By Furqan Khan

Context

On August 7, Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia signed a joint defense agreement stipulating that an armed attack against one member will be regarded as an attack against all. The agreement, known as the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, is significant because it brings together three powerful Sunni-majority states under a collective-defense framework at a time when the Middle East’s established security order is under considerable strain. Although the pact has attracted attention primarily because of its resemblance to NATO’s Article 5, its broader significance lies in the institutionalization of defense cooperation among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey. The agreement envisages greater political and military coordination and provides a framework for strengthening joint exercises, defense cooperation, and military-industrial collaboration. Turkey has also indicated that the framework could eventually be expanded to include other regional states.

The Mecca agreement should therefore be understood less as a fully developed military alliance than as an emerging regional security mechanism. Its importance derives from the strategic environment in which it was created: declining confidence in the reliability of the existing U.S.-led security architecture, continuing confrontation with Iran, concerns about Israel’s regional conduct, and growing interest among Middle Eastern states in developing greater indigenous capacity for deterrence.

Disordering Regional Security Environment

For nearly five decades, the United States has been the principal external security guarantor for its allies and partners in the Middle East. Its military deployments, defense relationships, and security commitments helped create an environment intended to protect energy infrastructure, maritime routes, and allied governments while preventing any single regional power from dominating the strategic landscape.

The geopolitical changes associated with the Iran war have placed that model under significant pressure. The conflict, which began in February with U.S. and Israeli attacks on Tehran, has exposed limitations in Washington’s ability to simultaneously deter Iran, protect its regional partners, and preserve freedom of action. The resulting uncertainty has encouraged regional states to consider additional security arrangements rather than relying exclusively on American guarantees.

The United States’ difficulties in protecting its Arab partners from Iranian attacks have been particularly consequential for Saudi Arabia. There is growing concern among regional partners about Washington’s reliability. Saudi Arabia has subsequently sought to diversify its security partnerships rather than remain dependent on a single external guarantor. This development is not necessarily inconsistent with the Trump administration’s emphasis on burden-sharing and reducing the costs of U.S. security commitments abroad. A greater willingness by regional partners to assume responsibility for their own defense could, in principle, complement Washington’s objective of reducing its direct military burden.

The problem, however, is one of perception. Burden-sharing produces different strategic effects when it is interpreted as greater allied responsibility and when it is interpreted as evidence that the United States can no longer be relied upon in a crisis. The Mecca agreement is, at least partly, a product of that credibility gap. It reflects Saudi Arabia’s willingness to seek alternative sources of deterrence and Pakistan and Turkey’s willingness to assume larger security roles in the region.

The agreement is also connected to Arab concerns about Israel – and the extent to which regional government’s view Israel’s military policies as another source of instability. Thus, the agreement cannot be explained solely as a response to Iran or solely as a reaction to declining American influence. It reflects a wider reassessment of the regional balance of power.

Mecca Agreement and Board of Peace

The relationship between the Mecca agreement and the Trump administration’s regional strategy is likely to be one of the most consequential questions surrounding the pact. At first glance, the two frameworks could appear competitive. The administration’s earlier regional vision, centered on the Abraham Accords, placed considerable emphasis on Arab-Israeli normalization. A security arrangement centered on Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan could instead encourage a parallel regional bloc whose strategic identity is based more explicitly on collective defense among Muslim-majority states.

Yet the two initiatives need not be mutually exclusive. President Trump reportedly described the Mecca agreement on August 16 as a “big, bold, and important first step”, suggesting that Washington does not necessarily regard the new arrangement as incompatible with its broader regional strategy. The more interesting possibility is that the two frameworks could eventually become complementary. The Board of Peace is accompanied by an International Stabilization Force (ISF) and associated security-architecture components.

The ISF is envisioned as a temporary multinational security and stabilization force, authorized under UN backing, operating under a unified command acceptable to the Board of Peace. Its responsibilities include maintaining public order, protecting reconstruction corridors, supporting humanitarian operations, and coordinating with Egypt and Israel while assisting a newly recruited local Gaza police force. The force is intended to provide an enforcement mechanism for maintaining territorial calm alongside phased Israeli military withdrawals and militant disarmament.

This creates a potential role for countries participating in the Mecca framework. Muslim-majority states could provide political legitimacy, personnel, equipment, or other forms of support for regional stabilization efforts. The difficulty, however, is Israel’s opposition to certain potential contributors. Israel has previously resisted the presence of Turkish armed forces in Gaza, while Israeli officials have also expressed reservations about Turkey’s participation in a future stabilization force.

The underlying dispute is therefore less about whether Muslim-majority countries can participate in stabilization than about who controls the mandate, composition, and rules of engagement of such a force. Israel has not rejected the ISF concept itself; rather, its principal concern is the identity and mandate of participating forces and whether they can independently influence Gaza’s security environment. Israel insists that Hamas must be disarmed and its military infrastructure dismantled before a full Israeli withdrawal. Prime Minister Netanyahu has continued to reject withdrawal until full disarmament is achieved.

This creates an important tension: Washington and the Board of Peace may see regional Muslim participation as essential to the legitimacy and implementation of the Gaza framework, while Israel remains concerned that participating states could acquire an autonomous security or political role.

What Would Trigger Collective Defense?

The central uncertainty surrounding the Mecca agreement concerns the practical meaning of its collective-defense provision. An attack on one member being treated as an attack on all does not necessarily mean that every member would automatically enter a war. The precise military obligations remain insufficiently defined. Critical questions include whether the provision applies only to attacks by states or also to non-state actors; what threshold constitutes an “attack”; and whether assistance would require combat deployments or could instead involve intelligence, air defense, logistics, maritime surveillance, cyber capabilities, or other forms of support.

The three members also have different threat perceptions. Pakistan’s principal security concerns remain concentrated in South Asia, while Turkey’s strategic interests extend across Syria, Iraq, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Caucasus. Saudi Arabia’s immediate concerns are centered more heavily on Iran, Yemen, missile and drone threats, and the protection of critical infrastructure. For that reason, the agreement should not be interpreted as a guarantee that Pakistan and Turkey would automatically fight every adversary confronting Saudi Arabia. Pakistan’s historical position on Yemen illustrates the distinction between political support for Saudi Arabia and participation in Saudi-led military operations. In 2015, Pakistan’s parliament rejected Riyadh’s request to participate directly in the Yemen intervention. At the same time, Pakistan’s current military relationship with Saudi Arabia demonstrates that limited or defensive assistance can be substantial. Pakistan has already deployed thousands of troops and a fighter-jet squadron to Saudi Arabia during the Iran war, along with other air-defense capabilities, under a separate Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA). The agreement was signed between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia last year.

If a state, or a non-state actor, were to launch a major attack on Saudi territory, critical infrastructure, or if the Kingdom’s sovereignty is threatened, the collective-defense provision would presumably become more relevant. Even then, the most likely initial response could involve defensive assistance: intelligence sharing, air-defense systems, counter-drone capabilities, maritime surveillance, logistics, and other forms of military support rather than immediate offensive operations.

The agreement’s effectiveness will therefore depend less on whether it replicates NATO’s Article 5 literally and more on whether the three governments can establish credible mechanisms for consultation, coordination, intelligence sharing, military interoperability, and crisis response.

What Does the Mecca Agreement Bring Home?

For Saudi Arabia, the agreement offers two strategic benefits: additional deterrence and greater regional leadership. Faced with Iranian and Houti attacks and uncertainty over the reliability of U.S. protection, Riyadh gains an institutional mechanism through which it can diversify its security relationships. For Pakistan and Turkey, the agreement expands their regional strategic profiles. Both countries already possess significant defense relationships with Saudi Arabia, while Pakistan and Turkey have developed extensive bilateral military cooperation. The Mecca agreement gives these relationships a broader institutional framework. According to the Turkish Defense Ministry, the fundamental goal of the agreement is to place existing military ties on a more “institutional and sustainable” basis.

The possibility of additional states joining also gives the agreement longer-term significance. Turkey has indicated that the framework could be expanded, with Egypt among the countries potentially relevant to its future development. The agreement has also been described by Pakistani officials as open to other countries in the region. A larger membership could eventually produce something resembling a “Muslim NATO,” although that comparison should be treated cautiously. NATO’s institutional depth, integrated command structure, standardized forces, and decades of operational experience are not currently replicated by the Mecca framework.

The strategic implications nevertheless extend beyond the three signatories. The emerging security arrangements in West Asia have consequences for American interests and influence. Washington’s declining agency in the regional security architecture could create greater opportunities for China and Russia to expand their diplomatic and strategic influence. More importantly, it signals that regional states increasingly regard security diversification as necessary even while maintaining relationships with the United States.

Conclusion

The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement is best understood as a product of a changing Middle Eastern security environment rather than simply as the creation of a new military alliance. The Iran war, uncertainty surrounding American deterrence, persistent Israeli-Arab tensions, and the wider fragmentation of the regional order have encouraged Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey to institutionalize defense cooperation. The agreement’s collective-defense provision is politically significant, but its military implications remain uncertain. The absence of clearly defined automatic obligations means that it should not yet be equated with NATO. Its immediate value lies in creating mechanisms for consultation, joint exercises, defense cooperation, technology development, and potentially coordinated responses to regional threats. Its durability will depend on whether the three members can reconcile their divergent threat perceptions and translate political solidarity into credible military interoperability.

The larger significance of the Mecca agreement, therefore, is not simply how many troops Pakistan or Turkey might commit in a future conflict. It is that three important regional powers are attempting to create a security mechanism that reduces dependence on any single external guarantor. If the framework expands and develops effective institutional and operational capabilities, it could become an important component of a more pluralistic security order in West Asia.

The emerging arrangement does not necessarily signal the end of American influence. Rather, it indicates that U.S. influence may increasingly operate alongside regional security structures that Washington does not fully control. The Mecca agreement may consequently prove significant not because it immediately creates a “Muslim NATO,” but because it represents another step toward a Middle Eastern security architecture in which regional powers assume a greater share of responsibility for their own deterrence and strategic stability.

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The post The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement: Implications For West Asian Security Architecture appeared first on Politact.

By Arif Ansar

Context

The fragile security landscape of South Asia is increasingly tied to the volatile geopolitics of the Middle East. As the tripartite tensions involving the United States, Israel, and Iran simmer, the shockwaves are felt acutely in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and for that matter India as well. To fully comprehend this equation, one must analyze the internal regional dynamics of South Asia first and then trace how they intersect with the unfolding Middle Eastern crisis.

The successful negotiation and remote signing of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on June 17, 2026, by U.S. President Donald Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, marked a monumental achievement for Pakistan’s civil-military leadership. If the Islamabad MoU sticks, in its current or reformed form, and transitions into a durable peace agreement, it holds the potential to fundamentally rewrite Pakistan’s domestic security, energy, and economic paradigms.

1. The Regional Dynamics: South Asia’s Internal Fault Lines

The relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan is currently defined by severe friction rather than neighborly cooperation. At the center of this tension is the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an extremist group that has escalated its terror campaign inside Pakistan. Pakistan accuses the Afghan Taliban of providing safe havens and tacit support to the TTP—a claim the Taliban administration in Kabul denies, though the cross-border nature of TTP attacks remains a persistent flashpoint.

Concurrently, Pakistan’s southwestern province of Balochistan is facing a severe security crisis. The insurgent groups such as Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) are demanding independence for the resource-rich province, has dramatically escalated its attacks against the Pakistani military.

Media reports suggest that the BLA is receiving strategic cooperation and material support from the TTP, creating a combined internal security challenge for Islamabad. Pakistan alleges that the BLA receives external backing from India to destabilize the country. India and Israel are exceptionally close strategic allies, sharing deep defense, intelligence, and counter-terrorism partnerships.

There is great power rivalry part of the equation too. BLA has repeatedly targeted Chinese infrastructure projects and personnel associated with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in Balochistan in other parts of the country, aiming to disrupt Pakistan’s economic lifeline and strain its relationship with Beijing.

2. The Middle East Equation: The Islamabad MoU and Saudi Defense Commitments

To understand how these South Asian fault lines link to the Middle East, one must look at Pakistan’s diplomatic balancing act. The nation has historically maintained a delicate equilibrium: keeping close ties with Saudi Arabia, and other GCC nations, while managing a long, porous border with its neighbor, Iran.

The Islamabad MoU

In mid-2026, Pakistan’s diplomatic corps, alongside Qatar, achieved a historic breakthrough by mediating the Islamabad MoU. This 14-point framework agreement successfully brought the U.S. and Iran to a temporary ceasefire, temporarily halting direct military hostilities, lifting the U.S. naval blockade on Iranian ports, and opening the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz. This diplomatic triumph cemented Pakistan’s role as a vital regional mediator. However, as hostilities have broken again indicating the stability of the Islamabad MoU remains incredibly fragile.

The Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA)

Compounding this fragility is Pakistan’s security obligation to Riyadh. On September 17, 2025, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA). Echoing NATO’s Article 5 language, the SMDA treats “any aggression against either country as an aggression against both”.

If an all-out war breaks out in the Middle East, a dangerous chain reaction is highly likely. Ansar Allah (the Houthis) in Yemen are highly likely to close the Babul Mandab Strait and launch retaliatory ballistic missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia. Faced with direct attacks, Saudi Arabia will almost certainly invoke the SMDA. Reports indicate that under the confidential terms of the pact, Pakistan could be required to deploy up to 80,000 troops to secure Saudi borders. Sooner or later, Pakistan will be forced to choose between entering a foreign conflict to defend Saudi Arabia or reneging on its defense pact, which would devastate its economic and strategic relations with the Gulf.

3. Implications of a Worsening Middle East Conflict on Pakistan and Afghanistan

If the Middle East situation continues to deteriorate, the consequences will ripple across South Asia, severely impacting Pakistan and Afghanistan, and India across military, economic, and social domains.

Pakistan is already heavily engaged in counter-insurgency operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) against the TTP, and in Balochistan against the BLA and BLF, the Pakistani military is stretched thin. Faced with a domestic security crisis, coming to the active defense of Saudi Arabia would be an immense logistical and military strain. Knowing this, adversaries like India and Israel are highly likely to speed up their destabilizing activities inside Pakistan. By utilizing existing proxies, they can ensure that Pakistan remains too deeply entangled in internal security crises to project military power or assist its Gulf allies.

This regional sabotage directly undermines Washington’s strategic goals. The U.S. relies on Pakistan’s diplomatic weight to mediate with Tehran, as seen with the Islamabad MoU. A destabilized Pakistan is a nation that cannot play a constructive role in preventing a wider regional war in the Middle East or contribute towards the success of new vision for the Middle East – under the Abraham Accords and subsequent establishment of Board of Peace.

The Explosion of Sectarian Strife

A direct conflict involving Iran—the primary Shia power—and the U.S., Israel, or Sunni Arab Gulf states will instantly inflame sectarian fault lines in South Asia. Both Pakistan Afghanistan have sizable Shia minorities that have historically been targeted by hardline Sunni extremist groups. While India also has a sizeable Shia population, and while Muslims there face state repression, Shia’s there have not been targeted in a similar fashion.

A worsening Middle East war will be actively exploited by transnational terror networks, most notably Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISIS-K). ISIS-K, which operates across both Afghanistan and Pakistan, views Shia Muslims as heretics and has frequently targeted their mosques, community centers, and schools.

In Afghanistan: The ruling Taliban, while ideologically hardline Sunni, has sought to maintain basic internal stability. However, a regional sectarian war will severely test their control. ISIS-K will use the anti-Iran, anti-Shia rhetoric of the wider conflict to recruit disgruntled fighters, escalating attacks on the Shia Hazara community and challenging Taliban authority.

In Pakistan: Sectarian violence has historically claimed thousands of lives. An active war involving Iran and Saudi Arabia could trigger a revival of sectarian proxy wars on Pakistani soil, pitting localized militant groups against one another and further fracturing the country’s social cohesion.

4. Economic Devastation and Connectivity Collapses

The economic fallout of a prolonged Middle East war on Pakistan and Afghanistan would be catastrophic.

Energy and Remittance Shocks

Pakistan imports the vast majority of its oil and gas from the Gulf. A disruption in the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab el-Mandeb would cause global oil prices to skyrocket, triggering hyperinflation in Pakistan’s fragile, debt-burdened economy. Furthermore, millions of Pakistani expatriates live and work in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. If the Middle East slides into a broader war, many of these workers could be forced to return home, cutting off the vital stream of foreign remittances that keeps Pakistan’s economy afloat.

The Death of Regional Connectivity

Both Afghanistan and Pakistan have pinned their economic futures on becoming trade hubs. Afghanistan under the Taliban has sought to utilize Iran’s Chabahar Port and the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) to bypass landlocked constraints and reduce its dependence on Pakistani transit routes.

While the Islamabad MoU briefly revived hopes for these transit corridors, an escalation of the war would render these infrastructure projects dead on arrival. Iranian ports would once again become military targets, isolating Afghanistan economically and pushing it deeper into poverty, which in turn breeds further radicalization and instability. Moreover, in the recent escalation, reports indicate that US has also targeted Chabahar port to increase pressure on Iran.

5. Conclusion: A Dangerous Convergence

The potential escalation of the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict is not a localized Middle Eastern issue; it is a direct threat to the stability of South Asia. For Pakistan, the war represents an existential geopolitical trap, forcing it to balance a strict mutual defense treaty with Saudi Arabia against the reality of a heavily armed neighbor in Iran and a domestic theater crawling with active insurgencies. For Afghanistan, the conflict threatens to fuel the fires of ISIS-K’s sectarian violence and destroy any hopes of regional economic integration.

As external actors seek to exploit these vulnerabilities, the line between the Middle East’s conflicts and South Asia’s internal wars is rapidly dissolving. If the Islamabad MoU completely unravels, Pakistan and Afghanistan will find themselves directly in the line of fire of a wider, highly destructive regional war.

Conversely:

If the Islamabad MoU “sticks” and transitions from a fragile ceasefire into a durable peace agreement, it holds the potential to fundamentally rewrite Pakistan’s domestic security, energy, and economic paradigms.

a. Security: Strangling Proxies

By capitalizing on its diplomatic leverage from mediating between the U.S. and Iran, Pakistan can demand reciprocal action against cross-border threats. A secure Iran, freed from Western military threats, can work with the Pakistan Army to seal the lawless border, choking the logistics and safe havens of the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) favored by India and Israel. Simultaneously, a stabilized region enables a unified U.S.-Pakistan-Iran diplomatic front to pressure the Afghan Taliban. Highly dependent on Pakistani and Iranian transit trade (like Chabahar Port), Kabul would be forced to dismantle the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). This double clampdown effectively ends the multi-front subversion designed by adversaries to keep Pakistan tactically entrapped.

b. Economy & Energy: Resurrecting the IP Pipeline

A durable reformed MoU triggers the lifting of U.S. sanctions on Iran, allowing Pakistan to complete the Iran-Pakistan (IP) Gas Pipeline without fear of international isolation. This removes the looming $18 billion “take-or-pay” penalty from Tehran, while injecting cheap natural gas to end rolling blackouts and slash industrial costs. Moreover, Gwadar Port is likely to take-off.

c. Autonomy: Balancing GCC Ties

Abundant energy and secured Central Asian trade routes drive organic growth, offering financial self-reliance and breaking Pakistan’s dependency on Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) bailouts. This shields Islamabad from strategic entrapment under its Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) with Riyadh, preserving its neutrality instead of dragging its military into regional proxy wars.

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The post US-Iran War And Alternative Futures For South Asia appeared first on Politact.

By Arif Ansar

Context

The escalation of open warfare between the United States, Israel, and Iran in early 2026—characterized by some as the “Third Gulf War”—has radically upended the strategic architecture of the Middle East. At the center of pre-war Western diplomatic planning were two highly integrated concepts: the Abraham Accords, aiming to build a normalization bridge between Israel and Arab states, and the Board of Peace (BOP), an international framework established under UN Security Council Resolution 2803 to oversee a post-conflict administration, international stabilization force, and real estate transformation in Gaza.

However, the military campaign launched on February 28, 2026, under the U.S.-Israeli codename “Operation Epic Fury”, fundamentally collided with the core assumptions of these frameworks. Instead of solidifying a prosperous, integrated, and Western-aligned trade bloc, the kinetic conflict exposed deep structural flaws in regional deterrence, shattered the prospects of two-state solution, and triggered an unprecedented shift in the balance of power.

1. The Disintegration of the Pre-War Vision: BOP and Abraham Accords Under Fire

Before the military escalation of 2026, the Abraham Accords and the Board of Peace functioned as a synchronized carrot-and-stick diplomatic strategy. The political objective was clear: circumvent the core issue of Palestinian statehood by offering massive economic, infrastructure, and technological incentives to the Arab world, effectively managing the region from the outside-in. The BOP was envisioned as a multi-layered colonial and financial administration—overseeing a Gaza Executive Board and a Palestinian National Committee—meant to signal a new era of regional co-prosperity.

When Operation Epic Fury commenced with devastating strikes on Iranian command structures, nuclear sites, and energy facilities, this vision suffered an immediate kinetic shock. Rather than acting as bridges for trade, the Abraham Accords were abruptly tested as raw military alignments. Iran’s retaliatory doctrine did not spare the region; Tehran launched waves of drones and ballistic missiles targeting not only Israeli territory but also Western assets and allies across the Gulf.

The BOP’s ambitious plans for Gaza—such as beachfront hotels and special economic zones—were instantly frozen as global energy markets panicked and global fertilizer and agricultural supply chains broke down. The war exposed an untenable contradiction: attempting to build an institutional framework for peace while simultaneously fighting a total regional war.

2. The Great Divergence: Independent Israeli Maneuvers vs. Joint Strategy

A central complication in the future of the BOP and the Abraham Accords is the apparent divergence between American diplomatic objectives and Israeli kinetic execution. While the United States has continuously attempted to orchestrate a diplomatic off-ramp, Israel has aggressively expanded its military footprint. Israel’s actions in Gaza, its incursions into Lebanon, and its unilateral willingness to strike deep into Iranian territory—even during active diplomatic windows—have created two starkly different strategic interpretations – that pose the most acute risk to the Interim Ceasefire Deal.

Interpretation A: The Maverick State Acting Unilaterally

This perspective argues that Israel is acting in open contradiction to Washington’s goals. Israeli leadership has made it clear that they no longer view the Oslo Accords or a two-state solution as viable frameworks. By pursuing a permanent military solution rather than a political compromise, Israel is explicitly prioritizing the absolute destruction of the “Axis of Resistance” over the long-term diplomatic health of the Abraham Accords. They are gambling that Arab states will eventually be forced to accept a dominant, nuclear-armed Israel as a fait accompli, regardless of the Palestinian issue.

Interpretation B: A Tightly Orchestrated Joint Strategy

Conversely, realism suggests that Israeli actions represent a coordinated, dual-track “Good Cop / Bad Cop” strategy with the United States. While Washington acts as the diplomatic negotiator—offering terms, carrots, and structural limitations—Israel functions as the unhinged kinetic hammer. By maintaining maximum military pressure on Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, Israel forces adversaries to negotiate from a position of acute vulnerability, allowing American diplomats to demand structural concessions that would be nearly impossible to attain through standard statecraft.

Regardless of which interpretation is accurate, the structural fallout is identical: Israel’s complete abandonment of the Palestinian political track has severed the primary artery through which the Abraham Accords were expected to expand to critical Muslim-majority nations like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, who have historically conditioned formal normalization on a viable two-state solution.

3. The 60-Day Ceasefire: Why Iran Emerges in an Enhanced Position

The multi-week diplomatic push that culminated in the temporary cessation of hostilities has set the stage for a potential 60-day extended ceasefire. However, an assessment of the strategic balance indicates that if a prolonged ceasefire is institutionalized under current conditions, Iran will have effectively won the geopolitical argument, shifting the regional balance of power in its favor with far reaching implications.

Despite enduring massive leadership losses and targeted degradation of its conventional military facilities during the initial strikes of Operation Epic Fury, Tehran demonstrated profound asymmetric resilience:

• Weaponization of the Chokepoints: By effectively throttling the Strait of Hormuz and imposing a massive $2 million transit toll on commercial tankers while outright banning American and Israeli vessels, Iran proved it could hold global energy markets hostage. It’s not clear whether the toll or fees will remain in any future deal.
• Surviving Regime Change Ambitions: Iran successfully weathered a decapitation campaign that killed its highest officials, proving that its institutional and proxy network could function and retaliate even under extreme duress.
• Demonstrated Retaliatory Reach: By launching direct, sustained missile strikes against Israel and retaliating against U.S. bases in the region, Iran dismantled the myth of Western invulnerability.

As far as its nuclear program is concerned, while Iran had previously committed to not attain weaponized capability. The major criticism of the earlier agreement with Iran reached in 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) under Obama administration was that it neither addressed Iran’s wider behavior in the region nor its ballistic missile program. On the positive side, JCPOA was backed by P5+1 countries i.e. US, China, Russia, France, UK, and Germany – along with European Union.

In the present context, P5+1 were not in the negotiating loop – but this does not indicate that they may not partake in any future roles. While frictions between NATO and US have increased over Ukraine and military approach towards Iran, President Trump is likely to seek support from the leaders at the G7 Summit meeting held in France, where he electronically signed the Islamabad MOU. However, in the escalating great power rivalries environment, the involvement of G7 nations will be quite nuanced.

Deciphering from the information available so far, nothing within the preliminary terms of the present ceasefire suggests that a 60-day truce will compel Iran to permanently abandon its regional proxy network. For Iran, groups like Hezbollah and Hamas are vital defensive organs. Because forcing their complete dissolution is beyond the scope of a standard ceasefire, Israel will view any finalized U.S.-Iran document with deep suspicion and may ultimately refuse to honor its terms, preferring to continue its military campaign.

4. The South Asian Pivot: Pakistan and India’s Subcontinental Tussle in the Gulf

The 2026 conflict has also manifested the subcontinental rivalry of India and Pakistan directly into the Middle Eastern theater, altering the geopolitical balance of power between the two nuclear-armed neighbors.

With the collapse of direct Western-led communication channels during the peak of the fighting, Pakistan leveraged its historic 900-kilometer border with Iran and its deep institutional ties with the Arab Gulf to emerge as the prime mediator between Washington and Tehran. The resulting “Islamabad Peace Process”—headlined by face-to-face talks in April 2026 between U.S. Vice President JD Vance and Iranian Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—elevated Pakistan into an indispensable global peace broker. By opening up back-channel communication lines via its Interests Section in Washington, Pakistan successfully negotiated the temporary cessation of hostilities, protecting its own vital economic interests, specifically the massive flow of worker remittances from the Gulf.

This diplomatic triumph directly challenges India’s long-term strategic investments in the Middle East. Over the previous decade, New Delhi had built a formidable geopolitical axis anchored on deep technological, defense, and economic ties with Israel and the UAE. India viewed this alignment as a way to project power westward and isolate Pakistan.

However, as Pakistan successfully positions itself as the necessary arbiter of regional stability between the U.S. and Iran, India’s rigid alignment with the Israel-UAE axis risks locking it out of the broader post-war regional consensus. If the Middle East transitions into a managed “cold peace” where Iran’s equities are formally recognized, Pakistan’s diplomatic capital will grow, neutralizing some of the strategic leverage India had accumulated through its partnerships.

5. Conclusion: The Structural Impasse of the Grand Vision

The grand vision originally championed by the Abraham Accords and the Board of Peace has arrived at a structural impasse. The only plausible pathway for these frameworks to move forward as instruments of a durable, comprehensive regional peace requires two simultaneous, seemingly impossible geopolitical concessions:

1. Iran must join the bandwagon, abandoning its regional agenda and accepting a formalized integration into a security architecture alongside Israel. This would be accompanied by the cassation of support for Hezbollah and Hamas.
2. Israel must accept a viable, sovereign two-state solution, ceasing expansion of territory either via settlements or military use.  This will providing the necessary political cover for Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the wider Muslim world to formally normalize ties.

Given current political realities, neither condition is achievable. Israel’s domestic political landscape remains firmly set against territorial compromise, viewing military containment and absolute security dominance as its only viable future. Concurrently, Iran’s clerical and military elite view their asymmetric deterrent power and proxy networks as the sole shield preserving the Islamic Republic from Western-orchestrated regime change.

Consequently, whether the conflict transitions through continued military attrition or a formalized ceasefire, the Board of Peace and the Abraham Accords will be forced to mutate. Rather than tools for authentic peace and regional integration, they will function as a defensive alignment designed not to resolve the region’s core disputes, but to manage an unstable and fractured “cold peace.”

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The post US-Iran Interim Ceasefire Deal, Israel, And The Future of Abraham Accords appeared first on Politact.

By Furqan Khan
Great Power Politics Fellow, PoliTact

Context

President Donald Trump is set to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping this week in Beijing, a summit originally scheduled for April and was stalled due to the ongoing US-Iran war. With the conflict carrying enormous economic consequences due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, it is likely to be a major point of discussion at the summit. What was expected to be a reset moment for US-China relations is now overshadowed by the Middle East conflict, which carries significant implications for the global economy.

Conflict at an Impasse Stage

After the initial Islamabad Talks failed to ease tensions between Iran and the United States, Pakistan’s shuttle diplomacy has reopened the lines of communication between Washington and Tehran. Tensions escalated after Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz in response to the US’ refusal to end the blockade of Iranian ports. While a ‘fragile’ truce remains in place, negotiations are stalled and fears of escalation are growing as the two parties recently exchanged fire in the Persian Gulf. After rejecting Iran’s proposal to open the Strait of Hormuz and end the war, which also suggested delaying negotiations over the nuclear program, Trump reviewed another 14-point proposal from Iran, but has expressed doubts – and later rejected another version. Meanwhile, domestic opposition in the US to the war is growing, which has already cost $25 billion. Moreover, the conflict has caused extensive damage to the US military assets across the Middle East and raised the gasoline price to its highest level in four years.

In the big picture, as the US jumps into another war in the Middle East, diverting its resources from the Pacific, it is pertinent to highlight what this conflict means for China, and its interests in the Middle East, as it also embroils in great power competition.

What is at Stake for China?

Since the beginning of this conflict, China has consistently condemned the US-Israel joint strikes on Iran in February that killed Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and demanded an immediate ceasefire. China has released numerous statements criticizing America’s broader approach to international affairs, and calling the US’ blockade of the Strait of Hormuz “dangerous and irresponsible.” Without mentioning the Iran war or blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, President Xi has criticized American actions in the Gulf, saying that the world may be returning to the “law of the jungle.”

China has substantial stakes in this conflict. It relies heavily on the Strait of Hormuz for more than a third of its energy imports. China remains Iran’s largest trading partner, and over 80 percent of its crude goes to Beijing. At the same time, China has deep economic and investment ties in the Gulf states, and the Strait of Hormuz being critical for its energy supplies, Beijing has leveraged diplomacy to seek an end to this conflict.

The China Hand

The US has accused both China and Russia of providing dual-use equipment and satellite imagery enabling Iran to target US positions in the region. The New York Times and CNN reported, citing US intelligence sources, that China was preparing a shipment of weapons, including anti-aircraft missiles, to Tehran. China has denied these claims, calling them “untrue,” and stating that China opposes such “ill-intentioned conduct.”

As he is set to meet President Xi this week, Trump also played down Chinese assistance to Iran, mentioning Chinese President Xi Jinping’s reassurance that China is not providing any weapons to Iran, while warning of “big problems” for Beijing in case they do so.

The war benefits China in many ways. The spike in oil and gas prices is pushing American allies, from the European Union to the United Kingdom – and from South Korea to the Philippines, into China’s clean energy infrastructure. They see it as a long-term solution to protect their economies. China may also be relieved seeing its rival getting bogged down in yet another war with declining credibility among its allies and the diversion of the American fleet from the Pacific. The US military has already expended an enormous amount of critical munitions that could potentially be used in a future conflict with China. China also appears most resilient in terms of energy security, given its huge oil reserves – the largest in the world. According to a recent report, China has enough oil stored to cover seven months of imports via Hormuz.

However, a conflict with wider economic and security risks reverberating throughout the region is not what China wants. Prolonged instability will threaten global markets and cause supply chain challenges. Moreover, the rising oil prices is already hurting the Chinese economy, making the Iran war and opening of the Strait of Hormuz a central concern for the upcoming Trump-Xi meeting.

China’s Leverage Over Iran

China has a strategic partnership with Iran, which is reflected in the 25-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed in March 2021. This included a massive $400 billion Chinese investment in Iran and defense cooperation in exchange for the discounted purchase of Iranian oil. The partnership allows Tehran to bypass Western sanctions while giving Beijing long-term energy security. China has also expanded its diplomatic footprint in the region by brokering a peace agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2021, helping the two rival Gulf states restore diplomatic relations.

Despite strong economic and security ties with Iran, China’s leverage has been limited. Nonetheless, Beijing’s role has been consistent, limited, and largely predictable. Chinese officials have used their conventional shuttle diplomacy, where Foreign Minister Wang Yi dialed nearly all regional partners and played its role in the UN Security Council, calling for a negotiated settlement. Beijing also joined Islamabad, the principal mediator in this conflict, to issue a joint ‘five-point initiative’ to end the war in the Middle East. At the same time, as both the New York Times and the Washington Post reported, China actively pursued the Iranians to agree to the initial two-week-long ceasefire.

A week before the Trump-Xi summit, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi met FM Wang Yi in Beijing, where Araqchi supported President Xi’s four-point proposal to end the conflict, reaffirming his “trust” in China. As part of his regional diplomacy, FM Araqchi also met Russian President Vladmir Putin in Moscow to discuss the war and continue “consultation” on regional and international issues. Trump held his own phone call with Putin during which the later expressed interest in playing an active role in ending hostilities in the US-Iran war. Trump, however, rebuffed the proposal and instead pressed Putin on ending the Ukraine war.

China’s response reflects a cautious great power strategy, where Beijing is concerned about the risks of conflict escalation but is also reaping its limited geopolitical benefits. It has not been pursuing the role of a mediator but rather a great power concerned about its broader interests in the region. Nonetheless, given its diverse energy sources and limited strategic commitment to Iran, China appears to be confident at managing the risks of this conflict.

Trump-Xi Summit 2026

As the two leaders meet this week, the Iran war and the resulting energy crisis will likely be a potential point of discussion. Trump’s announcement to continue the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, which China uses to import one-third of its energy needs, complicates the process of seeking a reset on major issues, including bilateral trade with China.

Tensions are already mounting as the two powers are taking actions against each other’s firms. The Trump administration recently sanctioned China’s largest refiners and threatened secondary sanctions against Chinese banks for facilitating Iran’s economy. Beijing has blocked Meta’s $2 Billion bid to acquire the AI startup Manus, an attempt to keep cutting-edge AI technology inside China.

The rare Trump-Xi summit is an opportunity for both competitors to bring the US-China relations on track following their trade truce in October last year. Trump realizes this and has been seeking a deal with Iran before the Summit. He wants to meet Xi from a position of strength and not with an unresolved conflict he started, alongside Israel, two months ago, which may now be giving the Chinese side an advantage. With the Iran war hanging over the summit, the meeting will may fall short of the expected outcomes in seeking a reset to the US-China bilateral relations.

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The post Iran War Overhangs Trump-Xi 2026 Summit appeared first on Politact.

The Geography of Stalemate: Risk Thresholds, Narrative Warfare, and the Quest for a New Regional Order

By Naade Ali

Context

Since the war began, it has become clear that the U.S., Israel, and Iran operate with fundamentally different risk thresholds—and those differences shape their strategies. The U.S. is less willing to tolerate prolonged economic strain but more inclined to employ overwhelming force, assuming it will bring the conflict to a swift conclusion. Israel, on the other hand, is betting on a scenario in which Iranian strikes on Gulf states provoke diplomatic backlash, potentially drawing those states into retaliatory action. Such a chain of events could pave the way for the broader regional alignment envisioned by Prime Minister Netanyahu, aimed at countering “radical Shi’a and Sunni forces” and ultimately weakening the Iranian regime. Israel, therefore, is prepared to bear the costs necessary to make this outcome possible.

From Iran’s perspective, the goal is to prevent this scenario from unfolding while influencing on GCC that American military presence on their soil has a cost and no benefit. Iran’s mosaic military doctrine is designed to endure sustained pressure while simultaneously increasing unpredictability and risk, making its actions more dangerous and uncertain. This high-risk tolerance remains one of its few tools to establish and maintain deterrence—something it is unlikely to compromise.

Iran’s geography plays a key role in its Anti-Access/Area-Denial

At present, it appears that the world’s most advanced military systems, equipped with cutting-edge and futuristic capabilities, are fundamentally constrained by geographical realities. Iran’s geography is a central “force multiplier” for its Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategy, effectively turning the country into a natural fortress that complicates any conventional military intervention. The superior airpower fielded by Israel and the United States has not translated into absolute control over critical chokepoints held by Iran, nor has it succeeded in dismantling the undersea and “Undermountain” missile infrastructure that keeps Iran’s defensive network largely operational and difficult to conquer despite relentless bombardment. These deeply embedded installations, carved into the Zagros Mountains, act as fortified nodes that enable Iran to sustain command-and-control functions.

While air strikes can degrade capabilities, complete neutralization requires a high-intensity land campaign—a scenario fraught with risk. Iran’s military doctrine leverages its unique topography, using natural barriers and limited access points to offset an adversary’s technological edge. For any invading force, the combination of logistical hurdles and Iran’s mastery of its difficult terrain makes a quick victory highly improbable. Consequently, U.S. strategy faces a stark trade-off: rely on stand-off strikes that degrade but do not eliminate threats, or escalate toward high-risk options for more decisive results. This geographic and structural advantage effectively cements a strategic stalemate, as Iran’s hardened infrastructure and ‘natural fortress’ prevent any effort from achieving a rapid military outcome.

For Iran, prolonging the conflict appears to be the preferred course at this stage. Tehran has deliberately increased the costs of the war to unprecedented levels so it can have maximum leverage in negotiations with the United States, with its core demands of—financial compensation, the removal of all sanctions, a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region and recognition of its control over strategic maritime chokepoints.

Iran’s use of threat language is particularly significant in this regard. The rhetoric can exert psychological pressure on adversaries, yet it risks backfiring if not supported by actual capability. In Iran’s case, however, its warnings have proven credible rather than symbolic. This is demonstrated by its selective attacks on regional countries and control over the Strait of Hormuz, where only vessels linked to China are permitted passage, effectively transforming global trade into a strategic instrument against the U.S. alliance.

The Narrative Pivot: Trump’s Strategy of Perception Over Conquest

In the conflict with Iran, Trump’s “winning card” is his ability to control the narrative, prioritizing the appearance of victory over the reality of a physical win. He relies on narrative dominance, using the perception of a diplomatic breakthrough to maintain both domestic support and global leverage. While he projects an image of Iran “begging” for a deal, the actual conflict on the ground remains a complex stalemate.

The sudden and highly visible emphasis on diplomacy, initiated under the Islamabad Talks, reflects a calculated effort to manage domestic expectations through narrative control. By steering attention toward backchannel negotiations, President Trump diverts focus from military challenges or internal criticism. It illustrates a broader tactic of strategic distraction: when one narrative weakens, another is introduced to create uncertainty. This deliberate blurring of facts makes it harder for the public to form clear judgments or hold leadership accountable. In this way, confusion becomes a tool—dampening opposition and creating space for an exit framed more by optics than by conventional military success.

On the other side, deeper internal challenges confronting the Trump administration are becoming increasingly evident. Among them is a formal Pentagon request for $200 billion to sustain military operations, a proposal that has provoked strong criticism and concern among both Democrats and fiscal conservatives in Congress. Democrats are actively leveraging the conflict for political advantage, accusing Trump of leading the United States into an unnecessary and prolonged war while positioning themselves ahead of the November midterm elections in hopes of securing a legislative majority. Meanwhile, Republicans with long-term political aspirations—like Vice President JD Vance, widely considered a likely contender for the 2028 presidential race—are encountering increasing challenges in presenting a persuasive “America First” vision as the conflict drags on.

It was during the widespread fatigue and disillusionment from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that Trump originally solidified his “America First” persona. Yet, the prolonged confrontation with Iran threatens to undermine that narrative, as rising casualties, economic strain, and geopolitical entanglements make it harder for emerging Republican leaders to argue for restrained foreign intervention while projecting strength abroad. Vance and others must now navigate a delicate balance: appealing to a voter base that values both national security and fiscal prudence, while demonstrating that they can manage a complex, protracted conflict without repeating the mistakes of previous administrations. This tension illustrates how domestic political ambitions are increasingly intertwined with the outcomes and perception of foreign military engagements.

As a result, the U.S. campaign against Iran has generated numerous challenges and setbacks that outweigh its tactical military achievements to date.

Israeli Game Plan

For Israel, the conflict represents a rare and historic opportunity to significantly weaken Iran. The country appears prepared for a prolonged confrontation; recent surveys indicate that 81% of Israelis support military action, with many willing to endure sustained attacks to see the collapse of the Iranian regime. Years of conflict with Hamas and Hezbollah have conditioned Israel to absorb both psychological and physical strain. In such an environment, hardship becomes normalized, allowing for greater societal resilience. While both Iran and Israel appear capable of enduring prolonged shocks, the United States lacks the same tolerance, creating a possible divergence in strategic trajectories.

In Israel’s view, the objective is to push further toward definitive regime change. However, it recognizes that airstrikes alone are unlikely to achieve this goal, which is why it is increasingly considering the possibility of a ground invasion, potentially with U.S. support. Such a move, however, would likely initiate a prolonged conflict. Israel understands that ending the war prematurely would risk undermining the gains it has already made. While this could help the Israeli government to maintain domestic unity by framing the conflict as an existential necessity, it would not necessarily produce similar political benefits for President Trump or his Republican Party at home.

For the United States, one possible course could involve stepping back and allowing Iran and Israel to confront each other directly. However, Iran appears to have anticipated such a scenario and does not intend for the conflict to remain confined. Its recent shift in military doctrine—confirmed by Major General Ali Abdollahi as a transition from defense to offense—indicates an ambition to expand the effects of the war from a regional to a global scale. By exploiting interconnected vulnerable systems of energy, food, and trade, Iran seeks to create a cascading effect in which damage inflicted upon it reverberates worldwide. Its broader objective appears to be the erosion of U.S. dominance and the restructuring of global power toward a Chinese-centered order.

By encouraging Arab states to align with China’s Global Security Initiative, Iran is promoting an alternative model of security that prioritizes sovereignty over U.S. involvement. In effect, it is attempting to achieve through warfare what China could not accomplish solely through economic means. This strategic gameplay was acknowledged by President Trump himself, who described the situation as a ‘big chess game’ suggesting that Iran is acting as a “smart player, playing high-level chess.”

Iran is striving to ensure that any resolution to the conflict will not restore the pre-war status quo. Instead, it seeks to extract maximum gains whenever negotiations take place. If Iran’s objectives are realized and revenues begin to flow, Iran would not only rebuild its economy but also invest heavily in military modernization, developing capabilities that could prove extremely difficult to counter in any future confrontation.

This prospect is deeply concerning for Israel, which anticipates that a post-war Iran could emerge as a highly militarized and resilient power. From Israel’s perspective, the only viable strategy is to continue the war and ensure that Iran is weakened to such an extent that rebuilding its military strength would take decades. However, such an approach demands sustained endurance, strategic patience, and a high tolerance for risk—traits that Iran has already demonstrated.

Whether Israel can maintain this level of resilience remains uncertain, and this question will become clearer as the conflict continues. This is not a short-term confrontation, but a prolonged struggle likely to reshape regional power dynamics. With diplomatic positions varying and domestic political pressures mounting, the conflict is likely to persist. The result is a negative-sum dynamic in which decisive victory remains unlikely; escalation risks stay high, and any eventual endgame will reflect not shared interests but the relative exhaustion and leverage of the parties involved.

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The post The US-Israel and Iran Conflict: The Interplay of Goals and Strategies appeared first on Politact.

By Arif Ansar

Context

The Middle East’s contemporary realignment did not begin with the war between Iran and Israel, nor with Iranian strikes on U.S. bases across the Gulf. It began earlier, with the slow erosion of faith in a security order built on American primacy, Israeli military overmatch, and the assumption of Arab strategic compliance. The Israeli strike on Doha in September 2025 merely stripped away the last illusions. What followed was not unity, but fragmentation. Instead, the Islamic world entered a phase of deliberate Middle Power alliance‑building, driven by layered threat perceptions and an urgent desire for strategic autonomy.

At the center of this transformation is a paradox. The region is witnessing the rise of new alliances, yet these alliances are not designed to fight a single enemy. They are instead meant to buffer against multiple threats simultaneously: Iranian asymmetry, Israeli unilateralism, and U.S. unpredictability. Complicating this further is the re‑emergence of the “Greater Israel” narrative, which has amplified regional fears that Israeli military power is no longer bounded by defensive logic alone.

From Gulf Unity to Gulf Divergence

For much of the post‑Arab Spring period, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates were viewed as the twin pillars of Arab order. They coordinated in Yemen, aligned against political Islam, and worked closely with Washington. That partnership now seem to have fractured into a structural rivalry rooted in fundamentally different understandings of power and risk.

Saudi Arabia has increasingly embraced a state‑centric, formalized security approach and strategic autonomy. Scarred by years of proxy warfare and conscious of the vulnerability of its economic transformation under Vision 2030, Riyadh has grown wary of open‑ended confrontation—particularly wars triggered by actors outside its control. Iranian attacks on energy infrastructure, U.S. bases, and shipping lanes reinforced Saudi fears not just of Tehran, but of being caught between Washington and Tehran. This explains Riyadh’s pivot toward formal defense guarantees, most notably with Pakistan, and its growing strategic convergence with Turkey.

The UAE, by contrast, has doubled down on a networked, maritime, and technology‑driven security model. Abu Dhabi prefers flexible alignments, proxy leverage, and intelligence dominance over rigid alliance hierarchies. Its deepening ties with Israel and India reflect a desire to hedge not only against Iran, but also against Saudi Arabia’s ambition to re‑centralize Arab leadership. This divergence—well captured in PoliTact’s analysis of Saudi‑UAE power tussles with Turkey and Iran—has become one of the most important drivers of bloc formation in the region. The result is not a split over ideology, but over risk management. Riyadh fears escalation without control; Abu Dhabi fears marginalization within a Saudi‑led order.

As Middle Power alliances harden across the Middle East, the other Gulf states—Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait—illustrate divergent strategies for managing exposure, autonomy, and survival amid the erosion of the U.S.-centric security order. Unlike Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which seek to shape regional outcomes through competing alliance architectures, these states operate primarily as system navigators, each responding differently to rising unilateralism and unmanaged escalation.

Qatar occupies the most exposed position. Its foreign policy has emphasized mediation, diplomatic connectivity, and hosting high‑level interlocutors, allowing Doha to play a central role in ceasefire negotiations and crisis diplomacy. This strategy, however, has carried increasing risk. The Israeli airstrike in Doha in September 2025—widely analyzed as a stress test for Gulf mediation and U.S. security guarantees—demonstrated the limits of protection derived from connectivity alone and raised questions about the durability of mediator immunity in a more permissive strike environment. Mediation provides access and relevance, but as escalation becomes kinetic, it offers diminishing insulation.

Bahrain represents the opposite strategy. Rather than seeking autonomy through flexibility, Manama has embedded itself deeply within Saudi‑led and U.S.‑aligned security structures. Hosting the U.S. Fifth Fleet and relying on external guarantees for regime stability, Bahrain externalizes risk upward to larger patrons, trading strategic maneuverability for protection. This approach offers short‑term stability but reduces Bahrain’s ability to hedge as the regional order fragments.

Oman occupies a quieter middle ground. Like Qatar, Muscat prioritizes mediation, but it does so through deliberate low visibility and strategic restraint. Omani diplomacy is characterized by neutrality, confidentiality, and avoidance of high‑profile military entanglements, allowing it to act as an intermediary without becoming a primary target. This combination has enabled Oman to preserve autonomy with comparatively lower exposure.

Kuwait, meanwhile, adopts a strategy of institutional caution. Its foreign policy emphasizes international law, neutrality, and multilateral legitimacy, shaped in part by domestic constitutional constraints and a historically empowered legislature. Kuwait avoids both alliance leadership and high‑risk mediation, focusing instead on predictability and restraint as a means of survival.

Taken together, these cases highlight the narrowing options available to small states in a region increasingly defined by unilateral force and competitive alignment. Flexibility, dependence, invisibility, and restraint each offer partial protection—but none fully insulate against a security environment in which traditional guarantees no longer reliably constrain escalation.

The Emergence of an “Islamic NATO” and Hexagon Alignment

Out of this environment has emerged what is increasingly described as an Islamic NATO‑style alignment, anchored by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, with Turkey as a central pillar. This bloc is often misunderstood as a purely anti‑Iran coalition. In reality, it is built on three overlapping threat perceptions.

First is Iranian asymmetry: missile forces, drones, and proxies that threaten energy infrastructure and regime stability. Second is U.S. unpredictability—the fear that American military decisions, often aligned closely with Israeli objectives, could entangle Muslim states in wars they neither seek nor control. Third is Israeli strategic autonomy, particularly as Israel demonstrates a willingness to strike across borders without regard for Arab diplomatic calculations.

The Pakistan–Saudi defense agreement reflects this logic. Pakistan offers nuclear credibility and conventional depth; Turkey provides expeditionary experience, NATO interoperability, and drone warfare expertise; Saudi Arabia contributes financial resources and diplomatic weight. Together, they form a deterrence architecture designed less to confront Israel directly than to prevent Muslim states from being involuntary participants in U.S.–Israeli campaigns. This bloc is therefore as much about autonomy as opposition.

Parallel to the perceived Islamic NATO is a looser but influential alignment in infancy, centered on Israel, India, and potentially UAE—often described as a Hexagon Alliance when extended to include additional partners. This bloc is driven by a different hierarchy of threats and economic incentives. For Israel, the priority remains Iran, but also the risk of regional isolation should Sunni states consolidate into a unified security framework. India views the Gulf through the lens of maritime security, energy flows, and competition with China. The UAE sees in this alignment a way to offset Saudi leadership ambitions while retaining access to Israeli technology and U.S. strategic networks. This bloc is not primarily anti‑Islamic. It is anti‑consolidation. Its purpose is to ensure that no single Sunni‑led alliance can dominate the region’s security architecture.

Greater Israel as a Strategic Disruptor
One of the most destabilizing factors shaping alliance behavior today is not a military doctrine, but a narrative: the re‑emergence of the idea of Greater Israel. While not an official policy of the Israeli state, the concept—rooted in religious‑nationalist ideology and echoed by influential political figures—has gained unprecedented visibility during and after the Gaza war. Regional actors interpret this discourse as signaling a rejection of territorial finality and Palestinian sovereignty. Al Jazeera and Middle East Eye have documented how references to biblical borders and permanent Israeli control “from the river to the sea” have triggered alarm across Arab and Muslim capitals.

The destabilizing effect of the Greater Israel narrative is threefold. First, it reframes Israeli military action as potentially expansionist rather than defensive. Second, it undermines the political sustainability of normalization agreements by making it harder for Arab leaders to justify cooperation without a Palestinian resolution. Third, it reinforces the perception that U.S. power in the region is structurally aligned with Israeli territorial objectives rather than regional stability. Even states aligned with Israel, such as the UAE, hedge against this uncertainty. Others respond by accelerating independent deterrence mechanisms.

Great Power Rivalry and the Turn to Hedging

The Islamic world is no longer a passive theater of Great Power rivalry. It is actively shaping a multipolar order in which Middle Powers hedge against everyone—including their allies. The Saudi–UAE split, the rise of Islamic NATO and Hexagon formations, the disruptive force of the Greater Israel narrative, and the quiet advance of China and Russia all point to the same conclusion: the era of uncontested security hierarchies in the Middle East is over. What replaces it is not stability, but agency. And in a region long defined by external control, that may be the most consequential shift of all.

As regional blocs multiply, China and Russia benefit not by conquest but by optionality. China’s deepening involvement in South Asia and the Gulf—through infrastructure, security arrangements, energy, and industrial investment—positions Beijing as an indispensable economic partner to all sides without entanglement in regional wars. Russia, meanwhile, offers selective military alternatives, reinforcing a multipolar security environment in which no single actor dominates. Neither power demands ideological alignment; both profit from fragmentation.

Who Are These Alliances Really Meant to Counter?

The central question—who are these alliances meant to counter—has no single answer. They are not aimed solely at Iran, Israel, or the United States. They seemed designed to manage uncertainty in a system where all three generate risk. Iran threatens through asymmetry. Israel threatens through unilateral escalation and expansionist rhetoric. The United States threatens—not intentionally, but structurally—through unpredictability and alignment choices that subordinate regional interests to global strategy and balance of power calculations.

For Saudi Arabia, Iran is dangerous not only because of missiles and proxies, but because Iranian escalation reliably draws in U.S. and Israeli responses that Riyadh does not command. For the UAE, Iran is disruptive but manageable through deterrence, diversification, and diplomacy. For Israel, Iran is framed as an existential threat demanding pre‑emptive action. For Turkey and Pakistan, Iran is a competitor to be balanced, not annihilated.

Iran’s retaliatory attacks on U.S. bases in GCC states did not unify the region. Instead, they exposed the costs of hosting American power. Gulf monarchies found themselves targeted not for their own actions, but for decisions made in Washington and Tel Aviv. As the Carnegie Endowment has noted, this dynamic has pushed Gulf states toward independent security thinking rather than deeper reliance on U.S. guarantees. In this sense, Iran functions less as the architect of regional order than as its accelerator—forcing others to adapt. The alliances forming across the Islamic world appear to be alliances of insulation, not crusades. They seek to preserve autonomy, reduce exposure, and prevent any single power from dictating outcomes.

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The post Geopolitics Of Islamic World And Middle Power Alliances After Iran Attack appeared first on Politact.

By Naade Ali

President Trump and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) are redefining the U.S.-Saudi alliance to address China’s rising influence and the Gaza crisis, effectively moving the partnership beyond its traditional foundations. Since their inception, the Saudi-US relations have experienced fluctuations but have been sustained by overlapping strategic interests and mutual dependencies. At the center of their crucible of interaction stood a security–petrodollar arrangement. Even when relations hit their lowest point, the core bargain held: Saudi Arabia continued selling oil in dollars and remained a key supplier to the United States, while Washington preserved its role as the Kingdom’s primary security guarantor and leading defense provider.

However, shifting global dynamics, fueled in part by intensifying great power competition between China and the United States, have pushed middle powers like Saudi Arabia to reduce their dependence on any single major actor and seek greater strategic autonomy. While this shift has broadened their ambitions, it has also uncovered greater opportunities and challenges. The Saudi-US relations are not indifferent to these evolving dynamics, with both countries recalibrating their bilateral ties along new strategic dimensions.

Saudi Arabia as a Swing State in the U.S.–China Rivalry

Today’s Saudi Arabia appears to be hedging away from over reliance on the United States, building a strategy centered on its pragmatic interests and exercising sovereign leverage. This helps in deal-making and to secure the space needed to navigate the great power rivalry. Saudi Arabia’s move to reduce its dependence on the United States gained momentum exactly when ties with Washington soured under the Biden administration. Confronted with the unpredictability of American policy, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) found an attractive alternative in Beijing, which offered strategic engagement without preconditions. Closer ties with China enabled Saudi Arabia to pursue a multidimensional strategy, diversify its partnerships, and maintain the flexibility necessary to manage uncertainties in its relationship with Washington.

For China, Saudi Arabia became a central pillar for expanding regional influence in the Middle East. Riyadh hosted the first-ever China-Arab States Summit and, through Beijing’s mediation, reconciled diplomatic ties with Tehran. Further consolidating their ties with Beijing, both Tehran and Riyadh also integrated into multilateral blocs where China and Russia hold considerable sway, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS. Additionally, China strengthened economic relations with the Kingdom, becoming its largest trading partner and providing robust support for Vision 2030. A major payoff of Saudi Arabia’s strategic pivot toward China was that it transformed Saudi Arabia into a geopolitical swing state. This effectively signaled to Washington it is fully prepared to deepen ties with Beijing unless the U.S. proactively restores its coveted central role.

The Trump–MBS Summit: A Strategic Inflection Point

President Trump’s extraordinary embrace of Mohammed bin Salman during his visit to Washington in November suggests that Riyadh’s calibrated swing-state posture is working. Riyadh now carries significant geostrategic weight and has taken center stage in the U.S.–China competition for influence in the Middle East.

Trump’s approach to strategic competition with China rests on two pillars: credible deterrence and tightening of alignment with key U.S. middle power partners. Within this framework, any complete Saudi drift into Beijing’s orbit is viewed as strategically unacceptable. At the same time, he is acutely aware of the practical limits of attempting to sever Riyadh’s growing relationship with Beijing, recognizing that containment of China cannot succeed solely through coercive pressure on allies to reverse course.

As evidenced by President Trump’s foreign policy conduct, he employs a distinctive blend of generous incentives and far-reaching, exclusive agreements in energy, critical minerals, technology, and defense. These arrangements simultaneously fortify bilateral partnerships and allow middle powers, such as Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to maintain a semblance of strategic autonomy in their relations with China. Beneath this veneer, however, the United States methodically secures alignment on matters of vital national interest, while deliberately imposing significant strategic costs on any partner that leans excessively toward Beijing.

Nevertheless, Trump’s transactional foreign policy has provided Saudi Arabia with an opportunity for adjusting its own strategy, allowing the Kingdom to pursue a more robust, interest-driven relationship with Washington. Riyadh recognizes that being a center of the Islamic holy places provides it immense influence in the Muslim world. United States relies on it not only to balance China in the Middle East but also to help secure a stable regional environment for Israel. This is a goal that, in Trump’s view, could be advanced if Saudi Arabia joins the Abraham Accords, potentially encouraging other Arab and Muslim countries to follow suit.

The Summit Outcome

Through Vision 2030 reforms and skillful diplomatic maneuvering, the Kingdom has transcended its traditional role. This transformation not only redirects the calculus of their bilateral partnership but also carries profound implications for the Middle East’s balance of power and the broader dynamics of great power competition. It has emerged as a pivotal regional powerhouse whose energy resources, vast investment capital, and geopolitical influence make it indispensable to both Washington and Beijing.

During their meeting, President Trump stated he was “the best friend Saudi Arabia has ever had in Washington,” a statement that highlighted his administration’s desire to deepen ties through personal rapport. Nevertheless, the agreements concluded between the two leaders demonstrate that the U.S.-Saudi relationship remains firmly grounded in their respective national interests and strategic imperatives, with both seeking to extract maximum advantage.

President Trump secured a $1 trillion investment pledge from the Crown Prince, alongside the signing of a Strategic Framework for Cooperation. This framework includes Saudi commitments to supply uranium, metals, permanent magnets, and critical minerals essential for U.S. defense and energy sectors. Leveraging Saudi Arabia’s vast deposits of rare earth elements (REEs), Trump advanced his goal of countering China’s dominance in critical minerals.

For his part, Crown Prince achieved major strategic gains: the Kingdom was granted major non-NATO ally status, a defense agreement was finalized, and approval was secured for the purchase of American F-35 fighter jets and other advanced weapons. These acquisitions will strengthen Saudi defense architecture. Additionally, in line with its ambition to become a global hub for artificial intelligence, Saudi Arabia also gained access to advanced AI chips and U.S. technology firms to support the development of its domestic AI infrastructure.

US-Saudi Ties and Gaza Peace Plan

The Washington meeting between President Trump and the Crown Prince highlighted both progress and persistent challenges in U.S.–Saudi relations, with Saudi-Israel normalization remaining a key point of divergence. While Trump pressed Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords, Mohammed bin Salman insisted that any normalization depend on Israel committing to “an irreversible, credible, and time-bound path toward Palestinian statehood.” Following the Israel–Gaza conflict, Riyadh has emerges as a leading advocate for international recognition of Palestine, a position consistently opposed by the U.S. and Israel. Its refusal to yield to Trump’s push for normalization reflects the broader post-war realities in Gaza.

By taking this stance, Crown Prince delivered a twofold message: First, the strengthening of U.S.–Saudi ties must remain entirely independent of any precondition for Saudi–Israeli normalization. Second, while Riyadh is open in principle to normalization, Israel’s refusal to recognize Palestinian statehood remains a major impediment. While Riyadh supports the Trump Gaza peace plan in principle, it rejects full Israeli control over the Gaza territory and insists on concrete conditions: a time-bound Israeli withdrawal, the deployment of an international protection force, and the reinstatement of authority to the Palestinian Authority.

Saudi Arabia’s demands on the Palestinian issue clash directly with Israel’s red lines, leaving Washington struggling to balance relations with both capitals. From Israel’s viewpoint, the rapidly deepening U.S.–Saudi partnership, explicitly decoupled from any obligation of Saudi–Israeli normalization, raises two profound concerns. First, it risks elevating Riyadh’s regional influence while undermining Israel’s primary strategic objective: the expansion of the Abraham Accords. Second, as long as Riyadh continues to regard Israel as a principal source of regional instability, not Iran, the possibility persists that Saudi Arabia could further deepen its relations with Iran.

Historically, the shared enmity toward Iran has been the bedrock of both the U.S.–Israel alliance and U.S.–Saudi security relations. Following their China-brokered détente, Riyadh and Tehran no longer see each other as existential threats. To prevent Washington from viewing improved Saudi–Iranian ties with alarm, Mohammed bin Salman has carefully framed them as potentially beneficial to the United States, offering to help the U.S and Iran reach a deal that could be vital to regional stability. Riyadh can indeed encourage Iran to talk, but persuading Tehran to accept U.S. terms is no less daunting than U.S. convincing Israel to meet Saudi demands on Palestine. The scenario thus exposes the limits of influence on both sides: neither Washington nor Riyadh can fully impose their will on Israel and Iran.

The Washington summit also revealed a deeper convergence: the United States and Saudi Arabia need each other to achieve their core objectives in the Middle East. Under the Trump approach, US appears willing to delegate primary responsibility for preserving and enforcing the U.S.-led order in the Middle East to Saudi Arabia. However, for Riyadh to fully assume the role of America’s pre-eminent regional partner, it will also have to bear the main burden of protecting U.S. interests, containing rivals, and upholding the existing regional architecture.

Such an alignment would signal to Iran that Saudi Arabia had become the de facto guarantor and enforcer of core American interests. A U.S.–Saudi power-sharing arrangement would also carry significant implications for Israel. Confronted with a region increasingly shaped around Saudi primacy, Israel would face a stark choice: either challenge Riyadh and risk damaging its own relationship with Washington, or accommodate Saudi terms and move toward normalization on conditions set by the Kingdom. Under this approach, in which Saudi Arabia and the United States emerge as mutually reinforcing strategic partners, both are able to secure the outcomes they seek from Iran and Israel.

The Saudi-UAE Rivalry and Yemen Conflict

As the new year begins, the region is no longer defined by “Arabs vs. Iran” or “Islamists vs. Monarchies,” but by the fallout of weakening Iran that is creating a power vacuum. Muslim Middle Powers are competing to to fill the space, illustrated by the Saudi-UAE split. In places of old alliances, new ones are taking shape premised on cold, transactional game of national interest. And these tensions are playing out from Yemen to Syria, Sudan, Libya, and Somalia.

While the Trump-MBS summit secured vital U.S. interests in energy and defense, it exposed the fragility of the broader regional architecture. Saudi Arabia is acting like a state, prioritizing borders, stability, and institutions to protect Vision 2030. The UAE resembles a corporation, prioritizing ports, trade routes, and resource extraction. Turkey and Qatar are navigating the space between them, leveraging their military and ideological assets to carve out their own spheres of influence.

Similarly, President Trump’s “20-Point Peace Plan,” unveiled in September 2025, was predicated on a unified regional architecture: Gulf capital would fund reconstruction, Egyptian-Turkish logistics would secure the ground, Pakistan-Indonesia-Turkey may be part of the International Stabilization Force (ISF), and Israeli-Saudi normalization would provide the political horizon.

As of late December 2025, the dramatic rupture between Saudi Arabia and the UAE—culminating in the Saudi airstrike on UAE-backed assets in Mukalla, Yemen—has shattered the “Sunni Coalition” prerequisite for the plan’s success. The 20-point framework is now being pulled apart by the competing power centers and Israel may find itself the short-term beneficiary of Arab fragmentation. Unless Washington can repair the rupture within the Gulf Cooperation Council, its grand strategy for the Middle East risks becoming a two-legged stool: supported by a strong U.S.-Saudi bilateral deal, but lacking the regional stability required to stand.

Related Articles:

Israel Airstrike Targets Hamas Negotiators In Doha, Threatening Gaza Ceasefire Talks – Sep 15, 2025
Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions – April 26, 2025
Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran – February 25, 2025
Assad’s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East – Dec 26, 2024
The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump – Dec 5, 2024
Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences – Aug 30, 2024
The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities – Sep 27, 2024
Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States – Aug 4, 2023
What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply? – Aug 4, 2022

The post Saudi Arabia as a Rising Middle Power: The Trump-MBS Summit, China, and the Future of Gaza appeared first on Politact.

PoliTact’s Global Security Study

With inputs from Naade Ali and Arif Ansar

Context

Negotiations on the Trump’s 20-point Gaza Peace Package has been ongoing in Egypt since Monday, and the deal on the first phase between Hamas and Israel was announced on October 8th. At first glance, the focus appears to be on tactical choices, such as cease-fires, hostage exchanges, the future of Gaza, the fate of Hamas, and whether the Abraham Accords survive the region’s new trauma. Trump’s plan is pragmatic: a phased cease-fire, hostage-prisoner swaps, an interim technocratic authority to oversee Gaza reconstruction and demilitarization. However, it’s much vaguer where the politics bite: long-term political status, refugee questions, and Palestinian statehood.

The leaders of eight Muslim-majority states: Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Türkiye, Indonesia, Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan, who met Trump on the sidelines of the 80th UN General Assembly in New York, had expressed support for the plan in a joint statement, praising his “sincere efforts to end the war in Gaza” and expressing confidence in his ability to achieve peace. However, the text of the plan released subsequently has raised concerns among Arab countries and drawn significant domestic criticism, as it deviates from the proposals of the foreign ministers of the eight Muslim states. Reports indicate that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu secured “the last word,” persuading Washington to make additional changes at a stage when it was harder for the Muslim countries to intervene.

How the Gaza question is resolved — whether as a primarily security-led stabilization by disarming, re-building, and technocratic governance or as a political settlement that recognizes Palestinian political rights in a durable way — is yet to be seen. An Israeli-U.S. approach that produces security and normalization without a credible, enforceable pathway to Palestinian political rights and without addressing refugee claims, settlements or permanent borders risks locking in a durable, managed status quo that advantageously cements Israeli gains and rewards Arab normalization while leaving Palestinian grievances unresolved.

For critics and many Palestinians, the plan’s biggest flaw is that it recapitulates the old “deal by omission” problem — postpone the hard political questions and hope that security fixes suffice. Robert Malley’s long reflection on the failure of past peace processes is a timely reminder that postponing core issues almost guarantees revival of conflict rather than durable peace.

Shift in the Middle East Balance of Power

Since Trump’s first term in power led to Abraham Accords in September 2020, the Middle East is undergoing tumultuous shift in the balance of power. This shift is away from Iran’s axis of resistance and towards those that signed the Abraham Accords – and others that were moving towards accepting it. Highlighting plans to expand the signatories to the Abraham Accord and emphasizing the strategic and economic benefits of cooperating with Israel, Trump recently stated:

“History has shown us that those who establish relations with Israel have thrived, while those who devote resources and attention toward the destruction — even the annihilation — of Israel have languished. Israel is not going anywhere. They are going to coexist with other peoples and countries in the region. The Abraham Accords demonstrate that nations are better off when they communicate, work together, and embrace new opportunities.”

The last five years have seen aggressive Israeli campaigns and intelligence operations directed at damaging — sometimes decisively — Iran’s regional network: kinetic blows, targeted assassinations of key operatives in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, and continued pressure on Iran’s enlistment of militias. Another focus has been the degrading of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, whether by eliminating key scientists, or by cyberattacks on its nuclear facility. In June, US also carried out bombing of the Iran’s nuclear facilities in Fordow, Isfahan, and Nanatz sites.

The net effect has been to cripple Iran’s reach: Hezbollah was weakened on the battlefield during the 2023–24 rounds of fighting; Iran’s Quds Force lost its most iconic commander in Qasem Soleimani in January 2020. Recently, Isreal shifted its focus to the political leadership, which lead to the assassination of Ismael Haniyeh on Iranian soil in July 2024, followed by elimination of Hassan Nasrullah in Lebanon in September 2024. However, it was the Israeli attack on Hamas negotiators in Doha last month that many experts believe may have broken the camel’s back. It blurred the line of who is Israel after – and what does it want to achieve with all the mayhem that followed Oct 7, 2023, tragic Hamas attack on Israel. The campaign against Iran has demonstrated that Israel can play with international rules at will and without any consequences. This will have grave long-term consequences for global order.

But degradation does not mean elimination — proxies adapt, civilian costs grow, and local politics evolve in unpredictable ways. Alongside coercion and violence, normalization diplomacy has quietly reshaped the balance. The Abraham Accords proved that several Arab states were prepared to prioritize trade, technology, and counter-Iran cooperation, over the old formula that required Palestinian statehood before normalization. This bargain created an “outside-in” model of Israeli influence — Israel’s security and economic ties extend into the Arab world even as its control over Palestinian territories and the facts on the ground become more entrenched.

That model has a dual consequence: it strengthens Israel’s regional legitimacy and deterred coalitions, but it also delegitimizes the Palestinian cause in some Arab capitals. Unless meaningful political concessions accompany normalization under the current rounds of peace accords – the situation may plan in the hands of hardliners in the longer run.

Reshaping the New Middle East

The 20-point Trump plan thus revolve around two linked wagers.

First: can an externally led, security-first approach end immediate bloodshed and create a stable environment for reconstruction? Second: can that short-term security compact be turned into a politically legitimate, durable settlement that includes Palestinian rights and prevents radicalization? If the answer to the second question is “no,” then any tactical success will be ephemeral — the security gains will ossify into new grievances and a renewed cycle of violence.

If the American-Israeli tack succeeds in producing a stable Gaza that is demilitarized, internationally managed and economically rebuilt — but without a credible pathway to Palestinian statehood, refugee resolution, or substantive political participation — the regional consequence is likely to be twofold:

(a) the anti-Abraham Accord camp will consolidate, and (b) the Palestinian national cause shifts from mainstream diplomacy back to asymmetric forms of resistance and transnational advocacy. That benefits actors that can exploit grievances — whether non-state actors in the region or international rivals that seek influence by presenting themselves as alternatives to the U.S. model.

Middle East and the Global Balance of Power

Potential failure of the U.S.-Israeli approach does not automatically favor China and Russia — but it creates openings. China and Russia are playing a long game: both have expanded political and economic ties in the Middle East, offering infrastructure, arms, and diplomatic cover without the political conditionalities the West often attaches. Beijing’s economic footprint, growing role in regional institutions, including BRICS partners, and willingness to court Gulf states for energy and investment means it can offer attractive alternatives to American dependency.

Moscow, for its part, remains an arms supplier and a diplomatic interlocutor (especially in Syria), and it relishes opportunities to undercut U.S. influence. If Washington’s approach produces stability without justice, public sentiment may turn away from the U.S. narrative and look to non-Western partners who promise investments or political balance-as as has already started to occur. That said, China and Russia do not currently possess the same depth of security integration with Israel or the same network of alliances that would let them ‘replace’ American influence overnight — what they can do is exploit U.S. credibility gaps to gain economic and political footholds.

The Way Forward

Three practical conclusions emerge from a realistic appraisal of Trump’s 20-point plan:

1. Security outcomes are necessary but not sufficient. Short-term stabilization that includes hostage releases, ceasefires, and reconstruction, is important and politically urgent — but by itself it will not end the conflict’s structural drivers. The old lesson of Oslo remains: postponing core grievances breeds future crises.
2. Normalization without a political track is a strategic accelerant for some actors and a strategic liability for others. States that prioritize economic and security ties with Israel will gain leverage; however, the Arab and Muslim Street will judge outcomes by whether justice is achieved for Palestinians.
3. Geopolitically, every gap left by U.S. leadership, or perceived U.S. indifference to justice, creates space for China and Russia to expand influence — primarily through diplomacy and investment, and secondarily through arms and political support. But neither Beijing nor Moscow offers a ready-made substitute for U.S. regional security guarantees; rather, they offer alternative hedges that regional states will use in pursuit of their own short-term interests.

If Cairo deal and the Trump package are to avoid merely delaying the next crisis they must do three things simultaneously:

Secure an immediate end to mass killing and human suffering; create an inclusive, accountable reconstruction process that gives Palestinians meaningful agency; and set out an enforceable, internationally backed political roadmap that addresses, not postpones, refugee claims, borders and sovereignty – as was done in the Oslo Accords. Without that tripod, any “victory” will be tactical, not strategic — and the balance of power will keep shifting unpredictably, with winners among states and non-state actors who are best at exploiting unresolved grievances.

Related Articles:

Israel Airstrike Targets Hamas Negotiators In Doha, Threatening Gaza Ceasefire Talks – Sep 15, 2025
Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions – April 26, 2025
Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran – February 25, 2025
Assad’s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East – Dec 26, 2024
The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump – Dec 5, 2024
Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences – Aug 30, 2024
The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities – Sep 27, 2024
What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply? – Aug 4, 2022

The post From Oslo To Trump’s Abraham Accords And 20-Point Peace Plan For Gaza appeared first on Politact.

Risk Assessment

Israel Strike in Doha Shakes Middle East Stability

Context

Israel struck Doha on September 9th—an attack that targeted Hamas political leaders during Gaza ceasefire negotiations and has pushed the Middle East into a new phase of instability. The incident killed at least six people, including a Qatari security officer and the son of a senior Hamas negotiator, and sent shockwaves through the already fragile Gaza peace process. The strike was remarkable not only for its timing, but for its location: an unprecedented Israeli operation on the sovereign soil of Qatar, a key player in Israel-Hamas mediation.

The immediate impact on the Gaza ceasefire talks has been devastating. Hamas quickly announced that its demands had not changed—insisting on a full ceasefire, Israeli withdrawal, humanitarian aid, and a prisoner-hostage exchange—while condemning Israel for sabotaging negotiations. Qatar, which has long played host to Hamas’ political bureau and served as a linchpin in past ceasefire talks, declared that the attack had “killed any hope” of a near-term agreement. The perception is now widespread that Israel is prioritizing military elimination of adversaries over a negotiated solution, a view reinforced by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s repeated calls for the “total defeat” of Hamas. This narrative threatens to undermine confidence in ongoing Gaza peace initiatives.

For Qatar and the broader Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the strike represents not only a political affront but a strategic shock. Doha has convened emergency consultations, and GCC states from Saudi Arabia to the UAE have summoned Israeli envoys to protest the violation of sovereignty. An Arabic-Islamic leaders’ summit is scheduled for September 15 to discuss the situation created by the Israel strike. The summit will be attended by members of Arab League and Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

After decades of multibillion-dollar arms purchases and hosting of U.S. military bases, the GCC now confronts the reality that Washington either could not—or would not—prevent Israel from striking within their borders. The strike risks driving Gulf nations to reconsider their reliance on U.S. guarantees and to explore alternative security alignments. The Israeli strike has shaken Gulf confidence in the American security umbrella. Qatar’s Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani also met with President Trump in New York on September 12 but the details of the meeting were not disclosed.

The Future of Hamas

Whether Hamas keeps political and military control or is replaced in Gaza, and how any post-conflict governance would work, remains the key stumbling block. Israel has pressed for assurances related to demilitarization while Hamas rejects disarmament demands or removing its political authority without a full agreement.

For Hamas, its armed wing is more than just a military tool—it is central to its political identity. The group insists that its “weapon of resistance” is sacred and non-negotiable. In recent ceasefire discussions, Hamas has repeatedly declined to give up its military capabilities without a comprehensive deal that includes guarantees of Palestinian statehood, Israeli withdrawal, and full respect for humanitarian and governance rights. Any demilitarization demand, from this perspective, is seen as a demand for surrender.

On the Israeli side, demilitarization is non-negotiable. Israel views Hamas’s military and governing structure as the main obstacle to peace and security. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other officials have made clear that any viable ceasefire or peace agreement must include: the destroying or dismantling of Hamas’s military infrastructure; the exclusion of Hamas from any future governance of Gaza; and the establishment of long-term oversight or guarantees that Gaza will not again become a base for armed attack.

For Israel, the demilitarization demand serves several purposes: a way to neutralize threats (rockets, tunnels, armed operations), to reassure its domestic political coalition especially hardline elements who see any compromise as weakness, and to prevent the recurrence of another large-scale conflict.

Third-party mediators, including Egypt, Qatar, and the United States, recognize that full instantaneous demilitarization is extremely unlikely. Hamas is deeply embedded in Gaza society, not only militarily but also through governance, social services, charities, religious institutions, and local legitimacy. Stripping it of arms without offering political, security, and governance compensations risks collapse of both trust and order.

The Israeli strike on Hamas negotiator’s in Doha can be seen as a tactics to pressure Qatar, and other Arab interlocutors, to support the demand for not only disarming Hamas-but to prevent any future role for the group in governance. Not doing so, now risks their own security.

Religious Dimension

By striking Hamas negotiators on Sunni Arab soil, Israel risks reframing its conflict as a broader war against Islam. For years, Israel’s regional clashes were directed largely against Shiite state actors such as Iran and groups affiliated with it. By striking Hamas leaders on Sunni Arab soil, Israel may have inadvertently broadened perceptions: that its war is not just against specific militant or extremist groups, but against Islam itself.

This is precisely the narrative that the U.S. sought to avoid during the War on Terror when American officials took pains to distinguish between global extremist movements like Al Qaeda and Daesh, and groups with localized political grievances like the Afghan Taliban. Ironically, the Taliban peace deal that the U.S. eventually negotiated was known as the Doha Accords, named for the very city that has now been bombed by Israel. The targeting of Hamas negotiators in Doha erodes the perception that there are safe spaces for diplomacy, and risks fueling extremist narratives.

Netanyahu’s own trajectory adds fuel to this interpretation. In recent weeks, he has doubled down on settlement expansion in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, bluntly declaring that “there will be no Palestinian state.” Reports suggest he has ordered preparations for a full military takeover of Gaza, with evacuation of civilian populations and consolidation of Israeli control.

At the same time, momentum is building at the United Nations for recognition of Palestinian statehood. The non-binding resolution sponsored by France and Saudi Arabia, named the ‘New York Declaration’, was presented on September 12. The resolution supporting the two-state solution was endorsed by 142 states with 12 nations abstaining. U.S. and Israel voted against the resolution. Netanyahu is expected to reject such recognition outright, portraying it as a reward for terrorism and a betrayal of Israeli security. Indeed, his government may respond by accelerating annexation policies to establish irreversible “facts on the ground.”

Implications for US

For the United States, the diplomatic fallout is complex. Qatar has been a vital partner in Hamas mediation and hostage negotiations and hosts the largest U.S. airbase in the Middle East. The GCC’s strategic importance to U.S. energy, counter-terrorism, and anti-Iran strategies makes the Israeli strike particularly sensitive.

Israel, meanwhile, remains Washington’s closest regional ally. The strike in Doha thus forces U.S. policymakers to confront the uncomfortable question: will American policy sacrifice credibility with Arab allies to defend Israel’s unilateral actions? The Trump administration’s own dismay was evident when President Trump declared himself “very unhappy” with the strike. The incident comes at a critical time for the Abraham Accords, the Trump initiative carried over from his first term, to normalize Israel’s relations with Arab states, potentially undermining Israel-Gulf diplomatic relations.

The implications for U.S. strategy are stark. Washington risks losing its credibility as a mediator, damaging its relations with the Gulf, and undermining its own long-term vision for Middle Eastern stability while benefiting China and Russia. More dangerously, it risks fueling the perception that Israel—and by extension its American backer—is engaged in a wider war against Islam. This perception could radicalize new generations across the Arab and Muslim world, erasing the careful distinctions that U.S. officials have drawn for decades between extremist groups and sovereign states.

The Israeli strike on Qatar is a wake-up call. It threatens not only the Gaza peace process, but the entire architecture of U.S. strategy in the Middle East. Unless Washington can re-balance its approach—standing firm on sovereignty, reviving diplomacy, and reaffirming its partnerships—it risks watching both the peace process and its regional influence collapse.

Related Articles:

Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions – April 26, 2025
Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran – February 25, 2025
Assad’s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East – Dec 26, 2024
The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump – Dec 5, 2024
Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences – Aug 30, 2024
The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities – Sep 27, 2024

The post Israel Airstrike Targets Hamas Negotiators In Doha, Threatening Gaza Ceasefire Talks appeared first on Politact.

By Naade Ali

Context

Afghanistan is once again at the dead center of great power rivalries. The then Soviet Union departed Afghanistan in 1989 abandoning the quest for access to warm waters and subsequently losing the Cold War, and then US left in 2021 after claiming to have achieved the primary goals of War Against Extremism.

The departure of U.S. from Afghanistan did not mean that it did no longer had any interests left in the country. It made sure to maintain over the horizon counter-terror capabilities. While the government of Pakistan at the time facilitated the peace talks between the US and Afghanistan and the withdrawal that followed – it was reluctant to offer further assistance as it related to fighting terrorists in Afghanistan. Many believe, this led to the fall of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government in Pakistan.

As the balance of power tussles escalate, with the US on the one side, and Russia and China on the other, the significance of Afghanistan is fast changing. The UN General Assembly recently adopted a resolution despite US objections, and abstentions of China, Russia, India and Iran, and with 116 nations including Pakistan voting in favor. The resolution calls on Taliban to reverse their growing oppression of women and girls and eliminate all terrorist organizations operating from its soil.

On the other hand, Russia that emerged from the ashes of Soviet Union, became the first country in the world to officially recognize Afghanistan on July 3rd, as US removed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which now is in power in Syria, from its list of terrorist organizations. This was after quick Western legitimation of Islamic authorities in Syria led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, a former al Qaeda member. Meanwhile, China congratulated Russia for recognizing Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan with it foreign ministry commenting, Afghanistan “should not be excluded from the international community”. Earlier in January 2024, China had recognized Bilal Karimi, as an official envoy to Beijing out of security concerns and economic interests.

The international configuration formulated in the aftermath of 9/11 to fight the Global War on Terror (GWOT) appears to be dismantling with the potential reemergence of traditional game play of ‘proxy wars.’ While US stance towards Afghan Islamic Emirate appears to be easing since the withdrawal, it does not look any closer to bestow recognition.

Where Does US Stand on Afghanistan?

Although the U.S. removed a $10 million bounty on Sirajuddin Haqqani, State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce clarified recently that many Taliban leaders remain designated terrorists and that this position remains unchanged. This statement came in the wake of a U.S. delegation’s visit to Kabul in March, where they secured the release of American hostages and held important meetings with Taliban leadership. During the meetings, the Taliban expressed their interest in re-engaging with the U.S. and resetting bilateral ties. They offered to reopen the U.S. embassy in Kabul in exchange for the transfer of control of the Afghan Embassy in Washington to the Taliban government.

Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi has repeatedly called on Washington to engage with the Taliban administration—a message he reiterated during trips to Saudi Arabia and Qatar in April. Muttaqi, explaining his interaction with American counterparts, said that during their discussions, he dismissed concerns about instability and the Taliban’s perceived lack of public support. He asserted, “No power can control Afghanistan without the support of its people. This truth must be acknowledged, and engagement with this government must take place.” He further argued that Taliban rule has brought enhanced internal stability and cautioned that any effort to weaken their government could lead to renewed instability in Afghanistan, threatening broader regional peace and security.

Despite the Taliban’s diplomatic overtures, the Trump administration has so far ruled out the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul or the formal recognition of the interim Taliban government. State Department spokesperson Bruce stated , “The United States does not recognize any entity as the government of Afghanistan and therefore has no plans to allow for the reopening of its embassy.” National Security Council spokesperson James Hewitt reinforced this stance, saying, “We have made no commitments regarding the Afghan Embassy in Washington, and there are no discussions underway concerning the status of the U.S. Embassy compound in Kabul.”

Pakistan-U.S. Pressure on Taliban

Washington’s continued refusal to recognize the Taliban regime is also widely seen as part of a coordinated counterterrorism understanding with Pakistan, aimed at pressuring the Taliban to break its ties with the internationally designated terrorist groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Pakistan has raised concerns about the U.S.-weapons left behind during the American withdrawal falling into the hands of terrorist organizations. A Washington Post report revealed that the perpetrators of the March Jaffar Express train attack in Balochistan used these abandoned U.S. weapons. Although President Trump had previously threatened to permanently suspend U.S. aid to Afghanistan unless the Taliban returned the military equipment, the Taliban flatly rejected the demand, declaring that the remaining American weapons “now belong to the Taliban and will not be returned.”

However, recent developments suggest a significant shift in the Taliban’s stance as U.S. and Pakistani pressure intensifies. In a phone call between U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar reported in April, both leaders underscored the urgency of neutralizing the threat posed by these weapons. Shortly after, Pakistan’s special envoy for Afghanistan, Muhammad Sadiq Khan, issued a stern warning that “all deals with Afghanistan are off” if the Taliban failed to address Islamabad’s terrorism concerns. He then traveled to Kabul to participate in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Joint Coordination Committee (JCC), aimed at restarting dialogue and addressing key security issues, particularly the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) threat.

According to media reports, the Taliban leadership has, for the first time, shown signs of flexibility suggesting a potential policy shift in response to Pakistan’s demands. Analysts point to mounting pressure from both Washington and Islamabad, including U.S. aid suspension and Pakistan’s mass expulsion of Afghan refugees, as key factors forcing the Taliban to reconsider their approach. With limited capacity to manage a large influx of returning refugees, the Taliban government now face the risk of a deepening humanitarian crisis. On the other hand, with the on-going tensions between Iran and Israel in the Middle East, Iran has also started deporting undocumented Afghan immigrants.

Afghanistan-India and U.S.

At the same time, growing Indian engagement in Afghanistan warrants equal attention. As a key U.S. strategic partner, India—owing to its improving ties with the Taliban regime—is well positioned to tap into Afghanistan’s vast mineral reserves, including rare earth elements vital for semiconductor manufacturing. With India striving to become a global semiconductor hub in collaboration with the U.S., Afghanistan could serve as a crucial resource partner. India’s trade with Afghanistan has already hit a record $642.29 million in 2023–24, according to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

If India succeeds in establishing a firm strategic and economic presence in Afghanistan, the U.S. could advance its goal of curbing China’s growing influence in Central Asia—without reintroducing a military footprint. Washington is well placed to leverage its bilateral relationships with both India and Pakistan in this context. While continuing to support Pakistan in counter-terrorism operations, the U.S. may once again delegate regional security responsibilities to Islamabad.

At the same time, it could enable India to expand its geo-economic role in Afghanistan, effectively advancing U.S. interests. This dual-track strategy—outsourcing security to Pakistan and economic engagement to India—offers a cost-effective, high-return approach for the U.S., especially when Trump prefers limited, transactional relations with South Asia. With larger foreign policy priorities elsewhere, this model allows Washington to remain influential in the region without committing significant resources.

U.S.-China and Afghanistan

The House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Authorization and Oversight Plan for the 119th Congress explicitly identified China as its top oversight priority and aligns with the central foreign policy objective of the Trump administration, underscoring countering Chinese influence while offering alternative development paths.

Part of the challenge from the American perspective is that Pakistan is strategically aligned with China, which is actively engaged to reconfigure the region around its interests, and the recent inclusion to this vision is Bangladesh. Pakistan’s Foreign Office Spokesperson Shafqat Ali Khan commented earlier this month on the topic that the cooperation between China, Bangladesh, and Pakistan is part of Beijing’s development agenda.

China holds significant geo-strategic stakes in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. As a key ally to Pakistan, China would face substantial setbacks if relations between the two neighbors further deteriorate. Beijing has sought to leverage its Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Global Development Initiative (GDI) as frameworks to promote peace, counter-terrorism cooperation, and economic development in the region. Chinese Ambassador to Afghanistan Zhao Xing, in a recent interaction with Taliban leaders, proposed key strategies to enhance collaboration with Afghanistan, which could potentially restore its strained relations with Pakistan.

It’s due to these interests that a trilateral summit between China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan was held on May 21 in Beijing soon after the four-day conflict between India and Pakistan. Some of the major outcomes of the meeting was the restoration of diplomatic ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan leading to the exchange of ambassadors. Moreover, the Chinese foreign ministry announced that China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) would now also be extended to Afghanistan.

The trilateral meeting occurred after Afghan side has progressively adjusted its position regarding the criticism emanating from Pakistan on providing support to TTP. The Afghan Taliban government has publicly denied accusations of supporting the TTP and allowing them to operate from Afghan soil. They have reiterated their commitment to preventing any group from using Afghanistan to threaten other countries. In a recent move, Afghan officials announced, “Sheikh Hibatullah’s diktats bind all groups pledging allegiance to him, and his diktat is that attacking Pakistan is haram.”

The Afghan Game Plan

In the evolving great power rivalry Afghanistan appears to be courting both US and China to get involved in Afghanistan, especially to address the security concerns emanating from the country – and using that as a leverage to gain international recognition. This approach seems to have worked in the case of Russia. Moreover, it’s also exploiting the vulnerabilities of Pakistan and China from India – possibly suggesting its potential utility to the U.S.

On the other hand, the Chinese strategy involves getting more involved in trade and connectivity of Afghanistan, through its partnership with Pakistan, pushing Afghans to change their behavior. However, U.S. appears to be employing the same approach towards Afghanistan, utilizing its partnership with India, to change Pakistan’s calculations.

Related Articles:

Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions, Trump, And Wakhan Corridor – Feb 3, 2025
Political Or Military Solution; Pakistan’s New Counter-Terrorism Operation Azm-e-Istehkam – Aug 1, 2024
Convergences in US Pakistan Ties and Afghanistan – Jan 1, 2024
Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP – Feb 22, 2023
Post Withdrawal Campaign Against Extremism In Afghanistan And US-Pakistan Relations – Sep 7, 2022
Emerging US Policy Towards Afghanistan After Withdrawal – March 2, 2022
Recalibrating The US-Pakistan Partnership In Afghanistan – Jun 22, 2021
US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden – Mar 2, 2021

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