By Naade Ali and Guest Analyst Mohammad Siraj Khan

Context

The three-phase ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, brokered in January 2025, aimed to end the protracted conflict in Gaza. Despite initial progress, the deal collapsed by late February due to disagreements over its implementation. Soon Israeli forces resumed a ground invasion into central and southern Gaza and expanded into the north of the enclave.

Phase One of the agreement had envisioned initial ceasefire and humanitarian measures to last 42 days. This was to be accompanied by hostage and prisoner exchanges and partial withdrawal of Israeli forces from populated areas in Gaza, with significant increase in humanitarian assistance to Gaza. Phase Two would include comprehensive agreements with negotiations for the release of remaining hostages and full military withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza – accompanied by formal cessation of hostilities. It was Phase Three that focused on reconstruction and long-term stability with international support, along with security guarantees to ensure long-term peace while averting future flare-ups.

Israel claimed that the negotiations with Hamas were ineffective, and Netanyahu warned that continued military pressure on Hamas was essential for hostage release and maintained that the current actions were ‘just the beginning.’ As tensions continue to rise, the Israeli cabinet approved an escalation of military pressure on Hamas, with Prime Minister Netanyahu asserting that the approach was “working” to secure a deal for the release of hostages held in the Gaza Strip.

Subsequently, Hamas agreed to accept an Egyptian-mediated proposal to release five living hostages in exchange for a 50-day ceasefire in Gaza. However, Israel rejected the offer, insisting on the release of 10 or 11 hostages as a prerequisite for resuming the truce.

Netanyahu also indicated his readiness to negotiate the final phase of the deal on his terms, which would see Hamas leaders permanently leave Gaza. “Hamas will lay down its weapons. Its leaders will be allowed to leave [Gaza]. We will take care of general security in the Gaza Strip and enable the implementation of the Trump plan, the voluntary immigration plan… That’s the plan. We’re not hiding it,” he stated. Adding to the Prime Minister’s warnings, Defense Minister Katz has also earlier threatened Hamas with the progressive annexation of Gaza, stating that “the more Hamas persists in its refusal to release the hostages, the more territory it will lose, which will be annexed to Israel.”

U.S President Donald Trump who took credit for the initial ceasefire also backed Israel’s recent military action. White House Press Secretary while blaming Hamas for Israel’s decision to renew its offensive confirmed that President Trump “fully supports Israel“. Upon assuming power, Trump has already ensured Netanyahu that securing Israel’s long-term national security remains a Washington’s key objective.

Trump’s support for Netanyahu was evident in his proposal to neutralize the Hamas threat in Gaza by displacing the entire population and permanently resettling them in countries such as Egypt and Jordan, while also suggesting long-term U.S. control over the strip in the post-conflict period.

Arab Plan for Gaza and Disarmament of Hamas

In response to backlash from Muslim-majority countries within the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Trump abandoned his mass displacement plan announced earlier. Still cautious of his intentions, members of the Arab League proposed an alternative post-war plan for Gaza, advocating for its reconstruction at a cost of $53 billion under the administration of a temporary committee of independent experts, along with the deployment of UN peacekeepers to prevent further escalation of the crisis.

The Palestinian Authority and Hamas have both endorsed the Arab plan. Western nations, including France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, have also supported it, viewing the end of Hamas’s control in Gaza as a step toward eliminating the threat to Israel.

However, the U.S. and Israel have rejected the proposal, arguing that it does not prioritize Gaza’s disarmament, fails to address Hamas’s future in the region, and allows the Palestinian Authority to return without sufficient security guarantees to Israel. Meanwhile, Israel plans to establish a government agency under the Defense Ministry to oversee the “voluntary departure” of Palestinians from Gaza.

Saudi Arabia and other states have condemned Israel’s actions, calling them ongoing violations of international law that pave the way for colonial settlements. These states have consistently advocated for a “two-state solution” to the Gaza-Israel conflict, emphasizing the need for an independent Palestinian state.

Netanyahu’s push to displace Palestinians, coupled with his threats to annex Gaza and Trump’s endorsement, has raised concerns among policymakers in the Muslim world that Trump may abandon the two-state framework in favor of a one-state solution.

Iran-U.S. Standoff And Future of Negotiated Settlement

Adding further complexity to the Middle Eastern geopolitical landscape is the ongoing standoff between Iran and the U.S.-Israel alliance. Iranian nuclear ambitions remain a major concern for both the U.S. and Israel. In response, President Trump has reached out to Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei, offering negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, but with a threatening tone. Trump has set a two-month deadline for compliance, warning of severe consequences for Tehran, indirectly referencing potential airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. “My big preference is that we work it out with Iran, but if we don’t work it out, bad things are gonna happen to Iran,” Trump stated.

In turn, Iran has warned the U.S. of a strong response, suggesting that any attack would turn American bases and its regional allies into “powder kegs.” Recently, Iran showcased its growing military power by revealing an expansive underground missile facility known as “Missile City,” complete with missiles, launchers, engines, and other advanced weapons. Iran’s ballistic missile force remains the largest in the Middle East, offering a strategic deterrent and signaling that any conflict with Tehran would be costly and protracted.

To ramp up pressure, the U.S. has been bolstering its military presence in the Middle East. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth recently deployed a second aircraft carrier, the USS Carl Vinson, to join the USS Harry S. Truman strike group, whose deployment was also extended. Additionally, the U.S. sent two B-2 stealth bombers to the Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean, a direct warning to both Iran and Yemen’s Houthi militia. These bombers, capable of carrying 30,000-pound “bunker buster” bombs, are now positioned within striking range of Iran.

U.S. officials have sent mixed signals to Iran. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff has advocated for a diplomatic resolution, while White House National Security Advisor Mike Waltz has adopted a more aggressive tone, stating that the administration aims for the “complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program.”

Iran views Trump’s nuclear talks as an attempt to force Tehran into relinquishing its defense capabilities. “The U.S. means disarmament when it says negotiation,” said Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Speaker of Iran’s Parliament. Despite the tense environment, Tehran has responded to Trump’s letter, stating that while it would not negotiate “under pressure and threats or increased sanctions,” it is open to indirect talks with the U.S. through third-party mediation. The letter was delivered via Oman.

This suggests that despite the threatening rhetoric between the U.S. and Iran, there is some hope for engagement, as both Washington and Tehran seem intent on avoiding a larger confrontation. Although Iran has not identified the third-party mediator, it is speculated that indirect talks may already be underway through channels in the UAE, and potentially with Saudi Arabia, which has previously offered to mediate talks between Iran and the U.S.

Reports have also surfaced of President Trump visiting Saudi Arabia in May. The Kingdom has emerged as a key diplomatic player, having hosted talks between Russia and the U.S. over the Ukraine issue. It holds significant potential to play a similar role in Iran-U.S. negotiations. Recently, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan engaged in discussions on regional developments with his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, signaling a more reconciliatory tone between Riyadh and Tehran. The Saudi Defense Minister also recently visited Iran and hand delivered a letter from King Salman to Ayatollah Khamanei emphasizing collaboration.

A U.S.-Iran deal would offer Saudi Arabia a prominent role at the negotiation table, aligning with its “positive neutrality” foreign policy. This would further elevate Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic weight, positioning it as a major middle power in global statecraft. Through diplomatic mediation, economic investments, and strategic alliances, the Kingdom has demonstrated its commitment to stability and development

Conclusion

The internationalization of the Gaza conflict has further deepened divisions between the U.S.-Israel bloc and Arab states, overshadowing any prospects for normalization. The once-stable U.S.-Middle East partnership that long served as a cornerstone of the international order, is now experiencing a profound paradigm shift as new alliances and strategic realignments begin to emerge.

Recent developments indicate that both Western and Arab capitals are preparing to make pivotal decisions regarding their stances on Gaza and Ukraine. Arab states are seeking Western support for Gaza’s reconstruction and governance, while Western powers, in turn, are expecting Arab backing on the Ukraine conflict. These shifting dynamics are unfolding in response to President Trump’s high-stakes geopolitical gambits, as he remains determined to pursue his unconventional foreign policy approach—applying pressure and demanding concessions from traditional allies and adversaries alike—moves that are already influencing his evolving Middle East strategy.

Mohammad Siraj Khan is a lecturer, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Prince Mohammad Bin Fahd University, Saudi Arabia

The post Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions appeared first on Politact.

By Naade Ali
South Asia and Middle East Fellow

Context

In the post October 7, 2023, Hamas led attack on Israel, the geopolitics of Middle East is fast evolving. This has been accompanied by the loss of Hezbollah leadership in Lebanon and the fall of Assad regime in Syria in December 2024. The inauguration of President Trump on January 20, 2025, has presented unique threats and opportunities regarding the future of two-state solution and Iran.

The likelihood of a broader conflict between Iran and Israel hangs in balance as President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have forged a strong strategic alignment. Meeting with Trump on Feb 4, Netanyahu tried to ensure that U.S. policy remained closely aligned with Israel’s objective of weakening Iran’s defense capabilities, particularly preventing it from ever acquiring nuclear missile power. On the other hand, Iran had hoped that Trump would adopt a pragmatic approach and revive nuclear talks leading to easing of economic pressure. To Iran’s disappointment, Trump pursued the reinstatement of “maximum pressure” policy on Tehran.

However, difference of opinion exists where Netanyahu, sensing an opportunity, is lobbying for a military solution towards Iran. Conversely, Trump is vying for a negotiated settlement while keeping hopes alive for a two-state solution. This he is doing by raising the stakes for the Gulf and Arab nations, who met in Riyadh on February 21 to discuss the future of Gaza. A follow-up emergency meeting of the Arab League is planned on March 4th in Egypt, to present a counter plan to what Trump has proposed.

Trump’s Carrot-and-Stick Approach

The “maximum pressure” doctrine portrays Iran as a destabilizing force and a significant threat to U.S. national interests, centered on three key objectives:

First, it seeks to cripple Iran’s nuclear program through harsh diplomatic and economic sanctions. Second, it aims to weaken Iran’s regional influence by dismantling its network of “proxies” and axis of resistance. This objective has taken on additional significance with the on-going Gaza crisis, elimination of Hezbollah leadership, and the fall Assad regime in Syria. Third, it strives to isolate Iran on the global stage, a move Iran’s president condemned as an attempt to “bring Iran to its knees.”

Justifying his approach, Trump claimed the timing was ideal, stating, “Iran, terrified after losing almost all its air defenses, would love to make a deal with the United States.” Confident that relentless pressure would force Iran into submission, he remains committed to a strategy of economic and diplomatic coercion.

Despite his tough rhetoric, Trump ruled out military intervention, dismissing reports of a potential U.S.-Israel strike as “greatly exaggerated.” While acknowledging Iran’s military ambitions—describing it as “very militant”—he firmly rejected the idea of bombing Iran, stating, “I would much prefer a Verified Nuclear Peace Agreement, which will let Iran peacefully grow and prosper.”

Meanwhile, key Republican leaders, including U.S. Rep. Mike Turner, have stated that Trump’s strategy is designed to “secure a long-term solution that guarantees Israel’s security by preventing Iran and its proxies from ever threatening its sovereignty.” Likewise, Rep. Joe Wilson has praised the maximum pressure campaign, asserting that it would ultimately weaken Iran and dismantle its network of terror proxies.

Israeli Plans

While U.S. President Donald Trump has shown reluctance to engage in direct military action against Iran, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has taken a more assertive approach. According to multiple credible reports, with Iran’s air defense systems significantly weakened and its regional proxies under strain, Netanyahu sees a strategic window to target Iran’s nuclear facilities—whether or not the U.S. supports the move. The American intelligence assessments indicate that Israel is actively considering large-scale strikes on Iranian nuclear sites in the latter half of the year, with Israeli officials expected to urge the Trump administration and key Republican leaders to endorse their plans.

The recent approval by the U.S. State Department of a $7.4 billion arms sale to Israel—including thousands of bombs and missiles set for delivery this year—suggests a broader effort to reinforce Israel’s military capabilities against potential regional threats. Israel already possesses U.S.-made bunker-busting munitions capable of striking Iran’s underground nuclear sites, particularly those concealed within the mountainous terrain of Fordow near Qom. This growing military buildup highlights Israel’s preparedness to neutralize Iran’s security infrastructure if necessary.

Israeli officials have repeatedly affirmed that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are fully prepared to launch strikes on Iranian nuclear sites. Defense Minister Israel Katz has hinted at the possibility of an attack in the coming months. In a letter to incoming U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, Katz wrote:

“The months ahead present both challenges that demand military readiness and opportunities to advance our strategic objectives.” He has previously stated that “Iran’s nuclear facilities are more vulnerable than ever,” suggesting that this moment may offer the best chance to neutralize what Israel perceives as an existential threat.

In essence, the emphasis of the approach is twofold: Israel exerting military pressure while the U.S. working on the economic squeeze. The outcome of the two would either result in a regime change led by the Iranian people – or push the Iranian government to strike a deal with Trump. According to some media reports, if Tehran does not reach an agreement with the U.S. by October, Israel is likely to initiate a military action.

How is Iran Preparing?

President Masoud Pezeshkian has warned that while Israel or its allies “may succeed in damaging Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, they will not be able to strip the country of its ability to rebuild.” His statement came after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei categorically rejected negotiations with the Trump administration, asserting that past talks had neither been rational nor honorable. “Negotiations with America do not solve any of our problems,” Khamenei declared.

President Pezeshkian has accused Trump of engaging in deceptive diplomacy while simultaneously working to undermine his government. While reaffirming that Iran does not seek war, he warned that “Iran will never bow to foreign pressure.” Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi echoed this sentiment, stating that negotiating with Trump would amount to surrender. He further cautioned that any military action by Israel or the U.S. against Iran’s nuclear facilities would trigger an “all-out war,” calling it one of the greatest strategic miscalculations Washington could make.

Last year, Iran announced plans to triple its military budget. Western think tanks estimate that Iran was the fourth-largest military spender in the Middle East in 2023, with a defense budget of approximately $10.3 billion.

On the other hand, Iran has deepened its military and economic cooperation with China and Russia. Despite crippling U.S. sanctions, Iran has found alternative economic mechanisms to sustain itself and remains a key player in the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS.

Some reports suggest that Iran is ramping up its missile program, with a vessel carrying 1,000 tons of Chinese-made chemicals—potentially crucial for missile fuel—recently arriving at an Iranian port. Furthermore, Iranian military has launched its first drone carrier ship, capable of launching stealth attacks, and has acquired Russian Sukhoi-35 fighter jets to modernize its aging air force. A strategic cooperation agreement signed with Moscow in January has further reinforced Tehran’s defense ties. Despite Israel’s escalating rhetoric, Iranian military officials insist that the country’s air defense remains intact and more resilient than ever.

Conclusion

For years, Israel and Iran have been engaged in a shadow conflict, carefully calibrating their actions to avoid all-out war. Recently, Iran has adopted a strategic paradigm described as ‘strategic patience’—a calculated approach that has shielded it from large-scale destruction while reinforcing its self-sufficiency. Iranian Vice President Javad Zarif has dismissed speculation that Iran might resort to nuclear weapons as a last-ditch effort for survival or deterrence. Instead, he emphasized that the nation’s self-reliant defense strategy ensures resilience against external pressure.

However, The New York Times has reported that Iran may be discreetly exploring the possibility of developing nuclear weapons should its leadership decide to take that path. According to the report, since resuming fuel production, Iran has accumulated enough enriched uranium to construct at least four nuclear bombs. While Iran has the technical expertise to develop a basic nuclear device relatively quickly, it currently lacks the capability to integrate such a weapon into a ballistic missile system. Nonetheless, a successful nuclear test could allow Iran to declare itself a nuclear-armed state, significantly altering the strategic balance in the region.

While Iran’s conventional military strength does not match that of Israel or the U.S., it retains the capability to inflict serious damage on both adversaries. As the main supporter of Hamas and Hezbollah, the question of Iran is directly linked to the present Gaza crisis and what comes next. While many Gulf and Arab nations have privately loathed Hamas for the Oct 7, 2023, attack on Israel and for disrupting the progress achieved through Abraham Accords, the Trump plan to take over Gaza, has forced them to back up their sentiments with action. It also represents the final step in the full culmination of the Outside-In approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Related Articles:

Assad’s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East – Dec 26, 2024
The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump – Dec 5, 2024
Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences – Aug 30, 2024
The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities – Sep 27, 2024

The post Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran appeared first on Politact.

Naad-e-Ali Sulehria

Context

The assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31st has brought Iran and Israel, and the larger Middle East, to the brink of all-out conflict. Not only that, it has also escalated the great power rivalry, which was already simmering over the situation of Ukraine. For the first time, Ukrainian forces have crossed the Russian border in the Kursk region and have taken over a few border cities.

Iran has threaten retaliation against Israel. While Israel has previously targeted other high profile Iranian figures, such as its nuclear scientists. However, for various reasons the country failed to give a proportionate response. One of the main one being that Iran does not want a full-blown conflict which can result in a strike against its nuclear program.

It was just on April 14 this year that Iran launched a barrage of missiles at Israel for assassinating two of its generals, targeted at the Iranian consular building in Syria. Most of these projectiles were intercepted. The Iranian reaction this time may be different. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, has vowed to punish Israel and recently denounced what he described as Israel’s psychological warfare, intended to make Iran reconsider its reprisal. He also offered a religious justification, declaring that any retreat—whether military, political, or economic—would be a grave sin in the eyes of God, inviting “divine wrath.”

While the nations response is inevitable, the uncertainty around its timing and scale, have intensified psychological strain and war fatigue in Israel. While some see this delay as reflecting Iran’s dilemma—caught between the need to respond decisively to Israel and the desire to avoid being drawn into a catastrophic regional war. This is especially true when the U.S. is fully backing Israel. However, others interpret the delay as a sign of Iran’s strategic patience, possibly preparing a more powerful and calculated response than before.

Why the Delay in Response?

Recently, Ali Mohammad Naini, spokesperson for Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, disclosed that the nation is unlikely to repeat previous style of operations and that there might be a significant pause. Two factors are likely contributing as Iran deliberates.

First, the annual ‘Arbaeen Walk,’ a major Shiite pilgrimage to Iraq is underway, with over 2.6 million Iranian pilgrims crossing the border. According to the Iranian Airport Authority, more than 100 flights have operated between Iran and Iraq over the past days, transporting thousands of Iranian pilgrims. With over 20 million pilgrims from Iran, Iraq, and other countries participating this year, Tehran is highly focused on securing this major event and is hesitant to engage in a conflict with Israel. Once the pilgrimage concludes, Iran will likely be able to refocus.

The second factor involves Iran’s continued efforts to secure international support for what it views as its legal right to defend its sovereignty and deter any further Israeli aggression on its territory.

Efforts towards Cease Fire

In the midst of heightened tensions, the U.S. has put forward a bridge ceasefire proposal for Gaza, contingent on the release of Israeli hostages held by Hamas. At the same time, the U.S. has called on OIC member states to urge Tehran to show restraint, cautioning that regional escalation could undermine the chances of securing a truce. To reach a deal between Hamas and Israel, the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken also visited the region again.

Following pressure from the U.S, reportedly Israel accepted the terms of the deal on 19 August. The U.S. is now counting on its Arab partners Qatar and Egypt to persuade Hamas to comply as well. While these efforts aim to prevent a broader conflict, Iran has downplayed these developments, insisting that a ceasefire will not deter Tehran’s plans for retaliation against Israel, indicating that it’s a matter of when, not if.

Experts estimate that instead of launching costly missile strikes, Iran may copy Israel’s tactic and may attempt to target  top Israeli officials. Whatever form Iran’s reaction takes, it is clear that such an action would provoke a full-scale response from Israel, significantly impacting regional security, particularly for its neighbors, including the GCC countries and Pakistan.

China and Russia

Both Russia and China have echoed Tehran’s narrative on protecting its “sovereignty, security, and national dignity.” Reports suggest that Iran is seeking to acquire Chinese spy satellites to enhance its capability to target U.S. and Israeli forces. This latest deal builds on the 25-year strategic agreement signed between Iran and China in 2021, in which both countries committed to advancing military, security, and economic cooperation.

Similarly, following the assassination of Haniyah, Russia’s Secretary of the Security Council visited Tehran to discuss enhanced security ties and pledged to increase military contracts between Tehran and Moscow. Subsequently, reports emerged that Russia had transferred Iskander missile systems and Murmansk-BN electronic warfare systems to Iran, adding to its already extensive arsenal of over 3,000 ballistic missiles. Russia will likely counteract NATO supplying assistance and weapons to Ukraine by bolstering its ally Iran and use this as a leverage against the West.

OIC, GCC, Turkey and Pakistan

Additionally, 57 Muslim-majority countries expressed their support for Iran during an emergency meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) on August 7th. While all member states condemned Haniyah’s killing as a blatant violation of Iran’s sovereignty, Pakistan voiced the strongest support for Iran in confronting Israeli aggression.

GCC countries with strategic partnerships with the U.S. are likely to avoid coming to Iran’s aid, as their agreements prohibit them from attacking a key U.S. ally. The same applies to Turkey, which could risk its NATO membership if it sides with Iran. However, Turkey’s recent stance towards Israel suggests it might be willing to take that risk. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has issued early warnings suggesting its military may get involved on the side of the Palestinians. Additionally, Turkish Ambassador to Iran has reportedly indicated support for Iran’s response, implying that Turkey and other Muslim-majority countries bear a shared responsibility to respond to Haniya’s assassination.

If Turkey becomes entangled in the conflict, Pakistan, with one of the strongest military forces in the Muslim world, would face immense pressure to take sides. This would create a strategic dilemma for the country, in the same way as it has for Turkey, which may want to defend Iran against Israel but also avoid jeopardizing ties with its key security partner, the U.S.

Supporting Iran could help Pakistan’s military restore its declining domestic reputation and advance the objective of fostering religiously inspired stability in the country. Even opposition figures like Imran Khan, whose standoff with the military establishment remains a major factor in Pakistan’s political polarization, might alter his position and support the military.

Alternatively, if bull blown conflict erupts in the Middle East and Pakistan supports remains lackluster for Iran, the country could face protests, especially from the religious groups. While the state might resort to cracking down on political dissent to contain domestic unrest, this could widen the gap between the civil-military establishment and the public.

The post Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences appeared first on Politact.

Context

In the previous articles, we have been examining the various dimensions of the Arab-Israeli rapprochement that got underway as a consequence of the Abraham Accords, signed during the Trump administration in 2020. As a result, UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco officially recognized Israel.

Progressively alarmed by the growing Chinese involvement in the region, demonstrated by the Chinese facilitated Saudi-Iran Détente reached in March, Biden administration had fasten its efforts to normalize ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel as well. Another factor of concern has been the changing politics of Israel – as Netanyahu seemed to have lost interest with the two-state solution.

During his visit to the US to attend the UN General Assembly meetings in September, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman indicated that the normalization process was moving along well, a sentiment shared at the time by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. However, since the signing of Abraham Accords, the paranoia on the Palestinian side had been mounting. All along, it was not clear what the Accords would mean for the Palestinians. Will it include a statehood for Palestinians and cessation of settlements?

While the first Saudi envoy for Palestinian Authority Nayef al-Sudairi did visit West Bank in September – it proved to be a little late in taming Palestinian concerns, especially Hamas. From a purely Israeli point of view, if the Arab states that have traditionally supported the Palestinian cause, agree to recognize Israel – the leverage of Palestinians in any negotiations is greatly reduced.

Things finally blew up on October 7 when Hamas members stormed into Israel killing almost 1400 and taking about 200 hostages. In reprisal, close to 7,000 Palestinians have been killed to date by Israeli bombardments – and the ground operation is imminent. Fears are growing the Israeli ground operation into Gaza will likely result in Hezbollah also becoming fully entangled, and thus widening the war. Moreover, the street pressure in Sunni Arab capitals is likely to push the respective governments to respond – especially if Iran holds true to its statements of not holding back if Israeli military actions continue.

Since the attack, President Biden has offered full support to Israel towards its aim to  eliminate Hamas, and at the same time he clarified that all Palestinians are not Hamas: “The vast majority of Palestinians are not Hamas. Hamas does not represent the Palestinian people.”

In his October 19 Speech, Biden stated: “History has taught us that when terrorists don’t pay a price for their terror, when dictators don’t pay a price for their aggression, they cause more chaos and death and more destruction.”

“As hard as it is, we cannot give up on peace. We cannot give up on a two-state solution,” Biden added.

Response from BRICS

As opposed to the US, China and Russia have stopped short of blaming Hamas while demanding cease fire and offering to mediate. Both have also affirmed that they’ll coordinate their policy for the Middle East. In essence, their position is close to those adopted by the Arab nations. According to media reports, China’s Middle East envoy Zhai Jun told his Russian counterpart, Mikhail Bogdanov, during his current trip to the region: “The fundamental reason the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has reached its current state is that the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people have not been protected.”

On the other hand, South Africa has adopted a more nuanced approach and has stated that its backing for Palestine cause does not mean it supports Hamas. It generally equates its own experience under apartheid as the same as being experienced by the Palestinians. South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) commented that its Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor got a request to speak with Ismail Haniyeh – and that the call was in line with nations policy to “engage will all parties in facilitating dialogue.”

On the other hand, India seems to have reversed its position of backing the Palestinians and has stood squarely with Israel. One of the reasons for that could be because ruling Bahartiya Janata Party (BJP) has given up any hope of receiving Muslim vote in the election next year. This seems similar to the United States where because of the policies adopted by Democratic Party in the Middle East and South Asia, Democratic American Muslims are thinking to shift in mass to the Republican Party. The dilemma being the Republican Party is even more hard-line when it comes to Iran and the Palestinian Issue. It was during the Trump administration in 2018 that the US decided to transfer its embassy to Jerusalem and withdraw from Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA). The agreement was painstakingly reached during Obama’s tenure. However, Trump did develop good relations with Saudi Arabia and Imran Khan in Pakistan.

India may also be evaluating the postures of the Arab world against Hamas vis a vis the Kashmir situation – and what it terms as cross-border terrorism from Pakistan.

Changing Middle East and South Asia

The recognition of Israel by Saudi Arabia would have represented a titanic event in the Islamic world – especially as it relates to the Core versus the Peripheral Islamic world. As a result of Abraham Accords, Pakistan’s other Arab and GCC allies were moving closer to Israel as well. It would have brought tremendous pressure on the peripheral Islamic nations, especially Pakistan, which takes clues from Saudi Arabia when it comes to the maters of Palestinians. On the one hand, Pakistan is China’s closest strategic partner, which is also expanding ties with Iran.

In earlier assessment, PoliTact had noted: “While most of the GCC nations are autocratic – a broken democracy still exists in Pakistan. Irrespective, under the present circumstances, Saudi recognition of Israel anytime soon, will gravely unsettle the political and security situation of the country, particularly if it were to be accompanied by economic and political pressure from Saudi Arabia, and other GCC nations, to follow suit. As for the timeline, President Biden would want an agreement before the US elections next year.

These high-stake decisions need public debate and political ownership – that are presently missing in Pakistan. In fact, the crackdown against PTI hardly creates a conducive environment to build consensus on these fast moving regional and global changes.”

Since the October 7 attack, the scenario has switched, and the Saudi-Israel normalization has all but collapsed. A whole lot will now depend on if Israel launches a ground operation in Gaza. If the war theater expands, the following pressures are likely to play out for Pakistan:

• Most likely the country will have to side with the Arab world and that will make it stand at odds with US and Israel. Pakistan’s caretaker foreign minister Jalil Abbas Jilani had stated on October 8, “We stand in solidarity with Palestinians and call for an immediate end to the violence and oppression by Israeli occupation forces. A viable and sovereign state of Palestine must be established on the basis of pre-1967 borders and UN resolutions.”
• If Pakistan sides with US and Israel – it will put it at odds with its other ally China, its neighbor Iran, and its own public opinion. A lot will depend on If Iran directly or indirectly intervenes in the conflict – and what position Arab states take at that point. China and Russia will likely both support Iran.
• Moreover, if Pakistan stays idle it would greatly dent its stance on Kashmir. And if in the future India takes a similar approach towards Kashmir – as Israel has now on Gaza – it will gravely complicate options for Pakistan.

The future of Abraham Accords and Saudi-Israel normalization now hangs on if Israel will launch a ground operation in Gaza. Reportedly, President Biden is doing his utmost to restrain Israel – and that was one of the aims of his visit. And if that can be accomplished – then the Palestinians would have to be at the dead center of any future negotiations. In other words, there can be no Arab-Israel normalization without first settling the Palestinian issue.

The post Hamas Attack On Israel, Abraham Accords, And South Asia appeared first on Politact.

Saudi-Israel Normalization and Beyond

Context

In a previous article we focused on understanding the changing geopolitics of the Middle East. Especially, the political, security, and economic interconnections between South Asia and the Gulf States, and one of the subsets, Pakistan and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This relationship has taken on added significance in the context of ongoing great power rivalry and China’s wider engagement with the Middle East, which resulted in the Saudi-Iran détente in March.

On July 28, 2020, PoliTact held a webinar to discuss the potential China-Iran $400 billion economic deal and its impact on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). China-Iran defense cooperation has been growing in the aftermath of President Trump’s decision in 2018 to unilaterally withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal reached in 2015 – which was a hallmark achievement of the Obama administration.

Moreover, additional Muslim states, such as UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco officially recognizing the state of Israel as a consequence of Abraham Accords, reached during the Trump’s presidency in 2020.These developments resulted in deepening of the contradictory pressures for Pakistan. On the one hand, the nation is China’s closest strategic partner, which was also expanding its ties with Iran. On the other hand, Pakistan’s other Arab allies, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar were moving closer to Israel.

In an event held on May 22 in collaboration with the Middle East Institute, the growing role of China in the Middle East was examined. The panelists had made the policy recommendations that US should not completely disengage or overreact to Chinese influence in a state of anxiety. Instead, the US should adopt a clearer approach to its political, economic, and security interests in the Middle East. Viewing US relations with its partners in the Middle East and Asia within the framework of great power competition with China may negatively impact the US approach and its interests.

Saudi-Israel Normalization

Progressively alarmed by the fast-moving dynamics of the Middle East and growing Chinese involvement has meant that the US administration could not sit idly. President Biden has launched an aggressive diplomatic engagement with Saudi Arabia, the country being seen as acting ever more unpredictably. At the same time, the changing politics of Israel is also a complicating factor as Netanyahu loses interest with the two-state solution.

According to New York Times, in at least two trips taken in the last couple of months by the national security adviser Jack Sullivan, Saudis have demanded a civil nuclear program in which they could enrich their own Uranium, not like UAE where they are shipped enriched material. In addition, they want a NATO style mutual security agreement in return for recognition of Israel. On the other hand, China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) has proposed to Saudi Arabia building a nuclear plant near its borders with Qatar and UAE. The move is to pressure the US to be more flexible in aiding its nuclear program.

According to a White House statement, Sullivan traveled to Jeddah:

“to discuss bilateral and regional matters, including initiatives to advance a common vision for a more peaceful, secure, prosperous, and stable Middle East region interconnected with the world.”

The gist of the Biden administrations diplomatic blitzkrieg is to keep Saudi’s from moving closer to China or Russia, build its ties with Israel, and coordinate against Iran. In the BRICS conference held in Johannesburg, Saudi Arabia and Iran were both invited to join BRICS. UAE and Egypt are also set to become BRICS members from January 2024.

Wider Implications

The normalization of Saudi ties with Israel would be the extension of the Abraham Accord. The recognition of Israel by Saudi Arabia would be a titanic event in the Islamic world – especially as it relates to the Core versus the Peripheral Islamic world. It would bring tremendous pressure on the peripheral Islamic nations, especially Pakistan which takes clues from Saudi Arabia when it comes to the maters of Palestinians. According to the polls conducted by the Washington Institute in 2022, public opinion in Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain that were initially favorable towards Abraham Accords have become less so ever since.

If a such a transformation is indeed achieved, a lot will depend on the scope of concessions provided to the Palestinians as part of the deal. Will it include a statehood for the Palestinians and cessation of settlements? With the right-wing government in Israel, why would it agree to any of such demands, especially when the outside-in approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has largely proven to be successful.

While most of the GCC nations are autocratic – a broken democracy still exists in Pakistan. Irrespective, under the present circumstances, Saudi recognition of Israel anytime soon, will gravely unsettle the political and security situation of the country, particularly if it were to be accompanied by economic and political pressure from Saudi Arabia, and other GCC nations, to follow suit. As for the timeline, President Biden would want an agreement before the US elections next year.

Pakistan is overwhelmed by domestic affairs presently, there is little bandwidth for a public debate on this fast-moving situation of the Middle East. Pakistan’s traditional position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was reiterated by its former Prime Minister Imran Khan presently in incarceration:

“Whatever any country does, our position is very clear. And our position was made clear by [Pakistan’s founder] Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah … in 1948: that we cannot ever accept Israel as long as Palestinians are not given their rights and there is no just settlement.”

Moreover, such a transformational step will also have a direct effect on the narrative of extremist organizations such as AQ, Daesh and their Associates. After all, the Palestinian predicament was one of the primary motivation behind why founders of these groups lobbied for violent means to achieve justice.

These extremist organizations targeted governments of the Islamic nations because they were believed to be complicit with the West, and with their support Israel was committing atrocities against Palestinians. Thus, if the justice is delivered, and is seen as such, this could pose far reaching consequences for the future of Islamic extremists – and for the relations of the Islamic world with Israel and the West.

It could also convince those groups that are active on the Kashmir front, that the rise of China could force peaceful resolution of long-standing conflicts – seen to be the unfinished business from when the balance of power shifted last. However, if the deal if reached without much public support or debate and is perceived as a sell off, it would pose tremendous risks for the future of normal governance in the Islamic regions.

This is what happened in the case of Libya recently, when its foreign minister Najla Mangoush met secretly with Israeli counterpart in Rome to normalize ties. The news of the meeting was made public by Israeli foreign minister Eli Cohen and ignited strong street protests in Libya. This caused Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah to suspend Mangoush claiming that she has acted individually and Libya feels strongly for the Palestinian cause.

The post Will The Fear Of China Aid Middle East Peace? appeared first on Politact.

Great Power Rivalry in the Middle East – What it means for South Asia?

Context

The New Cold War paradigm and great power rivalry framework is settling in and beginning to define international affairs. After Europe and Pacific, Middle East is emerging as another hotly contested theater between the global powers. While Ukraine has been consuming most of the media bandwidth, matters related to Iran’s nuclear program and Israeli-Palestinian conflict had taken more of a back seat. Nonetheless, after the War Against Terror, Ukraine has become the new pivot increasingly defining geopolitics, and meanwhile galvanizing NATO and EU.

President Biden’s visit to Israel and Palestinian territories in July, and then to Saudi Arabia, signaled that US aspires to reinvigorate its traditional ties with the Arab world – as it attempts to harness their support against Russia and China. And this was stated by none other than the President himself while speaking to the GCC during his visit to Saudi Arabia,

“We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia or Iran … We will seek to build on this moment with active, principled, American leadership.”

US withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, and from Afghanistan in 2021, gave the impression that America was no longer interested in the Middle East – a perception that was reinforced by mantras such as ‘Pivot to Asia’ used during the Obama administration (2009-2017). Moreover, Iran nuclear deal (also known as JCPOA) reached in July 2015 had greatly unnerved the Israelis and the Gulf States regarding the balance of power in the region and US intent.

After coming to power, one of the first nation visited by former president Trump in 2017 was Saudi Arabia. However, he withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018. During his tenure, US once again established cordial ties with Israel that have been damaged during the Obama presidency. One of the common themes that brought the Arabs and Israel closer has been the expanding influence of Iran in the region. Trump also applied maximum pressure on Iran. In a drone strike in January 2020, Iranian intelligence chief Qasem Soleimani was eliminated in Baghdad. On the other hand, Israel also kept the pressure on the country to stall its nuclear ambitions. The chief of Iran’s nuclear program, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, was assassinated in November 2020.

In parallel and on the diplomatic front, Trump administration worked towards improving ties between the Arabs and Israel, which culminated in Abraham Accords in August 2020. As a result, UAE, Bahrain, and subsequently Sudan and Morocco, also normalized ties with Israel. It was believed that Saudi Arabia will also soon follow, and according to some analysts, other key non-Arab nations, like Pakistan, are also being pressured towards this reorientation of the regional threat perception. The other key Muslim state, Turkey, already has normal ties with Israel.

Revitalized NATO

While Trump was exerting pressure on Iran, pulling out of the nuclear deal also alienated American European allies who had strived greatly to secure the deal. Moreover, not contributing enough towards NATO has also been a persistent source of tension between the US and its European allies. The Ukraine crisis has helped reverse this while attracting new aspirants, like Sweden and Finland, for NATO membership. Just before travelling to the Middle East, Biden was in Europe attending the NATO and G7 gatherings. One of the top-most agenda during the NATO meetings was to come up with a new concept that unites and define the NATO alliance for the future. NATO’s updated mission statement for the first time mentions Russia as the greatest threat and China-Russian alliance as a counter to its values.

While NATO looks to thwart Russia in Ukraine, Middle East represents the other flank. There is less consensus on how much time and resources it will take to achieve the goals in Ukraine and elsewhere. Disruption of supply chains and rising energy costs are some of the direct consequences of the conflict, including inflation, when nations were just beginning to come out of Covid-19 induced economic woes.

China- Russia and Middle East

China and Russia both have been extending their influence in the Middle East. The $400 billion China–Iran treaty signed in March 2021 must have been an ominous development from the perspective of the Gulf Arabs and the US. However, the talks have been proceeding for a while, as has been the ‘Outside-In Approach’ to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has become an active player in the Middle East with strategic ties with a number of regional players, to include Saudi Arabia. As its influence increases gradually, it could become an active interlocutor between Israel and the Palestinians, and other conflicts of the Middle East. However, it’s not clear if China desires to get involved in the security affairs of the region, like Russia has in Syria – as far as the Middle East is concerned. Soon after Biden’s visit to the Middle East, Putin and Erdogan visited Iran and discussed the evolving situation in Syria, and allowing shipment of Ukrainian grain through the Black Sea. According to media reports, Khamenei called for long-term cooperation between Russia and Iran and to guard against ‘Western deception’.

Chinese analysts present a case the nation wants to be more involved in providing economic support than engaging in the security affairs of the Middle East. Nonetheless, it has good political and military relations with both Iran and Israel. As part of BRI, China has been extending its trade relations with Israel and lately US has objected strongly to some of them citing security concerns – such as the Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) running a container terminal at the Port of Haifa – near an Israeli naval base that is frequently visited by the US Sixth Fleet. The Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had warned Israel in 2019 to reduce its economic and security ties with China or risk reduced security cooperation from US.

If the China-Israeli economic ties are allowed to strengthen uninhibited, overtime China will be able to build leverages that can potentially undercut US primacy in the affairs of the Middle East. The Israelis disagree on this, stating the nature of its ties with China and the US are of totally different nature.

Conclusion

Thus, Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia represents a push to counter China and Russia and meanwhile providing continuity to the policy undertaken by Trump, which resulted in Abraham Accords. At the same time, engaging and supporting the Palestinian authorities, and reiterating that two-state solution remains the best way forward to resolving the conflict.

The fresh engagement also envisions a new security architecture for the region that some have called the Arab NATO. During the G7 meeting held in the Bavarian Alps, the leaders also announced the $600 billion Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment program, seen as an alternative to Chinese BRI.

With their energy resources UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, have also come to play an increasingly critical role when it comes to the affairs South Asia, most recently exhibited in Afghanistan. Then there are the expanding Indian ties with the Gulf nations that have overshadowed the traditional Pakistan’s influence. And this change has undercut the financial support from the region Pakistan had relied upon in the past. PoliTact had covered this shift in a joint event with the Middle East Institute in November 2018.

The reoriented US engagement with the Arab world will also have a profound impact on the affairs of South Asia – and the present political and economic turbulence in Pakistan could be the direct result of this flux in Middle East – and surge of great power tussles there.

The post What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply? appeared first on Politact.

US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has said that Western allies are cautioning Israel against attack on Iran. Panetta strongly believes that Israel has already made the decision to strike Iran this spring. He said the US is leading the persuasion initiative, though it believes outside argument will not have any effect on Israeli decision-making. US is presenting the argument that Iranian regime will be considerably weakened after imploding its ally, Syria, but the attack on Iran will have the opposite impact.

Israel fears Iran will soon reach the zone of immunity, where limited military strike will not deter it from launching its nuclear bomb. Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak said on Thursday that if sanctions do not prevent Iran from making nuclear bomb, then there is worldwide understanding to launch a military strike.

Meanwhile, President Ahmedinejad predicted on Wednesday that Iran’s economy would grow eight percent over the next 12 months despite Western sanctions. He added that the budget was developed taking into account the price of oil and increased the defense spending by 127 percent under the new budget.

On the other hand, after leading the Friday prayers, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei warned that Iran will retaliate to the western oil embargo or military attack. He said that war with Iran will be detrimental to America, whereas it will not dampen Iran’s determination to continue the nuclear course. Khamenei added that he has no fear to state that Iran will back any nation or group that wants to confront or fight Zionist regime.

The post Israel Preparing Spring Attack, Iran Doubles Defense Spending While Khamemei Threatens Retaliation appeared first on Politact.

Gaza crisis has erupted once more. Rockets are being fired at Israeli cities, just like in 2012, 2009 and 2006, and the Israeli ground offensive is now underway as well. Heavy civilian causalities are being reported as a consequence of the continuous Gaza bombardment. But the question is how is the present Israeli operation, named Protective Edge, different than the 2012 operation Pillar of Defense, and the Israeli-Lebanon/Hezbollah war of 2006.

There are three major observations:

1. The tussles between Shia-Sunni state and non-state actors
2. The global powers engaging Iran in talks over its nuclear program
3. The alignment of interests between Sunni regional states and Israel

While the present crisis seems to be a repeat of the past, geopolitical situation of the region is much different. The Arabs are deeply divided; the Middle East Peace Process lies in stalemate with US withdrawn from its role of the primary interlocutor. Moreover, the emergence of the Palestinian unity government, represented by Hamas and Fatah, is perceived as quite threatening by Israel. The most important variation, however, is that Iran is for the first time engaged in negotiations with the global powers (P5+1). Lastly, Hezbollah has other war theaters to worry about, mainly Syria and Iraq, than to get involved with Israel.

Analysis

Tussles of Shia and Sunni State, Non-State Actors

The underlying theme in the whole Middle East affair is the surging influence of Iran and its proxy, Hezbollah, over Iraq and Syria. While the West is fighting a war against the Sunni non-state actors, the Shia non-state actors are playing a dual role; firstly by countering Sunni extremists and secondly by enhancing Iranian influence.

While the rise of Iran and its proxies is threatening towards Israel in the long run, it also has a positive impact in the short term. Israel benefits when the attention of major regional players is not focused towards it. Nothing accomplishes this more than the Shia-Sunni state and non-state struggles.

Hezbollah is already engaged in saving the Assad regime in Syria and is also thinking of getting involved in Iraq. In this environment, it would hardly want to get entangled with Israel. Similarly, the Sunni non-state actors are also not yearning to shift their focus away from diminishing the influence of Iran and its proxies in the region.

This may represent an opportunity for Israel to deal with Hamas when the Arabs, Iranians and the Turks, are distracted by IS (formerly ISIS) threat, and the conflict of Syria and Iraq.

Last time Gaza erupted in 2012, and Lebanon in 2006, the West had not yet engaged Iran in negotiations over its nuclear program, and the regional Sunni and Shia non-state actors were not as influential as they are today.

Iran Engaged

For the first time negotiations have helped engage Iran while creating leverage for the West. Now Iran has to seriously prioritize its interests and evaluate if it is more important to achieve a permanent nuclear deal and normalization of ties with the West. Or, will it continue with activities in Syria, and in support of Hezbollah and Hamas that are considered highly detrimental. From western perspective, Iran’s cooperation and constructive role in these areas, including in Iraq, can be highly conducive in achieving peace between Israel and Palestine.

Where differences still exist on reaching a final deal, the reason the talks have been extended beyond July 20th is probably because engagement with Iran is already helping to control its behavior and influence vis-à-vis various regional flashpoints. However, this approach requires managing anxieties of Israel and Sunni Arab nations.

Iran’s budding detente with the West also tilts matters in its favor, which is perceived as a dangerous turn of events by the Sunni Arab states, and by Israel as well. The approach adopted by US towards Arab Spring afflicted nations, especially Egypt, and against military strikes against Syria, has furthered paranoia in Arab capitals.

Arab-Israeli Alignment of Interests

In short, and ironically, there is synergy of interest between the regional Sunni Arab States and Israel. They both support Fatah over Hamas, the secular set up in Egypt, reversal of Iran’s regional resurgence and its endeavor towards acquiring nuclear weapons.

The post Differences Between Israeli Operation Protective Edge, Pillar Of Defense, And 2006 Israeli-Lebanon War appeared first on Politact.

China and Russia vetoed the UN Security Council resolution that condemns Assad’s crackdown and backs Arab League plan calling for Bashar Assad to step aside. Both reiterated their opposition to the use of force to resolve the Syrian crisis, where escalating violence has killed thousands of civilians as the regime has cracked down on dissidents. The other 13 members that include US, UK, France, India and Pakistan, voted in favor of the resolution. Arab League Secretary General Nabil al-Araby was pressing the Council to take swift and decisive action. On the other hand, Syrian UN ambassador dismissed the criticism against the regime, calling it the dream of western powers to return to colonialism and hegemony.

Analysis

Russian envoy to the EU had objected to the language of the Western-Arab UN Security Council resolution, calling for ‘unspecified measures’, if President Bashar does not cede power. Russia wanted a clear clause that rules out the possibility of external military intervention.

Russia had further stated that it will not support any action that is imposed on Syria; moreover, it will not take sides as had happened in the case of Libya. Sergei Lavrov had earlier commented that armed extremists disrupting the civic life are equally condemnable as the use of violence by the government. Additionally, Lavrov had warned that the regime change will not be restricted to Syria only, and it would spread.

China had also resisted Western push for the Security Council resolution, calling the forced regime change a violation of the United Nations Charter and the basic norms guiding the practice of international relations.

Meanwhile, Washington has maintained that the fall of Assad’s regime is inevitable, and it’s only a question of time. The opposition Syrian National Council has deplored the ‘lack of swift’ action by the international community and to protect the Syrian citizens ‘by all necessary means’. The rebel Free Syrian Army has claimed fifty percent of territory is no longer under the control of the regime, while CIA director David Petraeus has said that Assad now faced challenges in Damascus and Aleppo, two cities that had been insulated from the unrest.

The post Russia And China Veto UNSC Resolution On Syria appeared first on Politact.

Contaxt

 Media discussion on VOA Dewa Radio Pashto Program ‘From  Washington2Khyber.’

 The discussion revolves around the challenges towards striking  Syria and President Obama’s decision to seek Congressional  approval.

  Panel includes:

– Arif Ansar – Chief Analyst, PoliTact, Washington DC
– Dr. Alam Payind – Director of Middle East Studies Center, Ohio State University
– Brigadier (R) Saad Muhammad – Security Analyst, Pakistan

The post Making A Case For Striking Syria appeared first on Politact.