How to Deal with Afghanistan’s Extremist Landscape?

Context

Since the full withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan in August 2021, it was assumed that Pakistan’s war against extremism had come to an end. There was a perception that the installation of Afghan Taliban in Kabul will make Pakistan’s regional influence grow. Besides, the nation was blamed for supporting the Taliban and providing them safe havens. Prior to 9/11 attacks, Taliban had extended its control to almost all of Afghanistan – and there were fears of its influence extending even further into Central Asia while threatening Iran. In 1998, 11 Iranian diplomats were killed in Mazar-e-Sharif in a battle between Iranian supported Northern Alliance and the Taliban forces – bringing the two close to a full blown conflict.

What transpired in the aftermath of 9/11 saw the reversal of the Taliban fortunes – and along with them with their supporters, particularly Pakistan. At the peak of the war against extremism, all major cities of the country were targeted by terrorists including its security forces. According to one estimate 83,000 lives were lost with an economic toll of about US$126 billion. The extremists accused Pakistan of supporting the infidels and providing bases and supply lines for NATO forces fighting Taliban.

However, since the US withdrawal, after a brief lull, the situation got progressively worse for Pakistan. Especially since the fall of Imran Khan’s government in April 2022. First came the elimination of Al Qaeda (AQ) mastermind Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul in July 2022, which demonstrated that Taliban were not holding up to their promise of breaking ties with AQ. Second, Pakistan was hoping that after US left Afghanistan, it could convince Taliban to act against Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). TTP had found refuge in Afghanistan since the operations carried out by Pakistan’s military in Swat and other Tribal Areas.

The horrific attack in Peshawar late January this year, which claimed the lives of more than 100 worshiping policemen, has reminded the country of the worse times of the war against extremism. This was followed by an attack on the police headquarters in Karachi on February 17. The country is once again grappling with the question of how to deal with Afghan Taliban and TTP.

Pakistan and TTP

Speaking at the Munich Security Conference on Feb 18, Pakistan’s foreign minister Bilawal Bhutto highlighted the risk:

“The concern is that if we and the interim (Afghan) government don’t take these groups seriously and they don’t demonstrate the will and the capacity to take on terrorist groups then they will conduct terrorist activities in the region first — we are already witnessing an uptick in terrorist activity in Pakistan since the fall of Kabul — but it won’t be long before it reaches somewhere else.”

He went on to add that Pakistan wants to work with Afghan Taliban to deal with TTP and to build its counter-terrorism capabilities, and is not looking to interfere in Afghanistan militarily. However, media reports indicate that Pakistan has targeted TTP linked leadership in Afghanistan several times since last April – and when Afghan Taliban are unwilling to assist. It reportedly carried out air strikes in April 2022 in Eastern Afghanistan. In August 2022, TTP commander Omar Khalid Khorassani was killed in a IED attack.

But it’s not clear if US desires to focus on Afghanistan – as its attention is presently preoccupied with Ukraine, Russia, and China. Even Europe is in the process of decoupling from China. On the other hand, Pakistan claims China to be a strategic partner, and it was the former prime minister Imran Khan’s visit to Moscow in February 2022 that unnerved the US. Soon after, his government fell in April 2022.

Prior to his visit to Moscow and since the US Afghan withdrawal, a debate had been raging about how US would maintain pressure on the global jihadists present in Afghanistan from repeating a 9/11 type attack – or from pulling a serious attack on India. Reportedly, US had wanted bases in Pakistan from where to maintain kinetic pressure on global extremists in Afghanistan. Imran Khan’s government was vehemently against providing any such cooperation since his political mantra was based on a negotiated approach – at least as far as groups like TTP were concerned. Moreover, he had consistently questioned the wisdom of Pakistan’s previous involvement in the campaign against extremism in support of NATO at a tremendous cost of blood and treasure.

During his time in power, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) led government had sought Afghan Taliban assistance in pacifying TTP, resulting in a ceasefire that fell apart in November 2022 – and resumption of TTP attacks against Pakistan. The TTP demands related to release of prisoners were met to some extent. On the other hand, their requirements of decreasing the number of security forces in FATA – and rescinding of FATA merger are more complicated.

These conditions truly show that TTP aspires for a space from where AQ and Afghan Taliban can extend their reach. Moreover, how TTP wants to achieve these demands i.e., through terrorism – as compared to negotiations, needs to be transformed. To change the way TTP is going about its demands will require a change in Afghan Taliban thinking first. While Afghan Taliban were fighting foreign troops, there is no such validity in case of TTP – as it relates to Pakistan. TTP using the argument that it seeks to implement Sharia does not garner much merit.

To alleviate the source of TTP’s appeal requires integration of FATA into the mainstream while improving the infrastructure and economic wherewithal of the areas involved. Moreover, to empower groups like Pashtun Tahafaz Movement (PTM) in helping to bring the disgruntled towards political inclusion and addressing grievances.

US and TTP

The presence and elimination of AQ mastermind Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul was a clear violation of Doha Agreement reached in February 2020. One of the key terms of the treaty stipulated Taliban will not allow Al Qaeda, ISIS-K and other International terrorist groups and individuals to use Afghan territory to launch attacks against US and its allies.

These allies could be interpreted to mean India and Pakistan. Over the years Afghanistan has become a hotbed for extremists from all brands. For example, AQ and Daesh (ISIS-K) targeting the US prior to withdrawal, TTP carrying out attacks against Pakistan, Lashker-e-Taiba (LeT) and related groups striking India, while East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) was linked to terrorist activities in China. What Bilawal’s comments quoted above may be referring to is the nightmare scenario of a terrorist attack occurring in India which can trigger a wider regional war.

A report published by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) recently indicates that on one hand US does not consider TTP to be a direct threat to US – but at the same time worsening security situation of nuclear Pakistan is deemed a security concern for the US.

The reality is there is an ominous lack of public support and political consensus in Pakistan on how to deal with extremists, especially with the likes of TTP. Additionally, the economic woes of the country prevents it from dealing aggressively with extremism. This could change if TTP were to launch and claim more deadly attacks within Pakistan. On the other hand, if the threat perception from TTP were to change towards being perceived as a direct threat to the US – the calculus could alter. Moreover, if fresh elections are held in Pakistan, and Imran Khan governments returns to the helm, he may take a different approach to dealing with TTP and galvanize public support.

While it remains unclear where the assets used for eliminating Ayman al-Zawahiri were based, it’s clear that US retains the capability to deal with risks from global extremists that directly threaten it. Will US allow these assets to be used against TTP, like in the past, remains ambiguous. Pakistan needs to develop a wider political consensus on how it wants to deal with extremism and reevaluate its ties with Afghan Taliban. This is very difficult to do for a nation amidst political and economic meltdown.

Understanding Afghan Taliban

The evolving extremism landscape in Afghanistan provide hints towards the future of the campaign against extremism. As Afghan Taliban have settled in – it’s not clear if they are willing to break ties with global extremists such as AQ, or act against local affiliates like TTP. On the other hand, its ability to counter ISIS-K is also questionable. So far, it’s not accepted any assistance in this regard fearing being labelled as a Western collaborator. Attacks from Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) in Pakistan are also on the rise, especially related to CPEC.

The opportunistic postures of Afghan Taliban are meant to exploit the fears of stakeholders like US, China, Russia, Pakistan, India, and Iran – and by maintaining a leverage of extremism over all of them. For example, it has kept the TTP gambit over Pakistan, while at the same time offering India to keep a check on LeT and Al Qaeda in the Indian Sub Continent (AQIS), and then delicately adjusting its policy towards global extremists (AQ and ISIS-K) and other Western concerns – including women rights and inclusion of minorities in governance.

Writing in the National Interest after his recent visit to Afghanistan, former senior policy advisor to the US State Department Secretary’s Office of Religion and Global Affairs, Qamar-ul Huda commented: “Washington must realize that religious-political actors like the Taliban are acutely aware of their value in regional politics; they understand that local governments and global coalitions are seeking them out to counterbalance the weight of violent extremism and build multilateral ties for stability and economic benefits. The key question is whether the Taliban can transform from militia-minded fighters to nation-building technocrats and deliver for Afghanistan.”

Speaking at a webinar organized by Karachi Council on Foreign Relations on January 11, 2022 Taliban’s Representative in Pakistan Sardar Ahmed Khan Sakeeb took a stance on Durand Line that is not much different from the Ashraf Ghani and Karzai governments. He stated that his administration wants to take the matter to the Afghan people and then discuss the matter further.

On relations with India and Pakistan’s apprehensions, the Taliban representative explained that they wanted to pursue economic and political relations with India, and will not make it an enemy because of Pakistan, or make anyone else an adversary because of India – and this is beneficial for all. Replying to criticism for not speaking up for Indian atrocities in Kashmir, he added that they will speak out whether the atrocities are being committed by India or anyone else. He advised on solving all matters though negotiations.

Conclusion

The unfolding scenario of Afghanistan is directly impacting the political and security situation of Pakistan. Its ability to convince Afghan Taliban to act against TTP has only produced facilitation of negotiations. This has greatly frustrated the new Pakistan government and perhaps has pressured it towards more counter-terrorism cooperation with the US – for which there is little public buy-in in Pakistan. And this puts the economically fragile nation in a quandary.

Faced with growing US-India strategic partnership, counter-terrorism cooperation with the US could provide the security and economic lifeline Pakistan desperately needs. However, US has shifted away from counter-terrorism to strategic competition with China and Russia. And thus, the question becomes where do Afghan Taliban, including regional and global extremists, and for that matter Pakistan, fit in the great power rivalry equation. On the other hand, it’s likely the joint pressure of China and Pakistan, to protect their common interests, could nudge the Afghan Taliban in the direction of more serious action and curtailing the activities of TTP, ETIM, and BLF.

Correction: A previous version had stated Omar Khalid Khorassani was killed in a drone strike – he died in an IED attack.

The post Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP appeared first on Politact.

Dr. Syed Mohammad Ali
Senior South Asia Fellow, PoliTact

Context

Despite a haphazard military pullout, and the subsequent despondency evoked by the rapid collapse of the Afghan government, the United States has been compelled to resume talks with the Taliban. The US decision to begin talking to the Taliban again in Qatar starting this week may seem like an undue concession to a group which the US has spent the last twenty years fighting. However, there are genuine compulsions underpinning the American decision to engage with the Taliban.

On the heels of the Taliban takeover, the US had immediately withheld foreign Afghan assets to the tune of $9.5 billion. There was also a halting of other western aid via bilateral and multilateral sources, which cumulatively financed between 70 to 80 percent of the annual budget of the country. The US and its allies have tried to apply economic pressure on the Taliban to compel them to show moderation, and not revert into the repressive regime which the US has spent over $2 trillion to topple and disband after 9/11.

While desperate for international recognition and support, the Taliban have thus far not shown willingness to be more tolerant or to create a more representative government. But the international isolation of the incumbent Taliban regime has incurred the heaviest toll on the citizenry. With winter approaching, more than half the country is facing acute food insecurity according to UN agencies such as the World Food Program.

Humanitarian Crisis and Extremist Threats

Given the presently dire situation in Afghanistan, the US and Europe have been trying to walk the tightrope of providing modest humanitarian support to the country but doing so in a manner without lending legitimacy to the Taliban. The UN system has thus far been used to funnel humanitarian support, which alongside similar aid from neighboring countries, is providing a lifeline to many desperate people. However, humanitarian support alone will not be able to prevent Afghanistan’s economic collapse.

While Pakistan has urged the Gulf states, Turkey, Russia, and China to commit support for the Taliban regime, no country has stepped forward yet to provide Taliban the kind of support which would be required to avert economic collapse. This is because there is no international or regional consensus on what to do next in Afghanistan.

There are however other troubling signs which have prompted the US to negotiate with the Taliban again. The initial US ‘peace’ deal with the Taliban was based on four major points, i.e. reducing violence, withdrawing foreign troops, starting intra-Afghan negotiations, and preventing Afghanistan from becoming a base for global jihadi outfits once Western troops had pulled out. The pact had provided Western forces with a face-saving opportunity to exit Afghanistan despite the failure of intra-Afghan talks, but the ability of the Taliban to prevent Afghanistan from becoming the base for another major attack on the West remains a pressing concern. And this is the reason US wanted to maintain over the horizon capabilities to contend with any potential terrorist threats.

However, the closest neighboring state from where these operations could be launched flatly refused to host American assets. Russia’s influence over Central Asian States led them to rebuff US attempts to maintain a military presence. This refusal is understandable from the Russian point of view, as allowing an American base in Turkmenistan, for instance, would have created an American presence on its own borders. Moreover, Taliban had resisted strongly to any such over the horizon operation – declaring it was capable to deal with such risks.

While Pakistan had provided much needed support to the US in the past as a major non-NATO ally, it paid a heavy price in the form of reprisal attacks, including domestic political backlash. Pakistan has however refused to host any US presence to engage in cross-border operations in Afghanistan, which could anger the Taliban.

Afghan Taliban have given assurances that they are more than able to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a base for jihadi outfits once Western troops pull out. However, states neighboring Afghanistan suspect that their adversaries will continue financing proxies which will use an increasingly destabilized Afghanistan to create trouble for them.

Chinese Worries

China fears that the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) will grow stronger in a destabilized Afghanistan, and it has wanted assurances from the Taliban that they will not permit ETIM to use Afghan soil to create restiveness in the Xinjiang region.

Although China is interested in the vast mineral reserves in Afghanistan, and it could potentially also link Afghanistan to the ambition Belt and Road Initiative. China has taken a cautionary approach to see if the Taliban can create stability in the country before trying to economically invest in them. Thus far, Chinese support to the Taliban is limited to provision of humanitarian support and to ensure that instability in Afghanistan does not create a militancy problem for China.

In its efforts to pursue its own version of stabilization in Afghanistan, the US has not shown much sensitivity to regional insecurities of Afghanistan’s neighboring states. It is not only Pakistan which felt uncomfortable with the Indian penetration in Afghanistan during the U.S. military presence in the country, but China also criticized the US administration’s decision during the tail-end of the Trump administration when it delisted the Eastern Turkmenistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a terrorist organization. There is an uptick of ETIM attacks targeting Chinese investments in Pakistan, and China is trying to use Pakistani influence with the Taliban to deny the ETIM sanctuary in Afghanistan.

Russian Anxiety

Like China, Russia also wants to prevent the spillover of any instability especially in to the Central Asia States  – and countering the threat posed by Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) and trafficking of illicit drugs. This can be best achieved if there is an inclusive government in Afghanistan. Russia has actively engaged with Afghan Taliban, Pakistan, and India to achieve this goal, but thus far there is no regional consensus on how to move forward.

India-Pakistan Dynamics

India wants to prevent sectarian groups such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) from using Afghanistan as a jihad launchpad against Indian atrocities in Kashmir – as had occurred in the past. India had invested heavily in the Karzai and Ghani governments to counter this possibility and it was allegedly also using Afghanistan to support groups such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Balouchistan National Army to carry out terrorist activities inside Pakistan. If Afghan Taliban are unable to establish their writ across the country, Pakistan fears these groups will continue to launch cross border attacks from their refuge in Afghanistan.

After the pullout of western troops, Pakistan has been trying to get assurances from the Taliban to prevent militants affiliated with the Balouch separatist movement or the TTP from launching attacks on Pakistani soil. However, in the absence of international consensus on how to deal with the emergent ground realities in Afghanistan, Pakistan has recently stuck its own deal with TTP which had been trying to use bloody means to turn the Pakistani state into an Islamic caliphate since the past two decades. The Afghan caretaker setup, including the Haqqani network, played an instrumental role in enabling a ceasefire between the Pakistani military and the TTP. Whether Pakistan’s ceasefire with TTP hold remains to be seen. It is also not certain if the Taliban will be able to prevent other jihadi outfits launching attacks in Kashmir or Xinjiang.

The Futility of Piecemeal Approaches to Stabilize Afghanistan

A piecemeal approach towards dealing with the emergent realities in Afghanistan is not sufficient to contend with jihadi groups, especially those with global aspirations. ISIS-K has denounced the Taliban as a fake jihadist movement, and it is trying to exploit the group’s internal tug-of-war between pragmatic considerations and its ideological rhetoric.

As a result, the Taliban remain wary of not being viewed as becoming complicit with the West after having assumed power. The Taliban caretaker setup, comprised of exclusively male and primarily Pushtun leaders, was presumably meant to appeal to the core ethnic base of Taliban supporters and to avert more hardline elements within the Taliban from joining ISIS-K. Despite this fact, however, the U.N. envoy to Afghanistan  has delivered a bleak assessment this past week claiming that ISIS affiliated groups now appear to be present in almost all 34 provinces of the country. The Taliban have sent in their fighters to eastern Afghanistan to dislodge them. Trying to flush out this elusive group will not be easy for the Taliban, and it will risk overstretching limited Taliban resources. It could further alienate many Afghans, whose life has taken a turn for the worse after the Taliban swept to power.

Emerging Approach

It is in this broader context that the US decision to begin talking to the Taliban needs to be gauged. The agenda for talks between the Taliban and the US negotiators seems broad. The US is still insisting that the Taliban will only receive financial and diplomatic support from Washington if they not only fight “terrorism”, but also install an inclusive government, respect the rights of minorities, women, and girls, and provide equal access to education and employment.

These latter and more ambitious goals will however be facilitated if the US can create needed consensus with the Taliban and with other concerned stakeholders to support the Taliban in contending with the ISIS-K threat. Securing a consensus amongst key stakeholders in this regard should not be difficult, given that none of the above-mentioned states have any interest in seeing ISIS-K becoming more influential in Afghanistan, leading to the kind of environment that led to 9/11 tragedy. It would also serve the other desirable goal of enabling more moderate elements within the Taliban to come to the fore and in turn make life more palatable for ordinary citizens of the country.

Dr. Syed Mohammad Ali is a Senior South Asia Fellow at PoliTact. He is an academic and research consultant based in Washington D.C. and teaches international affairs and anthroplogy courses at Georgetown, Johns Hopkins, and George Washington universities, and he is a Non Resident Scholar at the Middle East Institute. Dr. Ali also writes a weekly column for Express Tribune, an affiliate of the New York Times in Pakistan.

The post Renegotiating With The Taliban: The Imperative Of Focusing On A Common Denominator appeared first on Politact.

By Arif Ansar and Dr Claude Rakisits

Context

For all intents and purposes US is entering the third stage of its military engagement in Afghanistan. The first one w­­as right after 9/11 when George W. Bush launched an attack against the perpetrators and their supporters, Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban respectively. The second phase was represented by the tenure of Barrack Obama, while the third stage is reflected by the arrival of Donald Trump to the helm.

As President Trump’s review of the Afghan strategy nears completion, the suspense continues on what may be the way forward. As has happened in the past in regards to many other recent deliberations, including related to Iraq, the political pundits are narrowing the debate to a few simple options. And because of this, the alternatives appear to be limited. It is very similar to when President Obama ordered his review of the Afghan strategy – and the generals presented him with few options. He had to go around, to diversify the choices on the table.

Leaders often have to be creative to broaden the alternatives available, to not get boxed in, and to augment sophistication and flexibility in their decision-making. Moreover, policy has to stay attuned to the changing circumstances otherwise it risks becoming irrelevant, this is especially true if the conflict is spread over a protracted period of time

Options

The present options seem to include:

• The troop levels in Afghanistan, and more importantly, their mission. Linked with this question is preparedness of Afghan Security Forces (ASF), and the weapons they need to take on the challenge head on. For example, the lack of air support has emerged as one of the key limitation for ASF.

• The role of Pakistan to bring about reconciliation in Afghanistan, and at the same time exerting military pressure against Afghan Taliban. Associated with this challenge is whether to utilize carrot or sticks towards the country – where allegedly the safe havens for the dreaded Haqqani Network still persist.

• Should Afghan policy be linked to Pakistan and India dynamics? As happened early on during the Obama presidency, there was an attempt to make this association, but under pressure from the Indian lobby the strategy was left with the acronym of Af-Pak. This does not imply that that the policy was oblivious to this dynamics, especially in the aftermath of 2008 Mumbai Attack, but it was relegated to behind the scenes dealing.

Absent from public debate is the realization of how complex the geopolitical and geo-economic reality has become. The global campaign against extremism and the transition in the global balance of power have become fully intertwined. As PoliTact had forecasted, the dynamics of the Middle East has now caught up with that of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Moreover, China and Russia are both involved in the Afghan Great Game – and it is critical to look at Afghanistan from the eyes of China, Russia, and Iran too. In other words, the American South Asia policy will have to be understood in relation to how these powers view the region and the role of the Afghan Taliban.

Understanding What Afghanistan Means for China, Russia, and Iran

Russia

The significance of Afghanistan for Russia has increased gradually, especially after the West imposed sanctions on Russia due to its actions in Crimea and Ukraine. Russians have felt that while it was cooperating with the West on a number of global concerns, and in relations to extremism, NATO was not reciprocating. Additionally, NATO did not desist from its expansion activities in the Russian Near Abroad.

In the Middle East too, Russians had been slowly loosing ground and it no longer enjoyed the kind of influence it once had under the Soviet Union. The removal of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi further reinforced Russian sensitivities. In case of Libya, China and Russia shared the position that NATO went beyond its stated objective, and that foreign powers should not interfere in the affairs of sovereign states. This was one reason that Syria became such a test case for Russia, forcing it to intervene military and come to the defense of its ally.

Russian involvement in Syria is not just to fight extremists, but more importantly to protect an Arab Spring-inflicted ally, whose government provides military facilities for the Russians. In essence, Syria occupies a key position for Russian power projection in the region and beyond.

Timing was another factor. As EU went through an economic recession, Putin watched keenly and exploited the vulnerabilities – especially in the energy sector. Russia has also been working on building closer ties with France and Germany. Moreover, Putin saw that after heavy military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US was over-stretched. However, when NATO started to re-exert itself in Syria and Europe under Obama, Russians slowly started to get more involved in Afghanistan and to nurture this leverage as part of a grand plan. This was occurring when Russia and China were also working with the US on the Iran nuclear deal.

Nonetheless, Russians initially established contacts with the Afghan Taliban. Moreover, they started to develop better economic and defense ties with Pakistan, despite opposition from its staunch Cold War ally, India. More recently, reports have emerged that Russia has also started to arm the Afghan Taliban and launched its own peace initiative for Afghanistan, which has had several meetings. The Russian’s consider Afghan Taliban to be the bulwark against the spreading influence of Daesh in the region.

Iran

Another Russian ally in the Middle East, Iran, has also undergone a transformation of views regarding the Afghan Taliban. Because of its heavy involvement in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon, to Iran Afghanistan increasingly represents another flank where it will likely confront similar dynamics as in the Middle East Theater of Operation. In this, the Afghan Taliban represent a saner local player for Iran to work with and to counter threats from Deash and other Sunni extremists.

China

Meanwhile, China has launched its “One Belt One Road” economic initiative, and one of its tributaries is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project. The success of the economic corridor is heavily dependent on the security situation of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Moreover, China has its own concerns regarding extremism sprouting from the region and impacting its Muslim population. Gwadar Port provides China an alternative sea access in case the Strait of Malacca was blocked, and there are rumors regarding militarization of this port at some point in the future.

China’s concerns on US and NATO policies are not significantly different from the Russians’. After all, this conformity of views is what led to the successful creation of organizations such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which recently included both India and Pakistan into its fold.

As is the case for Iran and Russia, Afghanistan represents another flank for the Chinese. As for the other flank, at its core, China is anxious regarding the emerging US policies in the Pacific region, which includes Taiwan and the “One China” Principle. Additionally, China’s draws a parallel to the situation in the Middle East – and whether a regime changes-type formula might be applied to the rash regime of North Korea. Not surprisingly, China and Russia have both protested the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile defense system in South Korea. Russia has similar apprehensions for the American Missile Defense Shield in Europe, which apparently is meant to counter missile threats from Iran – but Russia thinks the system is directed towards its capabilities.

Domestic Politics of Pakistan, Afghan Policy Review and India Ties

As this global context evolves and the American review of Afghan policy continues, the domestic politics of Pakistan is becoming unstable, seemingly oblivious to the regional and global situation.

Last week the Supreme Court of Pakistan unanimously declared that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was not “honest” and that therefore he was “disqualified to be a member of Parliament”. Mr Sharif subsequently resigned, promising to use all available legal and constitutional means to challenge the verdict.

This long-awaited decision was the culmination of over a year of investigation into the business affairs of the prime minister and three of his children following disclosures in the Panama Papers. The Sharif family members were unable to provide valid documentation to prove how they had accumulated such vast wealth, including very expensive London apartments, in a legitimate fashion.

Sharif’s departure is unlikely to change much domestically and externally, especially given that he will retain the leadership of his party, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N). It’s ironic that Sharif’s disqualification was based on constitutional amendments put in place during President Gen Zia-ul-Haq’s rule (1977-1988) given that Gen Zia was effectively Sharif’s mentor who helped him establish his political credentials in Punjab.

Needless to say, Sharif’s supporters believe all this to be a conspiracy by the military which was determined to get rid of him once and for all. It’s important to remember that Sharif hasn’t always had a good relationship with the country’s all-powerful army. His first stint as prime minister ended when the Chief of the Army Staff forced him to resign in 1993 following corruption charges. His second premiership was cut short in 1999 when Gen Musharraf toppled him and sent him into exile in Saudi Arabia for the better part of a decade.

During this third term, which started in 2013, Sharif’s relationship with the military was also strained. Soon after taking office Sharif was determined to negotiate with the Pakistan Taliban (the TTP as it is known here) as he had promised during the election campaign. The army was dead set against these talks, having lost 5000 men fighting the terrorists in the tribal areas along the border with Afghanistan. These talks, which were going nowhere, ended following an attack on Karachi airport in June 2014. Following the horrendous TTP attack on a school in December 2014, the military was determined that its wide-scale operation in the tribal areas would hunt down all militants, Pakistani and Afghan. On the whole, this military operation has been effective in eliminating, degrading and disrupting the various terrorist groups.

However, there is still lingering suspicion in the higher echelons of the military and the bureaucracy in Washington that the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network are still getting assistance from elements of the Pakistan military for their attacks against civilian and military targets in Afghanistan. These doubts as to whether Pakistan is running with the hare and hunting with the hounds is nagging American policy-makers. So increasingly officials are wondering what sort of pressure can be put on Pakistan to change its ways.

The chairman of Pakistan’s Senate Defense Committee, Senator Mushahid Hussain, recently said at a meeting here in Washington that he was hoping that there would be clarity from the Trump administration on its approach to South Asia. Unfortunately, given the internal infighting in the White House on this issue (and many others), it’s unlikely that we will be getting clear guidance on this matter in the near future.

When it comes to Pakistan’s relationship with its two large neighbors, China and India, no one expects any changes. Chinese officials were quick to reassure everyone that CPEC wouldn’t be affected by Sharif’s downfall. As for India, no one is expecting changes either in the bilateral relationship, if anything, it will probably get worse before it gets better. There had been much hope that PM Modi and PM Sharif—two business-friendly leaders—would move the relationship forward. However, nothing came of that, instead relations deteriorated in the wake of terrorist attacks in India by Pakistan-based jihadists.

So while on the whole the ousting of Nawaz Sharif is good news for trying to improve the poor state of governance in Pakistan. It’s unlikely to make too much of a difference in the long-term. Many more corrupt politicians would need to be disqualified to run for office before the people of Pakistan would be convinced that there is a genuine change in the air.

Proof, if proof is necessary, that little will change is the fact that Nawaz Sharif had chosen his brother, Shahbaz Sharif, who is the Chief Minister of Punjab, to eventually replace him as prime minister of Pakistan. However, there’s a feeling in the party that it might be best not to replace Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, the newly-installed temporary prime minister, and instead let him contest the federal election due to be held around June 2018. Regardless as to who is eventually chosen as prime minister, as leader of the party, Nawaz Sharif will make sure that his successor makes no changes without his approval.

The question becomes, under this political instability will Pakistan be able to meet the demands that may result of the American Afghan policy review. Pakistan’s political setup is increasingly busy with infighting and is unlikely to be able to focus and deliver when it comes to Afghanistan. Moreover, tensions in the civil-military relations will further complicate implementation when it comes to matters of Afghanistan and India. The risk being that similar to the recent events of Turkey and Saudi Arabia, a hardliner could emerge.

American South Asia Policy

On Pakistan’s security concerns vis-à-vis India, US has traditionally taken a balanced approach. However, this began to change during the era of Bill Clinton, when foundational steps for building strategic ties with India were laid. This policy has continued over Democratic and Republican administrations and now is reaching maturity. Under President Trump, the trajectory is likely to continue.

The dilemma for US policy has continued. Pakistan has and offers to cooperate in the campaign against extremism when it comes to those groups that carry global ambitions – but it is quite sensitive to protecting its interests when it comes to India. US has used the political, economic, and military leverages at its disposal to try to change Pakistan’s behavior in this regard, but those have had limited efficacy.

In the evolving balance of power of the region, China and Russia have moved closer to Pakistan, which otherwise was a customary US partner. On the other hand, Russia’s Cold War ally, India, has moved heavily towards the US. Afghanistan itself is building its ties with both China and Russia but the regime’s heavy dependence on Western support for survival would only allow it to go so far in that direction.

In this context, American détente with Russia has become a necessity not a desire. US appears willing to show flexibility over Syria and to entertain Russia. However, Trumps romance with Putin has deeply worried the European powers and the domestic opposition has also continued. With American flexibility over Syria, Russia would have likely reciprocated in the South Asian theater. Moreover, the détente with Russia would have been a bad omen for Russian and China bonhomie, BRICS and SCO, including Iran.

In the prevailing political atmosphere of the US, the detente with Russia looks unlikely. This will only increase the utility of Pakistan over time, like Saudi Arabia in the Middle East, to counter Iran and Russia.

The post The Third American-Afghan War And Transformation Of Perception On Afghan Taliban appeared first on Politact.