Context

The 12th meeting of the Council of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) will be held from June 6 to 7 in Beijing. The gathering is taking place soon after the May Chicago conference in which Afghanistan topped the agenda. The concerns regarding the shape of NATO presence in Afghanistan beyond 2014 and the possibility of a hasty withdrawal, both have alarmed the neighborhood. This, however, is not the only issue worrying the members of SCO. Matters related to the turmoil in Middle East and North Africa are also aggravating anxiety.

Analysis

Syrian Dynamics

As the humanitarian crisis worsens in Syria, the prospect of NATO intervention looks very real. During her visit to Denmark on Thursday, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that the case for military involvement is getting stronger, and she blamed the Russian policy for the potential civil war in Syria.

Many experts have raised alarm bells that military intervention in Syria will likely be a prelude to a wider regional war in the Middle East. The spillover effect is already being felt on Syria’s border with Turkey and Lebanon. While the West is increasingly perceived as using liberal values to intervene in other countries, China and Russia are alarmed by the growing trend of military intervention and use of force to bring about regime change.

“The consequence of hasty military operations in foreign states usually means that radicals come to power,” Russia’s former president Medvedev stated recently. “And sometimes these actions – which undermine state sovereignty – could result in a fully-fledged regional war. And even – although I do not want to scare anyone – the use of a nuclear weapon.”

Shangri-La Meeting And SCO Conference

The growing assertiveness of NATO and increasing chaos in Middle East and North Africa are raising the profile of SCO as a security organization. Among other issues, the organization has also been contemplating on when to upgrade the observer status of Pakistan, India and Iran to full membership. During the June meeting, Turkey is likely to be included as a dialogue partner, while Afghanistan is hoping to achieve an observer status.

The SCO meeting immediately follows Leon Panetta’s major address on June 2 at the all-important 12th get-together of the Shangri-La security Dialogue in Singapore. He is also visiting India and Vietnam over a week long trip. Reportedly, the focus of his speech in Singapore is the American military shift to the Pacific. Moreover, Defense minister of India A K Antony will also deliver one of the keynote speeches.

So, while the mood at the Shangri-La is about the growing assertiveness of China in the Asia Pacific and what can be done to counter it, the sentiment at the SCO conference is regarding what happens in Afghanistan after the NATO forces leave in 2014 and the deteriorating situation of Middle East and North Africa.

Within the SCO, Russia and China are not necessarily on the same page on all issues. For example, when it comes to granting full membership to Pakistan, Iran and India, the views of two powers vary. Russia feels that the matter has already been prolonged and that it should have been dealt more robustly. On the contrary, China has taken on a much more conservative stance on the issue of full membership.

The Politics Of SCO Membership

As it relates to India, some experts claim that the country may have had tied itself to closely to the US policy in Afghanistan, while the situation is not shaping up the way New Delhi would have hoped. India now appears to be aligning its Afghan policy with Russia, China, Iran and other Central Asian states. However, the US and EU sanctions on Iranian oil have not only complicated the otherwise amicable Iranian ties with India but have also strained Iran’s ties with China, Russia and Pakistan.

Nevertheless, the SCO member states would not be comfortable with the US-centric Indian foreign policy. At the same time, it would be difficult for the alliance to ignore the opportunities India presents because of its size and location. The organization obviously would also be facing a challenging task of balancing the India-Pakistan rivalry.

On the other hand, Russian position on respecting the state sovereignty and territorial integrity suits Pakistan’s present predicament. Despite being a major non-NATO ally, the country has encountered several breaches of its borders including drone strikes. Russia announced last November it would publicly endorse Pakistan’s bid for full membership to the SCO. The Russian Premier told reporters at the time that Pakistan was an important economic and trade partner and announced Russia’s support for its proposed trade and energy projects.

Although Russia may have backed out of supporting the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project, it has declared an intent to provide partial funding and technical assistance for CASA-1000 project, expansion of Pakistan Steel Mill ($500m Grant), Guddu and Muzaffargarh power plants, and Thar coal project.

While the present six members of the SCO are attempting to adopt a common stance on matters of strategic stability and balance in the region, the entry of Pakistan, India or Iran complicates the positions of alliance.

Whatever the case may be it is apparent that despite a strong desire from Pakistan, Iran and India to join the SCO as a full member, the alliance is likely to take a long-term view of the regional and global politics. The SCO will most likely allow time to take its course and for NATO to make its own mistakes, as oppose to making any hasty decisions that complicates the global balance of power. Judging from how things are evolving, Pakistan and Iran may very well end up on the SCO side with GCC countries allying with NATO. On the other hand, India and Turkey are likely to end up in a challenging position as global politics and crisis unfold.

The post From Chicago To Shangri La And Beijing appeared first on Politact.

Context

In addition to the Afghan-US-NATO alliance, the main issue under deliberation at the Loya Jirga was the signing of a long-term security pact between the US and Afghanistan. Over 2,000 Afghan delegates have convened in Kabul for a Loya Jirga, or grand council. The rhetoric coming out of the Loya Jirga will irk many in the US establishment; however it will most likely be overlooked given the positive outcome for the US-Afghan pact.

Nonetheless, several contentious issues are developing related to reconciliation in Afghanistan. The main ones being,

• The Intra-Afghan political dynamics.
• The shape and size of US presence in Afghanistan after withdrawal in 2014.
• The role of regional stakeholders in Afghanistan.
• The process of US military withdrawal.
• The involvement of various Taliban factions in the political reconciliation and the role of Pakistan.
• The tussles of Emerging and Established powers.

Analysis

Midday Saturday it was reported that a vast majority of the Loya Jirga delegates, which comprise tribal heads and regional delegates, had voted to support the US-Afghan pact for a continued US presence in Afghanistan past the 2014 withdrawal of combat forces.

The approval of the pact was widely expected, however it is far from establishing the agreement as a clear-cut deal. The delegates approved of the treaty with the inclusion of two conditions: Firstly, that there would be an end to night-time raids on civilian houses, and secondly that all detention facilities in the country would come under Afghan control.

The issue of the night raids has been a sore one for the Afghan’s, as it is strongly felt as an invasion of the privacy of the house, which is a sacrosanct thing for the fiercely private and honor-driven Afghans. However, for the US the night raids have proven a very successful tactic at rooting out militants in civilian areas. An estimated 82 percent of suspected militants currently in detention were captured in night raids.

While the raids and the status of detention centers are important, the overriding sentiment behind the inclusion of the two conditions was that of asserting sovereignty. A reoccurring theme in Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s speeches at the Jirga was that Afghanistan is a sovereign, independent nation and should be treated as one. The consensus at the Jirga, and the two conditions set out by delegates, are seen as a strengthening of Karzai’s bargaining power with the US. This does not guarantee that any conditions will be met, but it bolster’s his position because there is a rare consensus behind him. Karzai does not need the permission of the Jirga delegates to broker a deal with the US, however his calling the Jirga together, and standing by the resolution of the Jirga will be seen in a positive light both in the US and in Afghanistan.

Bonn Conference

The Loya Jirga has been called at a significant time for Afghanistan, in between the Istanbul Conference, held in early November, and the Bonn Conference, scheduled for early December. Both conferences seek to deal with issues of Afghanistan’s future, and the timing of the Loya Jirga couldn’t be more spot-on.

The confirmation of backing for the security pact between the US and Afghanistan is an important step, and will mean a lot more progress is possible at the Bonn Conference. Much more so than at the Istanbul Conference.

Iran’s position at the Bonn Conference also looks positive, given that they were very active at the first Bonn Conference in 2001. President Karzai expressed warm sentiments in regards to Iran at the Loya Jirga, which may pave the way for Iran to take a central role at the Bonn Conference in December. While this is an uneasy balancing act for Afghanistan between the US and Iran, there was some small leeway made in this regard at the Istanbul Conference, as both parties expressed optimism at the shared interest in a peaceful and stable Afghanistan.

Pakistan and the US: Friend of Foe?

Pakistan’s position vis-à-vis Afghanistan was expressed with slightly confused sentiments at the Loya Jirga. On the one hand, Pakistan was censured for continuing allegations of interference in Afghanistan, and on the other Karzai vowed that he would side with Pakistan in the eventuation of a US-led attack on the country.

The confused rhetoric did not stop at Pakistan. Karzai played to the anti-American sentiments of his countrymen in his speeches at the Jirga, which will no doubt have irked a great many in the US. Washington, however, has chosen to bight its tongue in this regard, as there is an understanding that the anti-US rhetoric is more about internal politics than any serious design to break ties. Moreover they are far more concerned about brokering the security pact than becoming overly upset about anti-US speechifying.

The Way Forward

The end result of the Loya Jirga was positive for Karzai, positive for the US and saw an unprecedented level of consensus from the Jirga delegates. However, the elephant in the room in all this is that the Taliban were not involved in the Loya Jirga, and did not support its formation, nor its resolutions.

This is a growing trend in the solution-finding process for Afghanistan. The decisions being made in Afghanistan, and at the Istanbul Conference, and no doubt the Bonn Conference as well, are all being rejected by the Taliban. This is not a reason for the solution-finding process to stop, but it is a very big reason to channel more energy into the reconciliation process.

There appears to be a resemblance between the tactics being adopted in negotiations now to those used at the time of Geneva Accords in the late 80s, dealing with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and what would follow. The Mujahidin did not directly take part in the Geneva talks and that part was mostly handled by Pakistan and the US. The counter part included President Najeebullah of Afghanistan and the Soviets.

With US recently shifting its position from excluding Pakistan from the political approach, to putting the onus on it to bring the various factions of Taliban to the table, appears to have a historical precedent. Meanwhile, Pakistan has provided no such guarantee that they have the will or a capacity to pull this off, as they did against the Soviets. Former Mujahidin that are now Taliban leaders, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar of Hizb-e-Islami and Sirajuddin Haqqani of Haqqani network, would likely provide the institutional memory that would result in strong opposition to Pakistan taking on the representation role again. PoliTact would continue to monitor the dynamics of the reconciliation process in Afghanistan.

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