Context

US Joint Chief of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen recently told reporters that Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) poses a “significant regional and global threat.” This statement significantly raises the stakes for Pakistan. PoliTact examines this statement by studying the historical evo
lution of LeT.

Analysis

The recent statements by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, Admiral Mike Mullen regarding LeT have surprised many. He asserted that the LeT network was expanding into Afghanistan and other countries beyond the AfPak locality. Until now, LeT has been known to be operating specifically in Afghanistan and Indian held Kashmir. However, there have been indications that the militant organization has started establishing links with terrorist-in-the-making in Europe and America. The arrest of alleged LeT operative David Headley and his involvement in the Mumbai attack may also be the basis for Admiral Mullen to declare LeT not only a regional threat but also a global one.

Background

Form all accounts, LeT has been a growing regional threat. Reliable information attained first-hand in background interviews and discussions with Afghan and Pakistani journalists, including Pakistani officials, reveal that LeT has restarted its activities with renewed zeal in the region. The organization is particularly active in southeastern and eastern Afghan provinces namely Kunar, Nooristan, Nangarhar, Laghman, Paktika and Khost provinces. LeT has also been exceptionally active in the Afghan capital Kabul and has already conducted several attacks in the city.

PoliTact sources assert that LeT is presently coordinating its activities with the Al Qaeda leadership as well as with the Haqqani Network. Additionally, LeT is also conducting operations with Afghan Taliban in Kunar, Nooristan, Nangarhar and Laghman provinces. The Afghan Taliban have had little following in these Wahabi-influenced provinces previously as they are predominantly Deobandis. On the other hand, LeT has established links with the local Wahabist due to a shared religious ideology. LeT’s local links date back to the late 1980s when the group’s head, Hafiz Saeed was himself based in Kunar. LeT’s mother organization, Jamaat Al Dawaat wal Irshad played a significant role in Kunar and paved the way for Hafiz Saeed to establish extensive links in this part of Afghanistan.

LeT has always had influence in these areas. Abdullah Azzam had established a virtual Wahabi mini ‘state’ in Kunar in the 1980s and LeT’s head Hafiz Saeed was part of that state, providing a large number of militant to Azzam to act as ‘soldiers.’ During the Taliban rule in Afghanistan, LeT was running a militant training camp for Kashmiri Mujahideen in Kunar. It was Azzam and the influence of his followers, which converted a large number of militants in these provinces to Wahabism. LeT is now leveraging these established links and influence in Afghanistan and is increasingly engaging in fighting with US and NATO forces while providing much needed support to sustain the insurgency in the above mentioned regions of Afghanistan. This role of LeT is thought to be the primary factor in the decision of local Wahabi organizations in Nooristan and Kunar provinces to swear allegiance to Mullah Omar.

While LeT have been involved in the region for decades, the groups recent activities in Afghanistan have mainly focused on countering and attacking Indian interests. The two attacks on the Indian embassy in Kabul were widely reported as the work of the same organization. LeT is reportedly also responsible for  several attacks inside India, including on the Indian parliament in January 2002. Indians also blame the Mumbai terrorist attacks of November 2008 on LeT.

Conclusion

LeT’s past and current involvement in Afghanistan is well known. However, the timing of the warning by Admiral Mullen is intriguing. Pakistan is yet to begin the North Waziristan offensive aimed primarily against the Haqqani Network led by Sirajuddin Haqqani. In the pre-flood scenario, the statement regarding LeT was designed as a pressure tactic for Pakistan to mount the offensive in North Waziristan. LeT is widely believed to have strong links to the Pakistani intelligence agency. Thus Admiral Mullen’s statement was probably aimed at sending a strong message to Pakistan military that if they keep desisting from launching North Waziristan operation against the Haqqani Network, they could face allegations and criticism for protecting LeT. Given that Mullen has already declared LeT as having global terrorist links, puts Pakistan at risk of being labeled as a state sponsor of Terrorism. However, in the aftermath of the floods the situation has completely changed, and players have been forced to reevaluate their strategy.

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The post Regional and Global Threats from Lashkar-e-Tayyaba appeared first on Politact.

Context
Drone attacks in Pakistan have increased dramatically during the month of September. According to the Long War
Journal, 35 such strikes took place in 2008, 53 in 2009 and so far 67 have occurred in 2010. The Prime Minister of Pakistan commented on Tuesday that even if US fails to deliver the drone technology, the country will soon have locally produced ones. This analysis lays out the significance of the recent surge in drone strikes.

Analysis

As noted by PoliTact in its August 10th forecast, senior US officials now also admit the focus of Pakistan’s military has shifted to providing flood relief and that counter insurgency and terrorism operations have been impacted. The US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently commented that due to the floods, Pakistan’s North Waziristan operation is expected to be delayed.

One reason for the hike in drone strikes could simply be that Pakistani military is preoccupied with providing rescue and relief efforts, while the US does not want the extremists to have the breathing space to plan and conduct terrorist attacks in Pakistan and elsewhere. With political unrest worsening in Kashmir, extremists might try to aggravate the situation further by striking a target in India.

According to media reports and based on the above assessment, US has stopped pushing Pakistan to do more, as this might be counterproductive. However, this does not mean that US would not act on its own at this crucial junction of the Afghan war. The major emphasis of the strategy is to weaken the extremists and bring them to the negotiation table from a position of weakness. Furthermore, there is a growing realization that the situation in Afghanistan cannot be controlled without eliminating the extremist sanctuaries in the tribal areas of Pakistan, a claim supported by both India and Afghanistan. The French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner also conveyed this sentiment on Tuesday when he said, “It’s not a secret for anyone, everyone knows that Mullah Omar is in Quetta, if he’s not now in Karachi.”

On the other hand, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has claimed responsibility for most of the recent terror attacks in Pakistan. TTP has linked the terrorist attacks to US drone strikes that have been conducted against them, which it claims have also caused civilian causalities. Additionally, the TTP spokesman Azam Tariq has accused the Pakistan army and the government of complicity in these attacks. By making these statements, Taliban have in fact accepted that the drone strikes are causing significant damage and this could also be the basis for the increase in UAV strikes in the tribal areas. While Prime Minister Gillani’s statement on the drone technology was probably meant to show disagreement between US and Pakistan on this matter, and to challenge the perception created by Taliban that the government is complicit in these strikes.

Drone strikes remain deeply unpopular in the country and are viewed as a violation of its sovereignty.  However, US humanitarian flood relief counters the negative perceptions created by the strikes. US is delicately but aggressively approaching both these goals; going after the extremists and providing flood relief. By adopting this tactics, US is attempting to prove that the drone strikes take out the very people that are known to kill Pakistani civilians, and thus to manage and offset the negative sentiment created by the drone strikes.

The post The Significance of the Surge in Drone Strikes in Pakistan appeared first on Politact.

Context

To date Afghanistan has given $1 million while India has offered up to $20 million for the flood victims in Pakistan. There have been allegations in the past that both were attempting to weaken the geopolitical stature of Pakistan in the region. However, in the post flood scenario India and Afghanistan have a lot to loose if Pakistan destabilizes beyond a certain point and if religious extremists appear to be gaining the upper hand. This analysis examines the possible positions of both countries in the aftermath of the ruinous floods in Pakistan.

Analysis

From the perspective of many in Pakistan, in order to establish its hegemony in the region, India in association with Afghanistan has been trying to weaken and destabilize Pakistan in a pincer style maneuver. Many people in Pakistan claim that the Indian diplomatic presence in Afghanistan particularly its consulates located around the Pak-Afghan border, are meant especially for this purpose. Furthermore, the terrorist groups such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which usually claims responsibility for most of the deadly attacks in Pakistan, are thought to be proxies for RAW and Mossad.

If the above theory is taken to be true, then the havoc brought about by the floodwaters has aided the mission of the above countries tremendously. However, their objective may have been to weaken Pakistan delicately up to a point, and not allow the balance of the power to tilt in favor of the religious extremists. Their emphasis may have been to change the behavior of Pakistan and thus to make it cease its traditional support for jihadi groups operating in Afghanistan and Kashmir. In order to achieve this, Pakistan’s risk reward calculus for aiding these groups had to be reversed. One way to accomplish this was to drive the focus of these groups inwards, as oppose to outwards, and thus shift their utility for Pakistan from being a strategic asset to strategic liability.

Nature appears to have played a cruel joke. Floods have utterly devastated Pakistan’s agriculture, economy and infrastructure. The focus of the Army at least for the time being has shifted to relief and rehabilitation efforts. In PoliTact’s assessment, in the medium to long term, the military would have to choose either to fight the extremists or carry out relief and reconstruction efforts, but it cannot do both.

Anticipating the emerging situation in which the odds are stacked up against the Pakistan army and the political set-up, it is likely the government will attempt a rapprochement with the religious groups. Although the probability of this happening has been lessened by the recent attacks claimed by TTP against the Shiite ethnicity in Lahore and Quetta. Nonetheless, Afghanistan sensing the possibility of this outcome has forewarned the US. The country has vocally claimed that the reason Afghan war is facing a stalemate is because of the duplicitous role of Pakistan and the safe haven which still exist there, a view backed by General Petraeus last week. Meanwhile, Karzai announced the formulation of a ‘peace council’ to start the peace talks with the Taliban who are willing to accept the Afghan constitution, lay down their arms and break ties with terrorist organizations.

Karzai and Afghan strategy appears to be moving in the direction of making peace with Taliban but meanwhile shifting the focus of the world towards extremists in Pakistan. This position is also supportive of India’s stance as it wants Pakistan to take action against Kashmir related jihadist such as Lashkar-e-Toyyiba (LeT). However, in the aftermath of floods both India and Afghanistan may have to change their approach towards Pakistan. In the future, they would have to adopt a highly supportive role towards strengthening Pakistan’s economy and its military, and not doing so may result in producing the scenario these countries may have been trying to avoid.

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Context

In the aftermath of the devastating floods the Pakistan’s democratic setup continues to exhibit exceptional weakness and disarray. Sensing an opportunity, the terrorists have unveiled their new strategy and suicide attacks have been initiated across the urban centers of the country. These urban hubs have come out relatively unscathed from the affects of the ravaging floodwaters. Pakistan faces daunting choices as the new reality unfolds.

Analysis

The suicide attack in Lahore occurred on September 1st followed up by Quetta blast today, and accompanied by smaller terror related incidents in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province. Subsequently, according to media reports an American drone attack took place North Waziristan against the extremists. Pakistan Air Force also recently conducted strikes in Khyber tribal agency. A new phase of the war against terror in flood ravaged Pakistan has thus begun.

The daunting choices confronting Pakistan in the emerging reality are: to continue the fight against extremists and thus sustain the foreign funding it desperately requires to keep its economy afloat, conduct rescue, relief and rehabilitation efforts, and to rebuild the infrastructure badly impacted by the floods. On the contrary, if the country fails to do an effective job of countering the extremists, the foreign financial assistance could dry up, escalating local discontent, and increasing the possibility that external powers will take matters in their own hands, as has often been threatened in the past. However, foreign intervention at least at this juncture is unlikely barring significant deterioration of the situation or a major terrorist attack abroad. As seen in Iraq, the new US strategy is premised on working behind the scenes, using covert operations and special forces, and reinforcing the capacity of its partners.

As previously noted by PoliTact, with the political set-up of the country not functioning, both the responsibilities of fighting extremism and providing relief for the flood victims have fallen upon the army. Thus an essential part of the extremist strategy would be to keep the military distracted and engaged. Moreover, the extremists will escalate their drive to bring about a mutiny against the state by capitalizing on the disenchantment of the flood impacted rural masses.

The choices for Pakistan army appear to be mutually exclusive. If the military decides to continue tackling extremism then the rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts will be greatly impeded, causing the disillusioned citizens to join the insurgency. If it decides to focus on rehabilitation, the extremists will get room to expand their influence further and increase the chances of foreign intervention. The military, however, does not have the capacity to address both flood relief and extremism simultaneously, and this points more towards either political reconciliation with some groups or allowing foreign forces to assist in the counter insurgency efforts with in Pakistan.

As the gap between the public sentiments and the state increases the questions regarding the ownership of the war are going to be revisited. Interestingly, the major political parties of the country have also started talking about a revolution. It’s not clear at this point if this is the same revolt the extremists are striving for as well. Furthermore, against whom the revolution will be carried out also remains murky. Nonetheless, political parties perhaps sensing the mood of the masses want to be on the side of popular sentiment if indeed a revolution is in the offing. Obviously, a sea change is occurring in the political landscape of Pakistan and it is not clear which way the nations military will go.

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The post The Start of a New Phase of War Against Terror in Pakistan – The Nations Fight Against Itself Escalates appeared first on Politact.

Context
President Obama announced the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom on August 31st and shifting of the focus to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. However, he made it clear the priority of his administration will be on resuscitating the American economy. This analysis interprets the deeper message of the speech and the underlying constraints and assumptions.  – Haqqani Network, Kurram Agency and Iran

Analysis

Without doubt the Iraqi and Afghan operations have considerably reduced the available capacity of the American military might. Particularly, when it needs to be concentrating on dealing with not only terrorism but also increasingly aggressive Russia and growing concerns regarding the expanding Chinese army, especially its navy.

Additionally, President Obama and many others have long believed that the real emphasis should have been the Afghan Theater, after all that is where the 911 attacks originated. On the other hand, the Iraq war proved to be a distraction and WMD’s were never found. Nonetheless, the Iraqi operation had to be properly managed and brought to a reasonable conclusion, allowing the American diplomatic, military and economic resources to be shifted to more urgent matters such as the Horn of Africa, AfPak, Middle East Peace Process and Iran. The job in Iraq though is far from over and even though Saddam and his regime were toppled other ethnic fault lines have rekindled and Iran’s regional influence has been strengthened.

The end of Iraq mission represents a shift of US policy from primarily military emphasis to a diplomatic and regional approach, brought about by its dwindling economy. However, the correct terminology should be the transition of the mission, where Iraqi’s are to take on the primary responsibility for the security and running the country while US acting as a back-up support. This is also a model to be replicated in Afghanistan.

A key realization on part of the US, which does not get much mention, is that its mere presence in these Islamic regions is fueling a reaction. The dynamics of this function complicates the US mission in Iraq and Afghanistan, and provides fodder for exploitation at the hands of the extremists. Under the new strategy, US forces will maneuver behind the scenes while reinforcing the local authorities and partners and using covert operations and US Special Forces instead, just as they are in Pakistan. The New York Times reported in May that General Petraeus signed a secret order in late 2009, increasing covert operations to counter militants and other threats across the region. The order authorizes Special Operations forces to operate in both allied and hostile nations in the Mideast, Central Asia and the Horn of Africa.

The long-term efficacy of this new strategy is yet to be seen. However, two outcomes are obvious. Firstly, it will move the focus of the extremists away from targeting the US troops and towards its local partners. Secondly, this could create a civil war like situation in these countries as the infighting intensifies. If US does not work on improving its own credibility in the Islamic world, the partners are going to simply appear as proxies and thus enhancing the probability of the Islamic hardliners to extend their influence. The Freedom Flotilla incident in May proved the centrality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that galvanizes the entire Islamic world, and it is also the issue where US can remarkably amplify its respect.

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Context

The Afghan national security adviser Rangin Dadfar Spanta was recently visiting US. In an article published in Washington Post on August 23, he blamed the role of Pakistan in addition to corruption inside the Afghan government for the predicament facing the country. He advised the US to re evaluate its strategic partnership with Pakistan as it has sustained supporting the extremists, which is leading to the erosion of assistance for the Afghan war.

The Afghan officials went as far as to suggest that Pakistani generals should be barred from visiting United States, perhaps modeled on the recent denial of visa to Lt-Gen BS Jaswal. He is the Indian Army’s Commander-in-Chief for Northern Command that includes Jammu and Kashmir, and was schedule for a regular official visit to China.

Analysis

The Afghan national security adviser went on to write:

“It is my firm conviction that securing our people, districts and towns from terrorists; institutionalizing the rule of law; and fighting corruption are necessary steps toward building a strong and responsive state. But that is not enough. No domestic measure will fully address the threat of international terrorism, its global totalitarian ideology or its regional support networks. Dismantling the terrorist infrastructure is a central component of our anti-terror strategy, and this requires confronting the state that still sees terrorism as a strategic asset and foreign policy tool.”

Ever since a democratic set-up was installed in Pakistan, the Afghan and Pakistan governments were believed to be cooperating more closely in fighting extremism. The consequence of this close cooperation resulted in a feeling of being ‘left out’ and not ‘properly’ consulted, on part of the US.

Under international pressure to deal with rampant corruption, Afghanistan is becoming increasingly frustrated by the global attention and sympathy Pakistan is generating in the aftermath of the devastating floods. It perhaps also senses an opportunity as the prospect of weakened Pakistan looms on the horizon. Due mainly to its rescue and relief efforts, the graph of Pakistan army’s image is on the rise both domestically and internationally. This is troubling for India and Afghanistan as they have worked feverishly against this trend. The official reports recently leaked by Wikileaks were considered by many in Pakistan to be part of this global campaign towards maligning the repute of Pakistan’s military.

The Pak-Afghan relations appears to be heading towards turbulent waters once again. PoliTact will be watching this unfolding trend and its possible implications on the politics of the region.

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Context

Introduction

The Pew Research Center’s Global Attitude Project recently released the findings of its 2010 survey on the attitude of Pakistani public on extremism and terrorism. The study was conducted in April of 2010, questioning thousands of respondents across the country. In the aftermath of the catastrophic floods in Pakistan, this survey could become a critical baseline to measure the public attitudes on extremism before and after the devastating floods. However, it should be pointed out that the study was mainly designed to gauge Pakistan’s public opinion particularly from the vantage point of United States. The survey, for example, does not cover public attitudes on the causes of religious extremism in Pakistan.

The Pew Research Centre’s Global Attitude Project recently released the findings of its 2010 survey on the attitude of Pakistani public on extremism and terrorism. The survey also covers people’s perceptions on Pakistan’s economic condition and foreign relations, particularly with the US. The survey was conducted in April of 2010, questioning thousands of respondents across the country.

The study provides insight into the evolving perceptions that ordinary Pakistanis hold regarding extremist and terrorist organizations. Moreover, the results of the investigation clearly convey that when it comes to the fight against militant organizations, the government of Pakistan is failing in the most important battlefield of all: the hearts and minds of Pakistani people. In the aftermath of the catastrophic floods in Pakistan, this survey could become a critical baseline to measure the public attitudes before and after the devastating floods.

Although surveys cannot be termed as exact representation of reality they do provide significant insight into prevalent attitudes that exist in the social setting where they are carried out. The Global Attitude Project surveys in Pakistan are generally reflective of the divergent public perception on Taliban and Al Qaeda as well as religious extremism and terrorism in the country.

Analysis

Perceptions of the Pakistani Public on Religious Extremism

Will Extremist Take Over Pakistan?

One of the most important questions of the survey covers whether the respondents were worried about extremist groups taking control of Pakistan. In response to this question 51 percent said that they were quite worried about the unfolding of such a scenario; 31 percent of the people surveyed said that they were not very worried, or not at all worried about extremists taking over of the country. If 51 percent of the respondents-a representative sample of Pakistani population-think that militants could take over Pakistan, it reflects on the low level of confidence the people have in the capability of the state and its apparatus to prevent such an eventuality. An alarming 84 percent of the respondents were unhappy about the state of affairs in Pakistan.

Views on Al Qaeda

The second important question of the survey relates to public’s view on Al Qaeda. As compared to 63 percent last year, 53 percent of the survey respondents had negative attitudes towards Al Qaeda this year. This represents a decrease of 10% from last year.

The somewhat favorable attitude of Pakistanis towards Al Qaeda is an indication of the failure of nations media as well as state agencies in building a case against the extremists and Al Qaeda. This may also be reflective of the backlash against Pakistan’s continued cooperation with the US in the fight against terror. Many Pakistanis equate the war against terror with more drone attacks, which occur with Pakistani acquiescence and are believed to cause civilian causalities.

Views on Pakistani Taliban

As far as the views about the Taliban are concerned, 65 percent of the respondents had unfavorable views while only 15 percent had a positive attitude. In comparison, last year 70 percent held negative views on Taliban while 10 percent had a sympathetic opinion.

Increase in the favorable attitudes towards Taliban is alarming considering they have continued their devastating attacks in Pakistan, bringing death and destruction to ordinary Pakistan citizens across the country. Furthermore, the fact that the Taliban have a political agenda for the whole state of Pakistan, which ultimately focuses on the imposition of their version of ‘Islamic’ system in the country, increasing favorable attitudes towards Taliban should be a cause of serious concern.

Views on Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT)

Questions measuring public attitudes on LeT were added to the survey for the first time this year: confirming the rise of danger posed by the group on the American radar while also reflecting Indian pressure and influence on US policy. In response to the question about LeT, 25 percent of people responded favorably and 35 percent unfavorably when questioned. On the other hand, 40 percent were not familiar with the existence of the group. As no comparison point exist, it is difficult to draw any conclusions. However, it does appear that popularity of the group is concentrated in particular parts of the country. With 40 percent of the respondents not recognizing LeT could be interpreted to mean that the group is not believed to pose a threat to Pakistan, which could translate into more public and financial support.

Greatest Threat to Pakistan

Yet another important question of the survey asked about the greatest threat to Pakistan. Not to anyone’s surprise, 53 percent of Pakistanis view India as the biggest threat. On the other hand 23 percent considered Taliban the greatest risk and a negligible 3 percent thought Al Qaeda to be the acute hazard for the country. Interestingly 5 percent named all the three of the above as the biggest threat. On the other hand, 6 percent thought none of above posed a serious threat.

The above data clearly demonstrates the majority of Pakistani’s still consider India to be its archenemy. This is despite the recent official rhetoric that the main threat to the state comes from within. Many Pakistan’s believe the Taliban and the insurgency in Balochistan are supported by India, which in collusion with Afghanistan are attempting to destabilize Pakistan. Moreover, the survey results highlight the fact that when it comes to the strategic threat perception of the country, the danger from India continues to supersede any risk posed by local militant and extremist groups.

Perceptions of Pakistani Political Leadership and Media on the Causes of Extremism

 It should be also be pointed out that the survey is mainly designed to gauge Pakistan’s public opinion and its implication for US policies in the region. The survey, for example, does not cover the public perception on the causes of extremism in Pakistan, which tremendously impacts its effort to formulate a response to the fight against terrorism.

This is where PoliTact has focused its attention for the last two years in a row. PoliTact has taken upon a longitudinal study to study the perspectives of a whole array of Pakistanis on the causes of present predicament of Pakistan. As part of this examination, PoliTact teamed up with APPJD (American Pakistani Physicians for Justice and Democracy). APPJD uses ‘discussion forums’ to build a basic framework around which political thought process and consensus building can be developed. In July 2009, PoliTact analyzed the views of the major political parties of Pakistan. This year another panel discussion was organized by APPJD on July 4, 2010 to discuss the role of media in-fighting extremism.

Up to now what has been observed in our study is the inability on the part of the country’s civil, political, and military intelligentsia to develop a consensus on not only who the enemy is, but also what are the roles of different institutions of Pakistan to fight this menace. Most of the focus usually revolves around: 1) the basic causes of extremism in Pakistan; 2) ethnic tensions; 3) the role of the Pakistani Army; 4) rampant corruption of the politicians; and 5) military or political solution.
Pakistan’s different institutions pay more emphasis on the present geopolitical and religious factors as opposed to understanding the current crises in the context of economic, social, cultural and historical underpinnings. They approach the problem as being linear and fail to take in to account the interconnection of the above listed variables, which requires taking a multidimensional view of the reality being confronted.

Conclusion

PoliTact has previously pointed out the key impediments in carrying out successful transformation in an organization. These according to a well known organizational transformational doctrine called the Blue Ocean strategy are; resources, cognitive, political and motivational. The authors of the strategy W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, claim the hardest challenge for a leader to bring about transformation is cognitive i.e., “…. to make people aware of the need for a strategic shift and to agree on its causes.”

While Pakistani public, intelligentsia, political and military leadership realizes the need and urgency for a strategic shift to tackle the multitude of challenges confronted by the country, they do not agree on the causes of the problems. As referenced above, without agreement on the causes and merely examining the attitudes of the people on extremism, is not going to assist in tackling the gradual radicalization of the Pakistani society and bring about a change.

This is where surveys conducted by Pew Research Center are most lacking, as they study the attitudes but not the causes behind the attitudes. On the other hand, as mentioned above, Pakistanis have focused most of their discussions on the causes of extremism.

PoliTact has highlighted the role of media in helping to build consensus and educating the masses on the causes of religious extremism in Pakistan, as majority of the political leadership lacks credibility in the public eye while the military leadership can often be myopic in its strategic outlook. We will continue to analyze the attitudes and perceptions of Pakistani pubic, leadership and institutions and examine not only the outcomes but also the possible causes for increasing religious extremism.

The post Perceptions of Pakistani Public, Media and Leadership on Extremism and its Causes – Analysis of the Pew Research Centers 2010 Survey on the Attitude of Pakistani Public on Extremism appeared first on Politact.