Context

Since the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, the Afghan Taliban character has been evolving and so are ties with Pakistan. The widely held apprehension that US exit will make Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) bolder is coming to fruition – as the number of TTP linked extremist attacks continue to rise in Pakistan with Baloch insurgency also simmering.

At the same time, there is a role reversal. While in the past US relied on Pakistan in dealing with matters related to the Afghan Taliban. Now, as Pakistan’s ties with Afghan Taliban deteriorate, it is resorting to seek US help to address the extremist menace emanating from Afghan soil. Pakistan’s Army Chief’s visit to the US reportedly was primarily to seek military cooperation to tackle the TTP threat. Conversely, the US emphasis is on economics and climate change.

There are a few significant grievances between Pakistan and Afghanistan. One, Pakistan has consistently demanded that Afghan Taliban deal sternly with TTP and Islamic State’s Khorasan branch (IS-K) operating from Afghanistan. US shares concerns related to IS-K but not necessarily on TTP. Although, in the past, US has assisted Pakistan in going after high value TTP targets through drone strikes. Pakistan’s decision to deport illegal Afghan refugees has added stress to the bilateral ties.

On the other hand, US seems to be increasingly satisfied with Afghan Taliban for pressure on IS-K, which makes them less likely to act against its erstwhile ally TTP. This creates a dilemma for Pakistan. Additionally, US intelligence indicates that Al Qaeda (AQ) has been weakened to the point of extinction. Pakistan is thus looking for convergences in its ties with the US to confront TTP by exerting pressure on Afghan Taliban.

Since the removal of Pakistan’s Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government in 2022, the government policy has shifted away from negotiating with TTP and towards using force – and has thus sought more counter-terrorism assistance. Ironically, the former Prime Minister had refused any military cooperation with the US in dealing with the extremist threat in Afghanistan – and some analysts pointed to this as the main reason for his removal – in addition to ill-timed trip to Russia to meet Putin.

Analysis

Zia-ul-Haq, Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, and Iranian Revolution

Since the Afghan Jihad of the 80s, Pakistan’s security perils have largely been linked to the situation of Afghanistan and periodic military escalation with India. While traditionally political unanimity has existed when it comes to handling India, the case of Afghanistan has led to political polarization and instability in the country – and has impacted its foreign relations in ways that have proved extremely detrimental to the social and economic wellbeing of the nation in the long run.

For example, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 provided the military ruler Zia-ul-Haq an opportunity to reset his utility for the West. He had earlier removed the political government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1977, who was later hanged in 1979. The Iranian Revolution and fall of Pahlavi dynasty, also in 1979, had greatly unnerved the US – and Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan fit well with the Domino Theory. These dramatic events in 1979 assisted Zia-ul-Haq to reset ties with the West.

The removal of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, with which US had cordial ties, represented a shift in the Middle East balance of power. Zia capitalized on the changing winds. With help from the Gulf Arabs and the US, Sunni proxies were created to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan – they also served as an ideological counterweight to the Shiite revolutionaries in Iran. This process also linked Pakistan more closely to the Arabs.

The Iranian revolution also initiated a chain of events in the Middle East. Fearing the repercussions on Iraq’s ethnic mix, Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in 1980, a war that lasted until 1988. He also wanted to establish Iraq as the primary force in the Arab world. Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990, leading to the First Gulf War in 1991. Pakistan sided with the Gulf Arabs and even deployed forces on the Saudi border with Iraq to prevent any invasion.

It was on September 11, 2001, when the Sunni-non state actors that fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets launched a horrendous attack on American soil – and thus started the Global War Against Terrorism (GWOT) that sucked in Pakistan once again.

Pervez Musharraf, 9/11, and Global War Against Terror (GWOT)

9/11 provided an opportunity to another military ruler in Pakistan to gain international credibility and reset ties with the US. In the aftermath of the 1999 short and bloody Kargil conflict, Gen Pervez Musharraf had overthrown the civilian government in October 1999, removing Nawaz Sharif from power. For this US had slapped sanctions, which were in addition to the ones imposed on Pakistan and India in the aftermath of 1998 nuclear tests. For Musharraf’s support in Afghanistan after 9/11, Bush lifted all sanctions on Pakistan in October 2001.

Prior to 9/11, Pakistan had been one of the few nations, including UAE and Saudi Arabia, that recognized the Taliban government. As the campaign against terrorism progressed, Pakistan focused its efforts more or Al Qaeda and less on Afghan Taliban – and was accused of providing safe havens for them.

While US got distracted by going into Iraq again in 2003 (Second Gulf War), Bush administration mounted pressure on Pakistan to launch military operations in FATA and eliminate what it termed as safe havens. Pakistan moved nearly hundred thousand troops from the Indian border towards Afghanistan to conduct operation which led to internal dislocation of up to 5 million people. US also conducted thousands of drone strikes in FATA between 2004 and 2018 chasing extremist leaders hiding there.

Pakistan’s military operations in FATA, including the Lal Masjid operation in July 2007, accompanied by drone strikes, started to create an ominous backlash internally. It was unclear if the US drone strikes were occurring with Pakistan’s acquiescence – but it would publicly protest the strikes vehemently as violation of its sovereignty.

Many high value targets were hit in Pakistan as extremist reprisal spread, with thousands of civilian and soldiers killed and maimed. According to Dawn newspaper, Pakistan’s economic loss in the war against terror was a figure around $126.79 billion. The security and political turmoil, including the civil-military divide, was reflected by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007.

The internal politics of Pakistan had gotten fully intertwined with the support it was providing to the US in the war against extremism, and more importantly, at what cost. While Musharraf had become gradually unpopular, and US grievances with him grew, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto demonstrated that this was a battle for Pakistan’s survival too. The Mumbai Attack in November 2008 created fresh headaches for Pakistan on how it was dealing with what are called good and bad extremists.

General Asim Munir, Post US Withdrawal Afghanistan, and US Pakistan Relations

As Pakistan’s new Amry Chief Asif Munir visits US to reset ties, the above historical context needs to be considered. While the nation’s position to counter threat from TTP has been shifting between a negotiated solution to a military one, with different global powers moving in and out of Afghanistan overtime, Pakistan’s own political polarization is swelling, economic prospects dwindling, and social fiber in tatters. Ukraine may have been imagined as the new Cold War that could help reset ties with the US. However, the events unfolding in Gaza have checked that conceptualization. Meanwhile, China facilitated Saudi, Iran detente has provided temporary relief and prevent ethnic tensions from boiling.

In retrospect, 1979 was a tumultuous year – the demise of western supported regime in Iran initiated the transfer of the regional balance of power towards the Sunni Gulf Arabs – with Saddam the casualty in the long run. The collapse of Soviet Union and end of Cold War by the beginning of 90s meant that the US had won the great power rivalry – with Pakistan’s pivotal role. However, in October 1990, US imposed sanctions in the form of Pressler Amendment. The amendment made military and economic aid to Pakistan conditional on it not acquiring nuclear weapons – and for US administration to certify that to be true. US apparently did not want Pakistan to benefit from their shared victory in Afghanistan.

Stalemate ensued as in-fighting between former mujahadeen leaders and factions in Afghanistan continued in the aftermath of Soviet withdrawal. The affairs finally came to climax as Taliban took control of almost entire Afghanistan. The popular Taliban opposition leader, Ahmad Shah Mehsud, was assassinated two days before 9/11 attack. If 9/11 had not occurred, Pakistan and Gulf State supported Taliban would have potentially extended influence further into Central Asia.

What can be expected in the aftermath of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, especially when Pakistan has built strategic ties with China, and India has become a strong American ally towards the ambition of countering global rival China? Moreover, unlike Soviet withdrawal in late 80s, following US departure, Taliban are in complete control of Afghanistan, with other players engaging directly with them. Burning bridges with Afghanistan will come at Pakistan’s own expense – and prevent it from gaining any mileage for the immense cost in blood and treasure the nation has paid over almost half a century. While the nation cannot delink from Afghanistan, patient diplomacy is the only way forward to engage and resolve the thorny issues.

The post Convergences In US-Pakistan Ties And Afghanistan appeared first on Politact.

Context

By Dr Claude Rakisits

The four-month old military operation in North Waziristan – Operation Zarb-e-Azb – and the smaller, more recent one in the Khyber Agency – Operation Khyber-I – against the various militant groups holed up in those areas have been successful, but only in a limited way. While the military capability of the Tereek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the umbrella grouping for a large number of Pakistan-based militant organisations, has undoubtedly been degraded, many of the fighters have either fled across the border into Afghanistan, or they have found refuge in Pakistan’s urban centres, particularly in Karachi. So while in the short-term terrorism may have been held at bay, in the long-term Pakistan’s terrorism problem is far from being resolved.

According to official military sources, well over 1000 militants have been killed. And over a 100 tonnes of ammunition and explosives have been recovered. Of course, there is no independent source to confirm these figures. But what we can correctly assume is that apart from Mohammad Hassan, a senior TTP commander, none of the top commanders or militant leaders has been killed because had this happened their corpses would have been displayed by the military as war trophies.

But while none of the politically heavies has been captured or killed, the operations have undoubtedly disrupted the TTP’s network which it had established, especially in North Waziristan. As a result many of these fighters have had to flee across the border, where they have established safe havens. While this may be good news in the short-term, in that these terrorists have left Pakistani soil, in the long-term this is bad news for Pakistan in that the militants will have the opportunity to re-group and re-arm in order to cross back over into Pakistan in the future.

Analysis

Fractured TTP

Among those who were able to flee across the border were the high-value commanders from the Haqqani Network and the Gul Bahadur group. They were able to do so because of the much publicised lead time that they were given that a major military operation was about to be launched. This will be bad news for the future stability of Afghanistan because they will have joined their brothers-in-arm to fight the Afghan security forces and the departing Western troops. This will not help an already fragile Afghanistan.

These military operations have also accelerated the fracturing of the TTP, a process which had already started following the replacement of their leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, who was killed in a drone strike in November 2013. Divisions were also sharpened over the approach to take vis-à-vis the unsuccessful peace talks initiated in February 2014 by the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. However, it was the selection of Maulana Fazlullah, a non-Mehsud, as successor to Hakimullah which caused the greatest resentment within the ranks of the TTP, particularly among the Mehsud. Given the military importance of the Mehsud tribe in the TTP, the Mehsud feel that one of their own should be leading the TTP. An additional factor causing further bitterness inside the TTP is the fact that Fazlullah is not living among his fighters but is hiding across the border in the Kunar province of Afghanistan.

As a result of these deep divisions, the TTP has fractured into a number of different components. The first big split was caused by Maulana Qasim Omar Khorasani, alias Abdul Wali, who was head of the TTP in Mohmand Agency. Khorasani publicly disagreed with Fazullah regarding the peace talks with the government. Accordingly, after having been expelled from the TTP, he established Ahrar-ul-Hind (Freedom of India) which eventually morphed into the Tehreek-e-Taliban Jamaatul Ahrar (TTPJA, Assembly of Freedom), reportedly taking with him over 50 percent of the TTP’s senior commanders. He firmly believes that Sharia law must be implemented throughout Pakistan. Even among his fellow terrorists, he is considered ruthless. He was responsible for ordering the execution of 23 Frontier Corps personnel, who had been held prisoner for the last three and half years, during the peace talks in February 2014. This terrorist act ended the talks once and for all.

The other big split is within the Mehsud tribe itself, with two factions vying for supremacy, often very violently. One is led by Sheriyar Mehsud, a loyalist of the late Hakimullah, who mainly leads the younger TTP members and is based in South Waziristan. The other faction is headed by Khan Said, alias Sajna, who used to be a close confidante of Khorasani and is principally in North Waziristan. Reportedly, he is interested in entering into peace talks with the Pakistan government.

Punjabi Taliban

Finally, there is the Punjabi Taliban, headed by Asmatullah Muawiya, which decided in September 2014 that it would abandon its armed struggle in Pakistan and no longer target the security forces and government representatives but would instead focus on promoting Sharia law. It would, however, continue its armed operations in Afghanistan. If this is indeed the case, the Punjabi Taliban’s withdrawal from the terrorism business will be a major victory for the government of Nawaz Sharif. This group has carried out many spectacular terrorist attacks in the past, including the 2009 assault on the Pakistan Army’s general headquarters in Rawalpindi; the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore in 2009; and the 2011 raid on the naval airbase at Mehran.

IS and Taliban

Further weakening Fazullah’s precarious hold on what is left of the TTP is the recent decision by six leading TTP figures – Shahidullah Shahid, Hafiz Saeed Khan, Hafiz Daulat Khan, Maulana Gul Zaman, Mufti Hassan and Khalid Mansoor – to swear allegiance to the Islamic State (IS)(alias the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria alias the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant). What this means in practical, military terms is difficult to assess today. However, what it does mean is that Al-Qaeda’s pull in Pakistan is weakening and that its level of influence has diminished under the leadership of Ayman Al Zawahri. His public stunt of creating a South Asia branch of Al-Qaeda did little to hide this. On the contrary, it confirmed its desperate search for relevance in the wake of IS’s meteoric rise in the world of terrorism. The decision by the leader of the Pakistan-based Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan to also swear allegiance to IS in October 2014 was further confirmation of Al-Qaeda’s fast diminishing weight in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

Implications

So what do all the above developments mean in the battle against terrorism in Pakistan? In the short-term, it is on the whole good news for the government of Nawaz Sharif. The TTP is now more divided, which means that the different factions have to compete over limited resources, including human and financial. This means its capability has been diminished and therefore so has its threat. Moreover, if the government is able to cut a genuine peace deal with the Khan Said faction of the Mehsuds that would further diminish the TTP’s terrorist reach. However, it is important to note that a fractured TTP, with each faction acting independently, does complicate the military’s ability to destroy it, or for the government to enter into negotiations with the organization as a whole.

However, in the long-term, terrorism in Pakistan remains a genuine threat. As noted above, many of the TTP commanders and leaders and their fighters have crossed the border into Afghanistan where they have joined their fellow ideological travelers and established safe-havens. They will assist the Afghan Taliban pursue their goal of regaining power in Kabul. And given the fragility of the Afghan state and the Afghan Taliban’s recent military successes, such an outcome remains a distinct possibility.

Needless to say, a Taliban victory in Afghanistan would be extremely bad news for Pakistan because Islamabad could expect the Afghan Taliban to assist its Pakistani counterparts to also seek power in Pakistan. In the meantime, the Pakistan Taliban hiding across the border will conduct operations back into Pakistan and progressively seep back into the tribal areas. As for the Taliban fighters who fled to the cities of Pakistan to join the thousands of militants already living there, expect them to conduct terrorist acts against innocent civilians and government and military targets. Urban terrorism may quite possibly rise, possibly becoming a much greater threat than what Pakistan has had to endure to date. All in all, despite some of the recent military successes, Pakistan has not yet been cleansed of the terrorist scourge.

Note: A version of this article also appeared in the Foreign Policy Magazine and Defense Journal, Pakistan.

The post The State Of Terror In Pakistan appeared first on Politact.

Context

Introduction
In a series of articles, PoliTact is examining the status of Taliban insurgency in each one of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Any realistic assessment of this region has to rely on objective and first hand access to the facts on the ground, to draw any meaningful conclusions or projections. In previous studies, we have examined the dynamics of Orakzai, Mohmand and Kurram and this article looks at Khyber Agency. 

Analysis

Location

 The Khyber tribal territory of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Agency (FATA) has since ancient times served as a doorway to invaders of India and traders from Central Asia and Afghanistan.

The total area of this tribal land is 2,756 Square Kilometers with a total population of 546,730. According to Statistics Department of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province, the literacy rate for males is 57.2% while for females it runs around 10.1%, with a total of 34.2% for the Khyber agency.

A prerequisite to understand the dynamics of Taliban insurgency in Khyber is to grasp the occurring of the surrounding tribal areas. Khyber is bordered by Kurram Agency towards the South West; Orakzai lies to the South while Mohmand is situated towards the north. One of the most strategically vital supply routes for NATO forces passes through the border down of Torkham in the West, leading into Nangarhar province of Afghanistan. To the East, lies Peshawar, the provincial capital of KP province of Pakistan.

Administrative Composition and Tribal Affiliations

Khyber Agency is composed of three subdivisions (Tehsils); Bara, Landi Kotal and Jamrud, and four main tribes of Afridi, Shinwari, Mullagori and Shimani inhabit Khyber. With the exception of Shinwari tribe that is situated in few areas of Landi Kotal subdivision, Afridi tribe and sub-tribes predominantly occupy all other areas of Khyber Agency.

Afridi tribe in Khyber Agency is subdivided into eight branches or sub-tribes: Adamkhel, Akakhel, Kamarkhel, Qamberkhel, Malikdikhel, Kukikhel, Zakakhel, and Sipah.

Militants belonging to extremist groups such as Lashkar-e-Islam and (LI) and Ansar-ul-Islam, including Pakistani Taliban groups (TTP) started to become active in Khyber around 2004. The makeup and orientation of LI is quite similar to Taliban.  LI is based in Afridi areas and most prominent in Bara sub-division of Khyber Agency. LI chief, Mangal Bagh, belong to Sipah sub-tribe, which is the least influential amongst Afridi clans. Recently the Tirah Valley has emerged as the emerging flash point in Khyber.

In order to understand the political and strategic significance of Khyber, one has to consider it from the perspective of:

• Khyber Agency for Pakistan
• The value of the tribal territory for Afghanistan and NATO forces there
• The criticality of Khyber for Afghan Taliban, TTP, and Al Qaeda strategy

Khyber Agency for Pakistan

For Pakistan, there is perhaps no other tribal area as valuable as Khyber, where it would want to maintain its influence. It can also be thought of as the heart of FATA, due to its proximity to Peshawar. It is also the tribal region that is most closely assimilated with Pakistan, brought about by not only its location but also the trade route which passes through it and connects Pakistan to Afghanistan. Additionally, running north to south, it is nearly the midsection, where Mohmand and Bajaur tribal territories lies to the north, and Orakzai, Kurram, North and South Waziristan, lying to the south of Khyber Agency.

Peshawar is exposed and is surrounded by tribal territories on three sides: north, west, and south. The mountain ranges provide some natural immunity to Peshawar. However, It’s connection with mainland Pakistan run towards the East. Therefore, Pakistan’s strategic imperatives in Khyber are twofold:

•  Build and maintain a buffer around Peshawar and keep Khyber relatively free of Taliban, and from any single group to dominate.
• To keep a key trade link between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and supply route for NATO forces, open, and to preserve this leverage over NATO.

Due to the current geopolitical realities of the region and history, Pakistan has traditionally considered the tribal area as a buffer zone and is sensitive to not alienate its people.

Like many other parts of Pakistan, the tribal territory, including Khyber, is also engulfed in a complex web of religious and ethnic tensions. Some of this is connected with the tussles of Deobandi and Barelvi schools of thought. Although LI is closer to Taliban, as they both subscribe to Deobandi orientation, however, this commonality has still prevented LI from forming an alliance with Pakistani Taliban (TTP). Nonetheless, it is widely believed that TTP is making steady inroads in Khyber despite inter-factional differences. In 2009, Khyber Agency encountered the highest number of terrorist attacks, including death and injuries, in all of FATA (see chart below).

It could be hypothesized that from Pakistan’s point of view, the center piece of its counter insurgency strategy in FATA, is to prevent Khyber from becoming fully embroiled in insurgency. Operations in Swat and South Waziristan and US drone attacks have had the effect of moving the extremists close to Khyber, such as in Orakzai and Kurram Agency, including Tirah Valley of Khyber. The two principal trade routes between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Chaman and Torkham, are likely to be impacted adversely if Pakistan does take on the much demanded North Waziristan Operation. Particularly, if it is combined with US pressure around Kandahar and other flash points along the border. Furthermore, it is also likely that terrorist activities and insurgency in Bajaur, Mohmand, and Swat in the north, would once again increase.

Khyber Agency for NATO and Afghan Forces

The NATO forces and Afghanistan share a common interest in Khyber Agency, which they share with Pakistan. For an example:

• To prevent militants and Pakistani Taliban from disrupting supply lines for military operations in Afghanistan.
• Avert any firm partnership to develop between Afghan Taliban, Pakistani Taliban and other militants, which could be against US and Indian interests in the region.

However, the interest of US, Afghanistan, and India diverge markedly, on which groups should have influence in the tribal areas of Pakistan, and in turn project their power in Afghanistan. Recent overtures from US towards a negotiated peace have also emboldened Karzai government to bring Afghan Taliban on board. Now the matter appears to be stuck on which faction of Afghan Taliban. However, US has mostly focused its attention on North and South Waziristan and this is where most of the drone attacks have taken place. If Pakistan conducts an operation in North Waziristan, the militants and terrorist there are likely to disperse and cause further problems for the state of Pakistan.

In the past, military pressure in Afghanistan has resulted in extremists moving to FATA. Similarly, facing operations in tribal areas of Pakistan, the militants either move to less active tribal regions or to Afghanistan.

In the long run, it would seem to be in Indian, US, and Afghan interests to develop a strategic leverage and influence in Khyber Agency and other tribal areas, to counter the traditional influence of Pakistan.

Khyber Agency for Al Qeada, Afghan, and Pakistani Taliban Strategy

The Al Qaeda grand strategy for the region is to keep the focus of Pakistani authorities divided so that it is unable to muster it’s forces at one point, as NATO and US would want. The Mumbai incident almost resulted in a war between Pakistan and India. Warnings have once again emerged from Western capitals, on the likelihood of another Mumbai style happening in India. The goal of any such incident would be to avert any operation in North Waziristan.

However, Al Qaeda strategy is not limited to Pakistan and the tribal areas. It also wants to divert the attention of NATO, US, and its allies in the region to many different fronts. Thus, Yemen and Somalia are increasingly becoming a focal point of global threats related to terrorism. Furthermore, like witnessed in Iraq, AQ would want to use local militant and extremist groups, to promote ethnic and religious upheaval in the rest of Middle East and South Asia.

The new US strategy envisions using local allies, and to build there capability to take on a majority of the combat role against extremists. On the other hand, AQ is relying on local extremists groups to target the local allies of US, and to turn the war against terror in to a war against Islam. Pakistani Taliban has repeatedly targeted lashkars created against extremists in tribal areas. For example, the suicide attack in Darra Adam Khel on November 5 claimed the lives of 60 people.

As far as the Khyber Agency is concerned, Pakistani Taliban would like to become a serious player there and be able to control the supply line for NATO forces in Afghanistan. Although Afghan Taliban would also want to damage the supply lines, it has attempted to keep its focus limited to Afghanistan and has not attempted to damage Pakistan’s interests.

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The post The Status of Taliban Insurgency in Khyber Agency appeared first on Politact.