Context

Alarmingly, US witnessed four 1-in-1-thousand years rain events over the summer. One of these events was in late July in Saint Louis when 9.04 inches of rain fell during a 15-hour storm. Around the same time, 14 to 15 inches of rain came down in Kentucky over a 5-day period. In early August, Southern and Central Illinois witnessed 8 to 12 inches of rain during a 12-hour period. And then the driest place in North America, Death Valley California, saw the most rain it has ever seen in August. Just as October arrived, Hurricane Ian hit Florida with a destructive blow.

And while this was occurring in the US, Europe was experiencing severe heat with several fires breaking out in France, UK and Portugal. In South Asia, after 2010, Pakistan observed its own water deluge with worst flooding ever this monsoon season. According to latest assessments, more than 1503 people died and 33 million have losses to livestock, crops, homes, and their livelihood. The World Bank projects the record-breaking floods caused loss and damage in-excess of $40 billion.

Speaking at an event hosted by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) on September 27, UNDP Development Program Administrator Achim Steiner commented on how dire the global economic situation is. He noted that amid a series of global shocks and overlapping crises — from climate change and COVID-19 to rising inflation and crippling debt — fragile and conflict-affected states are under unprecedented strain. Rising food and energy prices resulting from the war in Ukraine have pushed 71 million people into poverty, worsening risks of instability and conflict.

Faced with increasing environment induced calamities – the daunting inquiry is how we got here, who is responsible for it, and how to pay for it. This is pretty much the same dynamics confronted with Covid-19, where China was often blamed for the pandemic.

According to the US National Intelligence Estimate that goes through 2040: “Geopolitical tensions are likely to grow as countries increasingly argue about how to accelerate the reductions in net greenhouse gas emissions that will be needed to meet the Paris Agreement goals. Debate will center on who bears more responsibility to act and to pay—and how quickly—and countries will compete to control resources and dominate new technologies needed for the clean energy transition.”

Dealing with the Future

As the climate crisis gets acute around the world, each nation is being pushed to refine their adaptation and mitigation strategies. Not only that, they are also having to define their narrative, approach, and capabilities to seek green funding sources.

One impediment is the amount of time it takes to to get approval for project funding. In an article published in Pakistan Today, Khurram Lalani listed some key challenges in seeking assistance from climate funds.

“Once the project is accepted, the Green Climate Fund (GCF) board’s approvals follow. In Pakistan’s case, the GCF took another 288 days on average to process approvals. Overall, this has meant that a total of 826 days were spent to get one project past the approval line. This does not factor in the work that a project proponent does on its own before submitting anything.”

He goes on to comment that lack of technical expertise and credible feasibility studies are some of the other obstacles in getting approval. Moreover, projects are poorly designed which results in a lot of money being unutilized, stated Kashmala Kakakhel speaking at an event organized by TABADLAB.

Nations that have the relevant expertise, like India and China, have ready access to climate funds. GCF is also plagued with bureaucracy. Lalani states: “To tackle the size and scale of climate finance, some sort of blitz-scaling is required. Some new iterations, trial and errors, speedier processes and faster timelines. Time for business as usual is receding fast.”

This sentiment was echoed by UNDP’s Achim Steiner as well, he urged more incentivize financial architecture that prioritize investments. He went on to add that our present political and economic systems are not evolving with the speed and intensity of catastrophes being confronted. Steiner backed the more networked multilateral systems to confront these natural calamities in a more proactive fashion.

Climate Change and Pakistan’s Response

During his visit to the US in September, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto presented a need for Green Marshall Fund – a likely reference to G7 plan to raise $100 billion annually to deal with climate change. But these funds are not meant for one country. To get a piece of the pie, and to be successful at the upcoming COP27 conference in Egypt, in addition to technical expertise, Pakistan clearly has to define its needs. For example, Syed Mohammad Ali, who is also a Senior Fellow at PoliTact, suggested:

“Pakistan could specifically ask the US for help with climate proofing the Indus Water Treaty, given that it was the US insistence which led the World Bank to broker this treaty back in the 1960s.”

Former USAID and State Department officials who have worked on these matters, reiterate the same, advising that Pakistan would have to articulate its asks – and back them up with credible data. They add, the confusion is also where the responsibility lies, at the provincial or the federal level.

Speaking at the Middle East Institute’s Podcast on Pakistan’s Climate, Economic, and Political Crisis, Stimson Center’s Senior Fellow and Director for South Asia Program, Elizabeth Threlkeld, commented that Pakistan also has an opportunity. As opposed to playing a victim role, the country should frame a clear narrative as it relates to climate justice – since its being impacted so much. Moreover, there is a potential for the nation to conduct needed reforms, think ahead, and identify cost-effective and realistic climate adaptation strategies – and offer it to the others. And in this sense, it can lead the Global South.

Pakistan American Community

In the wake of devastating floods, politically active organizations that represent the Pakistan-American diaspora are in active mode as well. They are engaging with congressional leaders to demand a flood relief package. They are also striving to mobilize and coordinate the activities of various community groups to best assist flood impacted people. Particularly, identifying funding sources and technical expertise that Pakistan can benefit from. This is not an easy task, and the present political stalemate in Pakistan, including the state of US-Pakistan ties, are coming in the way.

While the Democrats recognize the dangers of climate change and have put this at the center of their policies – there is no such buy-in from the Republicans. After all, it was Trump administration that decided to withdraw from the Paris Agreement in 2020 – which Biden rejoined in 2021 after coming to power.

As US prepares for midterm elections in November and the Presidential election in 2024, politically active Pakistan-American community groups are having a challenging time framing their message to US representatives as it relates to flood aid for Pakistan. Republicans could take one or both chambers of Congress in the upcoming midterm elections.

This is a predicament they share with the Pakistan government in what narrative to adopt. Do they join the larger debate in seeking aid and climate justice – or present a case that Pakistan’s flood disaster is a one-off humanitarian tragedy, to which Republicans are probably more amenable.

Additionally, the matter is also how to categorize the assistance, under Loss and Damage or Adaptation and Mitigation. US has favored Mitigation as opposed to Loss and Damage Fund, since that has more chances of getting Republican approval. Conversely, developing nations have advocated for Loss and Damage assistance to rebuild as they face extreme weather events.

Conclusion

The disconnect between Pakistan and the US is at the strategic level. In the growing great power rivalry, the nation is often seen standing on the opposite side of the isle. And this dynamic should not be allowed to play out in the realm of climate change. Like Covid-19 and Campaign Against Extremism, climate change can only be countered by everyone working together.

Being a strategic partner, India has an extensive climate track-II dialogue with US – and to a lesser extent with UK. Though Pakistan exists in the same region, it has no such elaborate engagement. This should not prevent the nation, as advised by climate experts, to seek Chinese assistance in climatizing projects being undertaken under CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor). China has also cooled down its cooperation with the US on climate due to tensions over Taiwan. However, US envoy for climate John Kerry stated that “we need to get China” back – a country with 30% of all emissions.

Kerry further added:“I personally vehemently disagree with that. Climate is a universal issue, a universal threat. Without political ideology, without political party. It does not represent global competition. It represents a global threat to the world, which the two largest emitters and two largest economies could greatly benefit the world by coming together and cooperating to try to deal with it.”

Arif Ansar is Chief Analyst at PoliTact. He can be reached at aansar@politact.com

The post Dealing With Climate Change In Pakistan And COP27 appeared first on Politact.

Context

Never before have there been so many conflicts been brewing at the same time, in particular in the regions of Middle East – and the adjoining areas of South Asia and North Africa. There is a tendency to view these conflicts as separate with their individual dynamics. However, they are intertwined and there is a need to understand their intersections and trajectory. In this, it’s also essential to grasp the mega trends and how they are linking these otherwise desperate conflicts.

History obviously is the most important determinant, playing out over time, as different empires and nations rise and crumble. Old grudges reappear in different form as attempts are made to settle scores. Many of the present day inter-regional conflicts can be associated with the following:

1. Left over business of World War II, falling empires, and end of colonialism that led to the creation of present day nation-states.
2. Shifting balance of religious dominance, such as that between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. And there are tussles with in religions for example between Shiite and Sunni Islam – spearheaded by Iran and Saudi Arabia, and joined by Turkey recently. And then there is the Eastern Orthodox Church, which Putin energizes. And more importantly, how these trend correlates with the role of religion in politics.
3. War Against Extremism
4. Rise and fall of different political and economic systems: from communism to capitalism – and from authoritarianism to democracy etc.
5. Struggle for the balance of power and resources between the regional and global powers, which is now taking place in a setting of climate change and Coronavirus pandemic.

The Corona Factor

While most of the characteristics laid out above represent a consistent part of the cycle of change and conflict as the world knows them. However, it is the climate change, and now the Coronavirus, that have seriously altered the dynamics and the struggle for the balance of power and resources.

Balance between Liberals and Conservatives and Nationalists

In many parts of the Islamic world, economies had already been suffering under the corrupt rulers, often supported by the West. These governments have focused most of their efforts on self-preservation than on the uplift of the masses. In the war against extremism with extraordinary focus on security, the fiscal systems have been further destabilized. This has lead to increased internal polarization, in which the space for liberals has been continually shrinking while the conservatives and nationalists are consistently on the rise, which also translates in to a growing role for religion in politics and governance.

Public versus Private Government Stances

In their efforts to promote their reign and retain western support, the leadership of these nations often went against the very fabric of public sentiment. This caused them to keep their political dealings private – away from the scrutiny of the public. This was the case during the Musharraf era and subsequent political set-ups in Pakistan that privately supported the drone strikes in the tribal areas – but publicly criticized them.

It is also true when it comes to the positions of Gulf States on sensitive matters such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Kashmir. On one hand, these states have grown closer to Israel and India – while mostly remaining silent on Indian and Israeli brutalities against Kashmiri and Palestinian Muslims. While this may have gained them temporary allocates in the West – the long-term implications of such policies are serious, and the gap between their public and private stances have grown wider and in some cases becoming unsustainable.

This divergence is even visible in the treatment of Uighur Muslims in China or when it came to Russian activities in Chechnya and Dagestan. Muslim states have kept quite on these maters because their national interests often converge with Russia and China on other important issues. Moreover, in the aftermath of 9/11 many movements and abuses of human rights have been conveniently lumped in to the category of extremism.

Political Governance

Added to this maze is the dynamics of Coronavirus. The dysfunctional systems in many of these nations were hardly able to deliver during normal times – let alone during the uncertain present. Moreover, the elongated war against extremism and prevalent corruption have eaten up and eroded the moral compass of these societies. With declining economies, the liberal and the ruling class are likely to be increasingly in the eye of the storm – as they are unable to deliver on the most basic services and provide security and opportunities for their citizens. This will push government to take on even more nationalistic and conservative stances.

In the long run, this will likely lead to more protests and upheavals, as the voices and messages of the extreme factions are gaining traction. We saw a glimpse of this even in the developing world, where the death of George Floyd at the hands of the police in the US led to the unleashing of long pent-up grievances.

Conclusion

As the economies crumble under the weight of COVID-19, many nations are unlikely to survive the Coronavirus induced struggles for the balance of power. Moreover, the fiscal pressures are likely to promote fissures along racial and religious lines. These outcomes will aggravate the tussles of new winners and losers – that will emerge as the tentacles of the virus spread wider and deeper.

This is amply at display in places like Lebanon and Jordan, with large refugee populations. According to World Bank estimate the tourism has dropped by almost 50 percent in Jordan, which constitutes almost 14 percent of its GDP. Moreover, with the return of many expatriates employed in the Gulf region, it has seriously impacted the inflow of foreign remittances. With the drop in oil revenues, it’s unclear if the oil rich Arab nations will be able to continue funding the geopolitical games in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Libya.

Moreover, it would be difficult for these governments to maintain their previous private stances, especially if India and Israel were to move forward with unilateral moves – like India displayed last year by abolishing the special status of Kashmir, and through possible West Bank annexation by Israel. And in this context, as the Coronavirus induced economic vows become more transparent; the political and governance challenges will manifold posing grave risks to the internal stability and state viability.

The post Coronavirus And Arab Spring 2.0 appeared first on Politact.

Context

On the anniversary of the December 2014 terrorist attack on the Army Public School, Peshawar, some important questions have been raised. How far has the campaign progressed in achieving the goals of the war against extremism? Moreover, what were the lessons learned from this tragic attack and have they been addressed as part of Pakistan’s National Action Plan?

A discussion was held on Voice of America to discuss the various facets of this campaign, which included the KPK Information Minister Shaukat Yusufzai. PoliTact’s Chief Analyst Arif Ansar, pointed out the economic loss is just one aspect of the cost – but often the most mentioned. One of the key consequences of the war against extremism is the societal transformation in the areas where this campaign has been carried out.

Like any individual that has undergone trauma, the places where the war is being conducted also needs ongoing rehab to address the psychological damage and aftershocks – to manage the anger – and to cure the mindset prone to violence. But this first requires a period of normalcy, which in many places has not been established. In fact, they are being confronted by many secondary and tertiary side effects, for which awareness has to be raised before they can be addressed in any meaningful way.

Listen to the Discussion:

The post The War Against Terror And Societal Transformation appeared first on Politact.

Arif Ansar

Context

Analysts and scholars from a variety of origins and backgrounds have described the present state of global affairs as going through a transition. The bilateral and multilateral ties during this interlude have remained anchored around the principles of globalization and laissez faire economic policies, which necessitate more economic cooperation.

However, the election of Donald Trump signifies the start of a new phase, which is a marked departure from the trajectory that was set forth since World War II, premised on economic interdependence as representing the best hope for safeguard humanity and preserving peace. Now, free trade is shifting towards protectionism – and the noble ideals such as promoting democracy and upholding human rights are taking the back seat. This was quite apparent in the recently laid out Trump’s Afghan policy and earlier during his visit to Saudi Arabia.

As this reversal takes shape, and contrary to what is popularly proclaimed, foreseeing the future is becoming more predictable. The history provides sufficient examples of how the commotion between the emerging and established powers usually plays out. This raises a related inquiry of why the US is seemingly ditching such high aspirations at this juncture?

A Sense of being Exploited

Whether stated or not, perhaps the most important reason is the perceived sense of being exploited by the emerging global powers that are getting ahead economically. And they are doing so by not being necessarily democratic or upholding human rights. In fact, a case can be made that in these times of chaos and polarization, democratic systems are reflecting mounting paralysis – whereas centralized and hierarchical systems are being able to better navigate the present turbulence.

Moreover, as the sources of Western economic wherewithal dwindle, they have started to challenge the very basis of their strength, such as multiculturalism and diversity. And again, historical precedence would suggest similar outcomes in such circumstances. When the going gets tough, immigrants and minorities are usually the first to be blamed for the predicament.

The prolonged war against extremism has played a pivotal role towards this dilemma. On the other hand, Europe that has acted as the bedrock of American global power projection is more and more looking unable or unwilling to play this role, as the seismic events in the form of Brexit play out. Additionally, the emerging powers of Russian and China are also acting as centrifugal forces when it comes to the future of Europe.

Thus, because of this imbalance of global power, and due to the apparent unwillingness of the US to maintain the present order, we are entering the most dangerous phase. The era of cooperation that marked the transition phase has now entered the confrontation stage. The key challenge for the other state actors has now become how to manage and maintain tranquility as the present order crumbles, while the shape of emerging system remains unclear.

On the other hand, one of the key challenges for the West, and the US, is that after an era of complete economic and military dominance, will they be able to adjust to the new global realities and multipolarity. Understanding the ‘America First’ principle is critical to grasping the emerging US posture.

Interpreting America First Doctrine

Since 9/11 US has found itself at the forefront of many theaters of the campaign against extremism. In addition to Iraq and Afghanistan, its involvement includes the GCC, Libya, Syria, Horn of Africa, and nations of Islamic Maghrib. While it has the support of Western and regional Muslim allies, however, most of the financial and security heavy lifting for this campaign has been undertaken by the US. Even NATO partners have been reluctant to increase their defense contributions to the organization. And this is despite the fact that American role brings security benefits for its regional and Western allies.

And because of this line of reasoning, resentment has gradually been building, which ultimately led to the election of Donald Trump and the mantra of ‘America First’. The full contours of this principle have not yet been laid out, and thus it is hard to comprehend it fully within the US and abroad. International actors are nervously trying to gauge what it means for the international order and for them.

From the American perspective, it has gone out of its way and at the cost of tremendous resources for the preservation and sustenance of the present system. The US has often acted for the common good and the mutual benefit of its allies. When it comes to global crises, other powers seldom act in the absence of American leadership. Obviously, American allies have their own perspective on the evolving American role and the narrative laid out above.

This sentiment has also crept over into the economic realm, and led to the quick dissolution of trade agreements such as the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) that America had itself crafted with tremendous efforts, while questioning how North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is benefiting the US. At the core of this belief is a feeling that US is being unfairly treated within the very system it helped create, and that Paris agreement on climate change will likely further strangulate American economic growth under the burden of strenuous regulations.

And if this is the case, with its emerging policies under Trump, US is telling the world that they need the present system more than it does. Moreover, it can help in maintaining the present order – but the allies would have to take the lead and the responsibility wherever applicable. This is not all, the US also seems to be saying that its interests supersede all others – and thus there is less and less room for diplomacy.

While there is an element of truth to how other nations have exploited the US, but one cannot underestimate the role played by American corporations. These companies have benefited tremendously from globalization by outsourcing work to other nations to maximize their profits while the American job markets and industrial capabilities suffered. The argument that technology and robotics are to blame for this is only a part of the explanation. And even if it is due to these reasons, it should have been a cause for alarm. A large unemployed workforce is in itself cause for instability, ethnic tensions, and hike in crimes.

Surprisingly, even the political representatives have failed to take notice of this combustible mixture, while overlooking the interests of their constituents. In one way, they are not to blame because globalization conflicts with the concept of nation-state, and often puts the citizen of their own country in second place. Globalization works best when there are minimal hindrances in the way of cross border trade, and the free market dynamics are allowed to play out.

America First and Allies

As this reversal takes shape, what will be the political, security and economic implications of the America First policy? In all practicality, America First mantra is likely to put it in confrontational mode with many of its allies, including other emerging powers. While President Trump has not repeated his earlier criticism of NATO, there is no hiding the fact that US wants NATO members to increase their defense spending if they in the long run want continued American security commitment. The America First policy was also at display in the unfolding North Korean crisis, where Trump criticized the trade dealings with South Korea at an ill-conceived time.

Moreover, the new sanctions imposed on Russia could also indirectly penalize EU, especially in the energy sector, and Germany and France have come out strongly against them.

There are five western firms that are partnering with Russia’s Gazprom to construct Nordstream 2 pipeline meant to carry gas from Russia to Germany. These include Germany’s Wintershall and Uniper, the Anglo-Dutch company Royal Dutch Shell, Austria’s OMV, and France’s Engie.

European Union President Jean-Claude Juncker was quoted as stating in July,

“If our concerns are not taken into account sufficiently, we stand ready to act appropriately within a matter of days. ‘America First’ cannot mean that Europe’s interests come last.”

In his South Asia policy President Trump also asked India to assist US in Afghanistan and payback for the benefits it derives from trade with the US.

America First approach is also accompanied by less and less emphasis on finding political solutions to international crises, whether it be in Afghanistan or the Middle East, or the emerging confrontation with North Korea.

The new doctrine thus require international actors, and even the allies, to prove how they are going to reciprocate the advantages received as a result of trade with, and security assurances provided by the US. As alluded to above, this message has already been conveyed to allies such as NATO, EU, South Korea, Pakistan, and India. Some nations, such as Saudi Arabia, have quickly jumped on the bandwagon by signing huge defense deals with the US.

At the heart of this misalignment between the US and the allies is a concern that who benefits more. In any relationship when matters sink to this level, it’s an indication that all is not well. In absence of partners, the combination of America First doctrine and American Exceptionalism, will likely produce dangerous consequences and hasten new global and regional realignments.

If American First policy does not produce economic dividends for common Americans in the short and long term, it will further complicate its domestic politics and confusion regarding its global role and future direction, and this in turn will further aggravate the present order.

The post Understanding Trump’s America First Doctrine And Its Implications appeared first on Politact.

How Weak Countries Carrying Economic Significance Become Playground For Foreign Interests

Originally published on June 9, 2009 and being republished with additions. Another modification was made to this article on January 16, 2017.

It is important to understand the present day political, economic, and defense policies of various international actors with the appropriate historical context. After all, in the absence of this relativity, it would be difficult to give meaning to the unfolding events, and predict their future trajectory. Looking at the past often leads to the discovery of historical parallels and analogies making it easier to grasp contemporary paradoxes.

When exploring such parallels, the attempt should not be to spell out every minute detail of the relevance – but to witness the irony of how history repeats and provides continuity, irrespective of if we are aware are not. And then it is up to the intrigue and ingenuity of the reader to draw the necessary connections and lessons.

The Japanese Amau Doctrine provides such a parallel, to make sense of the present-day mega economic projects, such as the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), or the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative that China has unveiled. And to see how these projects are an example of the present global realignment and shift in the balance of power.

While Amau Doctrine was directed at a weaker China, it is China now that has emerging stronger and is attempting to shape the world affairs. An additional question that comes to mind is that how does the dynamics surrounding Amau Doctrine, described below, helps us understand the future of Europe and European Union, especially in the aftermath of Brexit, and the election of Donald Trump on a nationalist and a protectionist agenda.

The Amau Doctrine is the Japanese equivalent of America’s Monroe Doctrine (1823), which was designed to protect American interests in the Western Hemisphere. The premise of Amau, formulated around 1934, is that Japan reserves the right to act unilaterally in order “to preserve peace and order in East Asia.” The context was the depression of the 30s, when Japan lost a substantial amount of its trade as a result of international trade barriers. The Doctrine was chiefly intended to convert the then feeble China into a client state and to establish Japan as the dominant power in the Pacific while containing Russia, resurgent then as now. For Japan, China was the main source of raw materials, as well as possessing tremendous strategic importance in its struggle with Russia.

In the Amau Doctrine, Japan also declared that China does not have the right to seek foreign assistance or to resist Japan in establishing a new order under the aegis of an East Asian League and furthermore, that any third parties involved in China would have to consult Japan. Historians believe that between 1933 and 1937 two events occurred that made Japan nervous: first, the increased Soviet presence on the Manchukuoan frontier and second, the formation, in 1936, of an anti-Japanese alliance consisting of Chinese Nationalists and Communists, enjoying Soviet support.

In addition, the Amau Doctrine directly challenged the so-called Open Door policy, under which many other powers, including Britain and United States, enjoyed special economic privileges in China. Britain’s China Lobby formulated what was to become England’s China policy in the Far East, which was that the government would safeguard Britain’s economic interests in China, enter into cooperation and competition with Japan and try to establish a China-Japan Detente.

During the 30s, Britain and France wished above all to avoid confrontation with Germany, which lead them to be forbearing with Japan, even in the face of its aggression. Moreover, at a time of global depression many of the big powers wanted to refrain from actions that could injure trade relations with Japan. The latter allied itself with Nazi Germany in 1936, then in July of the following year invaded China. This was followed by the infamous ‘Rape of Nanking’ in December 1937, in which between 250,000 to 300,000 Chinese civilians were massacred by the Imperial Army of Japan. These memories linger and continue to have a negative effect on Sino-Japanese relations.

The American policy towards China was largely the work of the American Asian Association (AAA) and proved less successful in promoting the national interest in China compared to the one devised by its counterpart, Britain’s China Lobby. Historians maintain that another factor was that the United States carried on a relatively small amount of trade with China at the time, in contrast to Britain, which had large merchant and banking houses in Shanghai.

The story of Japan in the 1930’s is pertinent to the current economic crisis in a number of ways. First, its Amau Doctrine emerged in response to a global recession and is an example of how such a catastrophe can impact major players and influence their decision-making. Secondly, weak countries, in this case, China, possessing vast resources and strategic importance, can become the arena where international power struggles are played out.

The post The Relevance Of Japanese Amau Doctrine To Modern Day Mega Trade Pacts appeared first on Politact.

Germany has long been receiving migrants from different countries. However, the past few years, the crisis with migrants from the Middle East and Africa has intensified. People are mostly fleeing from war and conflict. With a request to comment on this issue, we turned to Abdullah Khurram, Visiting Research Fellow, Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin, South Asia & Middle East Fellow, PoliTact in Washington.

Do you think German society is prepared to accept large numbers of refugees and economic migrants from the Middle East? Is Germany able to painlessly assimilate those people?

Arguing from deep compassion, Chancellor Angela Merkel convinced the German public to continue to accept refugees from conflict-ridden countries such as Syria. Around 1.1 million refugees were accepted by Germany, mainly from the Middle East and Africa. This won Germany praise from many around the world, including from Pope Francis and President Obama. These refugees were met with cheering crowds and the German people wholeheartedly invested their time, energy, and money to welcome them.

In refugees, Germany saw a humanitarian duty, as well as an economic opportunity. Germany estimates its working age population would reduce by 6 million by 2030, and therefore, an influx of young population through refugees would help sustain economic growth.^[1]In words of the Economy Minister Sigmar Gabriel, “If we manage to quickly train those that come to us and to get them into work, then we will solve one of our biggest problems for the economic future of our country: the skills shortage.”^[2]

Moreover, as Konstantin Richter argues, “Other nations have long respected and envied Germany for its economic success. But we have not exactly been considered warm-hearted or lovable. Now, all of a sudden, millions dreamt of coming here – and we felt flattered. The refugees made us feel good about ourselves.”^[3]

However, amidst this humanitarian duty and economic opportunity, larger questions such as what would ‘German-ness’ mean to the refugees remain unanswered. Assimilation and cultural issues were a problem from day one. In words of one German citizen who hosted refugees at his apartment in Berlin, “Some never even said ‘thank you’. One seemed to feel genuinely sorry for us because we have three daughters and no sons. Another asked, apropos of nothing, whether my wife was ‘a Jewish girl’”.^[4]

What truly started turning the public opinion against refugees were the New Year Eve’s sexual assaults in Cologne. Germany’s “willkommenskultur”—meaning welcoming culture— and Chancellor Merkel’s slogan “wir schaffen das”— meaning “we can do this”— had now started fading away. Moreover, economic concerns also become a part of how the public opinion started changing. 77 percent Germans believe refugees will increase German debt, 66 percent think it will make it harder for them to find housing, and 62 percent believe it would lead to more criminality.^[5]

While for many decades, German people have consistently voted for traditional postwar political parties; however, today, a huge influx of refugees has enabled a rapid rise of the far right that staunchly stands against the refugees. In particular, the populist Alternative For Germany (AfD) party is using the situation to its advantage to shake up the political dynamics in the country. This refugee influx has also stirred up the far-right movement of “Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West.”

There have been more than 1,800 recorded attacks against asylum seekers and their accommodations in Germany since January, 2016.^[6] Moreover, lack of acceptance can also be seen in other areas; for example, in Neuperlach Sud, a suburb of Munich, residents have started building a 13ft-high stone wall to separate their houses from a refugee center.^[7] Furthermore, in September 2016, far-right extremists were suspected of being behind attempted bombings targeting a mosque in Dresden.^[8]

People from other countries too have taken advantage of Germany’s generous asylum policies. For example, as of 2015, Albanians and Kosovars were among the top five groups of people arriving in Germany. This trend particularly alarmed the German government because it considers both these countries as “safe countries of origin.”^[9] Thus, the challenge of refugee management continues to become more complicated. Moreover, Berlin’s courts are paralyzed by the amount of back-log of asylum applications, and even more worrisome is the fact that only 13 percent of the refugees have so far been able to find work. However, one reason of this is also that until their asylum application is approved by the courts, they can formally not join the labor market.^[10] But for those who are already in the labor market and yet unemployed, cultural issues also reduce their employment prospects. In words of a Syrian refugee, “Regardless of our educational levels, maybe sometimes the nationality plays a big role in choosing the people. That’s what I felt – sometimes, not always.”^[11]

Despite the increasingly negative public opinion, Germany’s stance towards the refugees is still very generous as compared to other European countries. The German state and society continue to rebuild the lives of the refugees. At the same time, refugees are also positively contributing in the German society. For example, refugees from Afghanistan have helped revive cricket in Germany, and the country now has 230 teams with over 5,000 cricketers taking part in official leagues.^[12]

Yet, the underlying question that remains is: if the Turkish Germans— country’s largest immigrant group— largely continue to remain in their own enclaves, then isn’t it perhaps a far-fetched belief that the Middle East and African asylum-seekers would one day be able to properly integrate into the wider German society? There are reasons to be optimistic. But cultural forces keep diffusing this optimism.

This interview originally appeared in The Greater Middle East

The post Germany Becomes The Bastion Of Liberal Values But Challenges Remain For Recent Migrants appeared first on Politact.

Context

By Justin McCauley

As the power contest between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran intensifies, an important factor is Iran’s advantage in the area of asymmetric warfare, particularly with regard to Yemen and Syria. A major driver in the rise of the so-called “Shi’ite Crescent” has been Iran’s ability to spread its influence through a combination of well-placed and robustly supported proxies (both state and non-state), as well as a nuanced capacity to leverage parochial ethnic and sectarian conflicts to Tehran’s strategic benefit. Saudi Arabia has not even sought to acquire this skill set.
Over the years Riyadh has consistently invested in the kingdom’s military capabilities, but such efforts have focused on building a well-equipped conventional force – one geared largely toward territorial defense. While Saudi Arabia has prepared itself well for an interstate conflict, it has failed to establish the kind of asymmetric capabilities that Iran has used so effectively to build Geo-strategic alliances and influence battlefields and political systems alike.

These capabilities could prove to be a strategic game-changer as the Saudi-Iranian rivalry further intensifies. Why has Tehran been so successful? Why has Riyadh faltered?

Analysis

The Iranian Advantage

Iran has excelled at asymmetric warfare since the inception of the Islamic Republic. The foundation of the Sepa-e-Pasdaran – the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) – and within it the Quds Force, alongside its regular armed forces, created in 1979 a military formation dedicated to nontraditional warfare and strategically indispensable expeditionary operations. The Quds Force specializes in what the U.S. military calls ‘Unconventional Warfare’ (UW), ‘Foreign Internal Defense’ (FID), and ‘Information Operations,’ i.e. organizing and leading guerrilla groups, assisting allied governments against insurgencies and revolutionary movements, engaging in psychological warfare, and carrying out “hearts and minds” operations.

The best example of the Pasdaran’s strategic efficacy is of course Hezbollah. The Iranian hand in the creation of Lebanon’s Party of God is well-known. A few dozen Quds Force officers infiltrated Lebanon, commandeered a barracks in the Beka’a Valley, recruited top-notch talent such as the infamous Imad Mughniyah (a.k.a. Hajj Radwan), and produced the inchoate Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO).

In a few short years the IJO, before its metamorphosis into Hezbollah in 1985, drove the U.S. from Lebanon and forced the Israelis into what became an 18-year quagmire. Now, as the most powerful force in Lebanon’s political arena, with an armed wing larger than the entire Lebanese Army, Hezbollah remains beholden to Tehran. The Quds Force currently runs blended UW-FID operations in Iraq and Syria. IRGC battalions augment government forces and Pasdaran officers direct Shi’ite militias such as the Hashd al-Shaabi and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq on the battlefields of both countries.

In Iraq, deep ties with powerful Shi’ite leaders, including Hadi al-Amiri (head of the Badr Organization) now pay major dividends for Tehran. These relationships are the fruit of the Quds Force’s dedicated covert support for both Shi’ite and Kurdish opposition groups throughout the Saddam era. “In Iraq, deep ties with powerful Shi’ite leaders, including Hadi al-Amiri (head of the Badr Organization) now pay major dividends for Tehran. These relationships are the fruit of the Quds Force’s dedicated covert support for both Shi’ite and Kurdish opposition groups throughout the Saddam era”

The Pasdaran is on the ground in Yemen with significant numbers of operatives involved in training and arming the Houthi rebels. It is likely that the Iranians want to draw Riyadh into an open-ended conflict that they can neither decisively win nor lose, but which will be sure to sap money, manpower, and prestige from the kingdom.

The Iranian model’s success stems partly from the advantageous structure and discipline of Shi’ite jihadist groups writ large. Unlike the apocalyptic and divisive takfiri extremism, that to varying degrees characterizes almost all consequential Sunni militant groups (except for some Palestinian groups), Shi’ite extremist organizations, while doubtless violent, are also observably disciplined, exercising strategic restraint and pragmatic foresight. The Pasdaran both instills and capitalizes on this characteristic.

In practical terms, this rationality has made the components of the “Shi’ite Crescent” somewhat more manageable in terms of Iran’s grand strategy. It has allowed for a coherent and consistent regional strategy, as well as the creation of an axis aligning Tehran, Baghdad, Damascus, and Beirut. Moreover, Hamas, a Sunni Islamist group, is one of Iran’s benefactors. This cross-sectarian alliance is in stark contrast to Daesh (“Islamic State”), Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda and other major takfiri groups, who would not only be loath to ally with Shi’ite actors, but who also seem to be detrimentally preoccupied with slaughtering their co-religionist rivals.

Part of this formula is self-evident in Shi’ism, which, relative to Sunnism, has a hierarchical structure and a respect for codified religious authority (as evidenced in the Iranian ideology of Wilayat al-Faqih). But it also derives heavily from Iran’s revolutionary positioning as, first and foremost, a bulwark of “Islamic resistance”.

While the Wahhabi-Salafi arc has grown increasingly nihilistic, messianic, and apocalyptic, Shi’ite extremist groups remain steeped in the language of “resistance”, nomenclature borrowed from Cold Warera Leftism, which also carries a powerful implicit link to the Palestinian cause, a key Arab unifier.

By invoking Third-Worldism, Iran has successfully positioned its ‘brand’ as a regional liberation movement, not as an irrational sectarian cult. Hezbollah’s military successes against Israel and Iran’s rhetorical and operational support for the Palestinians have also garnered immense goodwill on the Arab street, where the Israel-Palestine conflict remains a pan-Arab political issue. It is also crucial to understand that the Quds Force’s long-standing relationships with Palestinian and Kurdish groups – both stateless Sunni Muslims – seem to confirm Iran’s status as primarily a resister of colonialism and imperialism (as opposed to a narrowly Shi’ite fundamentalist force).

The Saudi Deficit

Saudi Arabia has no counterpart to the Quds Force. The kingdom’s military is geared almost entirely toward national defense and conventional warfare. Saudi special operations units focus on tactical counterterrorism, but have no UW or FID capability to speak of. Unlike the Iranians, the Saudis have spent the last 35 years looking largely inward.

After the 1979 revolution in Iran, major Sunni powers like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan engaged in “Islamization” – efforts to reinvigorate Sunnism in the face of fundamentalist Shi’ite expansionism. This did result is some increased foreign activity. The Saudis matched the financial commitment of the U.S. to the Afghan mujahideen during the 1980s. For many years Riyadh officials have been intentionally lax in combating terrorist financing from within the kingdom’s borders.

Also, the Saudis have allowed convicts and other undesirables to leave the country to wage jihad across the Middle East and Central Asia. But unlike the Quds Force, Saudi forces are not on the ground with allies, building rapport and offering tutelage. Compared to the committed patronage of Pasdaran efforts in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, the Saudis apply a “fire and forget” policy that leaves them little if any strategic control and opens them (and the region) up to unintended secondary and tertiary consequences.

The most crucial difference between Iran and its Shi’ite reservoir and the Saudi kingdom’s relationship with its potential proxies is credibility.

Unlike the Islamic Republic, which remains popular with Shi’ite Islamists of varying stripes as well as with some Sunnis in the wider Middle East, the Al Saud are viewed by many on the Arab Street as decadent and corrupt. In the eyes of many Salafists, the Saudi rulers are apostates allied with the West and unfit to serve as the guardians of Mecca and Medina.

Hence, while most Shi’ite (and some Sunni) organizations view the Islamic Republic as the father of the anti-Western and anti-Zionist resistance, the spawns of Wahhabism view the House of Saud as occupants of the Dar al-Harb, or territory outside Muslim rule. From the Saudi perspective, it is an issue of reliability.

As stated above, in spite of the kingdom’s state-promoted brand of Wahhabism, Sunni takfiri groups do not feel beholden to Riyadh, nor do they view the kingdom as a paternalistic, ideological big brother. This translates into limited prospects for dependable allies who will obey the House of Saud’s strategic guidance. The result has been Saudi Arabia having to manage support for conservative Wahhabis within the kingdom for over 35 years, while attempting to deflect the worst elements who demand the House of Saud’s overthrow.

Maintaining this delicate balance has somewhat tied Riyadh’s hands with regard to entrepreneurial operations abroad vis-à-vis Iran. Perhaps a more fundamental point lies at the heart of Riyadh’s lack of asymmetric adventurism. Saudi Arabia, as an illiberal and undemocratic dynastic monarchy, is by definition a reactionary and anti-revolutionary state. To venture abroad and actively foment insurgency and the overthrow of governments would be to incite exactly what Riyadh most fears for itself.

While the Saudis have proven willing at times to meddle in the internal affairs of weak states, they will not enact a systematic policy against a foe that can respond in kind. The sanctity of the state is inseparable from the Saudi political leadership’s survival.

Conclusion

The military parity of Iran and Saudi Arabia is such that it will likely preclude a direct confrontation. While Saudi Arabia’s armed forces are much better equipped than Iran’s (the Saudi military budget is roughly eight times that of Tehran), the Islamic Republic compensates by possessing a much larger force in terms of manpower and by maintaining an ability to take a defensively asymmetric posture.

The geostrategic reality is that Iran has the ability to attack major centers of oil production in Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern Province (EP) in response to any Saudi and/ or Western aggression. A single effective rocket strike on Saudi Aramco’s Abqaiq facility, for instance, would send the international oil trade into complete disarray. The power of this Iranian deterrent is likely not lost on Saudi strategic thinking.

Mohammed bin Salman’s aggressive – some would say impetuous – war policy in Yemen will continue to be met with Iranian asymmetric efforts. The same will be true in the case of Syria if Riyadh takes a more direct role there, as has been suggested. The Saudi war in Yemen already has significant potential to become an open-ended quagmire, which would ultimately benefit Iran. The kingdom’s best weapon against Iran at the moment is the economic strategy of keeping oil prices low to retard Iranian growth as sanctions lift. Riyadh’s status as a swing producer gives it immense power in this regard, but with major powers like Russia and China looking to invest long-term in Iran’s energy sector, Saudi market manipulation will only delay the inevitable.

The Iranians have honed their skills in asymmetric conflicts. Their influence in Iraq is largely attributable to Tehran’s investment in groups such as Badr, Dawa, and SCIRI over the span of decades. Iran’s premier proxy, Hezbollah, twice humiliated Israel on the battlefield – in 2000 and 2006. Given the Israeli military’s extremely high levels of experience and effectiveness, Hezbollah’s achievements were significant.

If the Houthis can achieve a similar result against the Saudis in Yemen, Iran’s strategic position in the Gulf will grow exponentially. Although Ansar Allah (the dominant Houthi militia in Yemen) is not Hezbollah, the Saudi military is not the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) either. In spite of its robust defense budget, the Saudi military’s lack of experience has led to embarrassing operational struggles in Yemen.

Many view the emergence of Iran as a hegemon to be inevitable. History, geography, and Iran’s status as a reemerging petro-state support this prediction. Over the last 35 years, Iran’s asymmetric warfare capabilities have allowed it to rapidly expand its geopolitical influence and strategic position in the Middle East. It remains to be seen the extent to which Iran’s efforts will further transform the region’s strategic landscape. However, Saudi Arabia is unlikely to fight fire with fire. Asymmetric warfare is often not only the tool of the weak, but also a means of affecting transformational change, which the nascent Iranian hegemon seeks. As a status quo power, that is the last thing which the Al Saud rulers want in the Gulf or anywhere else.

Justin McCauley is an independent analyst based in Dubai specializing in terrorism, geopolitics and security affairs in the greater Middle East and the post-Soviet space

A version of this article also appeared in Gulf State Analytics, an affiliate of POLITACT.

The post The Asymmetry in the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry appeared first on Politact.

Context

By Abdullah Khurram

The Balkan states have come a long way since the Yugoslav wars and the ethnic cleansing of the 90s. The region has improved both economically as well as politically. Slovenia and Croatia have become members of the EU while all other countries in the region are actively working towards this goal. However, despite the tremendous progress, the region is still confronted with considerable political, economic and security challenges.

On my trip to the region in July, I interacted with a number of Balkan based centers of intellectual thinking especially in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia and Albania. These discussions helped develop these five key areas that can help the Balkan nations deal with their domestic and international challenges.

1- Economic and political stability is the key, and for that, engagement with all global powers can be valuable
2- Increasing advocacy for joining the EU
3- Leveraging the role of moderate Islamic clerics to counter extremism
4- Restoring hope in the state
5- Rebranding the region and developing best practices from within

Analysis

1. Economic and political stability is the key, and for that, engagement with all global powers can be valuable

Instead of choosing one international camp over the other, the Balkan states should rather be focused on engaging with all global powers, while promoting regional cooperation to deal with local challenges. Moreover, the attraction of becoming a corridor for transporting goods should not take away the emphasis from strengthening domestic economic and manufacturing capability. This requires being aware of one’s strengths and limitations and the ability to create win-win scenarios.

The EU, US, China, Russia and Turkey can all help the region advance towards attaining political and economic stability.

The Bush administration played a key role in supporting the Albanian and Croatian membership to NATO. It also helped improve Kosovo’s diplomatic status by encouraging its parliament to unilaterally declare independence.

The Russians too have shown a keen interest in engaging with the Balkans; visits of politicians and businessmen have increased over the past decade, which has consistently increased Russia’s economic clout and strategic assertiveness in the region.

On the other hand, Turkish companies have made heavy investments in areas like healthcare, airport management, and agriculture. The facility of visa-free travel and trade liberalization, both have helped boost business between Turkey and Western Balkans and it has increased by 84 percent between 2000 and 2008.1

China is also committed towards advancing the New Silk Road project and is not only enhancing regional investments but also creating a network of large ports and railway lines. As part of this, Montenegro chose a Chinese company to build a 800 million Euro highway that connects the country to Serbia. Similarly, a Chinese company is to construct a highway between Albania and Macedonia. The third largest Albanian port of Shengjin, located in the Adriatic Sea, has also been leased to China for the next 25 years.

While the US and the EU might not be in the best of their financial condition to invest heavily in the region, they still maintain a tremendous diplomatic leverage to improve political stability in the region. At the same time, Turkish economic penetration and Chinese investment can help the region become economically more prosperous.

Thus the regional countries should be willing to openly engage with all global players who can contribute to local stability and development.

2- Increasing advocacy for joining the EU

The EU nations have consistently supported the case for the Balkan states becoming full members. However, many in the region think that due to the current problems being faced by EU, it is not prepared to accept any new member in the near future. Despite such perceptions, support for their membership does exist.

On 25 May, 2015, the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Daniel Mitov noted that “There must not be the slightest doubt that all of the countries of the Western Balkans should be part of the EU one day. They have clearly and categorically expressed their desire for this. We have to help them constantly”.2

Similarly, Albania’s Defense Minister Mimi Kodheli emphasized during her speech at the Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. that “If the EU wants our countries to one day be prosperous member states,” then it must reach out more enthusiastically and energetically, rather than “placing all responsibility for achieving this on these countries themselves”. ³

To create a sense of urgency, the Balkan nations should increase their advocacy not only towards EU states but also in the US, a country that maintains significant influence over Europe. To do this, the embassies of these nations in the US could either host joint conferences in collaboration with the think-tank community, and/or create a joint lobby group with regional countries pooling in their resources.

3- Leveraging the role of moderate Islamic clerics to counter extremism

Different regions of the world where Muslim populations are predominant are searching for methods to counter violent extremism. The role of clergy is key in this regard, who have often not lived up to the preset day requirements by coming out with a clear-cut narrative on what it means to be a good Muslim in the modern pluralistic societies. Their messages either promote hatred or do not publicly condemn extremism.

In a recent video, as it is doing in other places, the Islamic State (IS) has attempted to recruit Balkan citizens. It has also been attempting to extend its reach to the region. IS is trying to do this by promoting a distorted version of history and by claiming that the design of World War I was to conduct a “global assault by [infidel] nations against Islam” and that its primary goal was to “create nation states in the lands of the Muslims.” 4

According to the video, this humiliation can only be finished with a “hijra” (migration) to the IS-controlled territory in Iraq.

The Balkan states should engage with influential religious leaders in the region, and beyond, to promote tolerant views and to prevent extremist groups from misusing religion to their advantage. In this regard, influential Islamic clerics should emphasize that resorting to extremist ideologies is an unacceptable way to address the grievances people may have with their respective governments.

The think-tank community of the region can also play a pivotal role in understanding militant ideology and motivation. For example, the Tirana based think-tanks, Institute for Democracy and Mediation and the Albanian Institute for International Studies, have been conducting instrumental studies on preventing radicalization of masses. ⁵

4- Restoring hope in the State

The hopes of joining the EU have already improved rule of law and accountability, while at the same time reducing corruption in the Balkans. However, this progress is not shared equally amongst different states. Moreover, the region is experiencing a number of economic challenges; FDI is low, unemployment remains high, and the average salaries very low.

To tackles these issues, the governments would have to step up their efforts.
They  could do so by further supporting the local businesses and by developing regional and global commercial and academic linkages. The region can specially benefit from promoting tourism. Croatia has been particularly successful in promoting tourism on its coastal cities of Split and Dubrovnik.

When it comes to governance, Bosnia and Herzegovina poses the greatest challenge. The Dayton Accord, reached two decades ago, was praised for protecting representation of various ethnic groups in the government. However, the model that was established has created unique impediments for the proper functioning of a state. The formula had allowed Bosniaks (Muslims), Croats (Catholics) and Serbs (Orthodox) each to choose their own president, with the chairman of this tripartite Presidency rotating between the three every eight months.

It created one country, but two entities, The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (home to Bosniaks and Croats) and the Republika Srpska (dominated by ethnic Serbs). Today, Bosniaks aspire for a centralized government, Croats look for a third entity of their own, while the Republika Srpska seeks even greater autonomy. Such a political system essentially reduces any chances of improved governance.

To improve the state of affairs in Bosnia, perhaps there is a need to promote a Bosnian identity as opposed to a system that re-emphasizes ethnic divisions. Ultimately, Bosnia needs international support to establish a system of governance which is pluralistic, all-inclusive and progressive in nature. It needs a single head of state that can work towards benefiting the entire country.

5- Rebranding the region and developing best practices from within

Over the past few years, the Balkan nations have made considerable progress towards improving regional ties. For example, Slovenia and Croatia agreed to settle their border dispute through international arbitration, a move that was also ratified by the parliaments of both countries.

Moreover, under the outgoing EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, Serbia and Kosovo have also improved their relationship.⁶ While Serbia is not likely to recognize Kosovo’s independence in the near future, nonetheless, the two have started talking on various issues.

On the other hand, Albania has started to think beyond its historical rivalry with Greece by opening its doors to Greek investment.⁷ Furthermore, in October 2009, Kosovo and Macedonia concluded the demarcation of their border, which made Macedonia the first former Yugoslav republic to demarcate all of its borders.⁸

With these successes, the nations of the region have a tremendous opportunity to rebrand the global image of the Balkans. Instead of being associated with conflicts and divisions, the Balkans could become an image of diversity where different states and various ethnicities are actively trying to overcome the past and reaping the benefits.

This may also require them to reframe the challenges that are viewed as domestic to be now considered as international.

The trade of illicit drugs is one such area. It is generally accepted that the Balkan networks play a crucial role in facilitating the smuggling of Heroin from Afghanistan to Europe. As the European Stability Initiative points out, the heroin first has to pass through “EU members Greece, Bulgaria and Romania to even get to the Western Balkans,” and “Smugglers then still have to cross the external Schengen borders in Slovenia or Hungary as well”.9

Another area needing attention has to do with refugees, asylum seekers and migrants making their way across the Balkans. Increasingly, they are getting trapped in Serbia due to Hungary’s new wall and its border with Serbia

Addressing such issues would require a multilateral approach.

Conclusion

Since the breakup of former Yugoslavia, the Balkan countries have demonstrated progress on various fronts. To avoid the risks and overcome challenges, they would need to increase their advocacy in the US and the EU to fasten their membership prospects.

While the US and EU might not be investing heavily in the region, they still maintain a diplomatic leverage that helps in maintaining political stability. At the same time, Turkish and Chinese investments can help the region become economically more prosperous. It is imperative that the regional countries be willing to openly engage with all international players who can contribute to the stability and development of the region.

Additionally, the Balkan governments should work to improve local employment rates, attract more FDI, and develop local industries that include tourism. These countries should also engage influential religious figures in the region, and from beyond, to promote tolerant views and to prevent extremist groups from misusing religion.

In the emerging interconnected world, overcoming challenges require adopting regional and multilateral approaches to various issues. While ethnic tensions have bedeviled the region in the past, to avail future economic opportunities necessitates more interdependence and cooperation.

End Notes

1 http://csis.org/blog/western-balkans-turkey-back

2 www.novinite.com/articles/168778/Bulgaria,+Croatia+Unanimous+on+Need+of+Western+Balkans’+Integration+into+EU#sthash.tIXRepDo.dpuf

3 http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/ukraine-isis-wars-increase-europes-risks-in-western-balkans

4 http://www.rferl.org/content/islamic-state-balkans-targeted-message/27058370.html

5 http://idmalbania.org/?p=4195

6 http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=56484

7 http://www.newsweek.com/balkan-success-story-69243

8 http://www.usip.org/events/diplomacy-in-the-balkans

9 http://www.esiweb.org/rumeliobserver/2010/06/16/iiss-trafficking-and-stereotypes-about-the-wild-balkans/
About the Author:

Abdullah Khurram is a South Asia and Middle East Fellow at PoliTact and is based at Johns Hopkins University in Washington D.C. He just finished a tour of the Balkans where he was invited by the Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies in Ljubljana, Slovenia, to deliver a talk on the “Geopolitics in Middle East & South Asia: Lessons for the Balkans.”

The post A 5-Point Agenda For The Western Balkans appeared first on Politact.

Context

Arif Ansar

Mixed reviews have emerged on the threat posed by IS to South Asia. One of the arguments postulates that the group will not be able to make significant inroads because the socio-political and religious terrain of the Middle East and South Asia are fundamentally different. Others have pointed out to the geographic reasons for why IS may not be able to fully penetrate South Asia; the two regions are obviously separated by Iran, a Shia power. The most dangerous development can be the coming together of AQ and IS in the future.

In its past analysis, PoliTact has projected that the affairs of Middle East, especially related to extremism and Iran’s nuclear program, were likely to dominate the affairs of South Asia at some point. Associated with this assessment was an alarm that if the Afghan reconciliation process lingers on for too long, as it has, the dynamics of the Arab politics may start to complicate the Afghan affairs, including Pakistan and India, in a manner they have not in the past. Now we feel it is beginning to happen in the form of Islamic State (IS).

Core Al Qaeda (AQ) has long had a presence in the region and has morphed in to a phenomenon known as AQ and Associates. The introduction of IS in to the extremist mix has considerably raised the stakes for the region. In a series of articles, PoliTact is examining the various facets of the threat posed by IS to the South Asia region, which will ultimately project towards Central Asia. Speaking at a conference held at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC on March 17, Kazakhstan’s Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Yerzhan Ashikbayev, noted that his country is deeply worried about the reports of IS presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan and is closely monitoring the situation.

Analysis

Different Understandings Of The IS Threat

In a recent development six leading TTP figures – Shahidullah Shahid, Hafiz Saeed Khan, Hafiz Daulat Khan, Maulana Gul Zaman, Mufti Hassan and Khalid Mansoor – swore allegiance to the IS. As widely reported, the IS spokesman Muhammad al-Adnani officially recognized the wilayah of Khorasan on January 26. He also designated Hafiz Saeed Khan, a former commander of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Orakzai tribal agency, as regional commander. On the other hand, Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadim, a former Afghan Taliban commander, was appointed as the deputy regional chief.

PoliTact’s South Asia Fellow Shreyas Deshmukh noted in his analysis of these reports:

“Against the backdrop of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) withdrawal from Afghanistan, ongoing military operations against TTP in Pakistan and the crucial Afghan peace talks, such unprecedented changes at the high level of Taliban leadership along with the spread of the IS ideology and influence will only strengthen the morale of terrorists in the South Asian region.”

On the other hand, PoliTact’s director for strategic initiatives Dr Claude Rakists commented: “what this means in practical, military terms is difficult to assess today. However, what it does imply is that AQ’s pull in Pakistan is weakening and that its level of influence has diminished under the leadership of Ayman Al Zawahri. Zwahiri’s public stunt of creating a South Asia branch of Al-Qaeda (AQIS) did little to hide this. On the contrary, it confirmed its desperate search for relevance in the wake of IS’s meteoric rise in the world of terrorism. The decision by the leader of the Pakistan-based Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan to also swear allegiance to IS in October 2014 was further confirmation of Al-Qaeda’s fast diminishing weight in Pakistan’s tribal areas.”

Commenting on the motivation behind these Taliban desertions, PoliTact’s South and Central Asia Fellow Zia-ur-Rehman noted:

“An official in Afghan government believe that the elements who are part of the IS, especially Khadim, who swore his allegiance to al-Baghdadi and became IS’s local leader, have lost their connections with Quetta Shura. According to the official, their key motivation is clear; IS is a strong brand and they can regain some of their prestige and show their muscle to the leadership of Afghan Taliban.”

What The Region Thinks

Despite these developments, confusion regarding IS and its regional ambitions persists in Pakistan. Speaking to the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee in February, Foreign Secretary, Azaz Ahmed Chaudhry, admitted that IS poses a serious concern and that the government is taking all necessary steps to counter the risk. On the other hand, Pakistan’s Interior Minister dismissed the IS threat as media hype in Washington while attending the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism.

Speaking at the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) on February 18, Pakistan’s Interior Minister Chuadhry Nisar Ali Khan vehemently denied that IS had any presence in Pakistan. Moreover, he added that the extremist space in the region is already full and has no room to accommodate IS. Furthermore, he emphasized to use the regional context to understand the extremist landscape and avoid generalization. What he probably meant was that Pakistan does not want to get entangled in another round of ‘do more’ demands, or to get sucked in to the to the Arab-Iranian politics.

Chaudhry Nisar’s cautious approach is similar to the Indian posture towards IS. India has maintained a low profile on the issue and does not want to unnecessarily complicate its relations with the GCC states, on which it depends heavily for energy needs, importing roughly 59 percent of its oil. According to a World Bank report, in 2013 India received about $73 billion in remittances from the Middle East, where nearly seven million Indians reside as guest workers.

During President Obama’s visit to India in January, US Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes commented, “When you look at our broader counter-terrorism cooperation and how we’re tracking the flow of fighters and terrorist financing there, I do think we want to find space for cooperation,” he told journalists. However, when it comes the risks posed by extremists from the direction of Afghanistan and Pakistan, US-India security cooperation goes beyond the realm of tracking finances.

On the other hand, the Afghan governments understanding of the IS threat is different than Pakistan and India. President Ashraf Ghani told the Munich Security Conference on February 8: “… And it is very important not to isolate the events from Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya from what is unfolding in Afghanistan and South Asia. Because the threats from the network perspective are becoming stronger, the state response is, unfortunately, weaker.”

US and NATO are also not taking the IS threat to the region lightly especially after how events have unfolded in Iraq. A drone strike early in February took out its main recruiter and recently appointed deputy regional commander, Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadim. Speaking at the Woodrow Wilson Center on March 17, Director at the office of OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) Secretary General, Ambassador Marcel Pesko, noted that IS can spoil the Afghan reconciliation process. Moreover, he stated that as the Afghan peace talks pick speed, the IS phenomenon in the region may get worse.

The IS threat may be behind the review of the number of forces that would remain in Afghanistan and the withdrawal timeline, being undertaken by the new US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter. However, the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan is one of the key demands of the Afghan Taliban before it would reconcile. Dr Shahrbanou Tadjbaksh noted at the Woodrow Wilson Center on March 17 that IS can spoil President Ashraf Ghani’s vision for regional connectivity. Furthermore, she pointed out that the interests of regional states are a bigger threat to Afghanistan than those posed by the non-state actors.

The Associates Of IS, AQ And The Future

The present enhanced security cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, including Pakistan’s on-going military operations in FATA, are likely being stimulated by an emerging trend that has already settled in the Middle East, and may be now moving towards the South and Central Asia. This pattern is the infighting between the associates of AQ and IS.

As reflected above, the full shape of what constitutes the Associates of IS in South and Central Asia is still in the formative stages. Nonetheless, as it evolves it can disrupt the nascent Afghan reconciliation process and with implications for India. To understand how this trend can unfold, the past provides one sample. In a dangerous development in December 2011, AQ, Afghan Taliban, and TTP representatives came together in the form of a consultative body called Shura-e-Murakeba.

Senior Al Qaeda leader Abu Yahya al-Libi as well as Siraj-ud-din Haqqani of Haqqani network, attended the meetings to form this Shura. Reportedly, other leaders attending included Hakimullah Mehsud and his deputy Waliur Rehman of TTP. Spokesperson for TTP, Ehsanullah Ehsan had stated that Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahdur, which Pakistan considered as Good Taliban, including Zabiullah Mujahid and Maulvi Sangeen, were also present. Some accounts suggest that Mullah Omar had sent Siraj Haqqani and Mullah Mansour to broker the agreement.

The congregations had produced the following outcomes: sort out differences between the groups; avoiding the unnecessary killings and kidnappings for ransom; ending of attacks on Pakistan’s military and refocusing of efforts towards US led coalition in Afghanistan. The timing of the birth of the Shura is noteworthy, the body came in to being after the November, 2011 NATO Mohmand attack. The incident resulted in the death of 26 Pakistani soldiers.

In a fashion similar to the meetings under Shura-e-Murakebha, Pakistan’s Punjab based jihadist also came together at the time. Banned religious group Jamaatud Dawa (JD) protested against the granting of most favored nation (MFN) to India, and declared it was ready for jihad against NATO. The gathering of 44 right wing entities was held under the banner of the Difaa-i-Pakistan Council (Pakistan Defense Council).

These meetings were interpreted by some as Pakistan’s attempt to pull the Islamists together in the aftermath of the NATO Mohmand attack. The coming together of extremist leaders in the form of Shura-e-Murakeba was also working against the strategy of dividing the AQ and Associates. Irrespective of this, as the US-Pakistan relations improved, many of the participants of the FATA conferences have since been eliminated. However, the fear has persisted that Pakistan and its military maintains some level of influence on various militant and extremist groups, a case consistently reinforced by India. In the aftermath of the Army Public School (APS) attack in Peshawar, and via Operation Zarb-e-Azb, Pakistan now suggests it has dropped the classification of Good and Bad Taliban.

In the future, IS could become the centripetal force for disgruntled extremists of all sorts, leading to friction and infighting between various configurations of extremists, with the states caught in the middle, as is the case in the Middle East. This could further complicate Afghan reconciliation and normalization of Pakistan-India ties. On a more ominous note, IS could potentially compete against Pakistan’s alleged influence over some groups. While the consistent pressure on Core AQ may have indeed weakened it, the emergence of IS has created an opportunity and a focal point for the Associates of AQ to gravitate towards. This is a potent reason for Pakistan and India to resume results oriented dialog.

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Context

The primary purpose of developing a forecast is to better plan. And at a more sophisticated level, to help shape a future that is conducive for ones interests. It’s an exercise to make a reasonable assessment of where matters might be heading. Smaller the variation between the trajectory of actual events, and the anticipated plan, greater the chances of success. Then there are risks, which if they were to come true, can seriously dent the expectations. Now a day, a term ‘black swan’ is more and more being used to conceptualize an unexpected and unprecedented event that can dramatically alter the present reality.

For instance, in the growing power tussles of the established and emerging powers, many nations are caught in a balancing act. While the present phase may be a transitory one, a single event could potentially end this stage and push different nations to chose between one or the other alignment. This is similar to how 9/11 dramatically altered international affairs. Anticipating what that incident could be, and how to pro-actively prevent such an eventuality, is critical.

While producing a forecast and a risk assessment, another important consideration to keep in perspective is the aspect of vantage point. Meaning, the future and the risks for one country are not the same as they may be for the other, just as is the case for individuals. Yes, there may be generalizations, but then there are always peculiarities as well. As a case in point, let’s take the example of campaign against extremism. The ramifications for the campaign that has been raging for about 13 years are different for the western nations than those regions that are inflicted by extremism.

Nonetheless, developing and understanding patterns and trends are an important ingredient and prerequisite for any forecast and plan.

Another essential distinction is the difference between local change brought upon by regional and global flux. Most often than not, global patterns are forcing a local response. Before formulating an appropriate tactical, strategic or policy level response, and for the sake of the success of the reply, it is vital to identify and understand the dynamics of global change first.

With this context, PoliTact has been working on identifying the most significant political, economic, and security patterns, from the vantage point of South Asia and Middle East. As oppose to listing them as the top ten risks or trends, as is fashionable these days, we have chosen a format that depicts how the political, economic, security and technology patterns are inter-linked. We have done so with an attempt to minimize rampant confusion and to enhance a conceptualization that helps to understand the confusion the world is presently experiencing.

The most important trend the nations of the region would have to grapple with is the changing nature of the world order.

Analysis
Nation-State Structure

While the world is organized politically in to an often arbitrary nation-state structure, there are a number of forces that are acting for and against this architecture. The campaign against terror with the associate phenomenon of non-state actors, climate change, disease, and technological advancements – particularly in the realm of communication technologies and social media, are all maneuvering against preserving the sanctity of the state, as we know it.

These man-made and other forces of nature are also hastening what has come to be known as the phenomenon of globalization, and making governance difficult. Equally, the communication revolution and social media has increased awareness and global consciousness for issues that transcend national borders and national identity. Then there are vested interests that have been over employed at the expense of the common people while putting the very social contract at jeopardy. The reaction can be seen in the form of movements such as the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street.

At another level, and more seriously, a crisis of identity is brewing. National identity is increasingly in friction with the economic necessities represented by the forces of globalization, which in turn are being challenged by the national security pressures of a state. Economic aspirations now stand face to face with security concerns in many parts of the world, and the individual identity hangs in balance between the national, global, religious, and ethnic loyalties. The forces of religion and globalization are both acting against the nation-state structure and are often perceived as exploitive. Recent events in India, Russia, and even Europe, suggests that the separation of religion/church and state may not be a done deal after all.

The European Union Model

The European Union was taken by many as the natural evolution of the nation-state structure, where states willing give up some of the sovereignty for the larger benefits derived from growing trade. However, the recent economic crises especially related to the banking and housing sectors, and tensions over Ukraine, are testing this model. The election results in Greece have once again revived thorny issues with in the EU.

This also remains a dilemma when it comes to Pakistan-India ties. The theory stipulates that increasing trade between nations leads to lessening of mistrust, while at the same time tying their fates to a shared future. This is not how the European Union appears to be evolving. The revisionist and nationalistic tendencies are reemerging.

In the long run, if economic circumstances worsen and security concerns rise, growing interconnectedness can create dependencies that could be extremely risky, as far as the sovereignty of a nation, are concerned. This is especially true if interconnectedness is exploited for political and security ends, as is when sanctions are imposed, witnessed recently in the case of Iran and Russia.

These concerns have posed a major roadblock in promoting trade between Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, as part of the New Silk Road vision.

TTP and TTIP

In additional to the European Union Model, the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Trans Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which the US is trying to finalize, will also provide important lessons.

The TPP will include 792 million people, makes up 40 percent of the world economy, and is perceived by China as a way to economically contain it. While the TTP excludes China, the nations regional approach to developing trade agreements, is seen as a way to keep US out from the region. At stake are the principles of bilateralism and regionalism versus multilateralism propagated by WTO.

Conclusion

The interplay of political, economic, security, and technology trends, and the forces of nature and globalization, are creating unique sets of pressures and vulnerabilities for the nation-state structure.

While the future model is still in evolution, the identity crisis that has ensued is creating multifaceted outcomes that need to be understood before policies and plans are put in place to address the challenges.

The larger trends are working across states and the response would also have to be coordinated and multilateral, which is difficult under the nation-state structure and the UN system (UN Security Council). Forming alliances is not easy in the absence of shared interests and values. What is occurring more and more is the configuration of coalitions around major crises and conflicts.

Then there is the issue of how the benefits and loses will be spread out in a globalized world, which depends on what one produces, and is also tied to how the value of those assets is determined. Consider the recent drop in oil prices, which has suddenly thrown the economies of Russia, Iran, and others, in to turmoil.

The global transition is by no means over, what’s critical is to spot what is emerging early and to be able to adapt quickly. The nation-state structure was suitable for an environment that is changing fast. The challenge now is to organize in a way that helps to deal with the future trends. And for this alliances and multilateralism are better suited than simple bilateralism. The complication being: aligning bilateral with multilateral approaches is a complicated task.

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