sunni extremists. This view is shared by Israel and the Republican Party in the US, which is in control of both the House and the Senate. This is why the next US election is becoming so crucial. On it depends the direction of the Middle East; will the new American president share the threat perception of Israel and Arab allies, is in contention. In addition, the foreign policy hawks in the Republican Party also want US to once again take an aggressive role in the fight against extremists and against Russia and China.

Extremism and Global Players

US, Russia, and China, and other global powers, share the threat from Islamic extremists and have supported the fight against them in one form or the other. While US has been doing the heavy lifting, other powers have facilitated by building capacity of the allies; by giving training and providing military equipment. Moreover, they have also helped by allowing the use of their territories as part of the crucial supply lines for the campaign against extremists.

However, as the regional states become more entangled in this fight, and with their future at stake, the question for these global players is: what does the change in the regional equilibrium of power means for the global balance. Or in other words, what does the extending arc of instability in these regions implies for their security and economic interests.

In essence, three main considerations arise from this for the global players:

Firstly, if the states involved in the campaign against extremists, which may be allied with China and Russia, start faltering, what would that mean for their global positioning?

Secondly, how will these powers react to the activities of the competitor in their perceived home spheres of influence?

For example, Russia has cooperated with the West when it comes to Syrian chemical weapons and the Iran nuclear deal, as being part of P5+1, but it is playing a different role when it comes to the affairs of Ukraine. Similarly, China would evaluate its posture in South and Central Asia in comparison to what occurs as part of the ‘Pivot to Asia’ US policy.

Thirdly, what would be their contingency plans if the regions engulfed by extremism sink to full fledge chaos that may impact global energy and trade flows?

The Chinese and Russian energy deals may be the direct result of these assessments. On the other hand, US has also made big gains towards energy independence while Europe is still caught in the bind. Phase III of the campaign against terror may see more direct interstate conflict which risks involving one or the other global power. And this will fundamentally change what was initially deemed as the war against Islamic extremists.

While mitigating far-flung security threats is one thing, risks that can imperil influence in the home sphere and economic lifeline of an aspiring or an established global power, is a different matter all together.

The post The Future Of The War Against Extremists; The Arrival Of Stage III appeared first on Politact.

Context

In its 2013 forecast, PoliTact had laid out a picture of the campaign against extremists that differed dramatically from the mainstream media. Many of these assessments were on the mark. As we approach the end of 2014 and enter the stage 2 of this campaign, these projections need to be revisited. As we conduct this exercise, the premises, tactics and strategies used to fight the war in the previous stage will also be reexamined, including their shortfalls and inadvertent consequences. It is this scrutiny that will point to what we can realistically be expected in the future, or stage 3.

Analysis

1. Eliminating the Leadership

After 9/11, one of the major emphases was to hunt down the head honchos and the perpetrators. The assumption was that if the leadership is eliminated, and those that replace them are also eradicated, the extremist outfits they represented would weaken overtime and disintegrate. The reality has played out differently. The elimination of Osama bin Laden may have weakened Al Qaeda (AQ) but the associates have emerged stronger and the extremist threat has spread to many new corners of the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region. This has created what is now identified as the phenomenon of AQ and Associates.

Moreover, seemingly AQ now also has a competitor in the form of Islamic State (also known IS, ISIS, and ISIL). With in these various extremist groups, there is a process of fusion and fission occurring simultaneously. The associates of AQ in the South and Central Asia, and Middle East, are having to decide their alignment with either AQ or the ISIS; obviously there can only be one Amir-ul-Mominin. In the case of Pakistan, the Taliban have splintered, some are beginning to align with IS and changing their long-standing affiliation with AQ.

One the one hand, this internal friction and power struggle is positive as this divides the enemy. On the other hand, this splintering has diversified the threat to the regimes in the region and to the West.

2. Nation-State Structure, Sovereignty, and Sectarianism

Another character that illustrated the previous phase and continues to presently, has to do with the constraints presented by the nation-state structure and state sovereignty. Associated with this is the persistent question of safe havens where extremists can regroup, cross-pollinate, and launch fresh attacks.

Since 9/11, the coalition forces have felt restrained by international borders while the extremists have conveniently crossed borders to other sanctuaries once they felt pressured in one location. This was the case in places like in Iraq, where extremists were traveling back and forth from Syria and other regional nations. The challenge has also remained highly prevalent on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

To counter this, American forces were authorized to take action wherever the extremist threat existed. This example was followed by Israel, and recently UAE and Egypt carried out air strikes against extremist groups in Libya.

At the same time, it was in Iraq where the sectarian dimension was added to the mix, and later resulted in the Sunni Awakening. Had it not been for the Iranian support, the NATO and US task would have been easier there. This is similar to what is taking place in Syria presently, where Assad would not have lasted against Sunni AQ, IS, and moderate opposition (Such as the Free Syrian Army) without the urban fighting skills of Shia Hezbollah and Russian support in the Security Council.

Thus overtime, the war against terror has inadvertently weakened the nation-state structure of the region. On the one hand, the states inflicted by terrorism are under extremist attacks, and at the same time struggling politically to maintain credibility on the street. The legitimacy of state was under scrutiny even before the war against terror started, as many have failed to govern and provide services to their burgeoning citizenry. This combustible mix was one of the causes that triggered the uprising now know as the Arab Spring.

As the priority of the West has remained on fighting the extremists, many autocrats of the region adopted the garb to persist and maintain the status quo. However, that strategy has proven to be short lived; ultimately, these governments would have to deal with both, increasing vocal citizens and the growing threat posed by the non-state actors operating across borders.

The stark irony is that it’s not in the control of any state to deal with extremism on it’s own. It’s a regional and global phenomenon, which requires dealing with the causes. Furthermore, the war against non-state actors has now gotten entangled with the global power tussles, apparent in Syria particularly. This leads to the question of if a political or military approach will be needed to win it. And what happens to extremists in stage 2 and 3, if the global power play between US, China, and Russia heats up further in different corners of the globe.

3. The Question of Ground Troops and Mission Creep

In the first stage, the US and NATO maintained their ground presence in Afghanistan and Iraq at a tremendous cost. The successes, however, were proven to be only temporary and easily reversible: the present situation of Iraq being the case in point. What occurred in Iraq has significantly raised the stake for the withdrawal from Afghanistan. This reality has now forced US to extend its mission in Afghanistan and the return of western advisors to Iraq and other places in the MENA region.

Over the years as the fiscal condition dwindled and the security situation worsened, NATO has been forced to develop new strategies to counter extremists. The new policy is focused on a smaller footprint and more use of rapid reaction Special Forces and Smart Technologies, such as drones, to achieve the objectives. For this purpose, NATO forces have been preparing for touch and go type operations and has established bases across the region. Additionally, the emphasis is on enhancing the capabilities of the allies, through providing military equipment and training, so they can lead the fight.

The dilemma is that many of these allies, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, have proven incapable of resisting the extremist onslaught on the ground, absent western advisors and air support. This has raised questions about the efficacy of training Iraqi and Afghan forces received in the past, and the utility of more training. Or, in other words, is it a question of capability or will.

Nonetheless, This has raised alarm for stage 2 of the campaign. Who will take on the burden of heavy fighting on the ground if the radicals are gaining and the allies are proving incapable? The American leadership is making it clear to its Arab partners that while they can assist; the main responsibility for countering the extremists rests on their shoulders.

In the resulting vacuum, the most successful fighters on the ground against IS/AQ are proving to be the Kurds and Hezbollah. Or, in other words it’s the non-state actors under state influence against those non-state actors that seemingly do not listen to anyone (IS/AQ and Affiliates). This is setting up a dangerous precedence and symbolizes the return of proxy wars.

While the initial goal of the war against extremism was to go after the perpetrators of 9/11, over time it has extended to dealing with rogue leaders and regimes that can potentially acquire weapons of mass destruction, are allies of Russia or China, have undemocratic set-ups, and carry hostile intent towards the West. The elimination of Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qaddafi, the present attempts of regime change in Syria, and P5+1 negotiations with Iran, are all linked to this risk.

While Russia and China share with US the apprehensions regarding the spread of non-state actors, they are also concerned about what it means for their influence and allies in the regions concerned.

4. The Ideology and Societal Transformation

One of the least explored and understood aspects of the campaign against terror is the grave societal transformation brought on by years of constant warfare and disruption. Thousands have died and millions have been uprooted. One of the obvious outcomes of this has been the gradual push towards religious conservatism, increasing militancy and lawlessness, diminishing economic prospects, and growing political and ethnic polarization of the nations inflicted by the scourge.

As alluded to previously, the blame does not just reside with the West, the local governments are equally liable for their disorientation and failure to understand the dynamics of the societal change underway. Recently held elections in Afghanistan, Tunisia, and Egypt etc. all have produced very close results and the demonstrated the need for political reconciliation. However, achieving political consensus in such a volatile and divisive environment is extremely challenging.

The evolution of politics in Egypt perhaps provides a perfect illustration of this phenomenon, where after the removal of Mubarak, Muslim Brotherhood was able to gain power through a close election. However, Mursi’s government was removed subsequently and now Sisi’s actions seem more an attempt to maintain a status quo. While many claim that it was the unwillingness of Mursi to share power that led to his demise, however, external threat posed by his regime to Israel and other Arab nations were also strongly at play against him.

Questions are now being raised if the Arab Awakening has hit a dead end. The terminology adopted by western think tanks is suggestive of how to answer this question. The Arab Spring inflicted nations, including Afghanistan and Iraq at some level, are now perceived as ‘countries in transition.’ This transition involves constitutional changes that would prevent religiously oriented political actors from gaining power, and with emphasis on promoting reconciliation among the other political stakeholders.

This approach is based on a fear that extremists may use the mainstream religious groups to arrive at the helm of power, especially when they do have a soft corner for them. In this transition, there is an attempt to have nationalist factions align with liberal thought, as oppose to the religious conservative elements. The political dynamics of Pakistan can also be understood in this context.

PoliTact has pointed out the futility of this approach, especially as the societies become increasingly conservative. The mainstream religious parties present the best hope to prevent the slide towards the abyss. As oppose to viewing them with apprehension, they should be looked upon as an opportunity. Similarly, if the negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program were successful, it would suggest that if properly engaged, even theocracies can behave rationally.

Stage 1 of the campaign against extremism has shown the limitation of a purely military approach. To prevent the failure of the stage 2 that is presently unfolding, the emphasis would have to be on reconciliation with the reconcilable. This would involve setting up a political architecture that involves the moderate political conservatives at it center. They are the best suited, and the last hope, to counter the extremist ideologies and moderate the extremists, and to check the otherwise inevitable trajectory. Blocking these elements from political participation, like Egypt is attempting, will result in an even harsher backlash.

In future articles, we will continue to discuss the shifting assertions of the campaign against terror. What can be said at this juncture is that viewing this campaign separate from the global and regional tussles for balance of power would be pure naivety. Moreover, the regional governments that are leading the fight against extremists would have to be extremely careful to not do so at the cost of public sentiment and the provision of services to them.

The post Understanding The Stage 2 Of The Campaign Against Extremists appeared first on Politact.

Context

By Arif Ansar and Claude Rakisits

What a difference two years can make. At the last NATO summit meeting in Chicago the world looked pretty good, Afghanistan appeared to be on track, jihadism was in retreat and Russia was behaving. Now NATO is unexpectedly confronted with some unique challenges. The security organization had thought it had move passed the Cold War era. That thinking has abruptly come to end. Europe is under Russian threat once more.

Then there are matters related to the war on terror. After the death of Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda (AQ) head honchos, NATO and the US wanted to move on, and pivot more towards the strategic threats that emanate from the Pacific. The new strategy to deal with the extremists was premised on the assumption that with the use of Special Forces and smart technologies, the remnants of AQ could be managed. NATO and the US required regional allies to lead the fight against extremists as they build the capacity of these partners. The thinking was that this would allow the room to conserve and redirect resources towards strategic adversaries.

The reality on the ground, however, has unfolded differently and has put this assessment to the test. Disturbingly, the war on terror is covering an ever-wider span, to include South and Central Asia and North Africa. The original Al Qaeda has over the years morphed into a phenomenon called Al Qaeda and Associates, and the emergence of groups such as Islamic State (IS). While the debate whether AQ has been weakened continues, it announced the opening of a new ‘Indian subcontinent’ branch recently. This is indeed an ominous development. While AQ and IS may be presently competing, the risk of them cooperating in the future remains a distinct possibility.

What had originally started as the war against extremists is now truly a battle between non-state actors and ever-feeble Western-backed regional states. And the direct threat posed to the US and Europe by AQ has now been supplemented by IS.

As NATO and the US decide their future strategy to tackle IS and put together a coalition, lessons learned so far in the war against extremists would have to be looked at realistically. The alliance would have to seriously think what would come after IS if things do not go as planned.

To avert the potential collapse of the entire nation-state structure in the Middle East, leading to a protracted and bloody sectarian civil war, a radical rethink is now required. This review involves examining the phenomenon of non-state actors afresh, understanding the societal transformation, and focusing more on economics. Without a revisit of the existing policy, the present global order risks further destabilization and loss of American influence. At this juncture it’s equally essential to not be fixated on the present reality alone and on preventing what may happen. Making strategy is as much about envisioning and preparing for an alternative reality.

Classification of Non-State Actors

Up to this point the non-state actors have been classified on the basis of whether they pose a regional risk or a global one. On the other hand, the cross pollination of jihadists has made this definition mute; the majority of the groups aspire to a vision larger than their capability. Then there is the question of Shia and Sunni non-state actors. While AQ and IS are Sunni non-state actors, Hezbollah represents the Shia one. Another way of looking at these groups is from the prism of purpose specificity, which is demonstrated by groups such as the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistan Taliban and Lashkar-e-Toyba. These differences provide opportunities to look at the phenomenon of non-state actors in a different manner.

Engagement with Iran related to its nuclear ambitions provides one such alternative in dealing with non-state actors. If there is willingness to talk with Iran despite its support for Hezbollah, then this suggests that while state support of the extremist groups is part of the present challenge, it could also be a part of the solution. The real danger is from those extremists that don’t listen to anyone, such as IS and AQ.

The on-going nuclear negotiations have not only helped engage Iran but also created leverage. Now, Iran has to prioritize its interests. It has to evaluate if it’s more important to achieve a permanent nuclear deal and normalization of ties with the West or continue with its activities in Syria and its support of Hezbollah. Clearly, Hezbollah’s restraint during the recent Gaza flare-up was no accident. Iran’s cooperation and constructive role in these areas, including in Iraq, could be highly conducive in ultimately achieving that ever-elusive peace between Israel and Palestine.

For this approach to fully yield results, the anxieties of Israel and Sunni Arab nations, especially Saudi Arabia, would have to be carefully managed. Behind the scenes the debate continues whether a ‘full spectrum’ approach should be adopted towards talks with Iran. Complicating the picture is that Israel equates Hezbollah and Hamas with other non-state actors, such as IS and AQ.

As NATO leaders strategize and Washington attempts to put together a coalition to deal with IS and their fellow ideological travellers, the critical difference between non-state actors that can be controlled by state actors, and those that can’t be, should be kept in mind. This differentiation may well be more useful than the standard classification of extremists with regional agenda and those with global aims, which evolved after 9/11.
This has the risk of conveying the wrong signal to the states that have influence over non-state actors and use them to achieve political ends. At the same time, it has the benefit of attaching responsibility for the conduct of such non-state actors. The best way to fight extremism at this juncture is to isolate AQ and IS from potential associates, and jump-start the search for political solution in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Societal Transformation

In addition to the role of non-state actors, it is critical to understand the fundamental transformation that Islamic regions and societies are going through. Regardless of the reasons why this is occurring, the balance is shifting towards religious conservatism. This is making Western powers edgy. Especially, if it leads to Islamists gaining power, like they did in Egypt and Tunisia.

But instead of preventing moderate Islamists from gaining power, they should be supported if they win free and fair elections. Moderate Islamists present the last hope to change the tide against the extremists. It’s better to allow them to fail, if that happens to be the case, rather than forcibly removing them. Premature removal of such regimes provides further fuel to the non-state actors that don’t listen and adopt violent means to achieve their aims.

In this context too, the engagement with Iran takes on added emphasis. If a deal over its nuclear program is reached in the near future, it conveys that, if properly engaged, even theocracies can act rationally.

As NATO and the US deliberate on a new strategy, it is clear success against extremists will not be achieved by kinetic means alone, but more so by making them irrelevant. One way to achieve this is to bring moderate Islamists into the fold, despite fears and apprehensions, and then help shift the total societal balance to the center later. There should be no illusions, adjusting this balance will require many years, as it did to get to the present unstable state.

The regional governments’ association with the West adds to the attraction of non-state actors. The war will be won by moving the masses away from the pull of non-state actors and making the state actors govern responsibly and deliver on their citizens’ socio-economic needs, which can hardly be done by focusing primarily on security affairs.

With events occurring so quickly and the possibility of black swans high, it’s not certain this strategy would be enough to change the tide at this late stage. The regional allies are proving incapable or unwilling of standing up to the challenge, and airpower alone will not do the job. Therefore, at this juncture it’s equally essential to not be fixated on the present reality alone and in preventing what may happen. Making strategy is as much about envisioning and preparing for an alternative reality.

Arif Ansar is a Chief Analyst at PoliTact and Claude Rakisits is a Director at PoliTact and Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council.

The post A Successful Strategy To Defeat Islamic State, Non State Actors appeared first on Politact.

Context
More and more the ground reality is at odd with the narrative that is presented publicly to explain it. There are several reasons for why this may be happening. Events are occurring rapidly, and moving too quickly, to be understood fully in the time available. There are vested interests that desire to present their side of the story and manage perceptions. The forces of status quo are stronger, and while they are successful in projecting their interpretation, in the long run, they often miss the mark. The reality by itself holds no biases.

A number of confusions presently engulf the world of politics and international relations. Some of them stem from the fact that in the information age we have come to expect everyone to freely and publicly declare their intent, which has hardly ever been the case. So when we hear policy statements and political leaders speak, we believe this is what they intend to do. In fact, there is now a stark demarcation between words and actions.

As oppose to commenting about how Iraq arrived at the present predicament, which is amply being done in the media, a more productive endeavor at this junction is to examine where the region is heading next. The public appetite in the West for more military interventions, or going back to places from where the withdrawal was expected, is no longer there, especially in times of economic recession. More seriously, how can authorities make a public case for more military involvements when the past policies and missions were presented as successful?

Analysis

The Present Predicament

At a NATO related speech, John Kerry on June 25 pointed out how Russia has used a massive media/information campaign to present a reality that differs from what is taking place on the ground in Ukraine. Then there is the question of if the US is truly pivoting to the Pacific, or is the highest priority to keep Europe aligned. At a recent speech by President Obama at West Point, he stated countering extremism was at the top of the list. Realistically, probably all three areas remain the priority for the US; it’s a matter of converging these three objectives under a single a goal.

Moreover, even the best held narrative on Iraq, and increasingly Afghanistan, is falling to stand against reality. Then there is the question of what is happening to the wider campaign against extremists, and where is it heading. PoliTact has been examining these questions in detail (see Related Articles section below). While the key leadership of AQ has been eliminated, the associates, and AQ inspired groups, have now spread the threat far and beyond. The original risk has multiplied many times over. While the West succeeded in taking the fight to the enemy and protect the homeland against major attacks, many of its state allies in the region are at a precipice of major debacle.

The irony is that the non-state actors, and the threat they pose; also provide the reason d’être for the badly needed western unity against the emerging strategic adversaries. On the other hand, the fragile state actors of the region inflicted by extremism have become more of a liability, with their alignment with the West increasingly uncertain, and their governance failing. The present situation needs to be understood in this context as well.

Dealing with the quagmire, now requires a kind of response for which the West neither has the appetite nor the resources. As pointed out in the previous assessments, the US and NATO are relying on Special Forces, smart technologies, and its regional allies to take on the fight against extremists. These allies, meanwhile, are increasingly reluctant, economically dependent, and proving incapable of leading the fight against extremists. Polarization is growing in these societies, and like Egypt, military may be relied upon again as an institution to control and govern. However, it’s not clear that even they can simultaneously control the forces of anarchy and also govern.

Then there is the question of a military or a political solution. The primarily military approach that lasted until Barack Obama came in to power, may have generated some room to attempt political settlement in places like Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. That breathing space has fast evaporated. The Talk-Fight approach has not shown any remarkable results either. Now, it appears the pendulum is reverting back to the military focus as being witnessed in North Waziristan and Iraq. In Syria, ‘Good’ and moderate non-state actors are going to be trained by US/NATO to stand up to Assad. Without clear-cut winners, or one or the other party having an upper hand, it’s hard to see why any party will reconcile.

The Future Challenge

As oppose to commenting about how Iraq arrived at the present predicament, which is amply being done in the media, a more productive endeavor at this junction is to examine where the bandwagon is heading next. PoliTact covered this theme in detail in its 2014 forecast. A number of broader questions are raised connected to the possible undoing of Iraq.

Will other week nations hold off the non-state actors, and how will the West and other stakeholders now respond. How will the slow moving US-Iran détente, and the shift in the balance of power in favor of Shia Muslims, impact the response from the Sunni State and ‘Bad’ non-state actors of the Gulf region, AfPak, and Turkey? Most critically, how does Israel view that shift of circumstance in favor of its archenemy Iran, especially in the aftermath of the collapse of the Middle East Peace Process?

In PoliTact’s estimation, the foremost priority for the western approach is geared towards preventing the non-state actors from getting hold of weapons of mass destruction, as witnessed in the case of Iraq and recently Syria. This is a goal shared with other powers such as Russia and China. The chemical weapons deal with Syria would not have been possible without the Russian assistance.

The second priority is to counter extremism using regional allies and moderate Sunni ‘Good’ non-state actors on the ground, especially in the Middle East, while at the same time continue to move ahead with the Iranian détente. The Iran factor also acts as leverage in acquiring better cooperation from Sunni state allies, while offering opportunities to use Shia non-state actors (Hezbollah) against ‘Bad’ Sunni non-state actors (AQ and Affiliates).

An increasingly important realization is to prevent China and Russia to take advantage of the situation in these regions. For example, both Egypt and Iraq, including Pakistan, are moving towards acquiring weapons from Russia. Moreover, from time to time, Russia has threatened to deliver advance air defense systems to Iran, which can have a dramatic influence over western and Israeli military options. Not to mention whoever maintains influence in these strategic regions will also maintain control over the critical trade and energy sea-lanes. Any closure of the Suez Canal, choking of the Strait of Hormuz, and instability around Horn of Africa, will have tremendous impact on global trade.

The exercise of promoting democratic norms and pressure for reforms will only be in places where it is convenient to do so.

The responses from other stakeholders will also be examined in the future articles. However, how China and Russia react to the western strategy in these regions are the major determinants of the future direction.

A prerequisite for solving a complex challenge, first of all, requires identifying and explaining it correctly. That is hardly achievable when the narrative for public and private consumption has discrepancies. It leads to many more issues, some of which we are witnessing presently in the West and the regions impacted by extremism. The public appetite for more military interventions in the West, or going back to places from where the withdrawal was expected, is no longer there, especially in times of economic recession. More seriously, how can authorities make a public case for more military involvements when the past policies and missions were presented as successful?

The post What Does Iraq Represent; Ground Reality And Public Narrative appeared first on Politact.

If an offensive goes ahead, Pakistan’s military will be unable to take full control of North Waziristan, a ruggedly mountainous zone slightly larger than the US state of Rhode Island, said Imtiaz Gul, executive director of the Center for Research and Security Studies in Islamabad. And no offensive will significantly weaken the militant groups based in North Waziristan unless US and Afghan forces are able to block the mountainous border and prevent the escape of militant fight
ers into Afghanistan, Gul told a February 10 conference sponsored by the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, and moderated by its director, Shuja Nawaz. The talks initiated by the Nawaz government with TTP, are likely meant to create political space for a military operation, said Arif Ansar, the chief analyst and CEO of PoliTact, a Washington-area strategic consulting firm.

Summary

While Pakistan’s government and its Taliban movement formally have started peace talks, events there suggest that the coming months may as likely bring a Pakistani military offensive, long sought by the United States, against the country’s biggest territorial stronghold of the Taliban and other militant groups. In late January, the Pakistani military and the Taliban traded their heaviest attacks on each other in recent months, many of them around that stronghold, the district of North Waziristan.

Surgical strikes informed by good intelligence may be able to weaken the Taliban’s leadership, Gul said. On the night of January 20, Pakistan’s air force attacked villages in the Mir Ali area of North Waziristan, the second time in a month that Pakistan has launched such air strikes. Those strikes have come as the United States effectively has suspended (since December 25) its campaign of missile attacks from remotely piloted drones, a campaign that that overwhelmingly has targeted militant groups in North Waziristan.

As Gul spoke in Washington, Taliban leaders in North Waziristan hosted a team of mediators for talks with the government that began in earnest this week. Those negotiations are not likely to bring a real reconciliation between the two, but may help the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif demonstrate to Pakistanis that it seriously attempted peacemaking before any eventual military assault, said Arif Ansar.

Sharif won election in last year promising to favor negotiations, rather than military attacks, in an effort to halt the Taliban insurgency of recent years. He faces political pressure against an assault on the Taliban from opposition leader Imran Khan. Khan says the Taliban movement will subside after US forces withdraw this year from their combat role in neighboring Afghanistan.

But the just-started peace talks are likely to underscore the deep political and cultural divide between the government and the Taliban, Gul said. The Taliban demand that Pakistan’s constitution be scrapped and that Islamic sharia law be used to rule the country.

Arif went on to elaborate and emphasize the following strategic calculations:

➢ On the other side of the border, President Karzai is increasingly seeking peace talks and has linked the Bilateral Security Agreement on this. In such a situation, how will Pakistan’s approach against TTP fit with the US withdrawal this year?

➢ Furthermore, as Pakistan exerts military pressure on TTP, will they shift to Afghanistan, as occurred in Swat and other operations in the past, or will they hide with in Pakistan cities and other tribal agencies? And in this context, how will this operation be different than the past ones?

➢ If Taliban do shift to Afghanistan, will the country act against them, or will the border regions become a refuge for TTP, as FATA has become for Afghan Taliban factions? This is already the case in Nuristan and Kunar provinces where the Taliban moved after the Swat operation in 2009, and from where they conduct activities in the settled areas of Pakistan.

➢ Is Pakistan seeking a serious push against TTP or just maneuvering to pressure it towards peace talks? Will the nation also incorporate action against other allied extremist groups? If not, how will these groups and Afghan Taliban react to pressure on TTP? And, has the nation prepared for the possible reaction.

➢ What will be the impact of the approach adopted on the US-Pakistan and Pakistan-India ties?

➢ What lessons can be drawn from the evolution of Al Qaeda and extremist groups in the Middle East and North Africa? The emerging division is increasingly between extremist groups with local agenda, and groups with regional and global ambitions. The intermingling of Arab Spring, war against extremists, Shiite- Sunni tussles, and the global balance of power struggles, has immensely complicated the situation, and is weakening the nation-state in these regions.

➢ After the potential inclusion of Iran in the Geneva II talks over Syria, will Iran also become a part of the formal talks on Afghanistan? In essence, what will be the impact of the flux in the balance of power in Middle East on South Asia?

Click on the link to get the Script for the event.

The post Assessing The Chances Of Success For A Potential Counter Terrorism Operation In North Waziristan appeared first on Politact.

Context
Media discussion on VOA Dewa Radio’s Pashto program – Hello VOA. The discussion revolves around the situation of Egypt, future of Muslim Brotherhood, challenges for the US-Egypt ties, and American policy towards the country.

Panel includes:

– Dr. Ghulam Mustafa – Chairman Department of Political Science, Peshawar University, Pakistan

– Arif Ansar – Chief Analyst, PoliTact, US

– Ahmed Tariq – Kings College London, Head of Insurgency Research Group, UK

The post Future Of Egypt And US Policy appeared first on Politact.

Context

Since the Non Aligned Movement Summit in Tehran, analysts have been weighing its significance. One can understand why there is confusion; in times of transition, it is hard to make sense of events as they occur. Evaluating developments require a sense of history that is usually lacking these days.

A number of unprecedented events unfolded this week. For example, US declared Haqqani network a terrorist organization as Pakistan and India agreed to ease their visa regimes and China and India decided to resume joint military exercises. Additionally, President Putin will visit Pakistan in October and General Kayani’s is heading to Russia. There are also media reports suggesting Chinese are to take over Gwadar Port.

To comprehend these developments one needs to look closely at what is emerging between the ties of global powers such as China, US, and Russia. As the Cold War ended, NAM glided into obscurity, there was no one left to align against. However, now that Russia and China are increasingly challenging the US, and vice versa, NAM, and similar platforms will obviously become more relevant once more.

Analysis

US-Russia Ties

In a recent interview with Russia Today, President Putin indicated that all is not well when it comes to US-Russia ties. These ties are stressed primarily over Syria and NATO’s missile defense system.

“Today some want to use militants from Al Qaeda or some other organizations with equally radical views to accomplish their goals in Syria,” Putin stated in the interview. “This policy is very short-sighted and is fraught with dire consequences.”

He added, “That was the case during the war in Afghanistan.” “At that time, our present partners supported a rebel movement there and basically gave rise to Al Qaeda, which later backfired on the United States itself.”

In this context, the war on terror appears more and more like a transitory phase. As the global power tussle intensify, the militias, extremists, and states are likely to be absorbed as proxies and partners into one or the other fold once more. This phenomenon is increasingly on display in the case of Syria.

Moreover, Russia Defense Ministry threatened counter measures last week if the US does not relent in implementing a missile shield over Europe. The Commander of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces stated that the country will develop a new intercontinental ballistic missile by 2018.

US-China Ties

In the case of US-China ties, things do not look much upbeat either. During Hillary Clinton’s visit to China last week, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao showcased his concerns in a press conference:

“Generally speaking, our relationship has been moving forward, but recently I am more or less worried.” He went on to add, “I feel that our two countries should maintain political mutual respect and strategic mutual trust. The United States should respect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” His comments sounded more like those that Pakistan makes after drone strikes.

China and US are increasingly at odds over the territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
The country has warned US against meddling in the territorial disputes while the US has called for freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei stated, “Countries outside this region should respect the choice of countries directly concerned with this issue and should earnestly honor their commitment to not taking sides in this dispute.”

China claims indisputable sovereignty over the islands of South China Sea while Philippines, Vietnam, and other nations assert the same. Recently the US accused China of escalating tensions as Beijing set up a remote garrison in the South China Sea.

Additionally, China has warned Japan that its decision to purchase Dial Islands will have serious implications as it considers the action illegal. Chinese President Ju Jintao has stressed on Japan to, “be fully aware of the seriousness of the situation and not make the wrong decision.”

Russia-China Ties

On the other hand, some analysts have played up the differences between Russia and China, calling it an unnatural alliance. Moreover, this perspective blames Russians for not reciprocating the Chinese in the Asia Pacific in the same manner they are supporting the Russians in the case of Iran and Syria. However, this notion was some what dispelled when the Chinese President Hu Jintao and Vladimir Putin met on the sidelines of 20th informal economic leaders’ meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.

Both countries reached consensus on key political, economic, security goals and agreed to push the China-Russia strategic partnership forward. These were previously decided upon at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting in June. In 2011, the volume of trade between the two countries was worth $83 billion, and Putin expected it to increase to $100 billion by 2015.

Pakistan’s Ties With US, Russia, China And India

While the US relations with China and Russia are not going well, Russian and Pakistan is moving closer while Chinese-India ties are heading towards normalization. This is occurring as concerns have grown in the US that India is not fully embracing what its’ strategic security relations with the US entail.

As Pakistan and India agreed to the easing of their visa procedures, China’s Defense Minster Gen Liang Guanglie’s was in India last week and consented to resume joint military exercises that had been suspended two years ago. The defense ministers of the two countries decided that closer military ties would facilitate trust and friendship between the two. Despite tensions, trade between India and China has climbed from $5 billion in 2002 to nearly $75 billion last year. On the other hand, bilateral trade between India and Pakistan was only $300 million in 2004 and has increased to $2.7 billion in 2011. At a joint press briefing held after the signing of the visa agreement, Pakistan’s foreign minister stated, “We will not be held hostage to history.”

Irrespective of what is happening to US-Pakistan ties, the views of Pakistan and India on key international issues are moving closer to those of Russia and China. In addition to the focus on developing regional trade and energy corridors, the buzzwords emanating from China, Russia, Pakistan, and India are respected for sovereignty and national integrity of states and resistance to external intervention in regional disputes.

Hillary Clinton herself candidly pointed out to this stark reality. She commented on her trip to China the two nations (China and US) are attempting to do something that has not been done before in history “which is to write a new answer to the question of what happens when an established power and a rising power meet.”

The comment pretty much sums up the present hustle bustle in international relations. It’s yet to be seen if history will be made or repeated.

The post Emerging Tensions In Relations of Global Powers; Implications For Pakistan, India appeared first on Politact.

Context

Ending months and decades of speculations, the Muslim Brotherhood has finally emerged triumphant by working within the Egyptian system. Traditionally and ideologically, what happens in Egypt does not stop there and many people are concerned what this evolution of Arab Spring in Egypt means for the volatile Middle East and the rest of Islamic world. As Egypt emerges, it is important to observe the dynamics that are unfolding there internally i.e., between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover, it is equally critical to see how the success of Muslim Brotherhood impacts other Islamist organizations that were inspired by it.

Analysis

What Caused The Arab Spring

Most of the initial discussions in the West revolved around what actually triggered the uprisings, and the criticality of social media as a galvanizer. There has been a focus on the study of these modern day social media inspired revolutions and what that means for the future.

Over time, the attention has now shifted to the deeper level analysis. For example, in case of Egypt, the younger forces of change that led the revolt against Mubarak were taken over by the more organized Muslim Brotherhood, while the forces of status quo are now spearheaded by its military. Moreover, the connection between the war on terror and the Arab revolt is now coming to the surface. In the chaos and vacuum of almost all Arab Spring afflicted countries, the Islamists and extremists are gaining ground. The tussle between the liberal and conservative and nationalistic forces is playing out in many countries. In fact, the American think-tanks have already identified the pattern working across the region as the ‘Rise of Islamists’.

These conclusions lead to the next critical set of inquiries. Despite all efforts to repress them, what has caused the rise of Islamists and where do affairs go from here. If one looks at the region without first limiting it by the dynamics of each country, the following key themes and influences emerge to be working across borders and time:

• The deadlocked Israeli-Palestinian conflict
• The nature of US-Israeli partnership
• The future of Al Qaeda and the War against Terror
• The Shiite Sunni divide
• The tussles of Arab, Persian and Turks for supremacy

These factors have been discussed amply in previous articles. For the purpose of this discussion, they are crucial in understanding the rise of Islamists. In many respects, ascent of the Islamists is the failure of the liberal and secular forces to represent the truly held values of the society. When autocratic, or even democratic rulers, cease to represent the intensely entrenched sentiments of their people, the system is bound to seek at least some semblance of equilibrium. This imbalance had after all inspired the Al-Qaeda leaders, who themselves were motivated by the forefathers of Muslim Brotherhood.

What’s Next?

Since 9/11, the war against terror has spread to many new corners. The extremists have worked across borders and so has the response, to include the drones. Now that the Muslim Brotherhood has arrived at the driving seat, this brings to completion a struggle that spans more than 80 years.

Within the Egyptian political system, the roles are now reversed. The military that has acted as the torchbearer of the liberal and secular values will now have to work with the Islamists that have always resisted those tendencies and were persecuted because of that. Will the military accept the political authority now vested in the Muslim Brotherhood? The answer to this question has wider implications for the region.

In some respects, what is happening in Sunni Egypt is what occurred in Shiite Iran in the late 70s. The western construct of the separation of church and religion appears to be melting away. The question is what message will Muslim Brotherhood inspired Islamists and extremists take from its success in Egypt. It provides hope to moderate Islamists that victory is still possible by working within the system and by not employing violent and deadly means. This will likely discredit organizations like Al-Qaeda.

A statement released by the Afghan Taliban over the success of Dr Muhammad Morsi stated that it is “the strongest blow in the Middle East and the whole world to the American and Zionist expansionism. May the Muslim Nation of Egypt and their newly elected government take good advantage of this important occasion and historical victory in the defense and achievement of the interests of the Islamic Ummah.”

Comparing Egypt And Pakistan

What is taking shape in Egypt could very well be where Pakistan is heading as well, where conservative and nationalistic forces are resurgent. In other respects, Egypt may be heading towards the inter-institutional tussles that Pakistan is presently facing.

The statements made by the most popular political leader of Pakistan, Imran Khan, also provided some early indications. He stated recently that the country was “formed on the very basis of becoming an Islamic welfare state.” Therefore, the Muslims of India and Pakistan will feel betrayed if it does not become one.

Pakistan is also different from Egypt. The military in Pakistan is no longer projecting itself to be the bastion of liberal and secular values, as the military of Turkey was and Egypt is. In Pakistan, the army is already suspected of having religious tendencies and is increasingly accused of supporting outfits such as Haqqani network and LeT. Pakistan’s military realizes the war against terror has transformed the society to such an extent that there is no longer room available to provide carte blanche cooperation to NATO forces in Afghanistan, or be seen as a close ally.

Moreover, Pakistan is not Egypt, as it does not directly threaten the security of Israel and compete in the politics of Middle East as Turks and Iranians do. Most importantly, and perhaps perilously, it is not Iran that is close to acquiring nuclear weapons but is not there yet. And, that is why any Egyptian style transformation in Pakistan carries much higher stakes for the West.

The post The Triumph Of Muslim Brotherhood In Egypt – The Rise of Islamists In AfPak appeared first on Politact.

The militant group Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) has hinted it will accept mediation by Saudi Arabia if its government offers them peace talks. Maulvi Waliur Rehman Mehsud, of the TTP said, “We will see our shura (council) will decide whether and when can we enter into talks with the government, with the military…but I think we will like to involve countries we trust…they are in the Arab world. Let’s say Saudi Arabia.” The second in command to Hakimullah Mehsud said he did not have any direct peace offer yet but insisted any deal brokered must guarantee enforcement.

Pakistan’s military and political leadership at the All Parties Conference (APC) last month decided it would try to initiate negotiations with militant groups active in the country including TTP. The APC has suggested a “national institutionalized mechanism’ based on pattern of the High Peace Council (HPC) set up by Afghan President Hamid Karzai be developed for the purpose.

The post TTP Prefers Saudis As Peace Brokers appeared first on Politact.

The US special envoy on Monday revealed that “some” US forces may remain in Afghanistan after 2014. The Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Marc Grossman stated it was possible for there to “be space for some American forces to be left in Afghanistan after 2014 to engage in counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics and continue to train Afghan forces.”

The US had announced that the ultimate goal was to transfer the security control of the country to Afghan security officials by 2014 as listed in the guidelines established by NATO in Lisbon last year.

The decision may be met with opposition from Russia. Russian envoy to NATO Dmitry Rogozin said last week that Russia will not agree to a U.S. military presence in Afghanistan after the UN mandate date for the transfer of power.

The post US May Retain Some Forces In Afghanistan After 2014 appeared first on Politact.