Context

Two former officials of Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), and a freelance British journalist have recently gone missing in Pakistan’s lawless North Waziristan Agency. The officers, Colonel (retired) Sultan Tarar, generally known as Imam, and Squadron Leader (retired) Khalid Khawja, are well known in the Jihadi circles for their support to the Taliban cause. In fact Colonel Imam is known as the father of Taliban due to his role in the Afghan jihad against the Soviets. They were accompanying a freelance journalist, Asad Qureshi, who was making a documentary on the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Two other unknown people accompanied them. There are indications the region is becoming active for a different reason now, in preparation for the scenarios premised on eventual US withdrawal.

Analysis

Given the state of affairs in the region, it is not surprising that the abduction and subsequent developments have many multifarious dimensions.

First, the abduction of two experienced ISI personnel, who have frequently visited the region and worked with the Taliban, shows that they perhaps miscalculated the hospitality of the militants, which may be wearing thin in view of frequent drone attacks by the CIA and the operations launched by the Pakistan military. North Waziristan, where the journalist and the ISI personnel have gone missing, is the last of the Taliban and Al Qaeda sanctuaries in Pakistan, where the Pakistan Army has not yet launched a full-fledged military operation, though technically speaking the army is present there. As the drone attacks in North Waziristan continue and the Pakistan Army hammers out the Taliban hideouts in neighboring tribal agencies, Al Qaeda and their allies, the Taliban, are quickly learning that their survival is now becoming trickier in the region. There is a possibility that the captors may have believed that the former intelligence agents or the journalist were working either for the ISI or the Americans on an intelligence gathering mission.

Second, the demand put in by the captors to release senior Afghan Taliban commanders Mulla Baradar, Maulvi Abdul Kabir and Mulla Mansoor Dadullah within 10 days is significant. The most senior Afghan Taliban commander whom the captors want to be released is Mullah Baradar, the second-in-command to Mullah Omar. His arrest, in a joint CIA-ISI operation, was widely hailed in the western media. While holding former ISI personnel captive could be seen as revenge for the arrest of Taliban commanders by the Pakistan agency, at the same time, it can also be surmised that the arrest of senior commanders have had a major impact on the Taliban, disrupting their operational strategies and lowering their morale.

Third, as CIA has taken out the top leadership of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, including Baitullah Mehsud  and subsequently Hakimullah, the chances that the terrorist organization may have split into several smaller factions, each operating independently with its own agenda, are very much present. Interestingly, the Afghan Taliban have expressed ignorance about the video clip of the captives, which was released after the abduction, and told the Afghan Islamic Press that they had no link to the event taking place across the border and also have no information in this regard. Nevertheless, for some strategists exploiting the divisions among the groups could be beneficial.

These former ISI officials, with their history of links and repute with the Taliban, are Pakistani assets that others perhaps aspire to, in the present geo-political situation of the Af-Pak theater. If these potential interlocutors of Pakistan start going missing, the county’s influence to shape the future outcomes once US leaves will be severely dented. PoliTact has previously pointed out that each strategic player at this stage of the Af-Pak war aims to limit the leverages that the other players hold.

There were reports that before his arrest, some western officials were pursuing contacts with Mullah Bradar independent of Pakistan and that this was the real cause of his arrest. A UN official had also criticized the role of Pakistan at the time. Now, the abduction of former influential ISI actors could be a get-even act, and quite possibly a message that Pakistan will not be permitted to find a solution to the quagmire on its own.

Fourth, according to reports, the hostage takers come from the largest Pakistani province, the Punjab, and are not native Pakhtuns. Many of the Punjabi Taliban, unlike the Pakhtun Taliban, have a sectarian background. Moreover, as criminal elements have merged into the Taliban, kidnappings for ransom have increased in the Taliban dominated areas. The demand for US$10 million for journalist Asad Qureshi confirms the fact that money is also one of the major factors in the kidnapping.

While neither of the ex-ISI officers may be very popular in anti-Jihadi circles, Khalid Khawaja, who has served Pakistan Air Force for 18 years, is nevertheless a highly controversial figure. He claims he had arranged five meetings between former Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif and the Al Qaeda chief, Osama bin Laden, in the Nineties, a charge debunked by the Pakistan Muslim League which Nawaz leads. Khawaja is also active on human rights issues and has been pursuing the case of missing persons, allegedly detained by Pakistani security agencies for being involved in terrorism. He has recently been defending five American terror suspects held in Sargodha in the Punjab province and is well known for filing frivolous court cases against the government.

Whatever the case may be, the abductions show the area remains one of the most dangerous places in the world, even for those who support the Taliban cause. If you have not taken up arms for the Taliban or against the Taliban, you may be regarded as a freelancer or an agent in the war zone. And that certainly is not a good idea. It also indicates how deeply infested FATA has become with agents and proxies representing all global and regional powers protecting their respective interests.

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Baitullah’s death could have major implications not only for Pakistan but for the region. For the first time, top leadership figures of the Taliban’s ‘irreconcilable’ elements are not only being targeted but eliminated, largely as a result of cooperation between Pakistan and the United States. And this even has been followed up by the arrest of a number of high-level TTP leaders and widespread reports of dissent in the ranks of the Taliban regarding succession issues. Now that Baitullah is no more, the focus of the Drone Attacks appears to be shifting to the Afghan Taliban.

Analysis

External Links

The AfPak Channel – Inside the War for South Asia (Foreign Policy and the New America Foundation)

US Strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan – Listen to The Diane Rehm Radio Show from NPR

The AfPak War – Special coverage of The Washington Post

The following are a list of potential developments produced as a result of PoliTact’s detailed assessment of the post-Baitullah environment:

Establishing Credibility and Revenge Attacks. Attacks on Pakistan’s major cities could decline in number. However, the danger remains that the newly appointed TTP chief, Hakimullah Mehsud, could attempt a string of suicide attacks in urban Punjab, the largest Pakistani province, to show he is worthy of his predecessor and also to avenge the elimination of Baitullah and the successes of Swat and Waziristan. There are also media reports of senior politicians being targeted. Unfortunately, past experience with FATA suggests that, given enough time and space, a new leadership will emerge. A period of infighting is usually followed by emergence of a leader who has proven himself, by killing or sidelining potential rivals.

The late TTP chief openly stated the he intended to launch attacks against the United States and the West. While he apparently lacked the resources for such a task, the danger shouldn’t be lightly dismissed. Muslim Khan, the spokesman for the Swat Taliban in Swat and now reportedly for TTP, claimed in his May 2009 interview that attacking the United States was a justifiable act.

There is reason to believe that Baitullah amassed several billion rupees through kidnappings and extortions, real estate in Dubai and inflows from the Gulf and Europe. He had the money to pay his fighters 20,000 to 30,000 rupees a year. While the Taliban has still not openly admitted that Baitullah is dead, whoever eventually replaces him will probably possess the financial resources needed for expertly conducted terrorist attacks.

Decline for Taliban Support among Religious Groups of Pakistan. Up to now, the Taliban has enjoyed a measure of support in some of Pakistan’s religious circles. For example, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamaatey Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) have criticized the army’s operation in Swat and other tribal agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The death of Baitullah, however, is expected to result in diminished support for Taliban among these groups.

An Improved Image for the Pakistan Army. The demise of Baitullah in a drone attack has lent increased credibility to the Pakistani Army’s campaign against the militants in Swat and FATA. True, the army was unable to capture or kill any of the senior leadership of the Taliban in Swat. But the death of Baitullah, an even bigger target, will provide a much-needed psychological boost for the armed forces, which in the past have faced strong criticism for making deals with the likes of Baitullah Mehsud. Moreover, the Pakistan Army had now proved to the West that given cutting-edge weaponry, it can competently handle formidable terrorist threats.

Increased Support for Drone Attacks. The death of Baitullah could deliver this message: hardcore terrorists are the chief casualties of drone attacks, not innocent women and children. However, although opposition to America’s drone attacks will be somewhat reduced, it will not end altogether. A case in point: Interior Minister Malik’s statement to a Pakistani journalist that “even if Baitullah Mehsud is killed, I condemn US drone attacks in Pakistan.” But that statement and similar ones by other politicians may be more for public consumption than for any other purpose.

A Change of Focus for the Drone Attacks. The Al-Qaeda’s grand strategy for Pakistan has been to keep the nation’s army engaged and distracted via its Taliban proxies, so that Pakistani and Afghan Taliban are freed up to attack US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. If the elimination of Baitullah actually results in the kind of disarray in its ranks currently reported by the press, then one of the objectives of the AfkPak policy will have been achieved. Now the focus of these drone attacks will swing back towards the Afghan Taliban.

Good and Bad News for the Afghan Taliban. The death of Baitullah will also definitely impact the Afghan Taliban, which was already opposed to Baitullah’s Jihad against the Pakistani armed forces. Led by Mullah Omar, The Afghan Taliban believes that the deluge of suicide attacks in Pakistani cities and on its armed forces have cost them the good will of elements of Pakistani society it wants as allies. For this reason, Mullah Omar had recently formulated new guidelines for the Taliban, forbidding it to launch suicide attacks on Pakistani cities. Followers of Baitullah ignored the edict while other Taliban commanders embraced it.

With Baitullah dead, the Afghan Taliban leadership could achieve a more coordinated alliance, with formerly independent elements falling in line. Fears that with the death of Baitullah more Pakistani Taliban, disenchanted with internal fighting among his successors, could cross into Afghanistan to take on NATO and American forces, might be justified. Lieutenant General Jim Dutton, International Security Assistance Force Deputy Commander in Afghanistan, had earlier warned that the operation against Baitullah Mehsud was “extremely important in defeating the Taliban on both sides of the Pak-Afghanistan border”. At the same time, however, the Taliban leadership will face a hard time holding meetings to plan and coordinate attacks, as the fear of the drones, which have made them vulnerable, grows.

The death of Baitullah will also increase pressure on the irreconcilable elements, at the same time enhancing Pakistan’s influence on various Taliban factions and escalating the politics of the good and bad Taliban.

The meeting with the US Naval Operations Chief was probably intended to calm the waters before the upcoming major maritime combat exercises between the US and India, to be held in October. Their purpose is to enhance interoperability between the armed forces of the two countries and will also be accompanied by the largest ground combat exercise that they have ever held together.

A Possible Hold on the Waziristan Operation. Meanwhile, Pakistani military sources have denied western media reports claiming that after the death of Baitullah, the army will not launch an operation in Waziristan and will also end air strikes and blockades of the area. In the present geopolitical environment, however, it seems likely that the Pakistan Army has in fact, at present, no intentions of taking on powerful Taliban commanders like Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Jalaluddin Haqqani of North Waziristan, and Maulvi Nazir of South Waziristan. All are opposed to fighting against the Pakistan Army. This could hamper the increasing rapport between Pakistan and the US. Pakistan will wait to see the outcome of the Taliban infighting and Afghan election, and observe the regional and global geopolitical environment, before progressing further.

Regional Implications

As the Taliban feels the pressure from Swat, Wazriristan and other areas of FATA, a number of outcomes are possible.

1. The Pakistani Taliban is likely to head for Southern Punjab, where they enjoy a measure of support from local Jihadists. Such an alliance could have the most dangerous consequences for India. Aware of the dimensions of this threat, especially in the post-Mumbai environment, India wants Pakistan to deal effectively with outfits like LeT, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and JuD. Pakistan has in recent days been carrying out raids against these Jihadi’s across the nation.
2. The Uzbek and Tajik forces, which drew support from Baitullah, are now more likely to return to Central Asia, in the process fanning support for Islamic Movements in Central Asia like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb ut-Tahrir. Moscow and China are both believed to be already on the alert for such developments, including NATO and US.
3. If, as some believe, Baluchistan hosts the Taliban Central Council, it could become a hot spot. The next drone targets could very well reside in Baluchistan, which is also the epicenter of Pipelinistan and the focus of geopolitical tussles between China, the United States, India, Iran and Afghanistan. Just this last weekend, Inspector General Frontier Corps Baluchistan, Major General Saleem Nawaz denied the claims of the western media that Mullah Omar and the Taliban’s Central Council were present in Baluchistan.

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An election run-off might complicate matters during this critical phase of the war. Common sense suggests that continuity at the political level would serve the interests of Afghanistan better than confusion, as the American surge falls into place. There are reports that General McChrystal, in his delayed assessment of the war in Afghanistan, may request doubling the number of troops to be used in the conflict.

If there were any lessons to be learned from the election held in Pakistan earlier this year, it was that the removal of Musharraf resulted in a radical change in the tactics and strategies employed by the country against the Taliban. Ironically, the ensuing domestic political confusion did not hamper, but actually helped, the Pakistani military meet its goals regarding the Taliban.

This context is important while we proceed to examine the elections and how they are impacted by regional and global political dynamics.

Analysis

How does one bring about change in a country where all the cards appear stacked against success? This question best sums up the geopolitical tragedy of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is a classic example of a nation in which the balance of foreign influences and interests, not internal factors, are critical in determining who rules. Thus the outcome of these elections will be decided largely by the interaction of regional powers – Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and India – as well as by the US, NATO, Russia and China, at the global level.

The media reports regarding public opinion suggest that Hamid Karzai will likely receive only plurality of the vote, perhaps 45%, followed by Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani, meaning that there will probably be a run-off. With Dostum (of Uzbek), Ismail Khan (Herat), Mohammad Qasim Fahim (Tajik) and Khalil Karimi (Hazara) as allies, Karzai has considerably bolstered his election prospects, despite the fact that he is domestically unpopular. In the absence of a better alternative, Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia would probably turn to him. Furthermore, Karzai has the kind of relationship with the Taliban which would make it easier for peace talks to take place. To what degree the US supports Karzai is a question mark.

An improved relationship between the United States and Iran is vital to a stable Afghanistan. A scenario where India and Pakistan were less wary of each another would also be a welcome development. The developing US-Russia rivalry is a third variable that could also impact Afghan politics and elections. A fourth is China’s concern over the increasing number of foreign troops in Afghanistan and the presence of extremists in FATA, which it suspects of ties with the Uighurs in the Xinjiang region.

The Afghanistan presidential election provided enough evidence for us to deduce certain facts about public sentiment in the country. First, Afghans are increasingly skeptical of the effectiveness of the coalition forces in Afghanistan and want more autonomy. Secondly, some of the candidates have aroused latent nationalistic feeling by discussing Pakistan’s dubious relationship with the Taliban and the status of the sensitive Durand Line. Thirdly, the great majority of Afghans are for commencing negotiations with the Taliban.

Such sentiments don’t jive with the major premise of the AfPak policy, which is greater cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan in countering the aggressions of the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The new policy is geared more towards negotiations with those Taliban elements who wish to part ways with Al-Qaeda. Advocates of AfPak assert that whatever its past record, Pakistan has now roused itself and is taking the fight to the Taliban, particularly those Taliban that are acting against the Pakistani state. The Obama Administration realizes that without the involvement of regional players and consideration of their security interests, Afghanistan cannot be pacified.

It is to the Al-Qaeda’s advantage to sow and exploit as many divisions, ethnic and/or religious, as it can, so as to make implementation of the AfPak strategy as difficult as possible. Furthermore, it might try to create a Mumbai-style incident so as to distract Pakistan. The warning issued by Indian Prime Minister two days ago against a new terrorist attack from Pakistan was to avert any such possibility. How much influence the Al-Qaeda still exercises in Iraq can also be tested by a serious escalation of violence there, which also has the potential to increase tensions between Iran and the United States.

Meanwhile, the Afghan Taliban, sensing the above-mentioned domestic political undercurrents in Afghanistan, appears to becoming more insistent in their demands for a timeline for the exodus of foreign forces before negotiations can occur. The recent statements by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar of Hizb-e-Islami are evidence of this. Moreover, the Afghan Taliban wants to use violence to intimidate voters, making the election a no-show. Lastly, by complicating the security situation in, and thwarting planned political arrangements for, the country, the Taliban wants to compel the coalition forces to see their efforts as futile, cut the best possible deal in their favor, and leave.

The death of Baitullah Mehsud and subsequent reports of infighting amongst various Taliban factions in FATA are nasty blows to the Afghan Taliban at this crucial juncture. How much impact they will have on the Afghan Taliban’s fighting machine, however, remains to be seen.

This much can be said with near certainty: whatever the outcome of the Afghanistan elections, all indicators point to an escalation in fighting in Afghanistan.

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Prior analysis from Politact has suggested that there was some kind of deal in the works between the TTP and Pakistan. There continue to be reports that this was indeed being pursued through Baitullah’s father-in-law, Mowlana Ikramuddin, at whose house Baitullah is believed to have been staying on the night of the attack. We had also pointed to the tightening juggernaut around Baitullah in our August 3rd report on the status of Pakistan’s Waziristan operation. In any event, we at Politact continue to believe that the irreconcilable elements of the Taliban will have a much harder time than before. For us, the phrase, “irreconcilable elements” refers to those Taliban factions which are unwilling to deal with the state of Pakistan, the United States or Afghanistan and are pursuing an independent political agenda.

The demise of Baitullah Mehsud will have important consequences, locally, regionally and internationally. Among them: for Al-Qaeda’s strategies regarding Afghanistan and Pakistan; the future of the TTP; the status of Pakistan’s Waziristan operation; the future of militancy and extremism in Pakistan; the Afghan Taliban and the war in Afghanistan; America’s AfPak Strategy; the domestic politics of Pakistan; The Pakistan-India relationship; Pakistan’s Counter-Insurgency Strategy; the views of the United States, NATO and Pakistan on the appropriate use of military force; and the future of controversial Drone Attacks and Drone technology.

Analysis

To begin with, the death of Baitullah is a significant blow to the morale of the Pakistani Taliban and other extremists. If indeed Baitullah is no more, the prospect of developing a leadership of similar caliber will be difficult, if not impossible.

Without strong leadership it will be hard to hold the TTP together and Al-Qaeda will try its utmost to remedy this. To Al-Qaeda it is critical to keep Pakistan distracted so as to allow the support lines for the Afghan Taliban to continue flowing. Therefore, the Afghan Taliban’s claim that this incident will not have any impact on the Afghan insurgency is a false one. It remains to be seen how those Taliban leaders, which use Pakistan for operating in Afghanistan, will react to this incident. Mowlawi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur will now feel more vulnerable than ever and this could make them more open to reconciliation. The Haqqani’s, meanwhile, would want to keep the momentum going in Afghanistan, as there is now more talk of negotiations and an exit framework by allies. Politact will be monitoring how these new dynamics plays out.

At the same time, the death of Baitullah vindicates the Pakistani Army’s strategy in the Waziristan operation. This incident, occurring as it did in the aftermath of the Swat operation, reflects favorably on the success of the nation’s new counter-insurgency strategy; it shows that the army is seizing the initiative from the Pakistani Taliban. It is also a sign of the high level of trust and coordination between Pakistani and American military forces (dismaying to the Indians). In the post-Baitullah environment, however, how the Pakistan military will react against the Taliban operating across the border in Afghanistan is still a question mark. This variable will be the ultimate challenge to the effectiveness of America’s AfPak policy.

Meanwhile, the Indians want to deploy the new zeal displayed by the Pakistanis against the Kashmiri Jihadis. It appears, however, that Pakistan’s current priority is to develop a soft corner with the United States before expecting any reciprocity on the Kashmir issue. This strategy seems to be working, as evidenced by statements from India’s Prime Minister at the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit in Sharm El-Sheikh last month. Prime Minster Singh agreed to the resumption of composite dialog between Pakistan and India and did not link it to the issue of terrorism; for this he had to take considerable flak back home.

We believe that both Pakistan and the United States should devote their energies to developing a more coherent stance on the drone attacks. With the passing of Baitullah, the improved relationship between the two countries has the potential to result in a more amicable solution. It should be pointed out, however that although Pakistanis in growing numbers believe that the drone attacks are beneficial to the country, the majority still see them as an infringement on national sovereignty.

The efficacy of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) technology has become increasingly apparent, especially in the context of an asymmetric warfare environment. That the United States is investing in production of more drones and reports indicates that they will be used more in Afghanistan as well. Meanwhile the Russians have also ordered drones from Israel, apparently as a result of their successful use in last year’s conflict with Georgia.

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Analysis

Pakistan wants to target and isolate Baitullah Mehsud while NATO and the United States also want to hit Mowlawi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadar in the South and North Waziristan respectively. All three have recently come together under a United Mujahidin Council. Recent drone attacks have been following Baitullah Mehsud and Mowlawi Nazir. These UAV attacks can be taken as stirring the pot, and then let Pakistan deal with the full brunt of Taliban menace. This also seems to be a strategy of diverting the Afghan war into Pakistan.

Mowlawi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadar are considered pro-Pakistan and they have up to now restricted themselves from targeting Pakistan military through a 16-month old peace treaty. Mowlawi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadar do carry out attacks across the border in Afghanistan.

The deadly attack over the weekend on a Pakistani military convoy in North Waziristan has claimed the lives of about 16 troops. Subsequently, the Taliban of North Waziristan announced scrapping of the treaty with Pakistan Army. They further claimed that they will attack the army as long as it does not stop support for the drone attacks and withdraw troops from Waziristan.

This development would make the Pakistan’s military operation in Waziristan extremely complex. Other than the aerial pressure, the military is unlikely to proceed further in its operation against Baitullah Mehsud, under the current environment. The Pakistan government has also announced that it’s not moving any troops from the eastern border with India. The Army will most likely try to salvage the treaty and provide some kind of assurance to Mowlawi Nazir and Haifiz Gul Bahadar that they will not be targeted once Baitullah is dealt with. While the reason United Mujahidin Council came in to existence was because these leaders stand convinced that this is exactly the strategy of Pakistan, to divide and weaken them.

The United States also does not trust the intent of Pakistan to go after all these players. Through peace pacts, these pro-government Taliban groups ensure the safety of Pakistan Army. At the same time, these groups are a source of NATO and American casualties across the border, which results in drone attacks in Pakistan.

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