By Arif Ansar

Context

The escalation of open warfare between the United States, Israel, and Iran in early 2026—characterized by some as the “Third Gulf War”—has radically upended the strategic architecture of the Middle East. At the center of pre-war Western diplomatic planning were two highly integrated concepts: the Abraham Accords, aiming to build a normalization bridge between Israel and Arab states, and the Board of Peace (BOP), an international framework established under UN Security Council Resolution 2803 to oversee a post-conflict administration, international stabilization force, and real estate transformation in Gaza.

However, the military campaign launched on February 28, 2026, under the U.S.-Israeli codename “Operation Epic Fury”, fundamentally collided with the core assumptions of these frameworks. Instead of solidifying a prosperous, integrated, and Western-aligned trade bloc, the kinetic conflict exposed deep structural flaws in regional deterrence, shattered the prospects of two-state solution, and triggered an unprecedented shift in the balance of power.

1. The Disintegration of the Pre-War Vision: BOP and Abraham Accords Under Fire

Before the military escalation of 2026, the Abraham Accords and the Board of Peace functioned as a synchronized carrot-and-stick diplomatic strategy. The political objective was clear: circumvent the core issue of Palestinian statehood by offering massive economic, infrastructure, and technological incentives to the Arab world, effectively managing the region from the outside-in. The BOP was envisioned as a multi-layered colonial and financial administration—overseeing a Gaza Executive Board and a Palestinian National Committee—meant to signal a new era of regional co-prosperity.

When Operation Epic Fury commenced with devastating strikes on Iranian command structures, nuclear sites, and energy facilities, this vision suffered an immediate kinetic shock. Rather than acting as bridges for trade, the Abraham Accords were abruptly tested as raw military alignments. Iran’s retaliatory doctrine did not spare the region; Tehran launched waves of drones and ballistic missiles targeting not only Israeli territory but also Western assets and allies across the Gulf.

The BOP’s ambitious plans for Gaza—such as beachfront hotels and special economic zones—were instantly frozen as global energy markets panicked and global fertilizer and agricultural supply chains broke down. The war exposed an untenable contradiction: attempting to build an institutional framework for peace while simultaneously fighting a total regional war.

2. The Great Divergence: Independent Israeli Maneuvers vs. Joint Strategy

A central complication in the future of the BOP and the Abraham Accords is the apparent divergence between American diplomatic objectives and Israeli kinetic execution. While the United States has continuously attempted to orchestrate a diplomatic off-ramp, Israel has aggressively expanded its military footprint. Israel’s actions in Gaza, its incursions into Lebanon, and its unilateral willingness to strike deep into Iranian territory—even during active diplomatic windows—have created two starkly different strategic interpretations – that pose the most acute risk to the Interim Ceasefire Deal.

Interpretation A: The Maverick State Acting Unilaterally

This perspective argues that Israel is acting in open contradiction to Washington’s goals. Israeli leadership has made it clear that they no longer view the Oslo Accords or a two-state solution as viable frameworks. By pursuing a permanent military solution rather than a political compromise, Israel is explicitly prioritizing the absolute destruction of the “Axis of Resistance” over the long-term diplomatic health of the Abraham Accords. They are gambling that Arab states will eventually be forced to accept a dominant, nuclear-armed Israel as a fait accompli, regardless of the Palestinian issue.

Interpretation B: A Tightly Orchestrated Joint Strategy

Conversely, realism suggests that Israeli actions represent a coordinated, dual-track “Good Cop / Bad Cop” strategy with the United States. While Washington acts as the diplomatic negotiator—offering terms, carrots, and structural limitations—Israel functions as the unhinged kinetic hammer. By maintaining maximum military pressure on Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, Israel forces adversaries to negotiate from a position of acute vulnerability, allowing American diplomats to demand structural concessions that would be nearly impossible to attain through standard statecraft.

Regardless of which interpretation is accurate, the structural fallout is identical: Israel’s complete abandonment of the Palestinian political track has severed the primary artery through which the Abraham Accords were expected to expand to critical Muslim-majority nations like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, who have historically conditioned formal normalization on a viable two-state solution.

3. The 60-Day Ceasefire: Why Iran Emerges in an Enhanced Position

The multi-week diplomatic push that culminated in the temporary cessation of hostilities has set the stage for a potential 60-day extended ceasefire. However, an assessment of the strategic balance indicates that if a prolonged ceasefire is institutionalized under current conditions, Iran will have effectively won the geopolitical argument, shifting the regional balance of power in its favor with far reaching implications.

Despite enduring massive leadership losses and targeted degradation of its conventional military facilities during the initial strikes of Operation Epic Fury, Tehran demonstrated profound asymmetric resilience:

• Weaponization of the Chokepoints: By effectively throttling the Strait of Hormuz and imposing a massive $2 million transit toll on commercial tankers while outright banning American and Israeli vessels, Iran proved it could hold global energy markets hostage. It’s not clear whether the toll or fees will remain in any future deal.
• Surviving Regime Change Ambitions: Iran successfully weathered a decapitation campaign that killed its highest officials, proving that its institutional and proxy network could function and retaliate even under extreme duress.
• Demonstrated Retaliatory Reach: By launching direct, sustained missile strikes against Israel and retaliating against U.S. bases in the region, Iran dismantled the myth of Western invulnerability.

As far as its nuclear program is concerned, while Iran had previously committed to not attain weaponized capability. The major criticism of the earlier agreement with Iran reached in 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) under Obama administration was that it neither addressed Iran’s wider behavior in the region nor its ballistic missile program. On the positive side, JCPOA was backed by P5+1 countries i.e. US, China, Russia, France, UK, and Germany – along with European Union.

In the present context, P5+1 were not in the negotiating loop – but this does not indicate that they may not partake in any future roles. While frictions between NATO and US have increased over Ukraine and military approach towards Iran, President Trump is likely to seek support from the leaders at the G7 Summit meeting held in France, where he electronically signed the Islamabad MOU. However, in the escalating great power rivalries environment, the involvement of G7 nations will be quite nuanced.

Deciphering from the information available so far, nothing within the preliminary terms of the present ceasefire suggests that a 60-day truce will compel Iran to permanently abandon its regional proxy network. For Iran, groups like Hezbollah and Hamas are vital defensive organs. Because forcing their complete dissolution is beyond the scope of a standard ceasefire, Israel will view any finalized U.S.-Iran document with deep suspicion and may ultimately refuse to honor its terms, preferring to continue its military campaign.

4. The South Asian Pivot: Pakistan and India’s Subcontinental Tussle in the Gulf

The 2026 conflict has also manifested the subcontinental rivalry of India and Pakistan directly into the Middle Eastern theater, altering the geopolitical balance of power between the two nuclear-armed neighbors.

With the collapse of direct Western-led communication channels during the peak of the fighting, Pakistan leveraged its historic 900-kilometer border with Iran and its deep institutional ties with the Arab Gulf to emerge as the prime mediator between Washington and Tehran. The resulting “Islamabad Peace Process”—headlined by face-to-face talks in April 2026 between U.S. Vice President JD Vance and Iranian Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—elevated Pakistan into an indispensable global peace broker. By opening up back-channel communication lines via its Interests Section in Washington, Pakistan successfully negotiated the temporary cessation of hostilities, protecting its own vital economic interests, specifically the massive flow of worker remittances from the Gulf.

This diplomatic triumph directly challenges India’s long-term strategic investments in the Middle East. Over the previous decade, New Delhi had built a formidable geopolitical axis anchored on deep technological, defense, and economic ties with Israel and the UAE. India viewed this alignment as a way to project power westward and isolate Pakistan.

However, as Pakistan successfully positions itself as the necessary arbiter of regional stability between the U.S. and Iran, India’s rigid alignment with the Israel-UAE axis risks locking it out of the broader post-war regional consensus. If the Middle East transitions into a managed “cold peace” where Iran’s equities are formally recognized, Pakistan’s diplomatic capital will grow, neutralizing some of the strategic leverage India had accumulated through its partnerships.

5. Conclusion: The Structural Impasse of the Grand Vision

The grand vision originally championed by the Abraham Accords and the Board of Peace has arrived at a structural impasse. The only plausible pathway for these frameworks to move forward as instruments of a durable, comprehensive regional peace requires two simultaneous, seemingly impossible geopolitical concessions:

1. Iran must join the bandwagon, abandoning its regional agenda and accepting a formalized integration into a security architecture alongside Israel. This would be accompanied by the cassation of support for Hezbollah and Hamas.
2. Israel must accept a viable, sovereign two-state solution, ceasing expansion of territory either via settlements or military use.  This will providing the necessary political cover for Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the wider Muslim world to formally normalize ties.

Given current political realities, neither condition is achievable. Israel’s domestic political landscape remains firmly set against territorial compromise, viewing military containment and absolute security dominance as its only viable future. Concurrently, Iran’s clerical and military elite view their asymmetric deterrent power and proxy networks as the sole shield preserving the Islamic Republic from Western-orchestrated regime change.

Consequently, whether the conflict transitions through continued military attrition or a formalized ceasefire, the Board of Peace and the Abraham Accords will be forced to mutate. Rather than tools for authentic peace and regional integration, they will function as a defensive alignment designed not to resolve the region’s core disputes, but to manage an unstable and fractured “cold peace.”

Related Articles:

The US-Israel and Iran Conflict: The Interplay of Goals and Strategies – May 1, 2026
Geopolitics Of Islamic World And Middle Power Alliances After Iran Attack – Mar 22, 2026
The End Of Strategic Altruism: Putin’s Visit And The New US-India Reality – Jan 13, 2026
From Oslo To Trump’s Abraham Accords And 20-Point Peace Plan For Gaza – Oct 12, 2025
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What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply? – Aug 4, 2022

The post US-Iran Interim Ceasefire Deal, Israel, And The Future of Abraham Accords appeared first on Politact.

By Furqan Khan
Great Power Politics Fellow, PoliTact

Context

President Donald Trump is set to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping this week in Beijing, a summit originally scheduled for April and was stalled due to the ongoing US-Iran war. With the conflict carrying enormous economic consequences due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, it is likely to be a major point of discussion at the summit. What was expected to be a reset moment for US-China relations is now overshadowed by the Middle East conflict, which carries significant implications for the global economy.

Conflict at an Impasse Stage

After the initial Islamabad Talks failed to ease tensions between Iran and the United States, Pakistan’s shuttle diplomacy has reopened the lines of communication between Washington and Tehran. Tensions escalated after Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz in response to the US’ refusal to end the blockade of Iranian ports. While a ‘fragile’ truce remains in place, negotiations are stalled and fears of escalation are growing as the two parties recently exchanged fire in the Persian Gulf. After rejecting Iran’s proposal to open the Strait of Hormuz and end the war, which also suggested delaying negotiations over the nuclear program, Trump reviewed another 14-point proposal from Iran, but has expressed doubts – and later rejected another version. Meanwhile, domestic opposition in the US to the war is growing, which has already cost $25 billion. Moreover, the conflict has caused extensive damage to the US military assets across the Middle East and raised the gasoline price to its highest level in four years.

In the big picture, as the US jumps into another war in the Middle East, diverting its resources from the Pacific, it is pertinent to highlight what this conflict means for China, and its interests in the Middle East, as it also embroils in great power competition.

What is at Stake for China?

Since the beginning of this conflict, China has consistently condemned the US-Israel joint strikes on Iran in February that killed Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and demanded an immediate ceasefire. China has released numerous statements criticizing America’s broader approach to international affairs, and calling the US’ blockade of the Strait of Hormuz “dangerous and irresponsible.” Without mentioning the Iran war or blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, President Xi has criticized American actions in the Gulf, saying that the world may be returning to the “law of the jungle.”

China has substantial stakes in this conflict. It relies heavily on the Strait of Hormuz for more than a third of its energy imports. China remains Iran’s largest trading partner, and over 80 percent of its crude goes to Beijing. At the same time, China has deep economic and investment ties in the Gulf states, and the Strait of Hormuz being critical for its energy supplies, Beijing has leveraged diplomacy to seek an end to this conflict.

The China Hand

The US has accused both China and Russia of providing dual-use equipment and satellite imagery enabling Iran to target US positions in the region. The New York Times and CNN reported, citing US intelligence sources, that China was preparing a shipment of weapons, including anti-aircraft missiles, to Tehran. China has denied these claims, calling them “untrue,” and stating that China opposes such “ill-intentioned conduct.”

As he is set to meet President Xi this week, Trump also played down Chinese assistance to Iran, mentioning Chinese President Xi Jinping’s reassurance that China is not providing any weapons to Iran, while warning of “big problems” for Beijing in case they do so.

The war benefits China in many ways. The spike in oil and gas prices is pushing American allies, from the European Union to the United Kingdom – and from South Korea to the Philippines, into China’s clean energy infrastructure. They see it as a long-term solution to protect their economies. China may also be relieved seeing its rival getting bogged down in yet another war with declining credibility among its allies and the diversion of the American fleet from the Pacific. The US military has already expended an enormous amount of critical munitions that could potentially be used in a future conflict with China. China also appears most resilient in terms of energy security, given its huge oil reserves – the largest in the world. According to a recent report, China has enough oil stored to cover seven months of imports via Hormuz.

However, a conflict with wider economic and security risks reverberating throughout the region is not what China wants. Prolonged instability will threaten global markets and cause supply chain challenges. Moreover, the rising oil prices is already hurting the Chinese economy, making the Iran war and opening of the Strait of Hormuz a central concern for the upcoming Trump-Xi meeting.

China’s Leverage Over Iran

China has a strategic partnership with Iran, which is reflected in the 25-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed in March 2021. This included a massive $400 billion Chinese investment in Iran and defense cooperation in exchange for the discounted purchase of Iranian oil. The partnership allows Tehran to bypass Western sanctions while giving Beijing long-term energy security. China has also expanded its diplomatic footprint in the region by brokering a peace agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2021, helping the two rival Gulf states restore diplomatic relations.

Despite strong economic and security ties with Iran, China’s leverage has been limited. Nonetheless, Beijing’s role has been consistent, limited, and largely predictable. Chinese officials have used their conventional shuttle diplomacy, where Foreign Minister Wang Yi dialed nearly all regional partners and played its role in the UN Security Council, calling for a negotiated settlement. Beijing also joined Islamabad, the principal mediator in this conflict, to issue a joint ‘five-point initiative’ to end the war in the Middle East. At the same time, as both the New York Times and the Washington Post reported, China actively pursued the Iranians to agree to the initial two-week-long ceasefire.

A week before the Trump-Xi summit, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi met FM Wang Yi in Beijing, where Araqchi supported President Xi’s four-point proposal to end the conflict, reaffirming his “trust” in China. As part of his regional diplomacy, FM Araqchi also met Russian President Vladmir Putin in Moscow to discuss the war and continue “consultation” on regional and international issues. Trump held his own phone call with Putin during which the later expressed interest in playing an active role in ending hostilities in the US-Iran war. Trump, however, rebuffed the proposal and instead pressed Putin on ending the Ukraine war.

China’s response reflects a cautious great power strategy, where Beijing is concerned about the risks of conflict escalation but is also reaping its limited geopolitical benefits. It has not been pursuing the role of a mediator but rather a great power concerned about its broader interests in the region. Nonetheless, given its diverse energy sources and limited strategic commitment to Iran, China appears to be confident at managing the risks of this conflict.

Trump-Xi Summit 2026

As the two leaders meet this week, the Iran war and the resulting energy crisis will likely be a potential point of discussion. Trump’s announcement to continue the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, which China uses to import one-third of its energy needs, complicates the process of seeking a reset on major issues, including bilateral trade with China.

Tensions are already mounting as the two powers are taking actions against each other’s firms. The Trump administration recently sanctioned China’s largest refiners and threatened secondary sanctions against Chinese banks for facilitating Iran’s economy. Beijing has blocked Meta’s $2 Billion bid to acquire the AI startup Manus, an attempt to keep cutting-edge AI technology inside China.

The rare Trump-Xi summit is an opportunity for both competitors to bring the US-China relations on track following their trade truce in October last year. Trump realizes this and has been seeking a deal with Iran before the Summit. He wants to meet Xi from a position of strength and not with an unresolved conflict he started, alongside Israel, two months ago, which may now be giving the Chinese side an advantage. With the Iran war hanging over the summit, the meeting will may fall short of the expected outcomes in seeking a reset to the US-China bilateral relations.

Related Articles

Geopolitics Of Islamic World And Middle Power Alliances After Iran Attack – Mar 22, 2026
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From Oslo To Trump’s Abraham Accords And 20-Point Peace Plan For Gaza – Oct 12, 2025
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The post Iran War Overhangs Trump-Xi 2026 Summit appeared first on Politact.

By Arif Ansar

Context

In the aftermath of the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021—formalized through the Doha Accords of 2020—South Asia has entered an entirely new and volatile phase. The Taliban’s return to power, their continued lack of international recognition, and the deepening conflict along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border have collectively reshaped the region’s geopolitical contours. What once was envisaged as an American “peace deal” has since evolved into a crucible of power rivalries, ideological contestations, and security dilemmas extending far beyond Kabul.

Amid this changing landscape, Washington finds itself confronting an old question in a new era: What strategic interests does the United States still have at stake in Afghanistan? This question gained renewed urgency after the tragic shooting near the White House on the eve of Thanksgiving in 2025, when Rahmanullah Lakanwal—a former Afghan supporter of U.S. forces who immigrated under the Protect America Operation—opened fire, killing two National Guard members. The attack, still under investigation, reignited the debate about the consequences of U.S. disengagement from Afghanistan and the enduring ripple effects of America’s two-decade military presence.

To assess these evolving dynamics, The Middle East Institute (MEI) collaborated with PoliTact to host a Webinar in November last year to explore these aspects centered around the evolving situation of Afghanistan and if merits a fresh policy and approach. Earlier in May, soon after the four-day conflict between Pakistan and India, MEI also conducted a discussion with regional experts to assess President Trump’s policy towards Taliban. Both discussions were moderated by Dr. Marvin Weibnbaum, the Director of Afghanistan-Pakistan Center.

Through these deliberations, a sobering consensus emerged: the U.S. has abandoned its nation-building ambition, replacing it with a strictly transactional and selective engagement guided by short-term counterterrorism and strategic interests. This shift marks a watershed in South Asian geopolitics—one in which regional powers like Pakistan, India, China, and Russia are recalibrating alliances, while the Taliban’s regime struggles to define its sovereignty amid growing internal fractures and international isolation.

Counterterrorism and Pragmatism

According to panelists such as Joshua White and David Sedney, Washington’s current strategy toward South Asia is driven not by ideology or doctrine but by political expediency. The United States, still wary of being drawn into another endless conflict, now prefers “quick interventions that can be framed as political wins” without the burden of prolonged commitments. At the heart of this approach lies counterterrorism (CT)—the only enduring U.S. interest in Afghanistan. The Taliban, Washington, and Pakistan paradoxically, share a common adversary: the Islamic State–Khorasan Province (ISKP). While formal cooperation remains limited, intelligence coordination to prevent ISKP attacks has emerged as a rare channel of pragmatic engagement. Adjunct Professor at George Town University, Doug London, underscored this convergence, observing that neither Washington nor the Taliban can afford an al-Qaeda-style attack “with fingerprints all over Afghanistan.” Thus, even hostile actors find themselves bound by mutual survival instincts.

Another dimension of U.S. engagement is transactional diplomacy—a pragmatic mechanism aimed at resolving targeted issues such as hostage recovery and retrieval of left-behind military assets. As former Afghan ambassador Javid Ahmad explained, these dealings often blur ethical lines; American captives have been freed in exchange for concessions, including the removal of Haqqani Network bounties. Similarly, billions of dollars’ worth of infrastructure and equipment left during the withdrawal remain part of simmering behind-the-scenes negotiations—either to buy back through intermediaries like Pakistan or to ensure their destruction to prevent exploitation.

Pakistan’s position in this matrix is particularly complex. While the U.S. remains a visible interlocutor, Islamabad’s deepest strategic alignment continues to be with China. Pakistan leverages Washington’s engagement as a counterbalance against overreliance on Beijing. According to the panelists, efforts to “reset” U.S.-Pakistan relations on the basis of trade, minerals, and counterterrorism cooperation may refresh dialogue but are unlikely to override hard security realities.

Human Rights and the Counterterrorism Dilemma

The Taliban’s domestic policies, particularly toward women and civil society, continue to complicate U.S. engagement. As Lisa Curtis observed, the regime has demonstrated “no change in policies” from its 1990s practices—the repression of women and stifling of dissent remain total. This poses a moral and strategic crisis for Washington: how to cooperate on counterterrorism while refusing to legitimize a regime that flagrantly violates human rights.

Curtis argued that sacrificing principles for intelligence access risks undermining long-term stability, as repression fuels extremism by creating ungoverned spaces ripe for recruitment. Yet London countered that, in practice, the U.S. often cooperates with regimes that commit abuses when it aligns with national interests, effectively separating human rights advocacy from realpolitik.

The delicate balance between moral credibility and strategic necessity defines Washington’s Afghan dilemma—where human rights concerns, while loudly voiced, often take a back seat to the imperatives of terrorism prevention.

The TTP Factor

When U.S. troops exited Afghanistan, many in Pakistan assumed the Taliban’s ascension would enhance Islamabad’s regional leverage. Instead, the opposite has occurred. The enduring ties between the Afghan Taliban and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have emerged as the central source of cross-border friction, destabilizing Pakistan more than any external actor.

Since the short but intense four-day war between Pakistan and India in May 2025, border skirmishes between the Taliban and Pakistani forces have intensified, reflecting a broader regional unraveling. Analysts such as Sedney describe these clashes as a subtext of the larger India-Pakistan rivalry, with each side using Afghan soil as a pressure valve for strategic signaling. Yet a full-scale Taliban-Pakistan war remains improbable. Pakistan’s military, with its overwhelming technological and nuclear superiority, could decimate Taliban forces—but at the risk of provoking a drawn-out insurgency it cannot control. The Taliban, aware of this asymmetry, prefer hybrid tactics, allowing the TTP to wage low-intensity proxy warfare inside Pakistan.

The Taliban dismiss Islamabad’s demands to curb the TTP, calling it a “domestic problem”. This refusal underscores their ideological kinship and the shared ambition to see Pakistan’s border tribal belt revert to Taliban-style Sharia governance. Ahmad warned that this dynamic is perilous: the TTP’s suicide battalions possess the capacity to incite urban terror within Pakistan, amplifying the country’s internal vulnerabilities.

Behind these clashes lies a larger ideological project—the Taliban’s belief, shared by TTP hardliners, that regional power is shifting back to the “Islamic Emirate” model. Sedney noted that radical circles envision a future, within a generation, where Pakistan and even India could see Taliban-like movements ascend. Whether delusional or strategic, this belief animates the persistence of militancy and shapes Islamabad’s deepening anxiety.

US Leverages and Pakistan’s Regime Change Dilemma

The question of whether the U.S. or Pakistan can leverage internal Taliban factionalism looms large. Within the movement, a pragmatic Haqqani network faction favors economic engagement and limited U.S. cooperation, while the isolationist Kandahar faction, led by Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada, rejects dependency and seeks autonomy. Although tensions exist, Akhundzada maintains ultimate control, preventing visible fragmentation that might invite civil war. For Pakistan, frustration with the Taliban’s defiance has sparked talk of supporting Afghan resistance groups. Yet Ahmad warns this path is fraught: funding insurgency would demand resources, while the disunited Afghan opposition lacks both cohesion and stamina.

Consequently, Islamabad’s strategy has shifted from influence to contingency—exploiting Taliban divisions when advantageous, but no longer betting on a “friendly” Kabul. As White put it, the myth of a compliant, pro-Pakistan “Pashtun leadership” in Afghanistan has always been just that—a myth. This reality has spurred a profound shift in mindset within Pakistan’s government. No longer divided between the “good Taliban” and “bad Taliban,” Islamabad increasingly sees a spectrum of “bad and worse Taliban.”

At an event held at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in February, 2022, the Special Representative for Afghanistan at the time, Tom West, had discussed the economic leverages US still holds and commented that Afghan Taliban has shown the least interest in future cooperation with the US in fulling the terms of their side of the Doha Accord. At the same time, West noted that US is not supporting any opposition to Afghan Taliban and is advising other nations to refrain from that, but some will do that sooner or later if Taliban does not show urgency. Answering a question, he commented that many players are realizing that not having US engagement in Afghanistan is not in their interest.

Regional Rivalries and Great Power Calculus

Beyond the Pakistan-Taliban binary, regional power competition has turned Afghanistan into a geopolitical chessboard once again. None of the major powers—China, Russia, India, or the U.S.—wants a total state collapse, yet each pursues a distinct agenda. India, for its part, has pivoted sharply. As Curtis noted, New Delhi is now actively courting elements within the Taliban to undermine Pakistan’s influence. The May 2025 conflict with Pakistan demonstrated India’s willingness to strike deep into Pakistani territory, signaling a readiness to rewrite the traditional escalation playbook.

Meanwhile, China and Russia tread cautiously. For Beijing, the overriding concern is protecting multibillion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) investments from militant spillover. Russia, despite its history of confrontation with Islamist movements, maintains unpublicized CT cooperation with the Taliban to prevent ISKP’s expansion into Central Asia. Trump’s renewed engagement with Central Asian leaders under the “C5+1 initiative”—focused on strategic minerals—has further rattled Moscow and Beijing, who view it as U.S. encroachment upon their regional sphere of influence.

Panelists such as White and Karp noted that China now holds more extensive economic leverage in both Pakistan and Afghanistan than any other actor. Despite attempts to mediate between them, Beijing’s balancing efforts have faltered. Nonetheless, economic interdependence has rendered China an unwilling stakeholder in both states’ stability.

For the Taliban, the Great Power rivalry offers an opportunity. In an assessment, PoliTact noted last year: “As Afghan Taliban celebrate 4^th year in power, the nation now finds itself at a crossroads of competing currents. The net effect is a cautious, multi-prong stance: keep Iranian channels open for trade and energy, nurture Indian economic alternatives through Chabahar, avoid burning bridges with Pakistan as it courts Washington, and remain pragmatically receptive to Chinese infrastructure where it serves Afghan interests.”

Javid Ahmad observed, the regime seeks “economic neutrality,” extracting benefits from all sides while avoiding puppeteering by any. Pragmatic factions engage Russia and China for investment; hardliners in Kandahar, wary of foreign intentions, prefer cautious distance. This balancing act defines Kabul’s foreign policy—a tactical survival strategy that keeps all powers interested, but none dominant.

Containment Over Resolution: The U.S. Strategic Dilemma

Dr. Weinbaum summarized the prevailing expert view succinctly: “There is no military solution to the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict—only conflict management.” After decades of direct engagement, the U.S. now acts as a remote balancer, occasionally intervening diplomatically but avoiding deep entanglement. Washington’s immediate goal is not victory, but containment: preventing Afghanistan’s collapse while denying extremist sanctuaries the freedom to orchestrate global terror. This means sustaining aid and limited engagement but conditioning every form of support on verifiable security behavior.

Panelists urged regional coordination involving China, Turkey, and Qatar, whose economic leverage could pressure the Taliban to restrain the TTP. However, as Karp pointed out, both Turkey and Qatar’s favoritism toward Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated movements complicates their credibility as neutral mediators.

Ahmad cautioned that the U.S. must abandon the pursuit of ideological “unicorns” and embrace pragmatic realpolitik—dealing with actors as they are, not as Washington wishes them to be. The mantra, he argued, should be “leverage first, ideals later.” Delayed engagement only increases risks of ungoverned chaos, but overreaction could trap the U.S. in another open-ended quagmire.

The Perpetual Balancing Act

As of 2025, U.S. policy in South Asia has evolved into a delicate balancing act—a calculated choreography between engagement and restraint. America’s current presence is limited but consequential: intelligence links, sporadic negotiations, and cautious cooperation with regional allies. Yet looming questions remain. If Afghanistan once again becomes a safe haven for transnational terrorist networks, what tools does Washington have to respond? Under Trump’s renewed mandate, analysts predict the U.S. would double down on counterterrorism partnerships—especially with Pakistan and India—to prevent another 9/11-style surprise.

However, as India’s outreach to the Taliban deepens, it risks entrenching the very militant alignments that destabilize Pakistan and jeopardize U.S.-Pakistan rapprochement. Such dynamics may inadvertently revive the ideological monster once defeated by the War on Terror. Moreover, the Taliban’s tacit encouragement of TTP demands—such as reversing Pakistan’s merger of tribal areas and enforcing Sharia law—threatens to seed an insurgent domino effect. This could erode Islamabad’s internal cohesion and ripple across borders, complicating U.S. peace efforts from Gaza to Central Asia. Trump’s Taliban policy would require broader public ownership of Pakistan’s CT strategy and preventing the budding India-Afghan ties from destabilizing Pakistan and the rejuvenated US-Pakistan ties.

Related Articles:

The Unbroken Alliance: Why the Afghan Taliban-TTP Nexus Is Dooming Peace with Pakistan – Nov 4, 2025
The Fragile Truce Between Pakistan And Afghanistan And The War Of Narratives – Nov 2, 2025
Afghanistan’s Strategic Outlook And New Geopolitical Realities – Aug 18, 2025
Afghanistan, Pakistan Relations and Great Power Rivalry – Jul 21, 2025
Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions, Trump, And Wakhan Corridor – Feb 3, 2025
Political Or Military Solution; Pakistan’s New Counter-Terrorism Operation Azm-e-Istehkam – Aug 1, 2024
Convergences in US Pakistan Ties and Afghanistan – Jan 1, 2024
Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP – Feb 22, 2023
Post Withdrawal Campaign Against Extremism In Afghanistan And US-Pakistan Relations – Sep 7, 2022
Emerging US Policy Towards Afghanistan After Withdrawal – March 2, 2022
Recalibrating The US-Pakistan Partnership In Afghanistan – Jun 22, 2021
US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden – Mar 2, 2021

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How Putin’s Visit, Venezuela Crisis, and Shifts in the Middle East and Afghanistan are Testing New Delhi’s Foreign Policy

By Furqan Khan
Great Power Politics Fellow

When Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived in New Delhi in December last year to attend the 23rd annual India-Russia summit, expectations were ripe for breakthrough agreements in energy and defense. Yet, despite the two countries agreeing to expand economic cooperation and reaffirming their “special and privileged strategic partnership,” no concrete measures were announced in advancing energy and defense cooperation.

Putin’s visit, however, came at a crucial time when the United States is pressing Kremlin to end the war in Ukraine, while India’s relations with Washington are under strain. At the same time, continued US pressure on India’s purchases of Russian crude, the imposition of punitive tariffs, and America’s renewed engagement with Pakistan have pushed India to seek alternative partnerships. This happens alongside a broader shift in American strategy, reflected in the Trump administration’s newly announced 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS), which signals a shift away from the allied-centric leadership to a more transactional, burden-sharing approach.

When viewed against these systemic shifts, Putin’s visit holds greater strategic value for both Moscow and New Delhi, even when the tangible outcomes were limited. Based on the recent developments in January, specifically the US military operation and the subsequent “US-controlled” oil framework, the Venezuela crisis has become a critical lever in US-India relations.

Symbolism – Not So much Substance

Putin’s visit, first by the Russian President since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, attracted widespread attention. Although the two leaders met elsewhere, including in Moscow and Tianjin in 2024 and 2025, respectively, this visit holds a distinct strategic significance. The two countries signed agreements on pharmaceuticals, critical minerals, and tourism, and also finalized an economic cooperation arrangement to increase their bilateral trade to $100 billion by 2030. However, the summit was more significant for what was not announced: oil and weapons deals.

Putin expressed readiness to supply “uninterrupted shipments” of fuel to India; however, New Delhi remained cautious about the offer. According to the Indian foreign secretary, decisions by Indian oil companies are driven by the “evolving market dynamics” and “commercial issues” they confront while sourcing their supplies, signaling US sanctions as a potential challenge. Similarly, defense cooperation also fell short of expectations. There were reports that weapons sales would be on the agenda of President Putin’s visit. In particular, the defense ministers from both sides were expected to discuss the timely delivery of the remaining units of the S-400 air defense system, which India purchased from Russia in 2018. Potential collaboration on the joint production of the next-generation S-500 system was also on the cards. However, no such agreements were finalized.

India was likely concerned by the potential repercussions of any high-profile defense deal over its already strained relations with the US, especially when New Delhi is working to negotiate a favorable trade deal with Washington.

Nonetheless, despite the absence of a substantive breakthrough, Putin’s visit was a symbolic show of strategic recalibration in the face of the American pressure. Greeting Putin with a red carpet offered India an opportunity to display its strategic autonomy and signal that India’s relationship with Russia is far from over. For Putin, as he is navigating tough negotiations to end the war, the visit signaled that despite Western attempts to render Russia a pariah, it still has friends of global significance. Therefore, even though fewer concrete steps were taken, the visit pumped energy into their “special and privileged strategic partnership.”

Testing the Strength of India-Russia Relations

Putin-Modi talks were watched closely in Washington, where sanctions are testing the strength of this bilateral relationship. The Trump administration has been pressuring Kremlin to end its nearly four-year war in Ukraine, while urging India to stop buying Russian oil, after accusing New Delhi of indirectly financing the war. Trump’s advisor Peter Navarro even called it “Modi’s War,” highlighting the significant rise in India’s purchases of Russian crude, from 0.2 percent before the war to 40 percent today. Consequently, the Trump administration imposed a whopping 50 percent tariff on Indian imports, of which 25 percent is punitive for buying Russian oil and weapons.

India has become the second-largest importer of Russian oil, after China, and more than a third of its oil imports have come from Russia over the past three years. However, this appears to be changing after the American sanctions recently targeted Russia’s two biggest oil giants, Rosneft and Lukoil, which might affect Indian oil companies, some of which have already stopped buying Russian oil. However, the decision to halt oil imports appears to be a temporary move by New Delhi to adjust for a favorable trade deal with Washington. During Putin’s visit, Modi reiterated his careful position on the Ukraine war, saying that India is not neutral in this conflict but stands on the “side of peace.”

Trump’s New Strategic Blueprint in National Security Strategy (NSS-2025)

The Trump administration’s approach towards India and the broader Indo-Pacific region is reinforced by the recently announced NSS, which departs from the strategic competition narrative and recognizes the existence of other “stronger nations” as a “timeless truth of international relations.” It reduces Russia from an “acute threat” to a challenge of managing its relations with the European Union, and downgrades China from a “pacing challenge” to an actor with which the US seeks to balance its economic relationship, avoiding the term strategic competitor. Nonetheless, the strategy expresses a commitment to “work with allies and partners” to preserve the balance of power.

For the last two decades, the American grand strategy has focused on preventing the rise of China as its peer competitor, in which India has been a critical partner. This seems to be changing under the new strategy, which expects India and other allies to address their challenges on their own under the burden-sharing principle. This shift indicates a potential erosion of India’s strategic exceptionalism in America’s strategy that New Delhi has enjoyed over the last two decades.

This shift in strategy is also reflected in the diminishing role of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) – a four-member Indo-Pacific alliance of Australia, Japan, India, and the US, which is losing its momentum. The NSS mentions Quad only once, while calling for improved commercial relations with India to “encourage New Delhi to contribute more” to the Indo-Pacific security. However, described as “more strategically aligned than ever before ” a year ago by President Biden, Quad has drifted into uncertainty under President Trump. Last year’s Quad summit, scheduled to be hosted by India in November and which Trump was reportedly reluctant to attend, did not go through, as India-US relations unraveled.

Trump has apparently broken Biden’s policy of strategic altruism that considered support for India’s major power status consistent with the US national interest. The current approach has been more transactional with the expectation of a direct quid pro quo.

Given these signals, India appears to be adjusting its diplomatic engagement in a hedging mode. Putin’s visit is part of that strategy, but it does not end in Russia. In September 2025, Modi was seen exchanging warm gestures with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Tianjin, both rejecting the notion of rivalry and instead calling each other development partners. China-India trade relations have also improved steadily over time since 2005, even though the US remains India’s largest trading partner. However, many in New Delhi believe that this is not a desirable position for India, one that it does not seek but is forced into by the Trump administration’s policies. At the same time, Washington has criticized India’s BRICS membership for the bloc’s revisionist ambitions against the West.

Against this backdrop, India’s rapprochement with China, and rolling out the red carpet for President Putin can, at best, ensures strategic autonomy for New Delhi without affecting the foundational basis of Indo-US strategic partnership.

US-India Ties and Pakistan

These regional and global shifts have significant consequences for South Asia, particularly as Trump’s embrace of Pakistan in recent months factors into India’s strategic calculations. The way Trump and his advisors have publicly criticized Modi’s government, especially after the May conflict with Pakistan, Modi’s diplomacy is also guided by a sense of political liability, where conceding to the US demands risks domestic political backlash.

After the India-Pakistan conflict in May, following a terrorist attack in Pahalgam (Indian administered Kashmir) last year, Pakistan credited Trump for the ceasefire and backed his nomination for the Nobel Peace prize, unlike India, which refused to give a similar credit. Trump’s reaction to the Pahalgam attack was a break from the past American presidents, who supported India and pressured Pakistan to crack down on militants allegedly operating from its soil. Instead, Trump showered praise on Pakistan’s civil-military leadership, credited Islamabad for the ceasefire in Gaza, and invested heavily in the country’s untapped critical minerals reserves.

Additionally, America’s defense cooperation with Pakistan, which India has consistently opposed, especially the recent US approval for the sale in support of Pakistan’s F-16 fleet worth $686 million, is likely to be received poorly in New Delhi. Washington has justified close defense cooperation with Islamabad as essential to counterterrorism, saying that the sale will “not alter the basic military balance” in South Asia. Taken together, the growing US tilt towards Pakistan potentially revokes Indian monopoly over Washington’s South Asia policy, creating space for Pakistan to maneuver while encouraging New Delhi to seek partnerships away from the US.

Evolving Middle East and Afghanistan

India’s foreign policy is also facing challenges in the evolving geopolitics of the Middle East and Afghanistan. The nation maintains good relations with both Russia and Iran, yet it is also growing its ties, particularly in the defense sector, with Israel, which puts New Delhi in a critical position to navigate this balancing challenge. This dilemma is also visible in the recent tensions between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in Yemen, where Iran is a major actor. As India’s energy, trade, and diaspora interests are deeply embedded in the Gulf states, navigating the conflict between the Gulf states as well as maintaining its relations with Israel and Iran becomes a critical challenge.

On the other hand, while only Russia recognizes the Taliban regime in Kabul, India is also expanding its ties with the Taliban regime in Kabul, recognizing the latter’s strategic relevance vis-à-vis Pakistan. This has happened in parallel to Pakistan’s continuing loss of leverage in Kabul, driven by the Taliban regime’s inability to crack down on anti-Pakistan terrorist groups in Afghanistan. These dynamics, along with the changing great power alignment in South Asia, are creating a complex regional environment for both India and Pakistan.

Conclusion

Putin’s visit to India was not a breakthrough in the India-Russia bilateral relationship, yet it occurred at a crucial time of global strategic recalibration. The 2025 NSS presents a new blueprint for the US foreign policy, one that downplays the Russia and China threat while calling for greater burden-sharing from allies and partners, including India, to preserve the balance of power. This, when read alongside the transactional turn in Washington’s approach towards New Delhi over the last few months, signals that the period of strategic altruism for India is eroding.

By welcoming Putin in New Delhi and opening up to China, India adopted a hedging approach rooted in strategic autonomy. The message from India is clear: it neither aligns exclusively with Russia nor allows the Western pressure to dictate its policy choices. This is also visible in India’s approach towards the Middle East, where it is faces the balancing challenge of maintaining competing ties in the Middle East and Afghanistan as it also maintains good relations with Russia and Iran. Particularly with the US, as Washington’s approach turns transactional under the Trump administration, the upward trends seen in US-India relations over the last two decades face a potential erosion.

Moreover, the Venezuela crisis has given Washington the leverage it lacked previously. It is resolving the “India-Russia oil problem” by creating a “India-Venezuela solution”—but one that keeps the remote control firmly in the White House. The White has indicated that it will permit India to buy oil from Venezuela under the newly unveiled system.

As India begins to lose its privileged position in Trump’s strategy, at least in the near term, space opens for Pakistan, which was previously sidelined given New Delhi’s centrality in America’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Irrespective, Trump’s NSS is only an intent and not a concrete policy shift, which warrants cautious scrutiny to assess its potential impact on the future of South Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region.

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The post The End Of Strategic Altruism: Putin’s Visit And The New US-India Reality appeared first on Politact.

PoliTact’s Analysis of Perception and Perspective

Context

President Donald Trump’s second term has ushered in a foreign policy that departs sharply from the liberal internationalist consensus of the post–Cold War era. Instead of multilateralism and institution-building, the Trump administration has embraced transactional diplomacy, tariff-based leverage, and a CEO-style approach to global power. The guiding logic is less about sustaining a rules-based order than about extracting concessions in a world Trump views as fundamentally zero-sum.

This orientation—the so-called Trump Doctrine—is reshaping the United States’ posture toward rivals and allies alike. He frames his foreign policy as an extension of his populist domestic agenda: “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) through trade realignment, industrial re-shoring, and hard bargaining. Yet while tariffs and deal-making remain his preferred tools, Trump also harbors ambitions for statesmanship, including a quixotic pursuit of a Nobel Peace Prize. His attempts to mediate conflicts from Ukraine to South Asia illustrate both the promise and the peril of his approach. The result is a high-risk strategy that could redefine America’s global role—and shape the political landscape of the next U.S. elections.

Tariffs as Tools of Statecraft

During his first term, as Robert Blackwill of the Council on Foreign Relations had noted, Trump consistently makes major foreign policy decisions against the advice of seasoned advisors, amid unprecedented turnover in senior defense and diplomatic posts. A 2020 Senate Democratic report accused him of transforming U.S. foreign policy into a tool of personal and business interests, undermining alliances and institutions alike.

At the heart of Trump’s foreign policy is the use of tariffs and trade leverage. Where previous presidents relied on sanctions or diplomatic pressure, Trump employs tariffs as his signature instrument—against adversaries and allies alike.

During his first term, tariffs targeted China, the EU, and even Canada and Mexico. His second term has expanded this logic into a global bargaining strategy: tariffs are cast not merely as economic tools but as instruments of national security. Trump argues that tariffs protect American workers, pressure foreign governments into concessions, and restore industrial self-sufficiency.

The long-term effects remain uncertain. Economists warn that trade wars increase consumer costs and disrupt supply chains. Yet Trump has succeeded in re-framing tariffs as patriotic policy, appealing to swing-state voters who see globalization as a betrayal. Going into the next election cycle, this rhetoric will be central to his pitch: only a tariff-wielding America, he claims, can reclaim greatness.

French observer of American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville, once warned that democracies risk losing their moral compass when governed solely for material gain. Trump’s America First agenda, rooted in tariffs and short-term bargaining, embodies this danger. For him, alliances and norms are not ends in themselves but bargaining chips.

Trump as Peace and Deal Maker

The Ukraine-Russia Stalemate

Trump’s most high-profile attempt at statesmanship came with the August 2025 Alaska Summit, where he hosted Vladimir Putin on U.S. soil—the first such visit since 2007. Styled as CEO-style deal-making, the summit bypassed traditional diplomats. Analysts at Chatham House concluded that the meeting emboldened Putin, who intensified his war aims rather than compromising. The Council on Foreign Relations reported that Putin’s demands remained maximalist: Ukrainian neutrality, demilitarization, and recognition of annexed territories.

Far from resolving the conflict, Trump’s intervention muddled U.S. messaging while alienating allies and NATO. Reuters called the summit a tilt toward Moscow, while AP noted it granted Putin undeserved legitimacy. European leaders have since moved to fill the vacuum, training Ukrainian forces and planning “reassurance forces” with limited U.S. backing. The Ukraine episode illustrates Trump’s foreign policy paradox: eager for dramatic breakthroughs, he often undercuts long-term credibility in pursuit of short-term optics.

Iran and the Quest for a Nobel Prize

Trump has repeatedly hinted that he seeks a Nobel Peace Prize, viewing it as the ultimate validation of his leadership. His prior efforts—such as the Abraham Accords in the Middle East—bolstered his claim but fell short of Nobel recognition.

Looking ahead, Trump is likely to focus on Iran’s nuclear program as the most dramatic arena for a potential peace deal. He has oscillated between threats of military action and promises of “the best deal ever.” His critics note that scrapping the 2015 JCPOA nuclear accord in his first term weakened U.S. leverage and pushed Iran closer to enrichment thresholds. Yet Trump now suggests he alone can broker a new accord, one tougher than his predecessors achieved.

Israel, Palestine, and the Limits of Transactionalism

Trump’s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains deeply shaped by his earlier recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and the Abraham Accords. In his second term, he presents himself as uniquely capable of brokering a “grand bargain” between Israel and Arab states.

Yet Palestinians remain sidelined, and violence in Gaza and the West Bank has escalated. European analysts argue that Trump’s transactional diplomacy—focused on Arab-Israeli normalization—ignores the structural roots of Palestinian grievances. Without addressing Palestinian claims to sovereignty, however, any settlement risks being cosmetic.

The recent Israeli attack on Hamas negotiators in Doha has threatened the entire architecture of U.S. strategy in the Middle East. GCC now confronts the reality that Washington either could not—or would not—prevent Israel from striking within their borders. The strike risks driving Gulf nations to reconsider their reliance on U.S. guarantees and to explore alternative security alignments, as Saudi Arabia demonstrated by concluding a defense treaty with Pakistan.

Not only that, on the domestic front, the incident has reinforced the MAGA-Israeli rift. Many America First voters have started to question Trump’s policy of prioritizing Israeli support over American interests. How this plays out will be utterly consequential for the future of American politics.

India and Pakistan Tensions

Trump has also cited his efforts to mediate between India and Pakistan, two nuclear-armed rivals, as evidence of his unique statesmanship. After the recent four-day conflict, he offered to broker talks over Kashmir, even claiming that Prime Minister Narendra Modi requested U.S. intervention. While India denied such overtures, Trump continued to highlight his role in lowering tensions during border skirmishes. Irrespective, Trump revives this narrative, portraying himself as the only leader willing to bring two nuclear powers to the table.

For domestic audiences, the image of Trump as peacemaker between two nuclear states reinforces his argument that he alone can prevent catastrophic wars—an argument likely to feature prominently in his re-election campaign.

No More Soft Power

Traditional presidents—including many of the Founders—understood that America’s influence lay in both persuasion and force. George Washington counseled avoiding entangling alliances, but also promoting republican values. Trump’s policy inverts this balance: U.S. soft power—the tools of USAID, VOA—is slashed, replaced by tariffs, threats, and military posturing.

Removing soft power tools weakens long-term credibility. A legislative report warned Trump’s instincts make U.S. a “bystander in international efforts,” undermining democracy promotion and global cooperation. Institutions like WHO, climate accords, and multilateral forums are dismissed, even as authoritarian players fill the void.

Trump’s defense of using military power against Iran’s nuclear program—despite ongoing talks—underscores reliance on hard tools over diplomacy. His use of economic coercion—tariffs on allies and adversaries alike—challenges norms of trade reciprocity.

At home, this approach reflects his populist stance: reclaiming leverage against countries like India by imposing tariffs and stricter oversight of H1B Visa Program, while demanding Europe meet NATO obligations. While Trump distances U.S. from multilateralism, countries like China and Russia are deepening cooperation via BRICS, SCO, and other forums. Meanwhile, U.S. has alienated NATO and EU—evident in the diplomatic backlash after Alaska.

On the other hand, European efforts to assure Ukraine’s security—a potential buffer zone, peacekeepers—are gaining momentum and autonomy, though still needing U.S. support. Emerging countries view Trump’s U.S. as transactional and surveys by the European Council on Foreign Relations indicated that global responses to his second term reflect hedging, not alliance-building.

Trump’s foreign policy represents a break with the post-1991 liberal order, which emphasized collective security, open markets, and democratic values. Instead, his worldview echoes 19th-century great-power politics, in which spheres of influence and economic coercion dominate.

Trump’s posture harks back to classic great-power thinking. Scholars have noted that U.S. resistance to Russian or Chinese spheres of influence is a post–Cold War construct. Historically, the U.S. itself wielded Monroe Doctrine-style influence and accepted postwar spheres such as Eastern Europe under Soviet control. He appears to embrace that tradition—viewing global competition through the lens of zero-sum regional hierarchies, especially across Eurasia. He prioritizes a strategy of wedge-driving between Russia and China, rather than accepting a multi-polar order.

The conventional wisdom in think-tank literature—a world moving towards multi-polarity, with diplomatic messiness but strategic balance—is largely ignored. Some argue multipolarity may be more hazardous than bipolarity. However, Trump avoids such debates: instead, he seems to seek a revival of bilateral leverage, playing off great powers to U.S. advantage where possible.

Election Implications: Tariffs and Populism at Home

Trump’s foreign policy represents a radical experiment in realpolitik. It replaces liberal order with transactional bargaining, elevates tariffs to tools of statecraft, and prizes symbolic breakthroughs—especially peace deals that might burnish Trump’s legacy.

For the next election, Trump’s tariff-driven populism may prove a potent political weapon at home. His campaign will emphasize tariffs, industrial re-shoring, and economic nationalism as proof of “America First” success. Swing-state voters, especially in the Midwest, may respond favorably to tariff-driven protection of steel, autos, and manufacturing. Yet suburban and business constituencies could rebel against higher consumer prices and global instability.

But internationally, America risks being seen less as a reliable leader than as a transactional actor chasing deals and prestige. Allies face uncertainty about whether U.S. commitments will endure. The credibility gap—created by Trump’s personalized, ad-hoc decision-making—risks long-term erosion of American leadership, regardless of who wins in the next election.

Equally, it’s critical to keep in perspective the sense of exploitation which resulted in the America First Mantra, using which President Trump came into power for the second time. If America First policy does not produce economic dividends for common Americans in the short and long term, it will further complicate the domestic politics and confusion regarding its global role and future direction. In this, how Trump balances his foreign policy regarding Israel will be critical.

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The post The End of Liberal Internationalism? Trump’s Foreign Policy Revolution and Its Electoral Implications appeared first on Politact.

Policy Brief – Vantage Point Analysis

Context

The recent meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Field Marshal Asim Munir, has stirred considerable global attention in particularly regarding what led to the meeting and what could have been discussed. It marks the first-ever instance of a sitting U.S. president holding a one-on-one meeting with Pakistan’s top military leader—an unprecedented move that reveals deeper shifts in regional strategy and global alignments.

Great Power Rivalry

U.S.-Pakistan relations have always been shaped by broader global dynamics, and the context now is the intensifying great power rivalry, primarily between the U.S., China, and Russia. The escalating Iran-Israel conflagration has added to this.

One of the persistent suggestions coming out of some DC based think-tanks is to avert pushing Pakistan into the full embrace of China. On the other hand, Pakistan has been messaging insistently that it wants to maintain close ties to the US despite its strategic ties to China. The meeting between President Trump and Field Marshal Asim Munir – and what follows – will likely test this. In the unfolding international relations maintaining a balance between great powers is becoming increasingly untenable.

Another critical dimension is the ongoing Iran-Israel conflict. In the post October 7, 2023, Hamas led attack on Israel, the geopolitics of Middle East is fast evolving. This has been accompanied by the loss of Hamas and Hezbollah leadership and the fall of Assad regime in Syria in December 2024, as part of what many consider the Outside-in Approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The likelihood of a broader conflict between Iran and Israel hangs in balance as President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have forged a strong strategic alignment. Netanyahu has tried to ensure that U.S. policy remained closely aligned with Israel’s objective of weakening Iran’s defense capabilities, particularly preventing it from ever acquiring nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Iran had hoped that Trump would adopt a pragmatic approach and revive nuclear talks leading to easing of economic pressure. To Iran’s disappointment, Trump pursued the reinstatement of “maximum pressure” policy on Tehran – culminating into an attack on its nuclear sites on June 22.

Pakistan has maintained the policy of siding with Iran. In his speech to the diaspora in Washington DC, Field Marshal Asim Munir reportedly cited Pakistan’s ‘clear and strong support’ for Iran in war against Israel. President Trump would have likely discussed Pakistan’s intent and the scope of its support in the background of expanding Israeli-Iran conflict, especially if US gets engaged, as it did on June 22, in eliminating Iran’s nuclear program – or any endeavors to change the regime.

From what has been reported since the meeting, Pakistan has offered to mediate with Iran and to assist President Trump pursue a negotiated solution, as he did with its recent short war with India. After meeting with Field Marshal Asim Munir, Trump had given two weeks window to arrive at a decision on if the US will get directly involved in the war against Iran. However, the attack on Iran’s nuclear sites occurred much before the window for negotiated solution was to expire.

According to some estimates, about 15%-20% of Pakistan’s population belong to Shia sect. Any attack on Iran, regime change, or any subsequent insurgency can have serious consequences for the ethnic and religious harmony in Pakistan and the Islamic regions. A foreign policy alignment too closely with Western military actions against Iran could inflame sectarian tensions at home. It would also put Pakistan and Chinese strategic alignment to the test – as Iran is also an ally of China and Russia. Additionally, the aforementioned nations shared membership in the China dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

US Pakistan Relations

Under President Biden, Pakistan was often viewed critically and often through an India-centric lens, particularly in the context of counter-terrorism. In contrast, the Trump administration was initially expected to adopt a hardline stance toward Pakistan, recent events suggest a pragmatic recalibration driven by strategic needs. Moreover, Pakistan’s government has carried out an active trade and security outreach with the U.S. administration to demonstrate its economic and security potential. In remarks by CENTCOM Commander Gen. Michael Kurilla, or Trump’s own statements, there’s been notable recognition of Pakistan’s role beyond the narrow counterterrorism framework.

The performance of the Pakistani military during the brief conflict with India in May has raised its global stature. While both sides de-escalated after Trump administration negotiated a cease fire, Pakistan’s ability to outmaneuver a much larger adversary, despite its plaguing political and economic challenges, captured international attention and enhanced the credibility of its defense establishment. This strengthened perception has also prompted the US to reconfigure its engagement with Pakistan’s power centers—primarily its military—based on shared regional interests, particularly as tensions in the Middle East escalate.

Allied with the U.S., Pakistan has played a decisive security role in the Cold War and the Campaign Against Extremism. Due to this partnership, it received western economic and military assistance. Pakistan once again stands at the juncture of another critical role involving the change in global balance of power. U.S. would once again desire security relation with Pakistan and furthering of the future envisioned under the Abraham Accords. As the security situation related to Iran worsens, it’s possible that different brands of non-state actors operating from the region and beyond attempt to exploit the situation. Pakistan’s experience in managing extremists could become very useful. For this cooperation, U.S. could potentially assist in dealing with India, undo the suspension of Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), while moving forward with the trade deals.

Civil-Military Imbalance: A Familiar Pattern

While the Trump-Munir meeting may elevate Pakistan’s global profile, it also underscores a persistent internal challenge: the civil-military imbalance. The fact that such a high-level bilateral meeting involved the military chief—and not the elected civilian leadership—highlights the dominance of Pakistan’s military in both foreign policy and national security.

This imbalance perpetuates a troubling precedent in which strategic decisions of national consequence have to be made in private without discussion, consensus, or public ownership. Such secrecy has historically resulted in policies with long-term political, economic, and social consequences—often to the detriment of public trust and national cohesion.

The Trump-Munir meeting is emblematic of a shifting global landscape in which Pakistan finds itself once again at a strategic crossroads. The potential for a renewed, multifaceted partnership with the U.S. is real, but it hinges on careful diplomacy, a balance between competing alliances, and a rethinking of how power is exercised at home. As great power competition intensifies and both the Subcontinent and the Middle East become more volatile, Pakistan may well reemerge as a pivotal actor—if it can navigate both its external relations and internal governance with foresight and integrity.

The post What Does Trump-Munir Meeting Means for US-Pakistan Relations – As Iran-Israel Conflict Escalates? appeared first on Politact.

Context

Now that the Biden administration has definitively announced plans to withdraw militarily from Afghanistan by September 11, the focus has shifted to the post withdrawal scenarios – and what that would look like for the US and other key stakeholders. The most important determinant of that is the status of Afghan reconciliation – and US-China ties.

Moreover, like has been the precedence, each major shift and decision is followed by a period of lull – as the other parties interpret what the changed circumstances mean. For many the question remains if US is fully intent on the military withdrawal. After all, the departure of coalition forces does not mean the end of political and security engagement.
As the Biden administration announced that US may not be able to keep the previously agreed May withdrawal deadline, Afghan Taliban has signaled it considers the delay a breach of the treaty signed last year. While they attended the meeting held under the auspices of Russia in March, Afghan Taliban did not show up at the Washington backed peace conference scheduled for April in Istanbul – and thus it had to be postponed. Notably, India was also invited to the Istanbul moot.

Subsequent to the announced delay, US has actively engaged Pakistan to help convince Afghan Taliban that slight delay in military withdrawal should not short circuit the overall plan. The country has already played a major role in facilitating talks with the Taliban. In this regard, the security advisors of Pakistan and US met in Geneva recently, and other direct communications have also taken place between the senior security leadership of both nations.

Media reports indicated that these contacts were geared towards securing the air and ground lines of access (ALOC and GLOC) during and after the US withdrawal. The controversy is already brewing if US has requested bases in Pakistan. And reports also reflect that under the Biden administration budget request for fiscal year 2022, some military training and economic assistance for Pakistan is forthcoming – but the overall suspension of military aid that came about in May 2018 remains intact. While the US is withdrawing militarily, the budget still asks for $3.3bn to support and sustain the Afghan Security Forces, a jump of 9.2 percent from 2021.

At the same time, violence has increased in Afghanistan and there are no signs of permanent cease fire that was being hoped for – as US agrees to leave albeit with a slight delay. But what can a few months accomplish which was not achieved in almost two decades?

The Spring Offensive

Seemingly, a delay of a few months should not matter, but when world events are moving with lightning speed, and added to that the Coronavirus related dynamics, postponements could create a new set of calculations. Perhaps the most important consideration would be the pace of fighting. Summer and Spring are usually the heaviest fighting season, with Afghan Taliban and coalition forces both launching operations.

Based on the agreement reached on Feb 29, 2020, Taliban are not targeting the coalition and American troops but that does not include the Afghan government forces. Therefore, one of the key assumptions that is likely to be tested is that if the Afghan forces can hold on their own – and thus indicate with some level of certainty what can transpire in the future. As US continues to close bases, Afghan Taliban are gaining in the vacuum that’s generated. Commenting on the situation, Foreign Minister of Pakistan showed concern that Afghan forces may not be able to hold on, and without political settlement, the country is heading towards a civil war.

This drastic prospect is not what Pakistan would hope for and has supported the concept of responsible withdrawal. Pakistan will likely increase pressure on Afghan Taliban to get on with the new reality – provided it get some concessions from the US. Pakistan wants US to take a broader view of its ties with Pakistan – and not just from the security prism of Afghanistan. Thus one of the key element at stake is the nature of US-Pakistan ties in the aftermath of US withdrawal – and what role Pakistan can offer while it takes place.

Blinken’s Proposal and Afghan Peace Process

Second causality to be tested by the delay is how the US withdrawal influences the Afghan Peace Process. One would assume that the momentous decision would have created a sense of urgency, as Secretary Blinken’s letter to Ashraf Ghani had specifically conveyed. And if the talks had progressed, perhaps a ceasefire could have been established before the full US departure.

According to Secretary Blinken’s proposal, the postponed April conference UN was going to convene in Istanbul, was to be followed by a 90-day reduction in violence. Moreover, the envisioned concept of interim government appears to have landed flatly in Afghanistan, with President Ashraf Ghani strongly resisting. The Ghani government prefers a new election to decide the fate of existing set-up – not a transitional government that includes power sharing with Afghan Taliban.

Thus, the delay in talks, and speedy US withdrawal, adds to the pressure on the Ghani government. The option it is utilizing is to blame Pakistan for what ails Afghanistan, and let the situation worsen dramatically – so as to cause a rethink on the part of the US and coalition forces.

Pakistan-India Ties

Another key dimension of the Afghan quagmire is the continued Indian intransigence towards the budding peace process. According to the Indian strategic thinking, Afghan Taliban gaining the upper hand would not bode well for the Kashmir conflict – and the insurgency there could likely gain more momentum. And thus, India would like Pakistan to remain distracted with Afghanistan while continuing to support groups such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other Baloch insurgents, and prevent CPEC related projects from maturing.

While India has also been working to distance Pakistan from its traditional Arab allies, for the first time, India has to consider tensions on its northern border with China – and this is where the India-US strategic ties and the Quad alliance comes in to play.

The External Minister of India, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, met with the US officials and Secretary Blinken on May 28 to emphasize its case. Clearly, a quandary for the US would be to balance withdrawal from Afghanistan with securing Indian interests, calming Pakistan’s security concerns, while obtaining more cooperation from India as it relates to the Quad strategy.

China-Iran and JCPOA

The sixth round of Iran nuclear talks are scheduled in Vienna this week. As the likelihood of US lifting sanctions on Iran increase, what role can Iran play in the post US Afghan withdrawal scenario, and will the results of Iranian elections make a difference?

It remains doubtful how much Iran can act as a calming force in Afghanistan. Iran’s trust with US and India is quite low. And that prospect has been made if even more remote due to its strategic closeness to China and Russia; the recent $400 billion China-Iran deal is a case in point. With this far-reaching treaty, Iran is likely to become more a conduit in extending Chinese influence in the Middle East.

If the Iran nuclear talks with Biden administration prove to be successful, it would likely play out of its of its own historical aspirations, in Afghanistan and the wider Middle East. But that also means relegation of the Sunni Arabs and Turks – and more importantly, this will require Israeli acquiescence.

Conclusion

The crux of the matter remains, will the US withdrawal from Afghanistan result in China-Russia dominated region, or the one under US-India. Remaining engage with the Afghanistan and Pakistan will provide some room to maneuver.

As alluded to by PoliTact in previous assessments, the window for Chinese and Russian cooperation on Afghanistan is narrowing quickly – and depends a lot on the cross leverages US, China, and Russia have on each other in other regions and matters. In this, the sequencing of events is of crucial significance. While Secretary Blinken’s meeting in March with Chinese counterparts held in Anchorage had a stark tone – the one with Foreign Minister Lavrov in May seemed more amenable, leading to the waiving of sanctions on Nord-Stream 2 pipeline.

The Biden-Putin summit, coming after the G7, EU, and NATO meetings, will demonstrate the state of play between US and Russia. The G7 agenda is expected to cover areas such as strategic stability, Ukraine, Belarus, Cyberattacks and cooperation in the areas of Coronavirus and climate change.

On the other hand, NATO’s website indicates the June 14 NATO leadership Summit will discuss Afghanistan. Speaking at an Atlantic Council event on June 7, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated the organization will continue to support and train Afghan military, while clarifying that most of this will be taking place ‘outside Afghanistan’. He went on to add: “at some stage Afghans had to take responsibility for their own future, and that’s what they’re doing with continued support from NATO allies.”

Stoltenberg commented that China is not an adversary, rhyming with the opinion piece President Biden wrote in the Washington Post on June 5th. He further added that they are looking at the possibility of re-initiating the otherwise defunct NATO-Russia Council.

Biden wrote in his price, “we want a stable and predictable relationship with Russia on issues like strategic stability and arms control. When he meets Putin, he will be taking a holistic approach – gauging how much is Russia willing to play ball on a whole gamut of matters dear to Russia – and then see how Russia can assist towards Afghan withdrawal. How China perceives any give and take, is part of the ongoing great power rivalry.

The post US Afghan Withdrawal, Regional Geopolitics, And Biden-Putin Summit appeared first on Politact.

By Dr. Syed Mohammad Ali

Context

Like most other countries around the world, Pakistan was in a wait and see mode on how its relationship with the United States would be impacted with the arrival of Biden administration. Pakistan’s omission from the list of invitees for the first international summit on climate change, being hosted by President Biden on April 23 and 24, is considered a bad omen by those arguing for a reset of US-Pakistan ties.

The Biden administration has invited 40 world leaders to this climate summit, which includes not only its traditional allies, but also Russia and China. From South Asia, India, Bangladesh and even Bhutan have been sent invites. Yet, Pakistan which is the fifth most populous country in the world, and amongst the top ten countries most vulnerable to climate change, has been sidelined.

Why the Biden administration chose to sideline Pakistan from the climate summit is puzzling, especially when the recently released Global Trends assessment by the US government’s National Intelligence Council itself has warned that water insecurity poses a major risk for South Asia. According to United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) forecasts, Pakistan is confronted with absolute water scarcity by 2025 due to its poor water conservative practices, combined with the impacts of climate change.

Some see differences over how to approach the peace process in Afghanistan as the cause for Pakistan’s exclusion from the U.S. led climate summit. The Biden administration’s announcement to delay military withdrawal from Afghanistan till September 11^th has created a precarious situation for Pakistan. Pakistan will now be under tremendous pressure to help convince the Taliban not to withdraw from the negotiations process or begin targeting international forces now that the timeline for American withdrawal has been extended beyond the May deadline. However, attributing Pakistan’s exclusion from the climate summit as a signal of American frustration with the peace process in Afghanistan seems unlikely. There are instead a range of issues, including the very nature of US-Pakistan bilateral relations, which need to be considered to understand why Pakistan has been invited to Biden’s climate summit and what this decision in turn implies.

Analysis

Geopolitics and the Future of US – Pakistan Ties

In addition to Pakistan’s utility in helping negotiate peace and ensuring long term stabilization in Afghanistan, the growing role of China in South Asia, and the protracted rivalry between nuclearized India and Pakistan, all necessitate America’s continued engagement with the country.

China and Pakistan have developed much closer ties over the past two decades. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) initiative has become a flagship for the much more ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China has recently inked treaties with Iran and Afghanistan to bring them into the folds of the BRI as well. On the other hand, after hosting talks on the Afghan peace process, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has recently visited Pakistan and India. His trip to India crisscrossed with that of Biden’s climate czar John Kerry. Earlier on March 12, the virtual Quad summit was held, focusing amongst other matters, on an open and inclusive Indo-Pacific. This was followed by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s visit to India.

Under the Biden administration, the US remains keen to focus on India as a strategic partner. How India aims to balance its existing defense ties with Russia, while developing greater synergy with the US, has some parallel to the balance that Pakistan is attempting to achieve in its bilateral relations with China and US.

Some US strategists believe that while Pakistan remains a key stakeholder in furthering the tenuous peace process in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s utility is going to diminish after the US has physically exited the region. For example, speaking at a virtually event at the Karachi Council on Foreign Relations on January 12, former US ambassador to Pakistan Cameron Munter stated that under Biden, Pakistan will be less of a priority, and that US-Pakistan ties are likely to be defined more by multilateralism rather than bilateral engagements. However, by sidelining Pakistan from the climate summit, Biden also seems to be denying Pakistan the benefit of US led materialism on climate change.

While great-power rivalry may continue to escalate under Biden, dealing with climate change requires keeping politics out and working with countries which are most vulnerable to climate change, and where the potential of climate change poses the danger of becoming a ‘threat multiplier’. Excluding Pakistan from the climate summit does not only impact its bilateral relationship with the US, this move also implies foregoing some important opportunities for regional cooperation which have wide-ranging implications for American strategic interests as well.

Lost Opportunity 1 – Facilitating cooperation between China and US

As the U.S. continues to partner with Pakistan on extremism, its bilateral relationship with India has made major strides during the past two decades, partly in the bid to counter China’s growing influence in the region. Conversely, Pakistan has increasing begun to rely on China to meet its infrastructure and energy needs, culminating in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Initially welcoming Chinese investments in Pakistan as the means to help stabilize Pakistan, the US has become increasingly wary of CPEC turning into the flagship project for the ambition Belt and Road Initiative. The Trump administration adopted an increasingly maximalist view of Pakistan’s relationship with China, and it warned Pakistan of falling prey to Chinese debt diplomacy.

With the Biden administration aiming to explore a broader spectrum of engagements with China, including not only confrontation and competition, but also cooperation, Pakistan seemed well positioned to offer both countries a chance to collaborate.

Pakistani policy makers have been reiterating that they do not want to pick sides in the strategic rivalry between China and the United States. While Pakistan may not be able to replicate the facilitative role that it played during the Nixon era to facilitate the Sino-American rapprochement, it could offer American firms an opportunity to invest in Chinese funded projects within Pakistan. Pakistan could especially benefit from collaboration between the two great powers to help make CPEC energy projects greener.

It is unfortunate that the Biden administration has squandered an ideal opportunity to jointly discuss such possibilities with China and Pakistan at the upcoming climate summit in the US.

Lost Opportunity 2 – Encouraging environmental diplomacy between India and Pakistan

Another missed opportunity of not inviting Pakistan to the Biden climate summit is the possibility of exploring means to put in place needed climate mitigation measures between India and Pakistan. Biden’s decision of giving John Kerry, the President’s Envoy on Climate Change, a seat on the National Security Council acknowledges how climate change is a threat multiplier, with the potential to aggravate preexisting sources of friction.

Nowhere else is the threat of climate change exacerbating conflict as severe as in South Asia, where nuclear-armed India and Pakistan share waters of the fast-melting Himalayan glacier.

Having brokered the longstanding Indus Water Treaty which divided the Himalayan waterways between these neighboring rivals, the US is well positioned to help put in place measures to conserve the Indus basin, and encourage other mitigation measures to build confidence instead of worsening relations between India and Pakistan.

During John Kerry’s current trip to Bangladesh and India to prepare for the coming climate summit, he encouraged Bangladesh and India to consider measures to better manage the Ganges river. But he was unable to do the same in the case of India and Pakistan, as Pakistan was not invited to the climate summit, nor was it a destination on Kerry’s itinerary.

Lost Opportunity 3 – Addressing water sharing concerns between Pakistan and Afghanistan

Pakistan’s exclusion from the Biden climate summit should not be interpreted as sign of American frustration with Pakistan over problems plaguing the Afghan peace plan. Yet, the absence of Afghanistan and Pakistan from the climate summit does have important implications. There is no water sharing agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan on the Kabul river, and this problem is being exacerbated by water scarcity and impending climate change threatening glacial flows feeding their shared waterways. Pakistan is also concerned about the Shahtoot Dam on Kabul River, being built with Indian support.

Afghanistan not getting an invite for Biden’s climate summit is perhaps understandable due to its uncertain political and security situation at present. However, the US could have invited the Pakistan government and worked with it to devise mechanism to better manage the Kabul river, which will only continue to grow in the future.

Moving Forward

Pakistan’s government seems caught off guard by the apparent American rebuke of being excluded from Biden climate summit. Pakistan continues brandishing its credentials to address climate change via its internationally acknowledged forestation drive. However, Pakistan has not yet been able to put in place effective measures to curb pollution or to develop an effective water conservation strategy. While the nation remains a low emitter, this is not a major accomplishment either, given the size of its economy.

While Prime Minister Imran Khan pledged the country will produce 60% of its energy via renewable resources at the Climate Ambition summit last year, the country’s energy portfolio remains heavily dependent on fossil fuels.

Pakistan certainly had much to gain from inclusion in an American-led climate summit. Despite this omission, Pakistan must keep its eye out for subsequent opportunities for international cooperation, especially during the UN climate summit to be held in November. The fact that Pakistan’s tree tsunami won accolades at the Word Economic Forum, and now Saudi Arabia is thinking of emulating this initiative are encouraging moves. However, Pakistan still needs to secure broad support for its efforts to contend with multifaceted climate related threats.

One major area where Pakistan can still aim to secure needed international cooperation is by attempting to make ongoing CPEC investments more environmentally friendly. Greening of CPEC can provide a blueprint for the Chinese financed infrastructure and energy projects in other countries.

While U.S. may be unwilling to help Pakistan achieve this goal, European countries with greater stake in the BRI may be more proactive partners to facilitate this goal – and perhaps this where the focus should be before the UN based climate summit scheduled for the end of this year.

Dr. Syed Mohammad Ali is a Senior Fellow at PoliTact

The post Broader Implications Of Pakistan’s Omission From Biden’s Climate Summit appeared first on Politact.

Context

PoliTact has consistently maintained that the longer the Afghan imbroglio continues it is bound to intersect with the other regional and global flashpoints – and the larger balance of power tussles. Not that it had not been in the past, but to a lesser degree.
Since 9/11, and the subsequent war against extremism, the global politics has been primarily shaped by cooperation in dealing with extremism. So much so that even legitimate struggles against oppression conveniently got linked with terrorism, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Kashmir.

As mentioned above, it would be wrong to assume that global power games, and the linked regional dimensions, had gone dormant as the campaign against extremism was being waged. It just had taken a different form. Consider the example of Arab Spring. As the uprising spread through the Arab world, it soon became apparent that the regime change that accompanied the popular revolts were risking the interests of Russia and China more.
And thus, the Spring came to a stop in the case of Syria, where Russia intervened militarily to save Bashar al-Assad, and by default its naval facility in Tartus. Syrian example also illustrated that different groups of extremists were being backed by array of state players, and thus it become a full fledge proxy war.

In the case of Egypt, the then General Fatah el-Sisi ousted democratically elected Islamist Mohammed Morsi in 2013. Morsi had arrived at the helm after the removal of Hosni Mubarak, as a result of the Egyptian revolution in 2011.

Libya provided another case where a different configuration of regional and global players emerged in the aftermath of the removal of Muammar Qaddafi, attempting to restore a semblance of order. Russia got involved militarily in Libya through its version of Black Water type mercenaries.

In most cases, China has remained on the sidelines. Instead, it has focused on economic route and developing strategic deals with both the Shia and Sunni states. It spoke in favor of state sovereignty and against foreign interventions.

In the emerging environment, the extremists with global aspirations, such as Al Qaeda (AQ) and Deash (ISIS), remained in the pariah status. However, the same could not be claimed for groups that came to be known as the associates of AQ and Daesh. These factions often had regional ambitions, grievances, and causes, which were either beneficial or detrimental to the interests of the regional and global stakeholders. In essence, the new reality was reflective of the political and security dynamics that existed before 9/11. And as the Cold War like situation returns, these local grievances and ambitions are likely to play a pivotal role.

The New Global Power Calculus

The metamorphosis of the war against extremism also applies to the South Asia region. While US and NATO have been doing the heavy lifting when it comes to the situation of Afghanistan, China and Russia have played a reconciliatory role. In the post 9/11 environment, and even before, China and Russia were threatened by their own brand of Islamic extremists, in Xinjiang, and Dagestan and Chechnya region, respectively. And they have remained worried about their extremists getting hooked up with the global extremists or their associates. In essence, helping in the war against extremism also diminished the domestic threats for these powers.

However, as we enter an era where the global power tussles will define politics once more, the reconciliatory role in Afghanistan is likely to evaporate. This does not bode well for the peace process. At the same time, it does not reflect well for Russia and China either. The theater for the Great Game is likely to get extended where the Pacific, including the Ladakh region, are already active. In short, Afghanistan, could become a quid pro quo on a much larger canvas.

Revitalizing NATO

As history teaches us, one of the critical steps in fighting global rivalries is by solidifying alliances and weakening those of the adversaries. And linked with that is an assessment of the kinds of threats being confronted. The type of alliance needed to fight non-state extremists is markedly different than the one to counter state actors.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came into being in 1949 in the aftermath of World War II. The first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay, had famously stated the organization’s goal was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” With the end of the Cold War and the Warsaw Pact, one of the main premises upon which the NATO military alliance was formulated was gone. The alliance began to look for a new purpose and identity that would keep it united against the emerging threats. The war against terror has proven to be one such unifying factor, as has dealing with rogue dictators and nations that threaten western interests, such as Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qaddafi and recently Iran. However, these motives have proven to be short lived in the present multi-polar world. But the return of great power politics, and Cold War like dynamics, can reinvigorate the alliance.

After the neglect suffered during the Trump’s presidency, the Biden Administration is busy strengthening alliances. To assure allies, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken visited Japan, South Korea, and NATO headquarters in Brussels. On the other hand, Secretary of Defense Loyd Johnson was in India and Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, on March 12 a virtual meeting of the QUAD leaders was held between the leaders of US, India, Japan, and Australia. In the press briefing after the meeting, US affirmed the ‘centrality of the Indo-Pacific in the US national security’. And, this was accompanied by the US-China strategic talks held in Alaska, that set the tone for the ties under Biden.

The Future of BRICS, SCO

On the other hand, an organization representing the emerging powers of Brazil, Russia, China, and India (BRICS) started off in 2011 with much fanfare, promoting commercial, political, and cultural cooperation. Its primary motive was to give voice to the realities of the multipolar world. In 2013, BRICS agreed to create global institutions to rival those of Western controlled IMF and World Bank. However, the economic recession of 2008 and the fluctuating global market has impacted the BRICS disproportionately. While China and India have continued to grow, the economies of Russia and Brazil have had a tougher time. This has obviously impacted the wherewithal of the organization.

More recently, China has been successful in handling the coronavirus pandemic and has been the least impacted economically – as compared to the West. This could also be the reason why the tensions between US and China have escalated.

The Chinese dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was formed in 2001 mainly as a security forum. The member governments have common security concerns, with emphasis on tackling terrorism, religious extremism, and ethnic separatism. In 2017, the organizing reached a milestone when India and Pakistan joined the organization as full members. Other members include China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Afghanistan and Iran have an observer status while Turkey is a dialogue partner of SCO.

As the global focus shifts from the campaign against extremism and towards great power challenges, the nature of BRICS and SCO is likely to morph as well. No other issue is more consequential to the future of these organizations than the role of India. The nation is also aligned with the Indo-Pacific strategy and QUAD. It simply cannot be a member of the emerging power club while supporting the established powers at the same time. Sooner or later, India would have to choose.

A case can be made that the present border tensions between India and China are a direct result of Indian decision to revoke the special status of Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019. Under the garb of US-China rivalry it attempted to settle an internationally recognized dispute unilaterally.

The Great Game of the earlier times was about the dangers of Russian invasion on British India via Afghanistan, the emerging one appears to be about protecting American India against Chinese penetration. While US would want to weaken the Sino-Russian partnership, a successful strategy would likely work by placating one of them, not by alienating both at the same time.

The post The War Against Extremism And The Return Of New Great Game appeared first on Politact.

Context

Serious questions have come to the fore since Capitol Hill got overwhelmed by Trump supporters on January 6^th. While there are security dimensions of what took place in Washington DC that day, for example why was the Capitol Police not prepared, the focus here is to understand what led to the violent attack – and what it could mean for American politics and the US global standing.

The dramatic events of January 6^th may have come as a surprise to many – but matters had been boiling for a while. Since last November, and even before, President Trump consistently remained ambiguous on if he would accept the election results if he were to lose – and when he actually lost – he remained defiant.

Furthermore, Trump’s appealing to right-wing extremists was also nothing new. Political pundits have overlooked this right-wing empathy as rhetoric and posturing. This belief came crashing down when supporters of Trump ran over Capitol Hill, with five casualties.

While he hardly exhibits the wherewithal to stand for a cause he is promoting, it seemed convenient to exploit the grievances of the disenfranchised Americans. The attack has now manifested the rhetoric; indicating that Trump meant what he said. While he has since attempted to back track – is the genie out of the bottle?

And this raises the alarming prospects for what comes next. To understand the trajectory, Trumps phenomenon and mantra of American First needs to be grappled with.

Politics, American Standing and Biden Administration

In the aftermath of the disturbances, Trump released a video indicating that he will allow a smooth transition of power. However, the political landscape has been seriously wounded. With the newfound majority in both the House and Senate, the Democrats move to impeach Trump would further aggravate political polarization. Moreover, it is unclear that the sentiments that Trump has ignited can now be tapered down.

The present chaos and drama is reflective of the tremendous stress US is under to chart out its future direction; whether it be the globalized one or based on America First. The coronavirus has added to the woes – where many have lost jobs and the lifestyle of others acutely impacted – adding to the public anger and stress.

Irrespective of who is to blame for what transpired on January 6th, Biden administration would have to focus on how to bring the disillusioned, and the Trump supporters, back into the system. This is the best approach to prevent matters being further exploited. This implies Biden would have to address the concerns reflecting by the America First mantra – to provide jobs and to improve the economic well being of the Americans than outsourcing jobs overseas.

The challenge would be to differentiate between those that want to deal with the differences peacefully – and those that are bent on using violence.

As far as the American image and global standing is concerned, its directly connected to how smartly Americans are perceived to be choosing the future direction of the country. For example, getting out of the deals US itself help shape was a clear sign to the world that America is confused about its future course. This also adversely impacts its global standing and credibility.

The post Storming Of Capitol Hill; Biden Administration, Globalization And American First appeared first on Politact.