How to Deal with Afghanistan’s Extremist Landscape?

Context

Since the full withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan in August 2021, it was assumed that Pakistan’s war against extremism had come to an end. There was a perception that the installation of Afghan Taliban in Kabul will make Pakistan’s regional influence grow. Besides, the nation was blamed for supporting the Taliban and providing them safe havens. Prior to 9/11 attacks, Taliban had extended its control to almost all of Afghanistan – and there were fears of its influence extending even further into Central Asia while threatening Iran. In 1998, 11 Iranian diplomats were killed in Mazar-e-Sharif in a battle between Iranian supported Northern Alliance and the Taliban forces – bringing the two close to a full blown conflict.

What transpired in the aftermath of 9/11 saw the reversal of the Taliban fortunes – and along with them with their supporters, particularly Pakistan. At the peak of the war against extremism, all major cities of the country were targeted by terrorists including its security forces. According to one estimate 83,000 lives were lost with an economic toll of about US$126 billion. The extremists accused Pakistan of supporting the infidels and providing bases and supply lines for NATO forces fighting Taliban.

However, since the US withdrawal, after a brief lull, the situation got progressively worse for Pakistan. Especially since the fall of Imran Khan’s government in April 2022. First came the elimination of Al Qaeda (AQ) mastermind Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul in July 2022, which demonstrated that Taliban were not holding up to their promise of breaking ties with AQ. Second, Pakistan was hoping that after US left Afghanistan, it could convince Taliban to act against Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). TTP had found refuge in Afghanistan since the operations carried out by Pakistan’s military in Swat and other Tribal Areas.

The horrific attack in Peshawar late January this year, which claimed the lives of more than 100 worshiping policemen, has reminded the country of the worse times of the war against extremism. This was followed by an attack on the police headquarters in Karachi on February 17. The country is once again grappling with the question of how to deal with Afghan Taliban and TTP.

Pakistan and TTP

Speaking at the Munich Security Conference on Feb 18, Pakistan’s foreign minister Bilawal Bhutto highlighted the risk:

“The concern is that if we and the interim (Afghan) government don’t take these groups seriously and they don’t demonstrate the will and the capacity to take on terrorist groups then they will conduct terrorist activities in the region first — we are already witnessing an uptick in terrorist activity in Pakistan since the fall of Kabul — but it won’t be long before it reaches somewhere else.”

He went on to add that Pakistan wants to work with Afghan Taliban to deal with TTP and to build its counter-terrorism capabilities, and is not looking to interfere in Afghanistan militarily. However, media reports indicate that Pakistan has targeted TTP linked leadership in Afghanistan several times since last April – and when Afghan Taliban are unwilling to assist. It reportedly carried out air strikes in April 2022 in Eastern Afghanistan. In August 2022, TTP commander Omar Khalid Khorassani was killed in a IED attack.

But it’s not clear if US desires to focus on Afghanistan – as its attention is presently preoccupied with Ukraine, Russia, and China. Even Europe is in the process of decoupling from China. On the other hand, Pakistan claims China to be a strategic partner, and it was the former prime minister Imran Khan’s visit to Moscow in February 2022 that unnerved the US. Soon after, his government fell in April 2022.

Prior to his visit to Moscow and since the US Afghan withdrawal, a debate had been raging about how US would maintain pressure on the global jihadists present in Afghanistan from repeating a 9/11 type attack – or from pulling a serious attack on India. Reportedly, US had wanted bases in Pakistan from where to maintain kinetic pressure on global extremists in Afghanistan. Imran Khan’s government was vehemently against providing any such cooperation since his political mantra was based on a negotiated approach – at least as far as groups like TTP were concerned. Moreover, he had consistently questioned the wisdom of Pakistan’s previous involvement in the campaign against extremism in support of NATO at a tremendous cost of blood and treasure.

During his time in power, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) led government had sought Afghan Taliban assistance in pacifying TTP, resulting in a ceasefire that fell apart in November 2022 – and resumption of TTP attacks against Pakistan. The TTP demands related to release of prisoners were met to some extent. On the other hand, their requirements of decreasing the number of security forces in FATA – and rescinding of FATA merger are more complicated.

These conditions truly show that TTP aspires for a space from where AQ and Afghan Taliban can extend their reach. Moreover, how TTP wants to achieve these demands i.e., through terrorism – as compared to negotiations, needs to be transformed. To change the way TTP is going about its demands will require a change in Afghan Taliban thinking first. While Afghan Taliban were fighting foreign troops, there is no such validity in case of TTP – as it relates to Pakistan. TTP using the argument that it seeks to implement Sharia does not garner much merit.

To alleviate the source of TTP’s appeal requires integration of FATA into the mainstream while improving the infrastructure and economic wherewithal of the areas involved. Moreover, to empower groups like Pashtun Tahafaz Movement (PTM) in helping to bring the disgruntled towards political inclusion and addressing grievances.

US and TTP

The presence and elimination of AQ mastermind Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul was a clear violation of Doha Agreement reached in February 2020. One of the key terms of the treaty stipulated Taliban will not allow Al Qaeda, ISIS-K and other International terrorist groups and individuals to use Afghan territory to launch attacks against US and its allies.

These allies could be interpreted to mean India and Pakistan. Over the years Afghanistan has become a hotbed for extremists from all brands. For example, AQ and Daesh (ISIS-K) targeting the US prior to withdrawal, TTP carrying out attacks against Pakistan, Lashker-e-Taiba (LeT) and related groups striking India, while East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) was linked to terrorist activities in China. What Bilawal’s comments quoted above may be referring to is the nightmare scenario of a terrorist attack occurring in India which can trigger a wider regional war.

A report published by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) recently indicates that on one hand US does not consider TTP to be a direct threat to US – but at the same time worsening security situation of nuclear Pakistan is deemed a security concern for the US.

The reality is there is an ominous lack of public support and political consensus in Pakistan on how to deal with extremists, especially with the likes of TTP. Additionally, the economic woes of the country prevents it from dealing aggressively with extremism. This could change if TTP were to launch and claim more deadly attacks within Pakistan. On the other hand, if the threat perception from TTP were to change towards being perceived as a direct threat to the US – the calculus could alter. Moreover, if fresh elections are held in Pakistan, and Imran Khan governments returns to the helm, he may take a different approach to dealing with TTP and galvanize public support.

While it remains unclear where the assets used for eliminating Ayman al-Zawahiri were based, it’s clear that US retains the capability to deal with risks from global extremists that directly threaten it. Will US allow these assets to be used against TTP, like in the past, remains ambiguous. Pakistan needs to develop a wider political consensus on how it wants to deal with extremism and reevaluate its ties with Afghan Taliban. This is very difficult to do for a nation amidst political and economic meltdown.

Understanding Afghan Taliban

The evolving extremism landscape in Afghanistan provide hints towards the future of the campaign against extremism. As Afghan Taliban have settled in – it’s not clear if they are willing to break ties with global extremists such as AQ, or act against local affiliates like TTP. On the other hand, its ability to counter ISIS-K is also questionable. So far, it’s not accepted any assistance in this regard fearing being labelled as a Western collaborator. Attacks from Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) in Pakistan are also on the rise, especially related to CPEC.

The opportunistic postures of Afghan Taliban are meant to exploit the fears of stakeholders like US, China, Russia, Pakistan, India, and Iran – and by maintaining a leverage of extremism over all of them. For example, it has kept the TTP gambit over Pakistan, while at the same time offering India to keep a check on LeT and Al Qaeda in the Indian Sub Continent (AQIS), and then delicately adjusting its policy towards global extremists (AQ and ISIS-K) and other Western concerns – including women rights and inclusion of minorities in governance.

Writing in the National Interest after his recent visit to Afghanistan, former senior policy advisor to the US State Department Secretary’s Office of Religion and Global Affairs, Qamar-ul Huda commented: “Washington must realize that religious-political actors like the Taliban are acutely aware of their value in regional politics; they understand that local governments and global coalitions are seeking them out to counterbalance the weight of violent extremism and build multilateral ties for stability and economic benefits. The key question is whether the Taliban can transform from militia-minded fighters to nation-building technocrats and deliver for Afghanistan.”

Speaking at a webinar organized by Karachi Council on Foreign Relations on January 11, 2022 Taliban’s Representative in Pakistan Sardar Ahmed Khan Sakeeb took a stance on Durand Line that is not much different from the Ashraf Ghani and Karzai governments. He stated that his administration wants to take the matter to the Afghan people and then discuss the matter further.

On relations with India and Pakistan’s apprehensions, the Taliban representative explained that they wanted to pursue economic and political relations with India, and will not make it an enemy because of Pakistan, or make anyone else an adversary because of India – and this is beneficial for all. Replying to criticism for not speaking up for Indian atrocities in Kashmir, he added that they will speak out whether the atrocities are being committed by India or anyone else. He advised on solving all matters though negotiations.

Conclusion

The unfolding scenario of Afghanistan is directly impacting the political and security situation of Pakistan. Its ability to convince Afghan Taliban to act against TTP has only produced facilitation of negotiations. This has greatly frustrated the new Pakistan government and perhaps has pressured it towards more counter-terrorism cooperation with the US – for which there is little public buy-in in Pakistan. And this puts the economically fragile nation in a quandary.

Faced with growing US-India strategic partnership, counter-terrorism cooperation with the US could provide the security and economic lifeline Pakistan desperately needs. However, US has shifted away from counter-terrorism to strategic competition with China and Russia. And thus, the question becomes where do Afghan Taliban, including regional and global extremists, and for that matter Pakistan, fit in the great power rivalry equation. On the other hand, it’s likely the joint pressure of China and Pakistan, to protect their common interests, could nudge the Afghan Taliban in the direction of more serious action and curtailing the activities of TTP, ETIM, and BLF.

Correction: A previous version had stated Omar Khalid Khorassani was killed in a drone strike – he died in an IED attack.

The post Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP appeared first on Politact.

Context

The abrupt withdrawal of US and coalition forces from Afghanistan last August, and the arrival of Afghan Taliban at the helm, represented a key turning point in the region and beyond. The attention in the past had remained on the risks of what the return of Afghan Taliban would mean. Now that it is the reality, the inquiry becomes what do their initial policies reflect about the future – particularly as it relates to the primary concerns of two principal stakeholders, US and Pakistan.

Since the arrival of US and coalition forces soon after 9/11, the focus was on dismantling Al Qaeda (AQ) and the support structure that created the safe havens for the planning of attack. In the so-called War Against Terror, the assistance of Pakistan was instrumental. However, while the nation has supported efforts to go after AQ, it was always apprehensive about taking the same line against Afghan Taliban.

Over the years, Pakistan had tried to convince US that the best approach would be to reconcile with the Afghan Taliban – while US strived to influence Pakistan to go after all brands of extremists, including those oriented towards India. The differentiation would come to be known as the Good versus Bad Extremists – those that were targeting Pakistan and those that were not.

Based on the state-of-affairs when the Soviets left Afghanistan in the late 80’s – and subsequent loss of US interest, Pakistan calculated that one day US and coalition forces would also depart – and then the country would be left to fend for itself.

Analysis

Doha Accord, Fall of Ashraf Ghani Government and US Withdrawal

The talks in Doha represented the negotiated path to settlement with the Afghan Taliban and these went through various phases. US sought assurances that Afghan Taliban would break ties with AQ and prevent Afghan territory to be used against any other nation again, respect human rights and minorities, and not hinder access of girls to education and professional careers. US and Afghanistan signed the peace accord in February 2020.

On the other hand, while not overtly stated Pakistan expected favorable policies from Afghan Taliban as it relates to India and Baluch insurgents – and firmer stand against the activities of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). TTP is responsible for several deadly terror attacks in Pakistan and against its security forces, while at the same time assisting Afghan Taliban. These ties represent a complex web of ties between extremist groups.

Doha agreement envisioned reduction in violence, withdrawal of foreign troops, intra-Afghan negotiations, and rewriting of the constitution. The manner in which the Ashraf Ghani government collapsed in the end, accompanied by US withdrawal, left many of the terms of agreement in ambiguity. However, Afghan Taliban did allow US forces to evacuate in safety, indicating that it meant to abide with some terms of the agreement. It is not clear if Afghan Taliban had given assurances that it would not militarily take over the government.

Afghan Economy and US Emerging Policy

Mired in conflict for years, the economy of Afghanistan was never doing well, and it was widely known that minus foreign support it would collapse. According to World Bank estimates, 45% of the GDP and 75% of government spending was foreign aid.

Therefore, taking over the government was one thing but running and governing the nation was a totally different matter. Experts agree that Afghan Taliban were not well equipped in the lateral and lacked professional expertise required to run the economy in shambles. And these circumstances offer an ideal environment for humanitarian crisis, which could then provide the ecosystem for the return of extremists.

Soon after withdrawal, US suspended more $7 billion worth of Afghan foreign reserves. The sanctions that were applicable previously on Afghan Taliban as a terrorist group got reinstated as well. All of this makes it very difficult to do business with the country. According to some estimates half of the nations 40 million population is facing hunger this year, made worse by severe drought. Under mounting pressure from aid groups, in a controversial decision US agreed to unfreeze $3.5 billion worth of frozen Afghan assets – the other $3.5 would be given to the families of 9/11 victim.

Speaking the USIP on February 15, the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Bureau of South and Central Asia Affairs, Thomas West, explained the emerging US policy and the quandary.

He stated that US wants to help the Afghan people but not Afghan Taliban. Replying to a question on what leverage does the US have now if Afghan Taliban does not abide by the agreement and demands of international community, Mr. West did not mention the immense economic leverage US has and is using.

However, when it comes to security cooperation, the Afghan Taliban has shown the least interest in future cooperation with the US in fulling the terms of their side of the Doha Accord, he added. At the same time, West noted that US is not supporting any opposition to Afghan Taliban and is advising other nations to refrain from that, but some will do that sooner or later if Taliban does not show urgency. Answering a question, he commented that many players are realizing that not having US engagement in Afghanistan is not in their interest.

He went on clarify, while US is trying to avert the humanitarian crisis, stabilize the Central bank and increase liquidity, it is not planning any major bilateral program and development assistance for the country. And even for the humanitarian aid, US will work through professionals and Taliban will have no say in that.

Afghan Taliban and Pakistan

Often blamed for supporting the Afghan Taliban and providing them refuge, Pakistan has shared the international demands of them – before any sort of recognition can take place. At the same time, the nation is worried by the brewing humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan which can send thousands of refugees its way once again – and create the kind of instability posing serious security and economic challenges for the country.

Since the Afghan Taliban came into power, and except a few ISIS-K claimed attacks, Afghanistan has witnessed the safest six months for quite some time. This however cannot be claimed for Pakistan where the TTP linked attacks are on the rise. The country has made great strides in its own war against extremists – as compared to the heydays.

Recent policy postures from Afghan Taliban reflect its falling short of many expectations important to Pakistan. These issues include the status of Durand Line, exerting pressure on TTP, and taking a tougher line on India.

Speaking at a webinar organized by Karachi Council on Foreign Relations on January 11, Taliban’s Representative in Pakistan Sardar Ahmed Khan Sakeeb took a stance on Durand Line that is not much different from the Ashraf Ghani and Karzai governments. He stated that his administration wants to take the matter to the Afghan people and then discuss the matter further.

On relations with India and Pakistan’s apprehensions, the Taliban representative explained that they wanted to pursue economic and political relations with India, and will not make it an enemy because of Pakistan, or make anyone else an adversary because of India – and this is beneficial for all. Replying to criticism for not speaking up for Indian atrocities in Kashmir, he added that they will speak out whether the atrocities are being committed by India or anyone else. He advised on solving all matters though negotiations.

When it came to the activities of TTP, Afghan Taliban have facilitated talks between Pakistan and TTP that had led to a temporary ceasefire which expired in December – but does not seem to have gone beyond that i.e., preventing the use of its territory for launching attack on others. According to the US Afghan Special Representative, this could be because of capacity and not the absence of will to act against groups such as ISIS-K. West fears the ISIS-K attacks could increase in Afghanistan once the weather becomes warmer.

Way Forward

Clearly, the nascent Afghan Taliban government is trying to develop independent positions and does not want to appear a lackey for anyone. It is too early to tell if the Afghan Taliban government intends to abide by the terms of Doha Accord related to security assurances, women and minority rights, and forming an inclusive government. It has shown the least progress when it comes to developing a government that represents the Afghan society.

The recognition of Afghan government and major humanitarian assistance is likely to be ultimately linked to what counter-terrorism cooperation Afghan Taliban can offer, in addition to progress in other areas mentioned above. This is especially true if the security situation deteriorates in Afghanistan as the weather warms up, and then spreads to Pakistan as the security officials of the country fear. And this predicament will also increase pressure on Pakistan to offer more assistance when it come to over the horizon operations.

The post Emerging US Policy Towards Afghanistan After Withdrawal appeared first on Politact.

Context

Since 911, and even before, the world affairs are often linked to significant events that force upon a change from routine, while moving them towards a different direction. The often-quoted assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 is a case in point that directly led to World War I. Then there are natural catastrophes that can have dramatic results on the conduct of human affairs. The dinosaurs are believed to have been made extinct 65 millions years ago by either an asteroid impact or a comet shower. Our universe itself was created as a result of an accumulation of reactions that caused the big bang 13.8 billion years ago.

While the natural catastrophes are beyond human control, human beings can plan events to have certain impacts and outcomes. The risk is that sometimes such instances have the desired outcomes with known side effects, but at other times, there can be unintended consequences. The killing of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani was just such an event. The question becomes that while Qasem Soleimani, a state actor, had been conducting the activities he is known for a while, why take him out now?

While there are different angles to assess this, PoliTact has attempted to grasp it from the perspective of Core versus Peripheral Islamic world theory. What risks did Qasem Soleimani particularly, and Iran generally, posed at this juncture as it relates to the affairs of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. May be it was not what he had done up to this point that mattered, but what he could have potentially assembled as an experienced player – to challenge the newly unveiled Trump’s Middle East Peace Process.

Analysis

As previously noted that the continuing war against terror, plus the situation of Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Libya, have played havoc in the regions of South and Central Asia, Middle East, and Islamic Maghreb. This has led to ever escalating political, security and economic flux and instability. In this, the multidimensional relations of Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have taken on an added significance. As the chart demonstrates, the following four segments of this diagram need to be further examined, and juxtaposed vis-à-vis the influences of other global powers.

1. Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia

These three Sunni states have much in common. However, there views diverge when it comes to important matters of the region and beyond, to include Kashmir and Palestinian issue.

In fact, Saudi Arabia, including UAE, is competing with Turkish interests in Syria and Libya. As it relates to the Middle East Peace Process, Turkey, Iran, and Qatar have opposed the Israeli blockade of Gaza and provided economic support to the Palestinians. On the other hand, Egypt, backed by Saudi Arabia, facilitated the blockade by closing the crossing points for the Palestinians.

Turkey, in addition to Malaysia, has spoken out against the Indian decision to impose emergency and unilaterally revoking the special status of Kashmir on August 5, 2019. On the contrary, Saudi Arabia and UAE have not taken such a stance and have in fact increased their investments in India.

Reportedly, the Saudis exerted tremendous pressure on Pakistan to keep the nation away from the Islamic Summit held in Malaysia last December. Saudi Arabia feared that the conference of Islamic nations was an attempt by Malaysia and Turkey to develop an alternative body to the Saudi dominated OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference). The Islamic Summit organized by Malaysia, and backed by Qatar, Turkey and Iran, indicated a preliminary attempt to present an alternative forum. This endeavor was opposed by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt.

“We are attempting to start small, and if these ideas, proposals and solutions are acceptable and prove workable, then we hope to take them up to the larger platform for consideration,” Malaysian Prime Minister Dr Mahathir stated. He added, I have suggested that we re-visit the idea of trading using the gold dinar and barter trade among us.

While US ties with Pakistan have improved recently because of its active facilitation of Afghan reconciliation; US-India alignment continues to be a source of tension, to which now Saudi Arabia and UAE have also been added. Turkish-US ties are also not well despite it being a NATO member. This is mainly because of US support of Kurdish forces in Syria, which Turkey considers as terrorists. Moreover, acquiring defense equipment from Russia (S-400 anti aircraft defense system) has further aggravated the ties with the US.

Turkey’s relations with China and Russia can best be described as need based. China and Russia have both supported the Assad regime in Syria while Turkey had initially wanted to remove him power. Turkey has also been critical of the Chinese treatment of Uighurs, however, it looks favorably towards Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the One Belt and One Road (OBOR) Initiative. Pakistan is a full member of SCO and one of the critical tributaries of OBOR, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passes through Pakistan. Media reports indicate Pakistan has attempted to get the Saudis and Turkey involved in the CPEC related projects, while Iran has already indicated its interest on joining.

Comparatively the Saudi-US ties are at the best level, especially why when the Saudis and UAE have complete alignment of interests, to include their recent shift towards Israel.

2. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran

On the other hand, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have had very close and mutually beneficial relationship, especially in the post Iranian revolution era. Economically weak Pakistan has relied on Saudi Arabia to bail it on a number of occasions. On its part, Pakistan has provided security assistance to the Kingdom and presently is heading the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC), founded by the Saudis.

However, the direction of influence is more towards Pakistan. Saudis have used their economic wherewithal, and increasing closeness to the US, to keep Pakistan away from Iran, and now from Turkey. Moreover, it appears that Saudi Arabia and UAE and are now acting in coherence when it comes to the matters of Pakistan, which involves a growing tilt toward India. In all likelihood, the CPEC project, and the development of Gwadar port, will decrease Pakistan’s dependence on the Gulf State and this is likely perceived as a threat. However, the Gulf States will benefit indirectly from the Gwadar port since it would ensure the uninterrupted energy supplies from these states to China – incase of tensions in the Indo-Pacific theater.

Any conflict involving Iran will put Pakistan in highly vulnerable position, and force it to choose sides, and therefore it’s actively pursuing to avert war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. This picture, however, cannot be fully grasped without understanding what is at play in the greater Middle East.

3. Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia – The Middle East

Managing tensions over Iran, and preventing a conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran, entails matter more than just Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Both Iran and Turkey are nations born out of former empires, while the Gulf States were the outcome of opportunist positioning during the World Wars. Nonetheless, the competition between the Persians and the Arabs is nothing new. The Ottoman’s took the brunt of what transpired during the World Wars, and now Erdogan is attempting to reclaim its lost status.

Then there are the left over issues of the Kurds and the fate of Palestine that are complicating the situation. Kurds are divided between Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria and are the very center of the present conflict brewing in Syria and Iraq. According to some estimates, 12 million Kurds are living in Turkey, 6 million in Iran, about 6 million in Iraq, and close to 2 million in Syria. All of these states, especially Turkey, are worried about the future of Kurds and their own national integrity, especially because of the US support they have enjoyed.

Then there is growing influence of Iran across the region to include Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria. Irrespective of the Shia-Sunni divide, the Iranians have provided support to both the Shia Hezbollah and Sunni-Hamas. At the same time, Iran has also assisted in the fight against ISIS.

Thus, there is an overlay of pressures and tensions in the Middle East that are being exploited by the global powers. In this the Gulf Arabs, to include Egypt – and minus Qatar, have been worried about losing face when it comes to sensitive issues of the Middle East Peace Process. They are also concerned about the growing influence of Iran and Erdogan’s Ottomanist ambition that now extends to Africa. In Libya, UAE and Saudi Arabia are supporting Khalifa Haftar while Turkey is backing the UN backed Government of National Accord (GNA).

4. Pakistan, Turkey and Iran

This is the segment with the most interoperability with in the nations that compose it. Pakistan and Iran are both close to China, while Turkey is increasingly developing cordial ties with it. Pakistan has been a strong ally of the US during the Cold War and in the War against Terror, while Turkey is a NATO member. And one would suppose that this would make US, Turkey, and Pakistan natural allies – but that is hardly the case.

Ironically, during the early days of Cold War, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Iraq were all part of CENTO (Central Treaty Organization), also known as Baghdad Pact, created in 1955 and dissolved in 1979. Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran are also part of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), founded in 1985 to promote trade and investment opportunities. ECO was preceded by the Regional Cooperation and Development Organization (RCD) – founded in 1965. To deal with the energy crisis, Pakistan-Iran Gas Pipeline was supposed to alleviate some of the energy shortages, but due to sanctions from the US on Iran and pressure from the Gulf nations, the project has hit numerous obstacles and is held in abeyance presently.

While Iran has tense ties with the US and Saudi Arabia, it does not have such issues with Pakistan and Turkey. However, the ties between Turkey and Iran are not ideal, but they are better than Iran has with any Arab nation. Turkey has continued to receive its energy supplies from Iran – and if the Syrian conflict can be managed, this would significantly decrease their divergences. 

Conclusion

It is clear from the above discussion that the contiguous Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey segment of the chart has the most potential, and they are increasingly aligned with China. Iran is the lynchpin of this alignment, and other than its nuclear program, that is perhaps the reason for the consistent focus on Iran.

The removal of Qasem Soleimani is likely associated with this apprehension. Iran has developed a network of proxies throughout the region and has supported them across the Sunni Shiite-Sunni divide. Recent media reports indicate that there may have even been attempts to build bridges with the Muslim Brotherhood. And this would have been ominous for the freshly unveiled Middle East Peace Plan. Iran is likely to pose the most serious challenge to the new plan.

Ironically, the Gulf States of Saudi Arabia and UAE now represent the other side that are opposing any convergences to develop in the Islamic world along the above lines, while failing to take a balanced position on the Middle East Peace Process or Kashmir. Increasingly the nations have to mitigate the tussles between Saudi Arabia/UAE and Iran on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia/UAE and Turkey on the other.

The post What’s Next In The Growing Saudi, UAE Power Tussles With Turkey, Iran appeared first on Politact.

Context

While the Pakistan-India tensions are known to flare up occasionally, the present one over the February 14 Pulwama incident has calmed down for the time being – but is likely to have a next episode. Most assessments of the incident have examined the conflagration from a bilateral prism, and less emphasis has been directed on scanning the domestic and regional context under which the present tensions have taken shape.

Domestic Politics

Palwana attack triggered a dangerous crisis between the two nuclear-armed neighbors; it represented a first foreign policy test for Pakistan’s new economically strangled PTI led government. It was perhaps meant to test the fresh political setup. On the other hand, corruption cases are proceeding against prominent political leaders, with the nations former three times prime minster, Nawaz Sharif, already serving a jail term. So there is the domestic politics of Pakistan to consider.

Afghan Reconciliation and India

Then there is the regional context where Afghan reconciliation is swiftly moving forward with emphasis on four key segments: intra-Afghan dialogue, troop withdrawal, counter terrorism assurances, and a complete ceasefire.  However, it’s unclear what the role of India, if any, would be in the Afghan settlement.

Related Interviews:
1. Pakistan’s Crackdown Against Banned Groups And Pakistan-India Tensions
2. Pulwama Attack: Political or Military Solution to Pakistan-India Tensions
3. Afghan Peace Process: Can Pakistan, Afghanistan, and US Trust Each Other

Speaking at the Senate Armed Services hearing recently, CENTCOM Commander General Votel commented US desires to ensure “Pakistan’s equities are acknowledged and addressed in any future agreement in Afghanistan.“

If Pakistan plays a positive role in achieving a settlement to the conflict in Afghanistan, the US will have opportunity and motive to help Pakistan fulfill that role, as peace in the region is the most important mutual priority for the US and Pakistan,” he added.

However, India cannot let Pakistan and China emerge as the chief beneficiaries of peace in Afghanistan, or to allow a return to the pre 9/11 geopolitical environment. The Pulwama incident once again raises Indian concerns and its attempts to place Pakistan at the center of cross border terrorism. Meanwhile, Pakistan tries to clear its culpability as the proceedings of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the United Nations Security Council take place.

Pakistan’s Crackdown Against Banned Outfits

The post Palwama crackdown on banned India oriented outfits in Pakistan, such as JuD, has the potential to make matters difficult for Imran Khan. He won the election apposing the kinetic approaches adopted in the campaign against extremism, and supported political route to settle the Afghan quagmire. Imran’s method ultimately received the American buy-in and has resulted in the present on-going direct talks between the US and Afghan Taliban.

The Pulwama attack, and the subsequent crack down, could add a new dimension to Pakistan’s campaign against extremism. Can Imran Khan also convince India that the causes of mutual animosity can be settled by dealing with the simmering Kashmir issue politically? India, under Modi, appears hell-bent on taking a military approach, but the world can hardly afford an irrational strategy in a nuclear environment.

Nonetheless, if Afghan reconciliation does take place, it does give Pakistan the space to address India oriented groups. Moreover, with Kashmir already hot, now mainly due to the Indian mishandling and harsh military tactics, any connection to groups like JuD serves to harm the otherwise legitimately accepted global issue.

The post The Pulwama Incident And Imran Khan’s War On Terror appeared first on Politact.

Context
US Ambassador to India Timothy Roemer has called it quits, citing professional, family and personal reasons. After seeing many highs in US-India relations in his brief tenure of two years, Mr. Roemer is leaving on a rather low note- the resignation comes just one day after India turned down two US bids for its 10 billion-dollar aircraft deal. The administration of President Obama had been viewing the multi-role combat aircraft contract as one which would create thousands of US jobs. While officials in Washington believe India’s rejection won’t cause any long-term damage to relations, there are some who think otherwise. “The feeling is that India may have settled for a plane, but could be foregoing a relationship,” former US State Department advisor Ashley Tellis said.

The post Ambassador Roemer Quits After India Rejected American Aircraft Bids appeared first on Politact.