The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was born in 1949 in the aftermath of World War II. NATO’s first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, provided a famous description of what he saw as the organization’s goal: “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down.” Since that time, the strength of the relationship between the European states and the United States has fluctuated, along with the credibility of an effective NATO defense against a prospective Soviet invasion. With the end of the Cold War and the Warsaw Pact, the traditional rationale for NATO’s existence vanished, so the organization’s supporters had to look for a new raison d’etre which could keep them united against emerging threats.

Analysis

European Unity and Divides

United States, for more than a century, has benefited from a divided and dependent Europe. The disappearance of the Soviet threat and the formation of European Union both jolted the purpose for which NATO was needed. Furthermore, the United States now wants both Germany and Japan, the losers of World War II, to share more of the international burden, especially in the war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in dealing with Russia. In general, though, Germany and France have both begun to take a direction towards a more independent foreign policy, which falls more in line with their historic status and role in Europe and in the world. In the backdrop of global economic woes, these pressures to some extent have also forced the United States to rethink its strategy in Afghanistan.

In the past, a Russian threat would have been enough to keep the Europeans united. But these powers, while concerned about China’s clout, are no longer sure of American leadership and wisdom and are more inclined to follow and develop their own path. As long as there is no direct threat to the security of Europe, it would be hard to keep them under one roof and this makes it harder for the United States to frame international agendas. The Russian’s are cleverly exploiting this rift and as a result, the United States has to rely more on Eastern European republics for support. Because of their history and geography, Eastern European countries believe they have much to fear from the resurgent bear. The United States on the contrary desires unified Germany to take on a more aggressive stance towards Russia, on which Germany is heavily dependent for energy resources.

France has been one of the uneasy members of the alliance that had initially left NATO in 1958, on quarrels related to its unequal status vis-a-vis the special relationship of United States and the United Kingdom. Then president of France Charles De Gaulle sought to establish a tripartite commission which would put France on equal footing with United States and United Kingdom. It had also wanted to extend the geographic reach of NATO to include Algeria, where France needed NATO’s help in fighting an insurgency. Furthermore, France wanted maneuvering room to negotiate its own peace with communist Eastern European nations, independent of NATO-Warsaw rivalries. (Under Nicholas Sarkozy, France has returned as a member of NATO since April 2009.)

The events of 911 seemed to breathe new life into NATO; the United States has attempted to enlist it in the fight against international terror. Now, it’s the United States not France, which wants to utilize NATO alliance to fight extremists. Another reason for the revival of NATO has come came in the form of resurgent Russia, for which many analysts believe, the alliance itself was to blame. According to them, when the Soviet Union dissolved, the United States had assured the Russians that NATO would not expand into its traditional sphere of influence. Now that NATO has offered Ukraine and Georgia Membership Action Plan (MAP) that trust has been violated. (The Membership Action Plan is a NATO programme of advice, assistance and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance.). From the American perspective, Iranian and North Korean nuclear threats also play a useful role in keeping the Europeans worried and tied to NATO.

Evolution of SCO Alliance

One must take into account another factor in order to fully understand the evolution of NATO and its future role: the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO is not only the result of an emerging alliance between China and Russia; it is competing with NATO for resources in Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia. Defeat in Afghanistan would not just be damaging to the United States but a lethal blow for NATO, probably strengthening the SCO. Similarly, for SCO to be really effective it is essential that Chinese and the Russians continue to cooperate and compromise towards their common interests.

In the context of South Asia, the tussle between NATO and the SCO assumes an especially interesting twist. Pakistan’s position vis-a-vis both alliances is an important one. Not only is the country a key “non-NATO Ally,” but it also has an Observer Status (which it shares with India and Iran) on the SCO Alliance. NATO wants Pakistan on its side so as to shape and implement its plans for the region and gain access to the region’s energy resources. On the other hand, Russia and China also wish to get their hands on these resources; one can see this in the just agreed upon Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline (An alternative gas-pipeline project favored by United States is the Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India – TAPI).

United States is equally courting to India and Pakistan to keep them away from SCO. Both India and Pakistan seem to be in no hurry to choose sides at this juncture. In case of Iran, it has good relations with China and Russia but none with United States. Things are beginning to change, as Iran is an important country not just for stabilizing Iraq but for Afghanistan and Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well. This has put Iran under tremendous external pressure.

For the moment though, all parties are cooperating against the threat of extremism. As mentioned above Afghanistan conflict is an issue that can make or break the credibility of these alliances. The cooperation and competition amongst these alliances cannot exist simultaneously forever.

It could very well be that there will be a reversion to the dynamics which existed in the South Asia region during the colonial era. In those days, Great Britain and France competed with each other and tried to keep the Russians out of the region. Later the American took over this role from Great Britain. If Germany and France continue to be lukewarm towards NATO and hew to an independent line regarding China and Russia, the United States will likely retaliate by blocking them out of the potential future benefits of following its lead. How this complicates the operations of the UN Security Council is anyone’s guess.

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Baitullah’s death could have major implications not only for Pakistan but for the region. For the first time, top leadership figures of the Taliban’s ‘irreconcilable’ elements are not only being targeted but eliminated, largely as a result of cooperation between Pakistan and the United States. And this even has been followed up by the arrest of a number of high-level TTP leaders and widespread reports of dissent in the ranks of the Taliban regarding succession issues. Now that Baitullah is no more, the focus of the Drone Attacks appears to be shifting to the Afghan Taliban.

Analysis

External Links

The AfPak Channel – Inside the War for South Asia (Foreign Policy and the New America Foundation)

US Strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan – Listen to The Diane Rehm Radio Show from NPR

The AfPak War – Special coverage of The Washington Post

The following are a list of potential developments produced as a result of PoliTact’s detailed assessment of the post-Baitullah environment:

Establishing Credibility and Revenge Attacks. Attacks on Pakistan’s major cities could decline in number. However, the danger remains that the newly appointed TTP chief, Hakimullah Mehsud, could attempt a string of suicide attacks in urban Punjab, the largest Pakistani province, to show he is worthy of his predecessor and also to avenge the elimination of Baitullah and the successes of Swat and Waziristan. There are also media reports of senior politicians being targeted. Unfortunately, past experience with FATA suggests that, given enough time and space, a new leadership will emerge. A period of infighting is usually followed by emergence of a leader who has proven himself, by killing or sidelining potential rivals.

The late TTP chief openly stated the he intended to launch attacks against the United States and the West. While he apparently lacked the resources for such a task, the danger shouldn’t be lightly dismissed. Muslim Khan, the spokesman for the Swat Taliban in Swat and now reportedly for TTP, claimed in his May 2009 interview that attacking the United States was a justifiable act.

There is reason to believe that Baitullah amassed several billion rupees through kidnappings and extortions, real estate in Dubai and inflows from the Gulf and Europe. He had the money to pay his fighters 20,000 to 30,000 rupees a year. While the Taliban has still not openly admitted that Baitullah is dead, whoever eventually replaces him will probably possess the financial resources needed for expertly conducted terrorist attacks.

Decline for Taliban Support among Religious Groups of Pakistan. Up to now, the Taliban has enjoyed a measure of support in some of Pakistan’s religious circles. For example, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamaatey Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) have criticized the army’s operation in Swat and other tribal agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The death of Baitullah, however, is expected to result in diminished support for Taliban among these groups.

An Improved Image for the Pakistan Army. The demise of Baitullah in a drone attack has lent increased credibility to the Pakistani Army’s campaign against the militants in Swat and FATA. True, the army was unable to capture or kill any of the senior leadership of the Taliban in Swat. But the death of Baitullah, an even bigger target, will provide a much-needed psychological boost for the armed forces, which in the past have faced strong criticism for making deals with the likes of Baitullah Mehsud. Moreover, the Pakistan Army had now proved to the West that given cutting-edge weaponry, it can competently handle formidable terrorist threats.

Increased Support for Drone Attacks. The death of Baitullah could deliver this message: hardcore terrorists are the chief casualties of drone attacks, not innocent women and children. However, although opposition to America’s drone attacks will be somewhat reduced, it will not end altogether. A case in point: Interior Minister Malik’s statement to a Pakistani journalist that “even if Baitullah Mehsud is killed, I condemn US drone attacks in Pakistan.” But that statement and similar ones by other politicians may be more for public consumption than for any other purpose.

A Change of Focus for the Drone Attacks. The Al-Qaeda’s grand strategy for Pakistan has been to keep the nation’s army engaged and distracted via its Taliban proxies, so that Pakistani and Afghan Taliban are freed up to attack US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. If the elimination of Baitullah actually results in the kind of disarray in its ranks currently reported by the press, then one of the objectives of the AfkPak policy will have been achieved. Now the focus of these drone attacks will swing back towards the Afghan Taliban.

Good and Bad News for the Afghan Taliban. The death of Baitullah will also definitely impact the Afghan Taliban, which was already opposed to Baitullah’s Jihad against the Pakistani armed forces. Led by Mullah Omar, The Afghan Taliban believes that the deluge of suicide attacks in Pakistani cities and on its armed forces have cost them the good will of elements of Pakistani society it wants as allies. For this reason, Mullah Omar had recently formulated new guidelines for the Taliban, forbidding it to launch suicide attacks on Pakistani cities. Followers of Baitullah ignored the edict while other Taliban commanders embraced it.

With Baitullah dead, the Afghan Taliban leadership could achieve a more coordinated alliance, with formerly independent elements falling in line. Fears that with the death of Baitullah more Pakistani Taliban, disenchanted with internal fighting among his successors, could cross into Afghanistan to take on NATO and American forces, might be justified. Lieutenant General Jim Dutton, International Security Assistance Force Deputy Commander in Afghanistan, had earlier warned that the operation against Baitullah Mehsud was “extremely important in defeating the Taliban on both sides of the Pak-Afghanistan border”. At the same time, however, the Taliban leadership will face a hard time holding meetings to plan and coordinate attacks, as the fear of the drones, which have made them vulnerable, grows.

The death of Baitullah will also increase pressure on the irreconcilable elements, at the same time enhancing Pakistan’s influence on various Taliban factions and escalating the politics of the good and bad Taliban.

The meeting with the US Naval Operations Chief was probably intended to calm the waters before the upcoming major maritime combat exercises between the US and India, to be held in October. Their purpose is to enhance interoperability between the armed forces of the two countries and will also be accompanied by the largest ground combat exercise that they have ever held together.

A Possible Hold on the Waziristan Operation. Meanwhile, Pakistani military sources have denied western media reports claiming that after the death of Baitullah, the army will not launch an operation in Waziristan and will also end air strikes and blockades of the area. In the present geopolitical environment, however, it seems likely that the Pakistan Army has in fact, at present, no intentions of taking on powerful Taliban commanders like Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Jalaluddin Haqqani of North Waziristan, and Maulvi Nazir of South Waziristan. All are opposed to fighting against the Pakistan Army. This could hamper the increasing rapport between Pakistan and the US. Pakistan will wait to see the outcome of the Taliban infighting and Afghan election, and observe the regional and global geopolitical environment, before progressing further.

Regional Implications

As the Taliban feels the pressure from Swat, Wazriristan and other areas of FATA, a number of outcomes are possible.

1. The Pakistani Taliban is likely to head for Southern Punjab, where they enjoy a measure of support from local Jihadists. Such an alliance could have the most dangerous consequences for India. Aware of the dimensions of this threat, especially in the post-Mumbai environment, India wants Pakistan to deal effectively with outfits like LeT, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and JuD. Pakistan has in recent days been carrying out raids against these Jihadi’s across the nation.
2. The Uzbek and Tajik forces, which drew support from Baitullah, are now more likely to return to Central Asia, in the process fanning support for Islamic Movements in Central Asia like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb ut-Tahrir. Moscow and China are both believed to be already on the alert for such developments, including NATO and US.
3. If, as some believe, Baluchistan hosts the Taliban Central Council, it could become a hot spot. The next drone targets could very well reside in Baluchistan, which is also the epicenter of Pipelinistan and the focus of geopolitical tussles between China, the United States, India, Iran and Afghanistan. Just this last weekend, Inspector General Frontier Corps Baluchistan, Major General Saleem Nawaz denied the claims of the western media that Mullah Omar and the Taliban’s Central Council were present in Baluchistan.

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An election run-off might complicate matters during this critical phase of the war. Common sense suggests that continuity at the political level would serve the interests of Afghanistan better than confusion, as the American surge falls into place. There are reports that General McChrystal, in his delayed assessment of the war in Afghanistan, may request doubling the number of troops to be used in the conflict.

If there were any lessons to be learned from the election held in Pakistan earlier this year, it was that the removal of Musharraf resulted in a radical change in the tactics and strategies employed by the country against the Taliban. Ironically, the ensuing domestic political confusion did not hamper, but actually helped, the Pakistani military meet its goals regarding the Taliban.

This context is important while we proceed to examine the elections and how they are impacted by regional and global political dynamics.

Analysis

How does one bring about change in a country where all the cards appear stacked against success? This question best sums up the geopolitical tragedy of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is a classic example of a nation in which the balance of foreign influences and interests, not internal factors, are critical in determining who rules. Thus the outcome of these elections will be decided largely by the interaction of regional powers – Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and India – as well as by the US, NATO, Russia and China, at the global level.

The media reports regarding public opinion suggest that Hamid Karzai will likely receive only plurality of the vote, perhaps 45%, followed by Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani, meaning that there will probably be a run-off. With Dostum (of Uzbek), Ismail Khan (Herat), Mohammad Qasim Fahim (Tajik) and Khalil Karimi (Hazara) as allies, Karzai has considerably bolstered his election prospects, despite the fact that he is domestically unpopular. In the absence of a better alternative, Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia would probably turn to him. Furthermore, Karzai has the kind of relationship with the Taliban which would make it easier for peace talks to take place. To what degree the US supports Karzai is a question mark.

An improved relationship between the United States and Iran is vital to a stable Afghanistan. A scenario where India and Pakistan were less wary of each another would also be a welcome development. The developing US-Russia rivalry is a third variable that could also impact Afghan politics and elections. A fourth is China’s concern over the increasing number of foreign troops in Afghanistan and the presence of extremists in FATA, which it suspects of ties with the Uighurs in the Xinjiang region.

The Afghanistan presidential election provided enough evidence for us to deduce certain facts about public sentiment in the country. First, Afghans are increasingly skeptical of the effectiveness of the coalition forces in Afghanistan and want more autonomy. Secondly, some of the candidates have aroused latent nationalistic feeling by discussing Pakistan’s dubious relationship with the Taliban and the status of the sensitive Durand Line. Thirdly, the great majority of Afghans are for commencing negotiations with the Taliban.

Such sentiments don’t jive with the major premise of the AfPak policy, which is greater cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan in countering the aggressions of the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The new policy is geared more towards negotiations with those Taliban elements who wish to part ways with Al-Qaeda. Advocates of AfPak assert that whatever its past record, Pakistan has now roused itself and is taking the fight to the Taliban, particularly those Taliban that are acting against the Pakistani state. The Obama Administration realizes that without the involvement of regional players and consideration of their security interests, Afghanistan cannot be pacified.

It is to the Al-Qaeda’s advantage to sow and exploit as many divisions, ethnic and/or religious, as it can, so as to make implementation of the AfPak strategy as difficult as possible. Furthermore, it might try to create a Mumbai-style incident so as to distract Pakistan. The warning issued by Indian Prime Minister two days ago against a new terrorist attack from Pakistan was to avert any such possibility. How much influence the Al-Qaeda still exercises in Iraq can also be tested by a serious escalation of violence there, which also has the potential to increase tensions between Iran and the United States.

Meanwhile, the Afghan Taliban, sensing the above-mentioned domestic political undercurrents in Afghanistan, appears to becoming more insistent in their demands for a timeline for the exodus of foreign forces before negotiations can occur. The recent statements by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar of Hizb-e-Islami are evidence of this. Moreover, the Afghan Taliban wants to use violence to intimidate voters, making the election a no-show. Lastly, by complicating the security situation in, and thwarting planned political arrangements for, the country, the Taliban wants to compel the coalition forces to see their efforts as futile, cut the best possible deal in their favor, and leave.

The death of Baitullah Mehsud and subsequent reports of infighting amongst various Taliban factions in FATA are nasty blows to the Afghan Taliban at this crucial juncture. How much impact they will have on the Afghan Taliban’s fighting machine, however, remains to be seen.

This much can be said with near certainty: whatever the outcome of the Afghanistan elections, all indicators point to an escalation in fighting in Afghanistan.

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Prior analysis from Politact has suggested that there was some kind of deal in the works between the TTP and Pakistan. There continue to be reports that this was indeed being pursued through Baitullah’s father-in-law, Mowlana Ikramuddin, at whose house Baitullah is believed to have been staying on the night of the attack. We had also pointed to the tightening juggernaut around Baitullah in our August 3rd report on the status of Pakistan’s Waziristan operation. In any event, we at Politact continue to believe that the irreconcilable elements of the Taliban will have a much harder time than before. For us, the phrase, “irreconcilable elements” refers to those Taliban factions which are unwilling to deal with the state of Pakistan, the United States or Afghanistan and are pursuing an independent political agenda.

The demise of Baitullah Mehsud will have important consequences, locally, regionally and internationally. Among them: for Al-Qaeda’s strategies regarding Afghanistan and Pakistan; the future of the TTP; the status of Pakistan’s Waziristan operation; the future of militancy and extremism in Pakistan; the Afghan Taliban and the war in Afghanistan; America’s AfPak Strategy; the domestic politics of Pakistan; The Pakistan-India relationship; Pakistan’s Counter-Insurgency Strategy; the views of the United States, NATO and Pakistan on the appropriate use of military force; and the future of controversial Drone Attacks and Drone technology.

Analysis

To begin with, the death of Baitullah is a significant blow to the morale of the Pakistani Taliban and other extremists. If indeed Baitullah is no more, the prospect of developing a leadership of similar caliber will be difficult, if not impossible.

Without strong leadership it will be hard to hold the TTP together and Al-Qaeda will try its utmost to remedy this. To Al-Qaeda it is critical to keep Pakistan distracted so as to allow the support lines for the Afghan Taliban to continue flowing. Therefore, the Afghan Taliban’s claim that this incident will not have any impact on the Afghan insurgency is a false one. It remains to be seen how those Taliban leaders, which use Pakistan for operating in Afghanistan, will react to this incident. Mowlawi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur will now feel more vulnerable than ever and this could make them more open to reconciliation. The Haqqani’s, meanwhile, would want to keep the momentum going in Afghanistan, as there is now more talk of negotiations and an exit framework by allies. Politact will be monitoring how these new dynamics plays out.

At the same time, the death of Baitullah vindicates the Pakistani Army’s strategy in the Waziristan operation. This incident, occurring as it did in the aftermath of the Swat operation, reflects favorably on the success of the nation’s new counter-insurgency strategy; it shows that the army is seizing the initiative from the Pakistani Taliban. It is also a sign of the high level of trust and coordination between Pakistani and American military forces (dismaying to the Indians). In the post-Baitullah environment, however, how the Pakistan military will react against the Taliban operating across the border in Afghanistan is still a question mark. This variable will be the ultimate challenge to the effectiveness of America’s AfPak policy.

Meanwhile, the Indians want to deploy the new zeal displayed by the Pakistanis against the Kashmiri Jihadis. It appears, however, that Pakistan’s current priority is to develop a soft corner with the United States before expecting any reciprocity on the Kashmir issue. This strategy seems to be working, as evidenced by statements from India’s Prime Minister at the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit in Sharm El-Sheikh last month. Prime Minster Singh agreed to the resumption of composite dialog between Pakistan and India and did not link it to the issue of terrorism; for this he had to take considerable flak back home.

We believe that both Pakistan and the United States should devote their energies to developing a more coherent stance on the drone attacks. With the passing of Baitullah, the improved relationship between the two countries has the potential to result in a more amicable solution. It should be pointed out, however that although Pakistanis in growing numbers believe that the drone attacks are beneficial to the country, the majority still see them as an infringement on national sovereignty.

The efficacy of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) technology has become increasingly apparent, especially in the context of an asymmetric warfare environment. That the United States is investing in production of more drones and reports indicates that they will be used more in Afghanistan as well. Meanwhile the Russians have also ordered drones from Israel, apparently as a result of their successful use in last year’s conflict with Georgia.

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Analysis

Pakistan wants to target and isolate Baitullah Mehsud while NATO and the United States also want to hit Mowlawi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadar in the South and North Waziristan respectively. All three have recently come together under a United Mujahidin Council. Recent drone attacks have been following Baitullah Mehsud and Mowlawi Nazir. These UAV attacks can be taken as stirring the pot, and then let Pakistan deal with the full brunt of Taliban menace. This also seems to be a strategy of diverting the Afghan war into Pakistan.

Mowlawi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadar are considered pro-Pakistan and they have up to now restricted themselves from targeting Pakistan military through a 16-month old peace treaty. Mowlawi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadar do carry out attacks across the border in Afghanistan.

The deadly attack over the weekend on a Pakistani military convoy in North Waziristan has claimed the lives of about 16 troops. Subsequently, the Taliban of North Waziristan announced scrapping of the treaty with Pakistan Army. They further claimed that they will attack the army as long as it does not stop support for the drone attacks and withdraw troops from Waziristan.

This development would make the Pakistan’s military operation in Waziristan extremely complex. Other than the aerial pressure, the military is unlikely to proceed further in its operation against Baitullah Mehsud, under the current environment. The Pakistan government has also announced that it’s not moving any troops from the eastern border with India. The Army will most likely try to salvage the treaty and provide some kind of assurance to Mowlawi Nazir and Haifiz Gul Bahadar that they will not be targeted once Baitullah is dealt with. While the reason United Mujahidin Council came in to existence was because these leaders stand convinced that this is exactly the strategy of Pakistan, to divide and weaken them.

The United States also does not trust the intent of Pakistan to go after all these players. Through peace pacts, these pro-government Taliban groups ensure the safety of Pakistan Army. At the same time, these groups are a source of NATO and American casualties across the border, which results in drone attacks in Pakistan.

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With the arrival of Zardari, Iran’s influence on Pakistan has been increasing as well; most illustrated by the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project. Traditionally, improvement of Pakistan’s relations with Iran comes at the expense of relations with Saudi Arabia. The most popular politician of Pakistan presently is the opposition leader Nawaz Sharif, who is also favored by the Saudi’s. How this dynamic will play-out as United States attempts its regional approach in the region, is yet to be seen.

The major foreign stakeholders in Iran are keeping their fingers crossed. The challenge is that no one knows for sure the true balance of the public sentiment in Iran. The media has played so many games that it has ended up in a trap i.e., confusion in assessing the true public opinion towards the reformers and the hardliners.

POLITACT predicts that the hardliners will be able survive the protests, but what we are seeing is the beginning of something that will play-out in the long-term. The pressure these demonstrators have built will force an incremental change in the power structure of the Iranian political institutions. These changes will not necessarily alter Iranian foreign policy or minimize its nuclear ambitions, but will make the nation more open to foreign influences. How Iran balances these influences while achieving its own interests is a test that the country has historically not handled well.

The post The Unfolding Iranian Crisis and Foreign Meddling appeared first on Politact.

Context

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As the Afghan war spreads deeper into Pakistan and its tribal areas, violence in the country’s urban areas has increased. Those who view these events as individual reactions to the Swat/Malakand Operation are deceiving themselves: in fact, the rise in violence is a consequence of a policy change.

The Pakistani government is currently ill-prepared to deal with these high-profile attacks and as a result is losing the public’s confidence.

Analysis

Some observers maintain that the attacks show a high level of ingenuity, but security lapses are too frequent to be explained solely in terms of terrorist sophistication. The targets of some recent high-profile attacks include: the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, the Sri-Lankan Cricket team, the ISI offices in Lahore and the Pearl Continental Hotel in Peshawar.

These attacks were successful in large part because in most cases not even the most elementary preventive measures were in place, not because of especially brilliant planning. In other cases what was lacking was serious attention to implementation of a contingency plan. Furthermore, the failure of the defensive plans to prevent or stop attacks was a sign of the ineptitude of the whole civilian security hierarchy and bureaucracy and raises the issue of whether their training and skills were up to snuff. The credibility of the politician is already at a low point; now the standing of the civil defense system, apparently unable to protect the public, is at stake.

If appropriate and stringent modern security measures were in place and employed, these attacks might have been prevented. All of these incidents, with perhaps the exception of the attack on the ISI offices in Lahore, involved a single catastrophic point of failure, which has the potential to wreak irreversible damage to the prestige and psyche of the country. The video footage of the attacks reveals that in each instance the security guards were caught off-guard by the speed with which the extremists executed their operations.

The intent here is not to blame the front-line security staff members themselves, but to point out that they were unfortunately a part of a bigger problem, a faulty security plan put together by their superiors. These higher-ups have failed so far to adapt to and counter frequently used extremist tactics. This points to their lack of modern training, which involves quick information sharing and analysis. Before any remedial action can be taken, failures in the existing apparatus have to be identified and then rectified immediately.

As to the new AfPak policy: it is based on the misplaced assumption that the Afghan Taliban and the insurgents in Aghanistan can be held at bay by controlling the cross border support for the Afghan Taliban from Pakistan’s tribal areas. Those who hold this view also maintain that pressure needs to be mounted on the Pakistani Taliban in the Pushtun support belt of the tribal areas of Pakistan. Some observers say that the failure to do this helps explain the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 80s. It should be pointed out, however, that although this might work out well in the short run, it will result in a strategic debacle over the long haul, by widening the theater of war and creating a civilian nightmare in the form of IDPs. If the United States and NATO, with their combined might, have not been able to isolate the troublemakers in Afghanistan, how can one expect Pakistan do so? Again, the above outlined approach risks spreading the war deeper into Pakistan, as the extremist and jihadist are not defined by region, nationality, or ethnicity but by an ideology spanning many Islamic countries and populations. In fact, targeted and precision weaponry in the hands of Pakistanis can be much more effective than large scale military operations (often resulting in civilian casualties) in dealing with the militants and eliminating their leadership. Large scale civilian casualties provide excellent ammunition for the extremists, strengthening passionate mass opposition to the Unites States, NATO and Pakistan.

No other measure can better reinforce the Pakistani resolve against extremists than support in the Kashmir dispute. This is also the issue by which the United States and the West can heal their credibility gap and burnish their public image in the region, giving teeth to their contention that they are not at war against Islam. President Obama’s speech in Egypt was the first major sign that the U.S. has this as a goal. Moreover, this approach is the most effective way to divide Al-Qaeda from the Taliban and the Punjabi/Kashmiri Jihadi’s. Without some improvement in America’s image, to be accomplished by quick, visible action regarding Kashmir and the Israel-Palestine conflict, no one – not the Pakistani Army, NATO, the American forces – can win against this rapidly spreading and deadly virus. Settling the Kashmir issue is not a losing proposition for India either, since the disastrous consequences of failing to do so through a negotiated settlement are becoming increasing clear. This refers not only to the nuclear threat but to the nexuses of Al-Qaeda, Taliban, and Jihadist groups that could, in the long run, gobble up both Pakistan and India.

Meanwhile, events such as the suicide bombing of the Mosque in Dir and the PC hotel in Peshawar, as well as the assassination of moderate religious scholars in Lahore, are tarnishing the image of the Taliban. The people of Pakistan are responding with growing resolve and increasing support for the army’s operations against Taliban militants and other extremists. Winning the hearts and minds of the public is one of the most challenging tasks involved in the war against terrorism, but it is esse

The post The Suicide Attack on the Pearl Continental Hotel in Peshawar – A Lesson in the Battle Of Public Perceptions appeared first on Politact.

The Pakistani government is currently ill-prepared to deal with these high-profile attacks and as a result is losing the public’s confidence.

Some observers maintain that the attacks show a high level of ingenuity, but security lapses are too frequent to be explained solely in terms of terrorist sophistication. The targets of some recent high-profile attacks include: the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, the Sri-Lankan Cricket team, the ISI offices in Lahore and the Pearl Continental Hotel in Peshawar.

Analysis

These attacks were successful in large part because in most cases not even the most elementary preventive measures were in place, not because of especially brilliant planning. In other cases what was lacking was serious attention to implementation of a contingency plan. Furthermore, the failure of the defensive plans to prevent or stop attacks was a sign of the ineptitude of the whole civilian security hierarchy and bureaucracy and raises the issue of whether their training and skills were up to snuff. The credibility of the politician is already at a low point; now the standing of the civil defense system, apparently unable to protect the public, is at stake.

If appropriate and stringent modern security measures were in place and employed, these attacks might have been prevented. All of these incidents, with perhaps the exception of the attack on the ISI offices in Lahore, involved a single catastrophic point of failure, which has the potential to wreak irreversible damage to the prestige and psyche of the country. The video footage of the attacks reveals that in each instance the security guards were caught off-guard by the speed with which the extremists executed their operations.

The intent here is not to blame the front-line security staff members themselves, but to point out that they were unfortunately a part of a bigger problem, a faulty security plan put together by their superiors. These higher-ups have failed so far to adapt to and counter frequently used extremist tactics. This points to their lack of modern training, which involves quick information sharing and analysis. Before any remedial action can be taken, failures in the existing apparatus have to be identified and then rectified immediately.

As to the new AfPak policy: it is based on the misplaced assumption that the Afghan Taliban and the insurgents in Aghanistan can be held at bay by controlling the cross border support for the Afghan Taliban from Pakistan’s tribal areas. Those who hold this view also maintain that pressure needs to be mounted on the Pakistani Taliban in the Pushtun support belt of the tribal areas of Pakistan. Some observers say that the failure to do this helps explain the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 80s. It should be pointed out, however, that although this might work out well in the short run, it will result in a strategic debacle over the long haul, by widening the theater of war and creating a civilian nightmare in the form of IDPs. If the United States and NATO, with their combined might, have not been able to isolate the troublemakers in Afghanistan, how can one expect Pakistan do so? Again, the above outlined approach risks spreading the war deeper into Pakistan, as the extremist and jihadist are not defined by region, nationality, or ethnicity but by an ideology spanning many Islamic countries and populations. In fact, targeted and precision weaponry in the hands of Pakistanis can be much more effective than large scale military operations (often resulting in civilian casualties) in dealing with the militants and eliminating their leadership. Large scale civilian casualties provide excellent ammunition for the extremists, strengthening passionate mass opposition to the Unites States, NATO and Pakistan.

No other measure can better reinforce the Pakistani resolve against extremists than support in the Kashmir dispute. This is also the issue by which the United States and the West can heal their credibility gap and burnish their public image in the region, giving teeth to their contention that they are not at war against Islam. President Obama’s speech in Egypt was the first major sign that the U.S. has this as a goal. Moreover, this approach is the most effective way to divide Al-Qaeda from the Taliban and the Punjabi/Kashmiri Jihadi’s. Without some improvement in America’s image, to be accomplished by quick, visible action regarding Kashmir and the Israel-Palestine conflict, no one – not the Pakistani Army, NATO, the American forces – can win against this rapidly spreading and deadly virus. Settling the Kashmir issue is not a losing proposition for India either, since the disastrous consequences of failing to do so through a negotiated settlement are becoming increasing clear. This refers not only to the nuclear threat but to the nexuses of Al-Qaeda, Taliban, and Jihadist groups that could, in the long run, gobble up both Pakistan and India.

Meanwhile, events such as the suicide bombing of the Mosque in Dir and the PC hotel in Peshawar, as well as the assassination of moderate religious scholars in Lahore, are tarnishing the image of the Taliban. The people of Pakistan are responding with growing resolve and increasing support for the army’s operations against Taliban militants and other extremists. Winning the hearts and minds of the public is one of the most challenging tasks involved in the war against terrorism, but it is essential to its success.

The post The Suicide Attack on the Pearl Continental Hotel in Peshawar – A Lesson in the Battle Of Public Perceptions appeared first on Politact.

Context
Changing Winds – a Rare Alignment

Surprised observers have called attention to the operations conducted by the Pakistani Army in Buner, Dir and the Swat Valley. The Army appears to be acting decisively under civilian command, launching an attack against Taliban militants; it is enjoying widespread public support. One might jump to the conclusion that the operation was launched in response to American pressure, but there are in fact other reasons.

The fatal blunders, both tactical and strategic, of TNSM and Mowlana Fazlullah played a significant role. There are a number of important events, occurring in quick succession, that served as nails in the coffin of the Swat Treaty of 2009.

Analysis

The first nail was the release of a video showing a group of armed Pushtun men flogging a helpless young woman. No explanation of why the girl was being punished in this way, no interpretation of applicable Sharia laws justifying such a punishment, could excuse it in the court of local and international public opinion and scholarly religious circles.

The second nail was the speech of Mowlana Sufi Mohammad himself, characterizing the Pakistan system of governance as un-Islamic. This speech was a cruel blow to groups such as the ANP, PPP and Muslim League-N, which had succeeded in getting the Nizam-e-Adal approved despite heavy resistance from domestic progressive forces and Western criticism. Equally insulted were the heavy-duty Islamic actors in Pakistan such as JUI-F and JI. These religious parties work within the political system of Pakistan and they retaliated with harsh criticisms of the Islamic interpretation provided by TNSM, the Swat Taliban and Sufi Mohammad.

The third nail was the Swat Taliban’s refusal to lay down arms once Nizam-e-Adal was signed by the President of Pakistan. In addition, the Taliban appeared in Buner, which convinced the military that the organization has more than local ambitions and is targeting the state of Pakistan. These actions exposed the religious and political naivete of the TNSM and the Swat Taliban.

Once the real nature of the Swat Taliban and TNSM was out in the open, the civilian government of Pakistan had little left to convince the West and its own progressive forces regarding the Swat Treaty. So General Patraeus gave the civilian Pakistani government two weeks to prove its credibility on this issue and once Pakistani public opinion turned against the militants, the army responded by launching its operation.

Another factor underlying the military operation in Swat was irresistible pressure from India. Just a few hours before Zaradri’s visit to the United States, India concluded its ‘Hindi Shakti’ anti-terror exercise with assistance from Israeli elite and commando forces. According to an Israeli website, the drill took place on the plains of Indian Punjab, near the Pakistani border. Israeli military instructors in India and Israel are training the Indian Kharga Corps to operate in areas targeted by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. India is sending the message that it is willing and able to deal with these terrorists in Pakistan, if that country itself is reluctant to do so. In the post-Mumbai environment, India’s case is convincing, as long as the West can ensure that Pakistan’s nuclear assets will not be used.

So it was response to strain both within and without Pakistan that the Swat operation was launched. The chance for its success lie in how effectively the Pakistani government handles the internally displaced persons (IDP’s), which some claim to be as high as one million in number. The longer the operation lasts, the greater the risk that these IDP’s will be forgotten and their lives permanently ruined, thus becoming prime recruits for the Taliban and other terrorist groups.

Another factor in the long-term success of the operation is its effectiveness in dealing with extremists in other tribal areas as well, which the government and the military have not attempted to do in the past. The recent military operation in Pakistan begs the question: it is just an isolated one, designed to deal with the Swat Taliban? Pakistan believes that each tribal agency is different, with unique political and social circumstances. In the opposing view, embodied in America’s new Af-Pak policy, without a coordinated and overarching counter-insurgency strategy for the country, these isolated and disjointed operations will have little impact on the overall security picture of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan warns against the implementation of this overarching strategy, arguing that it risks uniting these apparently scattered militants, as well as provoking Pushtun resentment, in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The larger the size of the IDP’s and the longer they remain displaced, the harder it will be avoid the perception that it is the Pushtun suffering on both sides of the Durand line.

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