Arif Ansar

Context

After long and arduous negotiations, the US reached an agreement with the Afghan Taliban in 2020, which came to be known as Doha Accords. While the treaty was agreed on during the Trump administration, it was the Biden government that abruptly decided to withdraw all forces from Afghanistan in 2021.

In the aftermath off 9/11, US had launched a full-fledged military operation against the Mullah Omar led Taliban regime in Afghanistan, for providing refuge to the planner of the first strikes on American soil since Pearl Harbor, Osama bin Laden, and subsequently refusing to break ties with Al Qaeda (AQ).

Afghan Taliban’s closest ally at the time, Pakistan, was conveyed a stern message, “you are either with us or against us”. The then military ruler General Pervaiz Musharraf, who had overthrown the democratic government of Nawaz Sharif in 1999, considered it a god-send opportunity to gain international credibility and getting on the good side of the US. Thus began the double game the nation was accused of, providing hinterlands to the Afghan Taliban in its tribal areas (previously FATA) while also allowing access to the NATO supply lines, running from Karachi to Afghanistan.

This approach complicated matters domestically and provided stimulus to the growth of local militants, such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). TTP began to strike security and military targets deep inside Pakistan while assisting Afghan Taliban to fight NATO forces.

Good versus Bad Taliban

As the US launched an offensive in Afghanistan following 9/11, most of the Taliban and AQ leadership dispersed, ending up in Pakistan. And thus pressure built on the country to take military action against such elements. While initially reluctant, with military equipment and financial support from the US, Pakistan conducted a number of such operations in formerly FATA region to flush out the militants. This list includes Al-Mizan, Rah-e-Raast, Rah-e-Nijat, Zarb-e-Azb, and Rad-ul-Fasaad.

The nations participation in the campaign against extremism was marked by what came to be known as Good versus Bad Taliban. TTP was labelled as the Bad Taliban and Pakistan’s security forces would take military action against them – but would not act against Haqqani Network, a faction of Afghan Taliban. Haqqani Network were considered Good Taliban and concentrated their activities to fight NATO in Afghanistan. NATO and US security officials had consistently warned that this approach would one day backfire.

US decision to negotiate a settlement with Afghan Taliban did not come easily. In fact, Pakistan had been conveying to the American counterparts from the get-go, the best approach to Afghan years long quagmire was to reach a negotiated settlement. The angry superpower was in no mood for any talks in the beginning and used its military and technological might to crush the rag-tag Taliban. In fact, every time Pakistan tried to make deals with local militant groups, which were attacking Pakistan’s security forces and supporting Afghan Taliban across the border, the leaders of these groups would end up dead at the hands of mysterious drone strikes. The list includes the names of notorious leaders such as Hakimullah Mehsud and Baitullah Mehsud. When pushed by US authorities to act against militant groups in FATA, Pakistan officials reportedly would claim, you Americans will leave one day but we have to live over here. And obviously, the country always had its archenemy India in the back of its mind.

Reconcilable versus Irreconcilable

Up until 2009, the US under Obama was surging its forces in Afghanistan as the fighting escalated. On the other hand, overtime US strategic thinking towards the array of extremist groups operating in the region evolved into what was called the Reconcilable versus Irreconcilable groups.

Under this approach, local groups such as Afghan Taliban with local grievances were considered reconcilable. However, groups like AQ carrying global agenda, and responsible for 9/11 and attacks in other parts of the world, were deemed irreconcilable and terrorists. Thus, the military pressure against Afghan Taliban was to bring them to the negotiation table, while emphasis was on eliminating AQ and its leadership altogether. Under the Doha Agreement, Afghan Taliban agreed to break ties with whatever was left of AQ. Moreover, to prevent Afghan soil from being used for attacks against American allies. The language was vague about if allies included Pakistan.

Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, Afghanistan, and TTP

Since US withdrew its forces from Afghanistan in 2021, there have been occasional attacks attributed to Daesh, but the country has largely been peaceful. This cannot be stated about its neighbor Pakistan.

Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) led government assisted the American departure from Afghanistan and exerted its pressure on Afghan Taliban to facilitate dialogue with the US. US position to negotiate with the Taliban aligned with what Imran Khan had propagated for a long time as the solution for the stalemate in Afghanistan. As the US left, the question of how to deal with Bad Taliban, such as TTP, became center-stage for Pakistan.

The PTI government and the then military chief Qamar Javed Bajwa attempted to use negotiations and connections with the Afghan Taliban to reign-in TTP. As the foreign occupier had no more presence, it was hoped that TTP would suspend its activities as well. This is not how matters have turned out.

During the phase of talks with TTP, the situation remained relatively calm within Pakistan. However, as TTP presented its key terms, some of them were deemed dead on arrival. One of them being that Pakistan remove its forces from tribal areas and reverse the merger of FATA with the mainland. Moreover, it also emerged that Afghan Taliban while were promoting talks between the TTP and Pakistan but were unwilling to step further if TTP does not listen. Afghan Taliban did offer to relocate the militants from the border areas to other parts in Afghanistan. Thus, it appeared that relying solely on negotiations with TTP may not work.

As this was taking shape, another thorny issue also started to develop between the US and Pakistan. While the US had militarily vacated from Afghanistan, it committed to maintain over the horizon (without boots on the ground) pressure on the Afghan Taliban, and to prevent AQ and other extremists from regrouping. For this, reportedly it sought military cooperation with Pakistan, which the PTI government refused. PTI and its leader Imran Khan were highly sensitive to the steep toll the nation had paid in blood and treasure for its involvement in the campaign against terror.

From Negotiation to Military Operations

The elimination of Ayman al Zawahiri through a Kabul drone strike in July 2022 demonstrated that Afghan Taliban were not fully living up to their promises – and that US was maintaining over the horizon assault capabilities. Moreover, recent reports indicate collusion between TTP, Baloch insurgents and India, to counter CPEC.

Targeting of Chinese personnel working on CPEC related projects, accompanied by political chaos and economic meltdown that accompanied the removal of PTI government, complicated the challenge for the present civil-military establishment on how to deal with the threat posed by TTP. In other words, it was not just US seeking Pakistan’s assistance to maintain pressure on different brands of extremists, but now also China.

On June 23rd, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced Pakistan’s new counter-terrorism operation, Azm-e-Istehkam (Resolve for Stability), to enhance the country’s efforts against terrorism and extremism. This initiative integrates kinetic military actions with non-kinetic measures, engaging all branches of the state.

Azm-e-Istekham’s represents a significant shift in Pakistan’s security strategy. It recognizes that policies that accommodate extremists through peace dialogues and supporting the Afghan Taliban’s return to power have proven detrimental. The military has announced that, in addition to small-scale operations targeting traditional terrorist groups, it will also take action against political dissenters especially those labeled as “digital terrorists” for spreading anti-military sentiments on social media.

Azm-e-Istekham and Pakistan-China Ties

The launch of Azm-e-Istekham is widely seen as Pakistan’s last-ditch effort to address growing Chinese security concerns regarding the safety of its 29,000 citizens in Pakistan, including 2,500 working on the $62 billion CPEC projects. Pakistan’s failure to mitigate the vulnerability of Chinese personnel and infrastructure, which have been targeted in recent terrorist attacks, has tested China’s patience and its reliance on Pakistan as an effective security provider. Frustrated by the political instability and volatile security situation in Balochistan and KPK, where over half of the CPEC projects are located, China has gone so far as to demand that Pakistan hand over security to Chinese forces, hinting at the possibility of establishing a Chinese military base on the Arabian Sea shores near Gwadar Port.

Pakistan cannot afford to allow Chinese military bases on its soil, as this would severely compromise its reputation as a sovereign nation and undermine the credibility of its military. Additionally, this would be seen as a highly threatening escalation as it relates to the great power rivalry.

In June, Prime Minister Sharif and military chief Asim Munir made a five-day trip to China to reassure the Chinese government of their commitment to providing security. This visit was followed by Senior Chinese official Liu Jianchao’s trip to Pakistan, during which he strongly expressed Chinese concerns about Pakistan’s political instability and deteriorating security situation, emphasizing the need for political consensus and enhanced security measures. Through Azm-e-Istekham, Pakistan is taking a gamble to regain China’s trust and demonstrate its capability to manage the situation before China resorts to more assertive actions.

Azm-e-Istekham and US-Pakistan Ties

The Azm-e-Istekham operation capitalizes on the shared interests between US and Pakistan towards combating extremism. For Pakistan, the operation would reinvigorate counter terrorism cooperation with the US. Demonstrating support for this new initiative, the US expressed its intention to establish high-level counter terrorism dialogue, including funding robust counter terrorism capacity-building programs, and supporting a series of US-Pakistan military-to-military engagements.

Azm-e-Istekham consists of three components: doctrinal, societal, and operational. Work is already being done on the first two phases, and the third phase is set to be implemented soon, contingent on the delivery of sophisticated small arms and communication equipment.

U.S. has delivered limited support to Pakistan’s law enforcement agencies. Last year, US Ambassador to Pakistan, Donald Blome, had announced an $8 million package to upgrade the anti-terrorist police force in Balochistan.

It is highly likely that the US, which renewed its defense pact named Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) with the country last year, will provide additional military aid to help Pakistan combat terrorism. This would be the reflection of President Biden’s renewed interest in Pakistan. In his letter to Prime Minister Shehbaz in March he expressed Washington’s desire to renew partnership with Islamabad to tackle pressing global and regional challenges.

US Elections and Azm-e-Istehkam

In the grand scheme of things, the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan in 2021 was based on a thinking portrayed by former president Donald Trump. He wanted to focus on the US more – calling it Making America Great Again (MAGA). In Europe, he stressed NATO to pay more for its defense needs if it desires American security guarantees. And in Afghanistan, it was the evolution of the strategy: what could be militarily done was achieved, by weakening and dismantling AQ, and thus a political solution was needed. Moreover, it was a realization that war against extremism had distracted it from dealing with global rivals, China and Russia.

In Pakistan, the reverse appears to be occurring. While it favored political solution in Afghanistan, it is turning to a kinetic approach when it’s in a least favorable position to do so – economically and politically, and without much needed public support.

From the conditions TTP presented it’s clear it aspires for a space from where to extend their reach. Moreover, how TTP wants to achieve these demands, i.e., through terrorism – as compared to negotiations, needs to be transformed. To change the way TTP is going about its demands will require a change in Afghan Taliban thinking first. While Afghan Taliban were fighting foreign troops, there is no such validity in case of TTP – as it relates to Pakistan. TTP using the argument that it seeks to implement Sharia does not garner much merit.

To alleviate the source of TTP’s appeal requires integration of FATA into the mainstream while improving the infrastructure and economic wherewithal of the areas involved. Moreover, to empower groups like Pashtun Tahafaz Movement (PTM) in helping to bring the disgruntled towards political inclusion and addressing grievances.

While the Biden administration has been supportive of the present regime in Pakistan, Trump may take a different approach. Trumps foreign policy, also reflected by the selection of VP nominee JD Vance, would be to appease Russia and end the Ukraine conflict, as they’ve already stated. The key emphasis would be to dent the China-Russia strategic ties. In the Middle East, Trump will likely pick up the Abraham Accords from where it was interrupted, due to the October 7 attack by Hamas on Israel. This would mean recognition of not only the two-state solution, but also Israel, and going hard against Iran.

In South Asia, Trump is likely to exert pressure on both India and Pakistan to counter China. Any anti-terror campaign will be seen through this lens – and the emphasis will likely be more on India oriented militants. In his previous term, Trump had even talked about facilitating the resolution of the issue of Kashmir between India and Pakistan.

PoliTact’s South Analyst Naad-E-Ali Sulehria contributed to this article

The post Political Or Military Solution; Pakistan’s New Counter-Terrorism Operation Azm-e-Istehkam appeared first on Politact.

Context

As Biden administration formulates its Pakistan policy, and reviews the Afghan peace deal reached in February last year – a debate is raging in both US and Pakistan based think tanks on the future of US-Pakistan relations. It is like a new season of an exciting Netflix drama serial, only that this one has been continuing for about two decades. For all intents and purposes Biden administration represents Season 4 of the US-Pakistan serial which has seen many twists and turns. During this period, several terms were used to represent the ties, such as ‘frenemies’ or a troubled marriage heading towards a divorce.

If we use this analogy, the serial started right after the 9/11 attack – represented by season 1 under Bush, followed by Obama’s season 2, and Trump’s season 3 just concluded on January 20^th.

What may happen in season 4 requires an understanding of the plot. And the great debate ranging in the think tank world represent this assessment. One of the assertions is that although the nation has maintained an important position during the previous administrations, its likely to be low on Biden’s priority list. This emphasis is not much different than the approach adopted under Trump where military aid was cut to Pakistan. A greater emphasis was towards global adversaries than on countering extremism or promoting human rights. The analysts are thus suggesting areas around which convergences can be built.

Some have mentioned that Pakistan can help build bridges between US and China, just as it can between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Others have emphasized trade as the focus, and cooperation in dealing with the pandemic and climate change. As the balance of power in the Muslim world is shifting away from the Arab world and towards the peripheral nations of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, the country can play an active balancing role vis a vis the global powers.

On the other hand, Pakistan is stressing it has moved away from geopolitics to geoeconomics, as witnessed by CPEC like initiatives. This has been a consistent message from Pakistan’s National Security Advisor, Moeed Yusuf, who recently spoke at the Karachi council on Foreign Relations and Woodrow Wilson Center.

Under the Coronavirus induced circumstances, this could be interpreted to mean that the nations focus is on economics and less on engaging in another kinetic phase in Afghanistan – which has devastated Pakistan’s social fabric and economy. And this mantra goes along with the policy the present Prime Minister Imran Khan adopted when he came to power in 2018 – that it can help in making peace but not in the continuation of war. Just about the same time, US also shifted its position, which resulted in direct talks with the Afghan Taliban. Previously, Taliban had consistently refused to negotiate with the Afghan government, calling it a puppet.

In essence, as opposed to the thrust on military solutions that had remained the hallmark of Bush and Obama administrations, under Imran Khan, Pakistan’s assistance was focused on facilitating the peace talks with Afghan Taliban. The concentrated efforts, and cooperation from China, Russia, and Iran, resulted in an agreement between the US and Afghan Taliban in February 2020.

The peace deal was not arrived at easily and there were obstacles at each step of the way, consistently from the same sets of players. The very first challenge perhaps came from President Karzai when Taliban were allowed to open an office in Doha in 2013, carrying the sign and flag of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. He argued that peace talks should be Afghan led.

In September 2019, the talks between the US and Taliban were abruptly broken off by President Trump – when peace deal was nearly at hand. Reportedly, he called-off talks due to an attack carried out by Afghan Taliban in Kabul that killed an American soldier. The confusion remained for some time if Trump had permanently abandoned the talks or if it was a temporary suspension. Moreover, he faced severe push back from Ashraf Ghani’s government. Senior former US officials with experience in Afghan affairs recommended US should not pullout before a real peace agreement, or in other words a responsible withdrawal.

Even when the deal was signed, everybody knew that the next step of intra-Afghan talks will be even more difficult, especially because of the role of spoilers, especially India. Heating global power tussles between US and China during the Trump administration added another dimension of worries. Up to now, global powers have cooperated when it comes to Afghanistan. Can it stay that way is not guaranteed.

As Biden administration evaluates its Afghan options, it is important to keep perspective of how we arrived at this juncture, what has already been tried. More importantly, to not get distracted under different pressures, especially when domestic challenges are mounting for the US. Keeping in view the historical context, about what can be achieved in Afghanistan at present – may not be possible six months from now.

How Did We Get Here?

Season 1 – 9/11 Attack (2001-2008)

Bush administration had been in power for about nine months when September 11 attacks struck the US. America launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) on October 7, 2001 with military strikes against Al Qaeda (AQ) and Afghan Taliban. The Taliban government crumbled quickly. While there were confrontations like the Battle of Tora Bora in December 2001, Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters mostly retreated to fight another day.

Early on US pressured Pakistan to join what later became known as the Global War on Terrorism. The nation had been one of the few, including UAE and Saudi Arabia, that recognized the Taliban government. The military ruler General Pervez Musharraf decided to support the US and to go after former allies, the Afghan Taliban.

In the aftermath of the 1999 short and bloody Kargil conflict, then the army chief Pervez Musharraf had overthrown the civilian government in October 1999, removing Nawaz Sharif from power. For this US had slapped sanctions on his government, which were in addition to the ones imposed on Pakistan and India in the aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests. For Musharraf’s support in Afghanistan, Bush lifted all sanctions on Pakistan in October 2001.

The 9/11 attacks presented an opportunity for Musharraf to gain international credibility. It was only later the realization dawned that AQ and Taliban had mostly slipped away from Afghanistan into the ungoverned Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

While US got distracted by going into Iraq in 2003, Bush administration increased pressure on Pakistan to launch military operations in FATA to eliminate what it termed as safe havens. Pakistan moved nearly hundred thousand troops from the Indian border towards Afghanistan to tackle the issue. US also conducted thousands of drone strikes in FATA between 2004 and 2018 to go after the extremist leaders hiding there. But Pakistan’s military operations in FATA, including the Lal Masjid operation in July 2007, accompanied by drone strikes, started to create an ominous backlash internally. It was unclear if the US drone strikes were occurring with Pakistan’s acquiescence – but it would publicly protest the strikes vehemently as violation of its sovereignty.

Many high value targets and facilities were hit in Pakistan as extremist reprisal spread, with thousands of civilian and soldiers killed and maimed. According to Dawn newspaper, Pakistan’s economic loss in the war against terror was a figure around $126.79 billion. The security and political turmoil, including the civil-military divide, was reflected by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007.

By this time, the internal politics of Pakistan had gotten fully intertwined with the support it was providing US in the war against extremism and at what cost. While Musharraf had become increasingly unpopular, and US grievances with him grew, the death of Benazir Bhutto demonstrated that this was a battle for Pakistan’s survival too.

The Mumbai Attack in November 2008, just about a month and a half before Obama was inaugurated on Jan 2009, created fresh headaches for Pakistan on how it was dealing with good and bad extremists.

Season 2 – Obama’s AfPak

On assuming power, President Obama initiated an exhausting evaluation of the US Afghan policy, which later adopted the acronym of AfPak. The late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke was appointed to lead the office, whose mandate was to originally include India, but that part was dropped due to heavy lobbying from the country. This may have been a critical mistake, as India remains opposed to any negotiated settlement with Afghan Taliban.

At the time it was assumed that the new policy would break from the Bush era focus on kinetic approach, and tilt more towards a diplomatic surge and a search for political solutions based on a regional emphasis. Obama’s assessment went through a metamorphosis of sorts and ended up being an evaluation of the entire US foreign policy. Reappraisal of policy involved the critical questions of what is at stake for America in Afghanistan? Dealing satisfactorily with this inquiry required evaluating US interests globally, understanding how they are related and then prioritizing in terms of the prevailing economic recession at the time.

The strategy that finally emerged represented the competing institutional influences that shape American foreign policy. Obama had to balance domestic economic realities with the perception of appearing weak on national security threats, a leverage he did not want to offer to the Republican Party. Additionally, he also wanted to fulfill his campaign promises of pulling troops out of Iraq and focusing on Afghanistan. Specifically, the new strategy opted for sending 30,000 more troops while setting a timeline for an exit to begin by July 2011.

The new US policy was followed-up with a process of strategic dialogue with Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. What transpired from this dialogue with India was a civil nuclear deal, the groundwork for which was laid during the Clinton administration. On the other hand, Kerry-Lugar-Berman aid package ran into controversy because of provisions that many in Pakistan thought compromised its sovereignty. The Raymond Davis incident in January 2011 further validated Pakistan’s apprehensions. At the same time, Mumbai attacks and dealings associated with David Hadley, increased cooperation between US and India against groups such as LeT based in Pakistan.

Thus, the feeling of mistrust between US and Pakistan continued to increase, with both actors blaming each other for playing a double game. The Operation Geronimo gave further evidence of how deeply each party distrusts the other, while claiming to be strategic partners. The subsequent Memogate Affair, followed by the Salala Incident on November 26, 2011 further dented the relationship. A perception grew that the Civil-Military divide in Pakistan was being exploited.

During Obama’s tenure, war against extremism had expanded quite wide and included Yemen, Syria, and Libya. Moreover, by 2011 and onward the extremist threat had transformed as many new groups came in to being, such as Daesh (also known as ISIS and ISIL). Moreover, the Arab Spring related upheaval was further destabilizing many regimes in the MENA theater, to be exploited by extremists and other global adversaries.

As US was over-consumed by the war against extremism, China and Russia were resurging. China launched the Belt and Road global infrastructure initiative in 2013, with CPEC being one of its main arteries. At the cost $62 billion China plans to upgrade Pakistan’s infrastructure, build modern transportation networks, numerous energy projects and special economic zones.

While US remained busy with the war against extremism, the economy was impacted. The 2008 recession had a significant impact on the American middle class and a thought was taking shape that China, and even American allies, were exploiting Globalization – and US was paying. These sentiments were galvanized and channeled by Trumps ‘America First’ mantra.

Season 3 – Making American Great Again and ‘America First’

While July 15, 2015 Iran nuclear agreement (JCPOA) was a significant step in the direction of negotiated settlement to conflicts, only a year and a half later President Trump reversed the deal. On the Middle East Peace Process, he went ahead to make the controversial decision of accepting Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

Trump also stepped out of the Paris Agreement and annulled the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that Obama had pushed and was signed in 2016. In essence, Trump was against multilateralism and multilateral institutions and preferred bilateral approach to issues. Trump stated in his speech at the 74^th UN session:

“Globalization exerted a religious pull over past leaders, causing them to ignore their own national interests. Those days are over.” He went on to add, “Around the world our message is clear, America’s goal is lasting, America’s goal is harmony, and America’s goal is not to go with these endless wars, wars that never end.”

While on the political and economic front he declared: “If you want freedom, hold on to your sovereignty, and if you want peace, love your nation. The future does not belong to Globalists. The future belongs to patriots. The future belongs to strong, independent nations.”

Following this principle, Trump supported direct talks with Afghan Taliban leading to the peace agreement. If it had not been for the Coronavirus, Trump would have likely won the election.

The storming of the Capitol Hill on January 6, and the events associated with the recent concluded US elections are reflective of the tremendous stress US is under to chart out its future direction; whether it be the globalized one or based on America First. The coronavirus has added to the woes – where many have lost jobs and the lifestyle of others acutely impacted – adding to the public anger and stress.

Irrespective of who is to blame for what transpired on January 6th, Biden administration would have to focus on how to bring the disillusioned, and the Trump supporters, back into the system. This is the best approach to prevent matters being further exploited. This implies Biden would have to address the concerns reflecting by the America First mantra – to provide jobs and to improve the economic well being of the Americans.

Season 4 – ‘America is Back’

Delivering a speech virtually at the Munich Security Conference on February 19, President Biden stated unequivocally that America is back. “I’m sending a clear message to the world,” Biden addressed the security conference. “America is back. The transatlantic alliance is back. And we are not looking backward.”

On the other hand, soon after his acquittal from his impeachment trial in the Senate, Trump stated: “Our historic, patriotic and beautiful movement to Make America Great Again has only just begun”. His acquittal from Senate trial means Trump can run for office again in the election of 2024, which is likely to be the most consequential in American history.

The domestic politics is becoming increasingly polarized and that is directly linked to the state of the economy, which has been seriously dented by mishandling of the coronavirus pandemic. In such conditions, it would become increasingly challenging for the US to concentrate on foreign affairs, especially on the ‘unending wars’.

And it is in this domestic and global context the US-Pakistan relations, and the associated Afghan conflict, will unfold. There is no appetite left in Pakistan, and perhaps amongst European allies as well, for the continuation of the war other than supporting a reasonable exit. Whatever could be done, has been done, and now the responsibility lies squarely on Afghans. This message needs to be delivered – accompanied by reduction in violence on the Afghan Taliban side – associated by agreed withdrawal of troops on the part of the alliance.

The mantra of Trade not Aid is more prevalent as far as Pakistan is concerned. While China, Russia, Iran, and Turkey, have all supported the resolution of the Afghan conflict and have not linked it to their other frictions with the US, this cannot be assured in the future.

In other words, if US would make things difficult for China and Russia in other places and matters, they will now likely reciprocate in Afghanistan. While re-engaging with Iran on nuclear talks, and suspension of sanctions, may buy some favors with Iran – coming in and out international agreements have casted a long-term impact on US credibility. There was a time when American word was taken as ironclad, and leadership changes did not matter. Now US is telling the world to accommodate its dysfunction and confusion.

One of the fundamental question at this point is, to what extent will Afghanistan become a theater where global power tussles are going to play out. And thus – how critical is Afghanistan to undercut China and Pakistan’s influence in the region – and this is where the role of India, the Indo-Pacific, and the related Quad strategy fits in. The answer to this question makes the decision for US and NATO easier – if they should leave now and fight somewhere else – or stay. In other words, will Afghanistan remain an area of cooperation amongst global powers – or will competition ensue.

The post US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden appeared first on Politact.

Context

The end of Cold War meant a significant shift in the threat perceptions of not only the two principals, but also pretty much every other country. Subsequently, 9/11 caused another dramatic change. The outrage caused by the attack resulted in near unanimous support for the US in dealing with the perpetrators. However, in the second stage, the traditional rivalries such as between Pakistan and India, Shiites and Sunnis, and Arabs and Israelis became intertwined with the war on terror. In the third stage that is presently unfolding, the actions against Islamists have also merged with the tussles of the global powers.



Analysis

Transforming Threat Perception of Middle East

Before the initiation of the campaign against extremists, the Arab-Israeli conflict over Palestine had been a central theme defining the politics of Middle East. The Sunni and Shiite states, had over the years attempted to outdo each other in their zeal to be the liberator of Palestine. While as a result of the Camp David Accords in 1978, Egypt accepted Israel’s right to exist; many others still refused to accept the reality created by the Balfour Declaration of 1917. The resulting enmity shaped the threat perceptions of both Israel and the Arabs. However, the demise of Soviet Union meant that countries such as Syria and Egypt could not longer count on its support.

Consistent military, economic and diplomatic US support for Israel enabled the Jewish state to withstand much larger Arab neighbors. On the other hand, the Sunni oil rich monarchies, for the most part, were also dependent on Western backing and security assistance to continue their rule. The West needed the Arab oil and these rulers needed security and legitimacy. However, over the years these dynamics severely curtailed Arab credibility to back their rhetoric against Israel with substance.

The September 11 attacks changed not only the threat perception of the US but also that of Israel and the Arab countries. Al-Qaeda threatened not only the West but also the Arab monarchies, and thus, all of a sudden, they shared a common enemy.

As the war on terror spread, the fall of Saddam Hussein stimulated another unexpected result: the resurgence of Iran. As a result, the balance of power in the Middle East shifted alarmingly and Sunni Arab states, especially the Gulf countries became more exposed, and further dependent on US for protection against the Shiite dominance. If this was not enough, the viral Arab Spring has added another dimension to the risks faced by these Arab countries. Thus, the threat from Israel to these regimes shifted to the danger from Iran, extremists, and their disgruntled domestic populace.

The Changing Threat Matrix of South Asia

On the other hand, another transformation of the threat perception was underway in South Asia. This one had to do with the Pakistan-India rivalry over issues that include Kashmir. Since independence, the defense and security policy of Pakistan have been largely India-centric, while it never perceived of any threats emanating from its western borders. India was considered more than a match for Pakistan, had it not have to worry about its northern border, and the danger it faces from China.

After September 11, Pakistan had to increasingly shift its focus to FATA and to counter Al-Qaeda and many other formulations of extremists that came to reside in the Tribal Areas. In addition, it had to cooperate with NATO in an unachievable task: to stop the flow of extremists across the long and porous Pak-Afghan border. Overtime, the country came under considerable pressure from US and NATO to revise its traditional national security premise; away from India and towards dealing with extremists. The Mumbai Incident served as a proof that the danger Pakistan faced was not external, but internal. Therefore, it should move troops from its eastern border to carry out operations in FATA, including North Waziristan.

However, the nation’s military establishment, considered being in charge of Pakistan’s defense and security policies, never appeared fully convinced with this line of argument. Moreover, the above version also stood against the narrative that is held by Pakistani nationalists and religious parties. According to them, US, Israel and India were conspiring against Pakistan and its nuclear capability, and the war against terror was actually a ploy to destabilize Pakistan towards achieving that goal. Their apprehensions were validated through the Afghan-India strategic deal, Raymond Davis incident, the unilateral operation in Abbottabad, Memogate, and now the NATO attack causing the martyrdom of about 24 Pakistani troops.

As pointed out in previous columns, in Europe as well as in Asia Pacific, the security and nationalistic concerns are triumphing over the potential benefit that economic cooperation may bring. The same trend appears to be holding true in the region. As a result, in Pakistan, the direction of the threat perception now appears to have shifted in favor of the religious and nationalist sentiments. It’s this fervor that caused the country to boycott the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan.

Had it not been due to the US and Israeli defense cooperation and shared concern over Iran’s nuclear program, from the American perspective, this would have been an opportune time for US-Iran détente. Speaking at the Brooking’s Saban Forum on December 2nd, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta laid out the three central pillars of American policy for Middle East: the security of Israel, the stability of the region and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. However, this centrality overlooks that by alienating both Iran and Pakistan, the Afghan solution is ever more inconceivable. From the angle of Pakistan, this strategic mistake only increases its leverage.

Conclusion

If the shift in the balance of power in the Middle East were to offer any lessons to Pakistan, it would be that it has made the Arab countries, especially the Gulf States, increasingly vulnerable. It has exposed these nations to both the traditional and contemporary threats, and increased their dependence on the Western support to mitigate them.

It is this dismal prognosis that is unlikely to convince Pakistan to act against the Afghan Taliban. Additionally, the global powers such as China and Russia are coming around to realize that while Osama is dead, the emerging world order is being reshaped in a manner that does not bode well for their future. Escalating Russian response to the US/NATO Missile shield, situation in Syria, and continued American presence in Afghanistan beyond 2014 reflects this mood. Similarly, the Chinese reaction to the increasing American focus towards Australia, Myanmar, and the Pacific realm generally, also represents this sentiment.

The post The Evolution In The Threat Perceptions Of Middle East And South Asia Since 9/11 appeared first on Politact.

US President Barack Obama on Tuesday said that the possibility of a “lone wolf” terrorist strike in America is greater than a coordinated assault such as the 9/11 attacks in 2001. Obama said his government continued to monitor and collect information regarding potential terrorist plots although Al-Qaeda’s strength has been degraded. The president’s remarks came during a television interview at a time when the Americans are preparing to mark the tenth anniversary of hijacked airplanes crashing in Washington, New York and the Pennsylvania countryside.

The post Obama: ‘Lone Wolf’ Terrorist Attack Biggest Worry For US appeared first on Politact.

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Context

The announcement of the intent to burn copies of Quran on September 11 by Mr. Terry Jones, a pastor of the Dove World Outreach Centre in Gainesville, Florida, has raised an alarming controversy around the world. As US authorities deliberate whether to allow burning of the Muslim holy book, the blowback is expected to be strong. Most of the media attention is focused on the reaction of the Muslim world; however the aftereffects could come in many shapes and forms. The intent to desecrate Quran in Florida is in a series of events, which point towards a building resentment against Islam in Europe as well as in the United States. In the backdrop of economic recession, religious intolerance is likely to grow.

Analysis

The road that has led to the possible burning of Muslim holy book has been preceded by some significant events, which include:

• The Danish Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy occurred in 2005, in which portraits of Prophet Muhammad appeared in 12 editorial cartoons and resulted in widespread riots in the Islamic world.
• In 2009 Swiss voters banned construction of minarets usually associated with the architecture of a mosque and warned Muslims to pay closer attention to local sensitivities.
• In July 2010, France’s parliament overwhelming voted in favor of banning the act of public veiling practiced by Muslim women. President Sarkozy also backed the step as it relates to the question of French identity. The bill would make it illegal to wear garments such as the niqab or burka anywhere in public and will impose fines of 150 euros for women who break the law. Moreover, 30,000 euros and a one-year jail term will be imposed on men who force their wives to wear public veiling.

The event is also linked to the politics of the Islamic centre near Ground Zero in New York, questions related to the faith of President Obama and the upcoming midterm election in November. Nonetheless, burning of the Quran will have serious national security implications for the US. Firstly, the event will reinforce the existing perception of the Islamic world that America is at war with Islam. In the aftermath of the devastation in Iraq and Afghanistan, it would be hard for US to reverse the dynamics that will result from the incident. It would tarnish the American image around the globe and would create significant hurdles in the way US foreign policy objectives.

In addition, the negative impact of the occurrence will not just be external but also internal to the US; it would result in the disillusionment of the American Muslims that not only are their views not represented in the US foreign policy but their religious values are not respected either. Thus ethnic tensions are sure to rise further and more cases of Muslim youth traveling abroad to join extremist forces could result.

Moreover, the relations between its Muslim allies and US would be strained and the capacity of the partners to deliver in the war against extremists will be greatly impeded. PoliTact had recently pointed out to the shift in US policy in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan with increasing reliance on its partners. The new emphasis is on boosting the capabilities of allies while US itself moving to the background and using more covert operations and Special Forces. In the aftermath of the possible burning, the image of partners as proxies will be strengthened and message of extremists will appear more convincing to the Muslim masses, with dangerous ramifications for these partners.

Copycat acts would soon follow as well, even if the burning of the Islamic holy book does not take place. Each imitation would be followed by a reaction, and thus creating an irreversible dynamics. As US commemorates 9th anniversary of 9/11, the enemy is not defeated and the global image of US has greatly diminished . Furthermore, the ethnic tension in Europe and US is growing and civilization based polarization of the world has become more pronounced.

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The post Anniversary of September 11 and Possible burning of Quran in Florida – Implications for US appeared first on Politact.