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		<title>The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/the-iran-pakistan-gas-pipeline-project-economic-and-geopolitical-realities/</link>
		
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		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Sep 2024 21:26:27 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[China and Islamic World]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global Realignment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global Security Advisor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South and Central Asia]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Iran Pakistan Gas Pipeline project]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Opportunity cost for Iran Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan energy needs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Iran Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Saudi ties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TAPI Gas Pipeline Project]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[US Pakistan ties and Iran Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://politact.com/?p=10423</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="397" height="342" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/28-01-2013_indepth-iran-map.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" fetchpriority="high" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/28-01-2013_indepth-iran-map.jpg 397w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/28-01-2013_indepth-iran-map-300x258.jpg 300w" sizes="(max-width: 397px) 100vw, 397px" />Context The saga of the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline project is a stark illustration of how geopolitical complexities can impede critical infrastructure development, even when the need is dire. For Pakistan, a country grappling with chronic energy shortages, this pipeline has long represented a beacon of hope for economic stability and growth. Yet, for decades, it [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-iran-pakistan-gas-pipeline-project-economic-and-geopolitical-realities/">The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="397" height="342" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/28-01-2013_indepth-iran-map.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/28-01-2013_indepth-iran-map.jpg 397w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/28-01-2013_indepth-iran-map-300x258.jpg 300w" sizes="(max-width: 397px) 100vw, 397px" /><p><strong><img decoding="async" class="alignleft size-full wp-image-3180" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/277_Iran_Karte_Oil_Gas_Sep_3_20091.jpg" alt="" width="277" height="284" />Context</strong></p>
<p>The saga of the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline project is a stark illustration of how geopolitical complexities can impede critical infrastructure development, even when the need is dire. For Pakistan, a country grappling with chronic energy shortages, this pipeline has long represented a beacon of hope for economic stability and growth. Yet, for decades, it has remained tantalizing out of reach, a victim of international pressures, regional rivalries, and economic challenges.</p>
<p>The story begins in 2010 when Pakistan, facing an escalating energy crisis, signed a landmark deal with Iran to construct a 2,750-kilometer pipeline. Initially valued at $7.5 billion, the project promised to be a game-changer for Pakistan&#8217;s energy sector. The potential impact was significant: according to a USIP report, Pakistan&#8217;s persistent power crisis was trimming off about 2 percent of the country&#8217;s annual domestic product[1]. Furthermore, a World Bank study estimated that power shortages in developing countries like Pakistan could reduce business profitability by up to 40 percent[2]. These figures underscored the critical nature of the project for Pakistan&#8217;s economic well-being and future growth prospects.</p>
<p><strong>Economic and Geopolitical Realities</strong></p>
<p>From its inception, the project has been shadowed by the looming threat of U.S. sanctions. Unlike India, which received exemptions for its involvement in Iran&#8217;s Chabahar port, or Afghanistan, which was granted allowances for trade through Iran, Pakistan has consistently faced stern warnings from Washington about the consequences of proceeding with the pipeline. This disparity in treatment reflects the complex web of U.S. strategic interests in the region. India is viewed as a potential counterweight to China&#8217;s growing influence, while for Afghanistan Chabahar represents and alternative for its dependence on Pakistan. Pakistan, with its complex relationship with the U.S. and close ties to China, finds itself in a less favorable position.</p>
<p>The US policy towards Pakistan, Iran, and India have different ambitions. The situation demonstrates the complexity of international relations, where strict policy adherence often gives way to strategic exceptions based on broader geopolitical goals. The American approach has been criticized for its inconsistency, but from the U.S. perspective, it reflects a nuanced balancing of various strategic interests in the region. Using exceptions and restrictions as tools allows U.S, to influence foreign policy choices of regional players.</p>
<p>The geopolitical landscape has further complicated Pakistan&#8217;s position. Historically, tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran meant that Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations were hesitant to support a project that could increase Iran&#8217;s influence and decrease Pakistan&#8217;s financial dependence on them. Especially because Iran’s influence in the Middle East has consistently been increasing. China and Iran also signed $400 billion-dollar strategic economic agreement in 2021.</p>
<p>While the Chinese facilitated Saudi-Iran détente reached in 2023 offered a glimmer of hope, it has not significantly altered the dynamics surrounding the pipeline project. This hesitation from traditional allies has left Pakistan in a precarious position, caught between its energy needs and its diplomatic relationships. Moreover, the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel has further hardened positions against Iran.</p>
<p>Pakistan&#8217;s economic instability has added another layer of difficulty. The country&#8217;s frequent need for IMF bailouts and its struggle to finance large-scale infrastructure projects have made the pipeline&#8217;s completion seem increasingly elusive. As years passed, the project&#8217;s costs escalated, and the global political and security environment became even more convoluted, making it more challenging for Pakistan to move forward. In August 2023, Pakistan announced the suspension of the project due to the threat of U.S. sanctions, highlighting the ongoing pressures and uncertainties surrounding the initiative.</p>
<p>The failure of alternative energy projects has exacerbated Pakistan&#8217;s predicament. Initiatives like TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline) and CASA 1000 (Central Asia-South Asia power project) have stalled, often citing security concerns in Afghanistan and Baluchistan. Consequently, Pakistan remains heavily reliant on expensive Independent Power Producers (IPPs), a situation that undermines the competitiveness of its exports in the global market. This dependence on costly energy sources creates a vicious cycle, hampering economic growth and making it even more difficult for Pakistan to invest in long-term energy solutions.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, regional dynamics have shifted dramatically. India has made significant strides in enhancing its connectivity to Central Asia through the Chabahar port, effectively bypassing Pakistan. In May 2024, India signed a 10-year agreement to develop and operate Iran&#8217;s strategic Chabahar Port, committing $120 million, along with an additional $250 million loan credit facility for related projects. This development not only provides India with strategic advantages but also highlights the opportunities Pakistan is missing due to its inability to complete the pipeline project. The Chabahar port offers India an opportunity to reestablish its presence in Afghanistan and enhance its access to Central Asian markets, areas where Pakistan could have played a pivotal role had the pipeline project moved forward.</p>
<p><strong>The Opportunity Cost</strong></p>
<p>The opportunity cost for Pakistan is substantial and multifaceted. Economically, the completion of the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline could have significantly reduced Pakistan&#8217;s energy import bill. Conservative estimates suggest that access to Iranian natural gas could have saved Pakistan billions of dollars annually in energy costs[3]. This reduction in energy expenses would have had a cascading positive effect on the economy, potentially boosting GDP growth by 1-2% per annum[4].</p>
<p>Moreover, the availability of reliable and affordable energy would have been a boon for Pakistan&#8217;s industrial sector. Many industries, particularly textiles &#8211; a key export sector for Pakistan &#8211; have suffered due to inconsistent power supply. With a steady supply of natural gas, these industries could have operated at full capacity, potentially increasing export revenues by 15-20% annually[5].</p>
<p>The pipeline could have also played a crucial role in reducing Pakistan&#8217;s dependence on the IMF. By stabilizing energy costs and boosting industrial output, Pakistan could have improved its foreign exchange reserves and reduced its current account deficit. Economic projections suggest that over a 10-year period, the pipeline could have contributed to reducing Pakistan&#8217;s external debt by 20-25%, significantly altering its financial landscape and reducing the need for frequent IMF interventions[6].</p>
<p>Furthermore, the project had the potential to transform Pakistan into an energy corridor, linking Iran to the vast markets of South Asia. This role could have brought in significant transit fees and positioned Pakistan as a key player in regional energy dynamics. Conservative estimates put potential transit fee earnings at $500 million to $1 billion annually, a substantial boost to Pakistan&#8217;s foreign exchange earnings[7].</p>
<p>The environmental impact is another overlooked aspect. Natural gas, being a cleaner fuel compared to oil and coal, could have helped Pakistan meet its climate change commitments more effectively. The shift to gas could have reduced carbon emissions by 15-20% in the power sector alone, contributing to global climate goals while also improving local air quality[8].</p>
<p><strong>Navigating the Future</strong></p>
<p>As Pakistan grapples with these lost opportunities and ongoing challenges, it finds itself at a critical juncture. The country must navigate the escalating great power rivalry between the United States and China while addressing its pressing energy needs. In this context, Pakistan could consider a multi-faceted approach to move forward.</p>
<p>Firstly, Pakistan should intensify its diplomatic efforts with the United States, emphasizing the project&#8217;s importance for regional stability and economic development. Framing the pipeline as a crucial element for broader international goals in the region might help in securing exemptions or finding a middle ground. This approach could involve highlighting how energy security in Pakistan contributes to overall regional stability, a key U.S. foreign policy objective. A more economically stable Pakistan could be a more effective partner in fighting extremism and promoting regional security.</p>
<p>Engaging with Iran through economic projects could provide more diplomatic leverage for the international community in negotiations over Iran&#8217;s nuclear program. While the pipeline would benefit Iran, it would also make Iran more dependent on its neighbors for economic stability, potentially increasing leverage in nuclear negotiations.</p>
<p>Secondly, Pakistan could leverage the improved Saudi-Iran relations to garner support from GCC countries. This diplomatic outreach should be coupled with a renewed focus on diversifying energy sources, including accelerating the development of domestic resources and exploring alternative gas import options. The recent geopolitical shifts in the Middle East offer a unique opportunity for Pakistan to reposition itself in regional energy dynamics.</p>
<p>Thirdly, Pakistan should consider a phased implementation of the pipeline project, starting with sections less likely to trigger immediate sanctions. This approach could be complemented by exploring technical solutions that might mitigate sanctions risks, such as processing Iranian gas at the border. By breaking the project into smaller, more manageable phases, Pakistan might be able to demonstrate progress and build momentum while navigating complex international regulations.</p>
<p>Furthermore, Pakistan needs to reduce political polarization and strengthen its economic foundations through structural reforms. Improving the investment climate to attract foreign investment in the energy sector and reducing dependence on external financial support would put Pakistan in a stronger position to pursue its energy security goals. These reforms could include streamlining bureaucratic processes, enhancing transparency in the energy sector, and developing a clear, long-term energy policy that prioritizes sustainable and affordable energy sources.</p>
<p>In the broader context of great power rivalry, Pakistan should maintain a balanced approach between the U.S. and China. Leveraging relationships with both nations, while also exploring multilateral forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and potentially BRICS, could open new avenues for support and cooperation on energy projects. This balanced approach could involve positioning the pipeline project as part of a broader regional connectivity initiative that benefits multiple stakeholders, potentially making it more palatable to international partners.</p>
<p>The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline project remains a symbol of unfulfilled potential in regional cooperation and energy security. Its completion could catalyze a transformation in Pakistan&#8217;s economic landscape, potentially adding 2-3% to annual GDP growth, creating hundreds of thousands of jobs, and significantly reducing the country&#8217;s carbon footprint. The ripple effects would extend beyond Pakistan&#8217;s borders, fostering regional integration and potentially contributing to stability in a volatile region.</p>
<p>As Pakistan continues to navigate the complex interplay of domestic needs and international pressures, the path forward requires astute diplomacy, economic resilience, and strategic foresight. By addressing these challenges head-on and adapting to the evolving geopolitical landscape, Pakistan may yet find a way to turn this long-delayed project into a reality. The stakes are high &#8211; not just for Pakistan&#8217;s energy security, but for its economic future and its role in an increasingly interconnected region.</p>
<p>The coming years will be crucial in determining whether Pakistan can overcome the hurdles that have long delayed this project. Success would not only secure a more stable energy future for its people but could also redefine Pakistan&#8217;s position in the regional and global economic order. The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline, therefore, represents more than just an energy project; it is a test of Pakistan&#8217;s ability to navigate complex geopolitical waters and emerge as a key player in the changing dynamics of South and Central Asia.</p>
<p>References:</p>
<p>[1] United States Institute of Peace (USIP) report on Pakistan&#8217;s energy crisis (2023)</p>
<p>[2] World Bank study on power shortages in developing countries (2022)</p>
<p>[3] Asian Development Bank (ADB) report on South Asian energy trade (2021)</p>
<p>[4] International Monetary Fund (IMF) country report on Pakistan (2023)</p>
<p>[5] Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Annual Export Data (2023)</p>
<p>[6] Economic projections by Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) (2022)</p>
<p>[7] Estimates from Pakistan&#8217;s Ministry of Energy (Petroleum Division) (2021)</p>
<p>[8] Pakistan&#8217;s Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to the Paris Agreement (2021)</p>
<p><strong>Related Links:</strong></p>
<p class="entry-title"><a href="https://politact.com/iran-pakistan-cross-border-clashes-and-deep-rooted-challenges/">Iran-Pakistan Cross-Border Clashes And Deep-Rooted Challenges</a></p>
<p class="entry-title"><a href="https://politact.com/great-power-rivalry-and-chinas-deepening-involvement-in-south-asia-gulf-states/">Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States</a></p>
<p><a href="https://politact.com/the-future-and-politics-of-iran-pakistan-gas-pipeline/">The Future and Politics of Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project</a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-iran-pakistan-gas-pipeline-project-economic-and-geopolitical-realities/">The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Future Of AfPak Beyond 2014</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/the-future-of-afpak-beyond-2014/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 16 Apr 2012 03:01:05 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Global Security Advisor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CASA 1000]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Eurasia Trade and Energy Corridor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FATA situation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of Afghanistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of AfPak]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of Pakistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of South Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics of South Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IP Gas Pipeline project]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Situation of Balochistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Pakistan relations]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://localhost/politact1/the-future-of-afpak-beyond-2014/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="568" height="475" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/15-04-2012_India-Pakistan-Trade.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/15-04-2012_India-Pakistan-Trade.jpg 568w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/15-04-2012_India-Pakistan-Trade-300x251.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/15-04-2012_India-Pakistan-Trade-502x420.jpg 502w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 568px) 100vw, 568px" />Context &#160; With the date of US withdrawal from Afghanistan approaching, the focus of Pakistan, as well as that of other stakeholders, has shifted towards envisioning the future beyond 2014. There is obviously an optimistic and a pessimistic picture. More than anything else, the major determinant of the direction of future events will be the [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-future-of-afpak-beyond-2014/">The Future Of AfPak Beyond 2014</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="568" height="475" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/15-04-2012_India-Pakistan-Trade.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/15-04-2012_India-Pakistan-Trade.jpg 568w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/15-04-2012_India-Pakistan-Trade-300x251.jpg 300w, https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/15-04-2012_India-Pakistan-Trade-502x420.jpg 502w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 568px) 100vw, 568px" /><p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignleft" src="https://www.politact.com/images/stories/15-04-2012_India-Pakistan-Trade.jpg" alt="" width="250" height="209" align="left" /></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>With the date of US withdrawal from Afghanistan approaching, the focus of Pakistan, as well as that of other stakeholders, has shifted towards envisioning the future beyond 2014. There is obviously an optimistic and a pessimistic picture. More than anything else, the major determinant of the direction of future events will be the ground reality and the public buy-in. <span id="more-1498"></span></p>
<p><strong>Analysis</strong></p>
<p>The optimistic view envisions a trade and energy corridor that extends from Central Asia to South Asia. As energy shortages worsen in Pakistan, the nation is not only stagnating presently but the prospect for meeting future needs is not any brighter. According to a World Bank estimate, widespread load shedding and the economic impact of the energy crunch are estimated at upward of 2 percent of GDP. The State Bank of Pakistan claims that by year 2016, the country will face an acute gas shortfall of 3.021 bcfd (billion cubic feet per day).After years of delay, the country is working on a number of energy projects and approaches simultaneously, with special emphasis on regionalism. Nonetheless, political complications and instability have hindered exploiting of both the internal energy resources as well as the external ones.</p>
<p>The list includes the Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline project, the Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (TAPI) pipeline project, and Central Asia-South Asia (CASA) 1000. Surprisingly, regional rival India has offered to export liquefied gas to Pakistan. One of the recent successes came in the form of a World Bank approval for $1.1 billion worth of Agro projects.</p>
<p>As economic and trade ties between India and Pakistan warm up, India’s state-owned oil and gas company GAIL wants to provide Pakistan liquefied natural gas (LNG). This would be done through an extension of gas pipeline to Lahore. The company has plans of bringing gas to Gujrat, and then will transit this gas through the Dahej-Vijaipu-Dadri-Bawana-Nangal-Bhatinda pipeline to Indian Punjab, and onwards to Pakistan. As opposed to building an LNG terminal that takes longer time, supplying gas through extension of pipelines is being considered more feasible for this venture.</p>
<p>On the other hand, India is also exploring a Pakistani route for the transport of iron ore from Afghanistan. The project worth $11 billion and involves a consortium of 7 states and many private firms. The companies in the consortium include: state-run miner NMDC Ltd, steelmaker Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd (RINL), private sector steelmakers JSW Steel Ltd, JSW Ispat Steel Ltd, Jindal Steel &amp; Power Ltd, and Monnet Ispat &amp; Energy Ltd.</p>
<p>Chairman of the Steel Authority of India, CS Verma said Hajigak mines and a 6 million-tons steel plant are being developed for this purpose. The Hajigak deposits contain about 1.8 billion tons of ore, with an exceptionally high iron concentration ranging from 61 percent to 64 percent.</p>
<p>The contract, to be signed in about two months, will be the biggest capital-intensive investment in Afghanistan, outweighing China’s $4.4 billion investment in Aynak Copper mine. Mining work is expected to begin in 2014 as the Afghan forces take over the security responsibility of the country. However, there are concerns whether Afghans will be able to provide the needed security.</p>
<p>As compared to using the longer Iranian route via Charbhar, Verma elaborated that India would prefer Pakistan for transporting the ore out and for building a slurry pipeline. While Pakistan recently approved the trade and transit treaty that allows Afghanistan to send goods to India, it has remained concerned about losing influence in Afghanistan as Indian economic clout increases there.</p>
<p>The above listed projects, including Pakistan-India trade cooperation, have tremendous economic potential for the region and Pakistan. For example, transportation, mining, construction, hospitality, agriculture and dairy sectors are all likely to substantially benefit. Additionally, the prices of basic consumer items, including medicines, are also expected to drop. However, in the absence of broad political consensus, the above vision is unlikely to be realized. In other words, a convincing public case has not been presented on what brought about a change in the long-standing government security concerns in Pakistan. In absence of this, the change in traditional policies might be perceived as a sign of weakness and present fuel to be used by hard line elements for further manipulation.</p>
<p>Driven by profit motives, the business community and traders have long been proponents of regional trade. However, since the start of the war on terror and due to poor governance, the liberal space has consistently shrunk while the nationalist and religious forces have constantly gained. None of the above approaches and projects will resolve the nation’s immediate energy and economic crisis. The success of these initiatives is dependent upon stable FATA, Balochistan, and Afghanistan, and that does not seem to be in sight. Moreover, achieving the above vision will require easing of international tensions over Iran’s nuclear program, which is also ultimately linked to the state of ties between Russia, China and US.</p>
<p>Managing change requires increased level of communication between people leading it and those impacted by it, so as to handle anxiety and misinformation. In case of Pakistan, we are seeing more interaction amongst those championing trade with India while the general public is in the dark. This usually means more of the potential benefits are likely to be exploited by the few, at the expense of the public. And, in this respect, it hardly represents a change.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/the-future-of-afpak-beyond-2014/">The Future Of AfPak Beyond 2014</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>Russia To Support Pakistan&#8217;s SCO Membership And Energy Needs</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/russia-to-support-pakistans-sco-membership-and-energy-needs/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 09 Nov 2011 07:30:01 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[A Dummy Cat]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Balochistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CASA 1000]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Energy needs of Pakistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Eurasia Trade and Energy Corridor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Guddu power plant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Muzaffargarh power plant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan India Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Russia Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan steel mills]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Riki Diq Project]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thar Coal project]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://beta.politact.com/?p=7913</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Context Russia announced it would publicly endorse Pakistan’s bid for full membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was responding on Monday to Pakistani Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani’s address at the Heads of Government meeting. The Russian Premier told reporters that Pakistan was an important economic and trade partner [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/russia-to-support-pakistans-sco-membership-and-energy-needs/">Russia To Support Pakistan&#8217;s SCO Membership And Energy Needs</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p>Russia announced it would publicly endorse Pakistan’s bid for full membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was responding on Monday to Pakistani Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani’s address at the Heads of Government meeting. The Russian Premier told reporters that Pakistan was an important economic and trade partner for Russia and also announced his country’s support for Pakistan’s proposed trade and energy projects.</p>
<p>&#8220;Pakistan is not only an important trade and economic partner but also a key Russian partner in South Asia and the Islamic world,&#8221; Putin was quoted as saying by ITAR-TASS news agency</p>
<p>Russia will also provided partial funding and technical assistance for:</p>
<ul>
<li>CASA-1000, a power transmission plant which will allow for the transfer of electricity from Central Asian states such as Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to Pakistan</li>
<li>Expansion of Pakistan Steel Mill ($500m Grant)</li>
<li>Guddu and Muzaffargarh power plants, and</li>
<li>Thar Coal project</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/russia-to-support-pakistans-sco-membership-and-energy-needs/">Russia To Support Pakistan&#8217;s SCO Membership And Energy Needs</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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		<title>Pakistan And The Eurasia Trade and Energy Corridor</title>
		<link>https://politact.com/pakistan-and-the-eurasia-trade-and-energy-corridor/</link>
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		<pubDate>Sun, 04 Sep 2011 04:31:57 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Analysis of Perception and Perspective]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Afghanistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CASA 1000]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China Eurasia expo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China Pakistan relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CSTO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dushanbe Four]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[energy tussles of Central Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of Afghanistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of Pakistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran Pakistan Gas Pipeline project]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kyrgyzstan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan and Eurasia trade and energy corridor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SCO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strait of Hormuz]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tajikistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TAPI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Urmuqi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Xinjiang]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://localhost/politact1/pakistan-and-the-eurasia-trade-and-energy-corridor/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p><img width="252" height="200" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/04-09-2011_Oil-abd-Gas.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" />Context Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari travelled to China’s restive Xinjiang province on August 30th for a regional tour as well as for the China-Eurasia Expo held at Xinjiang’s capital Urmuqi. On September 2 he was in Dushanbe, Tajikistan’s capital for a high-level meeting with the Russian, Afghani and Tajik Presidents. Pakistan is aggressively pursuing [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/pakistan-and-the-eurasia-trade-and-energy-corridor/">Pakistan And The Eurasia Trade and Energy Corridor</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<img width="252" height="200" src="https://politact.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/04-09-2011_Oil-abd-Gas.jpg" class="attachment-large size-large wp-post-image" alt="" style="float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;" decoding="async" loading="lazy" /><p><strong>Context</strong></p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignleft" src="https://www.politact.com/images/stories/04-09-2011_Oil%20abd%20Gas.jpg" alt="" width="252" height="200" align="left" />Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari travelled to China’s restive Xinjiang province on August 30th for a regional tour as well as for the China-Eurasia Expo held at Xinjiang’s capital Urmuqi. On September 2 he was in Dushanbe, Tajikistan’s capital for a high-level meeting with the Russian, Afghani and Tajik Presidents. Pakistan is aggressively pursuing linking up with the Eurasia trade and energy corridor and these visits are laying the foundation for that vision. However, the peace and stability in Afghanistan is essential if these dreams are to come true. <span id="more-1698"></span></p>
<p><strong>Analysis</strong></p>
<p><strong>China-Eurasia Expo 2011</strong></p>
<p>With the fasting month of Ramadan over, President Zardari spent Eid celebrations abroad as he embarked on his seventh visit to China since coming to office in 2008. Zardari was touring the Xinjiang region of China, which borders Pakistan and was the first foreign head of state to visit the region’s capital, Urmuqi.</p>
<p>Urmuqi was playing host to the China-Eurasia Expo, which the President attended and which set the theme for his visit. Zardari met with numerous trade leaders to discuss increased business ties with Pakistan on numerous fronts, with the energy sector a key area of interest. Zardari also used the visit to air his hopes that one day China and Pakistan could enjoy passport-free movement of people between the two countries, comments which, according to Chinese media reports, were vetted and approved by Beijing before Zardari uttered them.</p>
<p>Zardari was equally keen to push for Pakistan to stand as an energy corridor for China, providing a gateway for energy resources, namely crude oil and gas to flow from Pakistan into China. Pakistan offers a number of possible avenues for funneling energy into China, through its ports as well as over land in pipelines or by rail.</p>
<p>President Zaradri supported road-rail-air networks connecting Pakistan&#8217;s northern areas with Xinjiang and energy (oil and gas pipelines) and communication (fiber optic) corridors between Pakistan and China connecting Shanghai to Urumqi to Gwadar to the Strait of Hormuz.<br />
&#8220;These new economic arteries will transform the destiny of the region and usher in a new period of peace and stability&#8221;, he stated.</p>
<p>While Pakistan is placed in a very geo-strategic position for providing China with energy resources, all options are as yet prospective because of regional security issues as well as internal instability in Pakistan. However Zardari made it clear to China that he wants China to see Pakistan as a viable option, which necessitates a greater investment by China in Pakistani infrastructure and in regional security issues to provide a stable platform for delivery of energy.</p>
<p>Pakistan and China have a mutual interest in stability in the region, particularly as Xinjiang province has been plagued by a low-level insurgency from elements of its Muslim Uyghur population, with accusations that militants from the Uyghur insurgency have trained in camps in Pakistan. Despite this underlying tension, Zardari expressed his dismay to the Chinese media over terrorism in Xinjiang, saying that the violence has pitted “neighbors against neighbors and friends against friends,” perhaps alluding to the neighborly dispute over the issue between China and Pakistan as well as within Xinjiang itself.</p>
<p><strong>The Dushanbe Four</strong></p>
<p>Following his visit in China, Zardari met with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Tajik President Emomali Rakhmon in Dushanbe on September 2, for a meeting of the so-called “Dushanbe Four.”</p>
<p>Hot on the agenda in Dushanbe was the issue of Afghanistan’s security as the US continues its phased withdrawal from the country. In two separate press conferences, Medvedev stressed that the security of Afghanistan and the greater region had to be dealt with by countries in the region, and that the US should focus the remainder of its time in Afghanistan on training and readying Afghan security forces so they are able to “provide for the defense capabilities of the state, and combat extremist groups and drug traffickers.” He further stated that “Responsibility for everything that happens and will happen in the region … will lie with our countries – Russia, Tajikistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan.”</p>
<p>The focus on regional control has been growing stronger, especially since the SCO meeting held earlier in the year. While the fallout from the Arab Spring was the main topic of discussion at the SCO meeting, most notably how to contain its spread so that Central Asia remain unaffected, the angle of focus was clearly on ways to strengthen regional ties to contain unrest, and Medvedev’s sentiment that security in Afghanistan was a concern for the region as expressed in Dushanbe was reminisce of similar comments made at the SCO.</p>
<p>The four leaders also discussed the possibility of gas pipelines that traversed their countries and the region, as well as a possible rail line.</p>
<p>Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan especially welcomed Russia’s interest in a gas pipeline project across the countries and the leaders of the four countries called for accelerated construction of the CASA-1000 power project. President Medvedev stated Russia was ready to invest “hundreds of millions of dollars” into the CASA-1000 project to send power from Tajikistan to Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan and Pakistan. “But for it to happen, necessary organisational decisions should be taken first, we have to be invited,” Medvedev told reporters.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://politact.com/pakistan-and-the-eurasia-trade-and-energy-corridor/">Pakistan And The Eurasia Trade and Energy Corridor</a> appeared first on <a href="https://politact.com">Politact</a>.</p>
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