Context

Al Qaeda-linked extremists carried out a deadly attack against the Algerian Amenas gas field on January 16. Reportedly, the strike was conducted in retaliation for the military intervention France has initiated in its former colony Mali. French planes had used Algerian airspace for carrying out the strikes. The event has demonstrated the acute risks faced by the energy facilities located throughout the region, including the Gulf States. More importantly, the attack has triggered a renewed phase of European intervention in northern Africa that will have consequences far beyond the region.

Analysis

Evolution of Target Selection

AQ linked extremists routinely carry out retaliatory attacks around the globe. Over time, the types of targets selected have evolved. Obviously, the target selection is based on the strategic intent and the message the extremists want to convey. Additionally, it’s also a reflection of their capability and the vulnerability of a target.

For example, in revenge for Pakistan’s cooperation with NATO forces in Afghanistan, in 2012 a number of sensitive military installations have been targeted. This includes air bases in Kamra, Peshawar, and a naval facility located in Karachi. In a high-profile attack in Benghazi last year, the US embassy was targeted, leading to the death of Ambassador Christopher Stevens. Last Friday, another US embassy was struck, this time in Ankara.

In the Middle East, Saudi national oil company Aramco came under a serious cyber attack in August of last year that damaged more than 30,000 computers. Reportedly, the attempt was to dent the Saudi oil and gas production. The targeting of an Amenas gas field in Algeria had a similar ambition. It supplies about 25% of the gas for Western Europe and the country is the fourth largest producer of gas in Africa. This poses a grave worry for the Europeans, as there appears to be concerted efforts by the AQ-linked extremists to disrupt the energy supplies.

Europeans Return to Africa

Despite the economic pressures and the emergence of more strategic threats in the Pacific, events related to the Arab Spring and extremism have pulled western attention back to the core Islamic regions.

As the US winds down its military campaign in Afghanistan, it has been reluctant to get involved in the developing North African theater of operation, where its interests are less clear. Like in the case of Libya, US is resorting to providing more logistical support, while the French and the British are taking the lead. At the same time, there is growing discussion about a new business model through which the US can lend its awesome logistical capabilities, acquired over decades of large investments in defense research and development, to the Europeans.

The challenge is not all European members of NATO are on the same page on how to deal with future threats. The dynamics that may evolve in Europe may not be much different from what occurred earlier in the last century and in the seventeen and eighteen hundred. During this timeframe, the major European powers were constantly at each other and these tussles were transferred to their respective colonies. Preventing any single power from dominating Europe caused almost constant shuffling of alliances.

As is the case now, even then the challenge was how to pay for the constant wars: the question of raising taxes and competition over trade and market access. The NATO alliance is already grappling with these tough questions. Over time, the present European stagnation is likely to play out in a manner similar to the past.

In this respect, the French military intervention in Mali might be the initiation of bigger fissures within Europe. For now, the British have announced that they will be sending about 360 troops to support the French in Mali. In PoliTact’s forecast for 2012, it was noted that the decline of European Union, the rise of Germany, and the resurgence of Russia, were fundamentally altering the balance of power in Europe. Moreover, the Germans and the Russians have also been moving closer. This transformation makes the French and the British especially uneasy and causes them to look towards the US to counter. However, the US, for the first time, does not want to play a leading role.

Furthermore, PoliTact had also pointed out: “These European tensions are already playing out in other regions of the world, especially in South Asia, Middle East, and North Africa. In the chaos that has resulted from the Arab spring, the European powers appear to be establishing their zones of influence.”

The Spheres of Influence

The spheres of influence conceptualization make further sense as the writ of the states in these regions is fast evaporating. These fears were aggravated this week when protests in Egypt flared up once more causing Defense Minister General Abdel Fattah al-Sissi to warn on Jan 29th about the potential collapse of the state. His statement was reinforced by a similar message by Israeli Air Force Chief Major General Amir Eshel a few hours later, presenting grave concerns about Syria and Egypt. On the Jan 30th, Israel conducted an air strike near Damascus, reportedly to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons and getting into the hands of Hezbollah in Lebanon.

If the disturbance in Pakistan continues unabated, the events of the Middle East and North Africa may provide a model for what can be the case. This further raises the importance of SCO alliance and escalates the significance of the news that Pakistan has decided to hand over the operation of Gwadar port to a Chinese firm. Even more startling was the statement that came from the Turkish foreign ministry, whose spokesman stated on Jan 31st that Ankara, like Pakistan and India, also desires to attain an observer status on the SCO.

It’s becoming clearer by the day that the existing order has become unsustainable, and attempts to resist the rapid transformation will prove to be ineffective. The key is not only to adapt but also be in a position to shape and influence what is emerging. While the emerging order is not clear yet, the lessons of history should not be taken lightly.

The post Far-Flung Repercussions Of Algerian Gas Field Attack appeared first on Politact.

Context

Since the elimination of Osama bin Laden, the hype about Core AQ has decreased and the narrative adopted presents the organization as a much-diminished threat. There are political and psychological reasons for this change. Under increased economic stress, the death of Osama bin Laden provided a key symbolic victory in the war against terror and opportunity to move on. However, on the ground, a different picture is emerging that defines this version. It’s increasingly the affiliates of AQ that have taken on its mission in Afghanistan-Pakistan region, Middle East, Horn of Africa and now the Islamic Maghreb.

To prevent the region from further instability, France intervened directly into its former colony Mali on January 11 by sending troops. It has also conducted air raids against extremists using the airspace of neighboring Algeria. As a reaction, five days ago AQ linked Islamic militants took over an Algerian Amenas gas field located near its border with Libya. The jumbled operation conducted by Algerian forces to take back the gas field caused the death of 24 hostages, including foreigners. The situation has now raised the prospect of another NATO-led intervention in the region.

Analysis

Core AQ

Through the use of Special Forces and drones, NATO and US have been intensely involved against the Core AQ in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. The contention was that if the core leadership is dealt with, other offshoots such as AQI (Al Qaeda in Iraq), AQAP (Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula), and AQIM (Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb) will also lose their vitality. The constant pressure, however, has produced two outcomes: many of the leaders have been killed, but new flashpoints are also emerging.

As the US withdraws its troops from Afghanistan, it does not in any way indicate AQ is a mute concern. Increasingly, the extremists and militant groups that are linked to AQ are spearheading its mission. This is evident in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region where are a conglomeration of militant and extremist groups led to the formation of Shura-e-Muraqabah. In the Middle East and North Africa, AQ and its affiliates are suspected of exploiting the Arab Spring afflicted hot spots, such as Syria and Libya. The assassination of the American ambassador to Libya is a case in point.

Emerging Tactics And Strategies

While the emphasis of the US and NATO strategy is to prevent AQ from finding a safe haven, from where it can plan attacks against the West. In actuality, AQ and its affiliates are relying less on safe havens and more on simply exploiting the chaos and vacuum created by weak or collapsing regimes. These governments are operating under the dual pressures of viral war against terror and Arab Spring.

One of the key challenges in this regard is that while these sites are being expected to control the situation within, they have minimal influence over the instability in the surrounding neighborhood. As noted previously by PoliTact, this has put the nation-state structure under considerable pressure.

When NATO and US went into Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, the conflict did not remain within the confines of these countries. One of the reasons for this being that AQ, with the help of its affiliates, has operated across borders. Over time, to confront this, the response did the same with the area of operation for the drones and Special Forces spanning the whole region.

The Nature Of AQ Affiliates

It has thus become essential to understand the nature of these AQ affiliates. In a majority of the cases, the associates are mostly local extremist and militant organizations, with regional ambitions. They usually have their own religious, nationalistic and political agendas that further complicate the ground reality. In return for their cooperation, AQ turns a blind eye to their activities. Similarly, these associate organizations use the cover of AQ for their benefit. However, the cross-pollination amongst extremists groups has produced disastrous results. Consider, for example, the interplay of AQ and TTP, Haqqani network and LeT.

Working through a network of local extremist and jihadi organizations has several strategic benefits for AQ. Firstly it gives them a reach and penetration that is impossible otherwise. AQ members simply embed themselves and can go undetected for quite a while. Secondly, it gives AQ sustainability. When AQ members feel the heat of direct operations, they migrate to other less hostile environments.

Meanwhile, the local affiliates provide the continuity in the absence of direct supervision. As NATO moves its attention based on shifting threats, it too depends on regional allies to keep a check on local affiliates of AQ. The nut result is that while NATO and US may move on declaring victory, the conflicts still simmer while producing economic drain at a time when no one can afford it. This is the situation in present day Iraq and the likely predicament of Afghanistan and Pakistan once the US withdraws.

The Separatists

Even before the war against extremists got initiated and the Arab revolts spread, many states impacted by these two phenomena’s were also inflicted by separatist movements of one form or the other. Most of these were the byproduct of how new states were crafted at the end of World War II. In a majority of the cases, AQ has stayed away from such nationalist-oriented insurgencies.

On the other hand, in the unfolding Arab revolts, the West usually sides with the liberal anti-regime and moderate Islamic forces that accept democratic norms, and not necessarily the separatists. This is obviously is a difficult balance to maintain and may change in the future depending on the nature of global politics. Nonetheless, the availability of multiple options is a tremendous asset to have.

As the state structures crumble under the dual pressures of war on terror and Arab revolt, AQ and associates are striving to fill the vacuum and create new flash points; events of Mali and Algeria signify this. This is creating, even more, opportunities for Western intervention when they can hardly afford it economically. Perhaps it would be wise to start thinking beyond the nation-state.

The post Transformation of Al Qaeda And Islamic Maghreb appeared first on Politact.

Context

In the last 10 days, a number of key international gatherings have taken place. The trilateral summit between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran was held last week in Islamabad. The conference on Somalia was organized in London, which also provided an important opportunity for the Clinton-Khar meeting last Thursday. On the other hand, ‘Friends of Syria’ met in Tunisia on Friday. In addition to the complex Afghan reconciliation and volatile Iran and Syria situation, the Horn of Africa has clearly emerged as another hot spot, impacting the events of Middle East and North Africa.

Analysis

Yemen And Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa is in the limelight recently for several reasons. The surrounding waters are a hotbed of piracy and every major power has naval presence there to protect the busy commercial sea routes that pass through Suez Canal. Located to the north of Somalia, just across the Gulf of Aden, is Yemen, another trouble spot. In addition to the AfPak, the region has become another serious extremist hub.

Over the years, as pressure from US drones and Pakistan military operations on tribal areas mounted, Somalia and Yemen became the ‘go to’ safe havens for the extremists. This, in turn, produced serious implications for Middle East and Saudi Arabia, which most certainly did not want to find itself in the same situation as Pakistan: having to face a potentially dangerous combination of regional rivalries and the terrorist threat.

In August 2009, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) had attempted to assassinate the Saudi Deputy Interior Minister, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, in the Red Sea port city of Jeddah. It was later found that the assailant had crossed over from Yemen and had connections with the tribal areas of Pakistan. The country later arrested and handed over two suspects to Saudi Arabia.

Subsequently, the Saudi’s carried out a number of operations along the Saudi-Yemen border region. Just as the Afghanistan war has spilled over into tribal areas and mainland Pakistan, the Yemeni proxy conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia had the potential to cross the border while also exacerbating Shiite-Sunni tensions in the region. When one considers the present fragile state of ethnic and religious balance in Iraq, it has been a frightening scenario for the Sunni Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations.

Therefore, US, GCC, and especially the Saudis and Egyptians, augmented their support for the Yemeni government’s counterinsurgency efforts, fighting al-Houthi Shiite rebels in the country’s remote mountainous north. However, this was the situation before the Arab Spring brook out and fundamentally altered the political and security landscape. In March 2011, Saudi led GCC forces went into Bahrain to contain the troubles there.

Situation In Somalia

Towards the south of Gulf of Aden lies Somalia. A UN back Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu is being supported by troops from the African Union, Kenya, and Ethiopia, to carry the fight against extremists. A serious development occurred there in early February when Al-Shabab released a joint video with Al-Qaeda, pledging obedience to Ayman al-Zawahiri. The announcement of the merger has come at a time when Al-Shabab was considered to be under pressure. Many analysts believe that the merger could change the nature of the conflict in Somalia. In this context, the London conference on Somalia took place at a key time.

At the London conference, David Cameron has announced that Somalia needs a representative government by the end of August, when the term for TFG ends. Similar to the strategy being applied against Al Qaeda connected groups in Afghanistan; Cameron declared those that part ways with Al-Shabab and violence it propagates, can join the political process. On the other hand, Al-Shabab, which was not invited to the London conference, has warned of ‘an ugly turn of events’ in case of unwanted interference.

Trouble in Somalia has been brewing for a while. In November of last year, Israel had extended its support to Kenya to help the country deal with Somali militants. Israeli President Shimon Peres had said at the time that his country would “make everything available” to the African nation to help it fight against the Al-Qaeda linked terrorists. Analysts, however, had warned that the partnership could increase support for Al-Shabab, which would attempt to gain help by showcasing the deal as anti-Muslim. Israel looks at the stability of Ethiopia as fundamental to a stable Horn of Africa. Moreover, Israel considers checking Saudi and Egyptian influence in Ethiopia beneficial to its interest.

In December 2011, the US Secretary of Defense described Yemen and Somalia as key nodes during his visit to Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, and declared it as the central location for counterterrorism efforts in the region. He added that America is shifting its focus to Africa on its Al Qaeda hunt after the success in FATA. As Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al Shabab become active in their ambitions, Panetta vowed that US would track these guys wherever they go.

Djibouti, a former French colony, has a strategic location; it borders Somali, Ethiopia and Eretria and is situated across the Red Sea from Yemen. According to a recent report in The Washington Post, US is building secret drone bases in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula as part of an aggressive campaign against Al Qaeda in Somalia and Yemen.

It is clear that in addition to Iran and Syria, the Horn of Africa is becoming much more active, with a destabilizing influence on the Middle East and North Africa. The Salafi Jihadists that were earlier forced to leave places like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan for the AfPak, have now returned to haunt the Middle East and Africa. The environment created by the Arab uprisings has produced an especially volatile situation. There is an increasing risk that Al Qaeda and affiliated groups are planning to exploit the chaos in many of the new hot spots.

The post The Threat From Horn of Africa And London Conference On Somalia appeared first on Politact.