By Arif Ansar

Context

In the aftermath of the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021—formalized through the Doha Accords of 2020—South Asia has entered an entirely new and volatile phase. The Taliban’s return to power, their continued lack of international recognition, and the deepening conflict along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border have collectively reshaped the region’s geopolitical contours. What once was envisaged as an American “peace deal” has since evolved into a crucible of power rivalries, ideological contestations, and security dilemmas extending far beyond Kabul.

Amid this changing landscape, Washington finds itself confronting an old question in a new era: What strategic interests does the United States still have at stake in Afghanistan? This question gained renewed urgency after the tragic shooting near the White House on the eve of Thanksgiving in 2025, when Rahmanullah Lakanwal—a former Afghan supporter of U.S. forces who immigrated under the Protect America Operation—opened fire, killing two National Guard members. The attack, still under investigation, reignited the debate about the consequences of U.S. disengagement from Afghanistan and the enduring ripple effects of America’s two-decade military presence.

To assess these evolving dynamics, The Middle East Institute (MEI) collaborated with PoliTact to host a Webinar in November last year to explore these aspects centered around the evolving situation of Afghanistan and if merits a fresh policy and approach. Earlier in May, soon after the four-day conflict between Pakistan and India, MEI also conducted a discussion with regional experts to assess President Trump’s policy towards Taliban. Both discussions were moderated by Dr. Marvin Weibnbaum, the Director of Afghanistan-Pakistan Center.

Through these deliberations, a sobering consensus emerged: the U.S. has abandoned its nation-building ambition, replacing it with a strictly transactional and selective engagement guided by short-term counterterrorism and strategic interests. This shift marks a watershed in South Asian geopolitics—one in which regional powers like Pakistan, India, China, and Russia are recalibrating alliances, while the Taliban’s regime struggles to define its sovereignty amid growing internal fractures and international isolation.

Counterterrorism and Pragmatism

According to panelists such as Joshua White and David Sedney, Washington’s current strategy toward South Asia is driven not by ideology or doctrine but by political expediency. The United States, still wary of being drawn into another endless conflict, now prefers “quick interventions that can be framed as political wins” without the burden of prolonged commitments. At the heart of this approach lies counterterrorism (CT)—the only enduring U.S. interest in Afghanistan. The Taliban, Washington, and Pakistan paradoxically, share a common adversary: the Islamic State–Khorasan Province (ISKP). While formal cooperation remains limited, intelligence coordination to prevent ISKP attacks has emerged as a rare channel of pragmatic engagement. Adjunct Professor at George Town University, Doug London, underscored this convergence, observing that neither Washington nor the Taliban can afford an al-Qaeda-style attack “with fingerprints all over Afghanistan.” Thus, even hostile actors find themselves bound by mutual survival instincts.

Another dimension of U.S. engagement is transactional diplomacy—a pragmatic mechanism aimed at resolving targeted issues such as hostage recovery and retrieval of left-behind military assets. As former Afghan ambassador Javid Ahmad explained, these dealings often blur ethical lines; American captives have been freed in exchange for concessions, including the removal of Haqqani Network bounties. Similarly, billions of dollars’ worth of infrastructure and equipment left during the withdrawal remain part of simmering behind-the-scenes negotiations—either to buy back through intermediaries like Pakistan or to ensure their destruction to prevent exploitation.

Pakistan’s position in this matrix is particularly complex. While the U.S. remains a visible interlocutor, Islamabad’s deepest strategic alignment continues to be with China. Pakistan leverages Washington’s engagement as a counterbalance against overreliance on Beijing. According to the panelists, efforts to “reset” U.S.-Pakistan relations on the basis of trade, minerals, and counterterrorism cooperation may refresh dialogue but are unlikely to override hard security realities.

Human Rights and the Counterterrorism Dilemma

The Taliban’s domestic policies, particularly toward women and civil society, continue to complicate U.S. engagement. As Lisa Curtis observed, the regime has demonstrated “no change in policies” from its 1990s practices—the repression of women and stifling of dissent remain total. This poses a moral and strategic crisis for Washington: how to cooperate on counterterrorism while refusing to legitimize a regime that flagrantly violates human rights.

Curtis argued that sacrificing principles for intelligence access risks undermining long-term stability, as repression fuels extremism by creating ungoverned spaces ripe for recruitment. Yet London countered that, in practice, the U.S. often cooperates with regimes that commit abuses when it aligns with national interests, effectively separating human rights advocacy from realpolitik.

The delicate balance between moral credibility and strategic necessity defines Washington’s Afghan dilemma—where human rights concerns, while loudly voiced, often take a back seat to the imperatives of terrorism prevention.

The TTP Factor

When U.S. troops exited Afghanistan, many in Pakistan assumed the Taliban’s ascension would enhance Islamabad’s regional leverage. Instead, the opposite has occurred. The enduring ties between the Afghan Taliban and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have emerged as the central source of cross-border friction, destabilizing Pakistan more than any external actor.

Since the short but intense four-day war between Pakistan and India in May 2025, border skirmishes between the Taliban and Pakistani forces have intensified, reflecting a broader regional unraveling. Analysts such as Sedney describe these clashes as a subtext of the larger India-Pakistan rivalry, with each side using Afghan soil as a pressure valve for strategic signaling. Yet a full-scale Taliban-Pakistan war remains improbable. Pakistan’s military, with its overwhelming technological and nuclear superiority, could decimate Taliban forces—but at the risk of provoking a drawn-out insurgency it cannot control. The Taliban, aware of this asymmetry, prefer hybrid tactics, allowing the TTP to wage low-intensity proxy warfare inside Pakistan.

The Taliban dismiss Islamabad’s demands to curb the TTP, calling it a “domestic problem”. This refusal underscores their ideological kinship and the shared ambition to see Pakistan’s border tribal belt revert to Taliban-style Sharia governance. Ahmad warned that this dynamic is perilous: the TTP’s suicide battalions possess the capacity to incite urban terror within Pakistan, amplifying the country’s internal vulnerabilities.

Behind these clashes lies a larger ideological project—the Taliban’s belief, shared by TTP hardliners, that regional power is shifting back to the “Islamic Emirate” model. Sedney noted that radical circles envision a future, within a generation, where Pakistan and even India could see Taliban-like movements ascend. Whether delusional or strategic, this belief animates the persistence of militancy and shapes Islamabad’s deepening anxiety.

US Leverages and Pakistan’s Regime Change Dilemma

The question of whether the U.S. or Pakistan can leverage internal Taliban factionalism looms large. Within the movement, a pragmatic Haqqani network faction favors economic engagement and limited U.S. cooperation, while the isolationist Kandahar faction, led by Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada, rejects dependency and seeks autonomy. Although tensions exist, Akhundzada maintains ultimate control, preventing visible fragmentation that might invite civil war. For Pakistan, frustration with the Taliban’s defiance has sparked talk of supporting Afghan resistance groups. Yet Ahmad warns this path is fraught: funding insurgency would demand resources, while the disunited Afghan opposition lacks both cohesion and stamina.

Consequently, Islamabad’s strategy has shifted from influence to contingency—exploiting Taliban divisions when advantageous, but no longer betting on a “friendly” Kabul. As White put it, the myth of a compliant, pro-Pakistan “Pashtun leadership” in Afghanistan has always been just that—a myth. This reality has spurred a profound shift in mindset within Pakistan’s government. No longer divided between the “good Taliban” and “bad Taliban,” Islamabad increasingly sees a spectrum of “bad and worse Taliban.”

At an event held at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in February, 2022, the Special Representative for Afghanistan at the time, Tom West, had discussed the economic leverages US still holds and commented that Afghan Taliban has shown the least interest in future cooperation with the US in fulling the terms of their side of the Doha Accord. At the same time, West noted that US is not supporting any opposition to Afghan Taliban and is advising other nations to refrain from that, but some will do that sooner or later if Taliban does not show urgency. Answering a question, he commented that many players are realizing that not having US engagement in Afghanistan is not in their interest.

Regional Rivalries and Great Power Calculus

Beyond the Pakistan-Taliban binary, regional power competition has turned Afghanistan into a geopolitical chessboard once again. None of the major powers—China, Russia, India, or the U.S.—wants a total state collapse, yet each pursues a distinct agenda. India, for its part, has pivoted sharply. As Curtis noted, New Delhi is now actively courting elements within the Taliban to undermine Pakistan’s influence. The May 2025 conflict with Pakistan demonstrated India’s willingness to strike deep into Pakistani territory, signaling a readiness to rewrite the traditional escalation playbook.

Meanwhile, China and Russia tread cautiously. For Beijing, the overriding concern is protecting multibillion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) investments from militant spillover. Russia, despite its history of confrontation with Islamist movements, maintains unpublicized CT cooperation with the Taliban to prevent ISKP’s expansion into Central Asia. Trump’s renewed engagement with Central Asian leaders under the “C5+1 initiative”—focused on strategic minerals—has further rattled Moscow and Beijing, who view it as U.S. encroachment upon their regional sphere of influence.

Panelists such as White and Karp noted that China now holds more extensive economic leverage in both Pakistan and Afghanistan than any other actor. Despite attempts to mediate between them, Beijing’s balancing efforts have faltered. Nonetheless, economic interdependence has rendered China an unwilling stakeholder in both states’ stability.

For the Taliban, the Great Power rivalry offers an opportunity. In an assessment, PoliTact noted last year: “As Afghan Taliban celebrate 4^th year in power, the nation now finds itself at a crossroads of competing currents. The net effect is a cautious, multi-prong stance: keep Iranian channels open for trade and energy, nurture Indian economic alternatives through Chabahar, avoid burning bridges with Pakistan as it courts Washington, and remain pragmatically receptive to Chinese infrastructure where it serves Afghan interests.”

Javid Ahmad observed, the regime seeks “economic neutrality,” extracting benefits from all sides while avoiding puppeteering by any. Pragmatic factions engage Russia and China for investment; hardliners in Kandahar, wary of foreign intentions, prefer cautious distance. This balancing act defines Kabul’s foreign policy—a tactical survival strategy that keeps all powers interested, but none dominant.

Containment Over Resolution: The U.S. Strategic Dilemma

Dr. Weinbaum summarized the prevailing expert view succinctly: “There is no military solution to the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict—only conflict management.” After decades of direct engagement, the U.S. now acts as a remote balancer, occasionally intervening diplomatically but avoiding deep entanglement. Washington’s immediate goal is not victory, but containment: preventing Afghanistan’s collapse while denying extremist sanctuaries the freedom to orchestrate global terror. This means sustaining aid and limited engagement but conditioning every form of support on verifiable security behavior.

Panelists urged regional coordination involving China, Turkey, and Qatar, whose economic leverage could pressure the Taliban to restrain the TTP. However, as Karp pointed out, both Turkey and Qatar’s favoritism toward Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated movements complicates their credibility as neutral mediators.

Ahmad cautioned that the U.S. must abandon the pursuit of ideological “unicorns” and embrace pragmatic realpolitik—dealing with actors as they are, not as Washington wishes them to be. The mantra, he argued, should be “leverage first, ideals later.” Delayed engagement only increases risks of ungoverned chaos, but overreaction could trap the U.S. in another open-ended quagmire.

The Perpetual Balancing Act

As of 2025, U.S. policy in South Asia has evolved into a delicate balancing act—a calculated choreography between engagement and restraint. America’s current presence is limited but consequential: intelligence links, sporadic negotiations, and cautious cooperation with regional allies. Yet looming questions remain. If Afghanistan once again becomes a safe haven for transnational terrorist networks, what tools does Washington have to respond? Under Trump’s renewed mandate, analysts predict the U.S. would double down on counterterrorism partnerships—especially with Pakistan and India—to prevent another 9/11-style surprise.

However, as India’s outreach to the Taliban deepens, it risks entrenching the very militant alignments that destabilize Pakistan and jeopardize U.S.-Pakistan rapprochement. Such dynamics may inadvertently revive the ideological monster once defeated by the War on Terror. Moreover, the Taliban’s tacit encouragement of TTP demands—such as reversing Pakistan’s merger of tribal areas and enforcing Sharia law—threatens to seed an insurgent domino effect. This could erode Islamabad’s internal cohesion and ripple across borders, complicating U.S. peace efforts from Gaza to Central Asia. Trump’s Taliban policy would require broader public ownership of Pakistan’s CT strategy and preventing the budding India-Afghan ties from destabilizing Pakistan and the rejuvenated US-Pakistan ties.

Related Articles:

The Unbroken Alliance: Why the Afghan Taliban-TTP Nexus Is Dooming Peace with Pakistan – Nov 4, 2025
The Fragile Truce Between Pakistan And Afghanistan And The War Of Narratives – Nov 2, 2025
Afghanistan’s Strategic Outlook And New Geopolitical Realities – Aug 18, 2025
Afghanistan, Pakistan Relations and Great Power Rivalry – Jul 21, 2025
Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions, Trump, And Wakhan Corridor – Feb 3, 2025
Political Or Military Solution; Pakistan’s New Counter-Terrorism Operation Azm-e-Istehkam – Aug 1, 2024
Convergences in US Pakistan Ties and Afghanistan – Jan 1, 2024
Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP – Feb 22, 2023
Post Withdrawal Campaign Against Extremism In Afghanistan And US-Pakistan Relations – Sep 7, 2022
Emerging US Policy Towards Afghanistan After Withdrawal – March 2, 2022
Recalibrating The US-Pakistan Partnership In Afghanistan – Jun 22, 2021
US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden – Mar 2, 2021

The post The Future Of Afghan Taliban-Pakistan Conflict: Implications For Regional Stability And US Interests appeared first on Politact.

The post What Does Afghanistan, Pakistan Conflict Mean For Regional Stability And US Strategic Interests? appeared first on Politact.

PoliTact’s Global Security Study

With inputs from Naade Ali and Arif Ansar

Context

Negotiations on the Trump’s 20-point Gaza Peace Package has been ongoing in Egypt since Monday, and the deal on the first phase between Hamas and Israel was announced on October 8th. At first glance, the focus appears to be on tactical choices, such as cease-fires, hostage exchanges, the future of Gaza, the fate of Hamas, and whether the Abraham Accords survive the region’s new trauma. Trump’s plan is pragmatic: a phased cease-fire, hostage-prisoner swaps, an interim technocratic authority to oversee Gaza reconstruction and demilitarization. However, it’s much vaguer where the politics bite: long-term political status, refugee questions, and Palestinian statehood.

The leaders of eight Muslim-majority states: Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Türkiye, Indonesia, Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan, who met Trump on the sidelines of the 80th UN General Assembly in New York, had expressed support for the plan in a joint statement, praising his “sincere efforts to end the war in Gaza” and expressing confidence in his ability to achieve peace. However, the text of the plan released subsequently has raised concerns among Arab countries and drawn significant domestic criticism, as it deviates from the proposals of the foreign ministers of the eight Muslim states. Reports indicate that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu secured “the last word,” persuading Washington to make additional changes at a stage when it was harder for the Muslim countries to intervene.

How the Gaza question is resolved — whether as a primarily security-led stabilization by disarming, re-building, and technocratic governance or as a political settlement that recognizes Palestinian political rights in a durable way — is yet to be seen. An Israeli-U.S. approach that produces security and normalization without a credible, enforceable pathway to Palestinian political rights and without addressing refugee claims, settlements or permanent borders risks locking in a durable, managed status quo that advantageously cements Israeli gains and rewards Arab normalization while leaving Palestinian grievances unresolved.

For critics and many Palestinians, the plan’s biggest flaw is that it recapitulates the old “deal by omission” problem — postpone the hard political questions and hope that security fixes suffice. Robert Malley’s long reflection on the failure of past peace processes is a timely reminder that postponing core issues almost guarantees revival of conflict rather than durable peace.

Shift in the Middle East Balance of Power

Since Trump’s first term in power led to Abraham Accords in September 2020, the Middle East is undergoing tumultuous shift in the balance of power. This shift is away from Iran’s axis of resistance and towards those that signed the Abraham Accords – and others that were moving towards accepting it. Highlighting plans to expand the signatories to the Abraham Accord and emphasizing the strategic and economic benefits of cooperating with Israel, Trump recently stated:

“History has shown us that those who establish relations with Israel have thrived, while those who devote resources and attention toward the destruction — even the annihilation — of Israel have languished. Israel is not going anywhere. They are going to coexist with other peoples and countries in the region. The Abraham Accords demonstrate that nations are better off when they communicate, work together, and embrace new opportunities.”

The last five years have seen aggressive Israeli campaigns and intelligence operations directed at damaging — sometimes decisively — Iran’s regional network: kinetic blows, targeted assassinations of key operatives in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, and continued pressure on Iran’s enlistment of militias. Another focus has been the degrading of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, whether by eliminating key scientists, or by cyberattacks on its nuclear facility. In June, US also carried out bombing of the Iran’s nuclear facilities in Fordow, Isfahan, and Nanatz sites.

The net effect has been to cripple Iran’s reach: Hezbollah was weakened on the battlefield during the 2023–24 rounds of fighting; Iran’s Quds Force lost its most iconic commander in Qasem Soleimani in January 2020. Recently, Isreal shifted its focus to the political leadership, which lead to the assassination of Ismael Haniyeh on Iranian soil in July 2024, followed by elimination of Hassan Nasrullah in Lebanon in September 2024. However, it was the Israeli attack on Hamas negotiators in Doha last month that many experts believe may have broken the camel’s back. It blurred the line of who is Israel after – and what does it want to achieve with all the mayhem that followed Oct 7, 2023, tragic Hamas attack on Israel. The campaign against Iran has demonstrated that Israel can play with international rules at will and without any consequences. This will have grave long-term consequences for global order.

But degradation does not mean elimination — proxies adapt, civilian costs grow, and local politics evolve in unpredictable ways. Alongside coercion and violence, normalization diplomacy has quietly reshaped the balance. The Abraham Accords proved that several Arab states were prepared to prioritize trade, technology, and counter-Iran cooperation, over the old formula that required Palestinian statehood before normalization. This bargain created an “outside-in” model of Israeli influence — Israel’s security and economic ties extend into the Arab world even as its control over Palestinian territories and the facts on the ground become more entrenched.

That model has a dual consequence: it strengthens Israel’s regional legitimacy and deterred coalitions, but it also delegitimizes the Palestinian cause in some Arab capitals. Unless meaningful political concessions accompany normalization under the current rounds of peace accords – the situation may plan in the hands of hardliners in the longer run.

Reshaping the New Middle East

The 20-point Trump plan thus revolve around two linked wagers.

First: can an externally led, security-first approach end immediate bloodshed and create a stable environment for reconstruction? Second: can that short-term security compact be turned into a politically legitimate, durable settlement that includes Palestinian rights and prevents radicalization? If the answer to the second question is “no,” then any tactical success will be ephemeral — the security gains will ossify into new grievances and a renewed cycle of violence.

If the American-Israeli tack succeeds in producing a stable Gaza that is demilitarized, internationally managed and economically rebuilt — but without a credible pathway to Palestinian statehood, refugee resolution, or substantive political participation — the regional consequence is likely to be twofold:

(a) the anti-Abraham Accord camp will consolidate, and (b) the Palestinian national cause shifts from mainstream diplomacy back to asymmetric forms of resistance and transnational advocacy. That benefits actors that can exploit grievances — whether non-state actors in the region or international rivals that seek influence by presenting themselves as alternatives to the U.S. model.

Middle East and the Global Balance of Power

Potential failure of the U.S.-Israeli approach does not automatically favor China and Russia — but it creates openings. China and Russia are playing a long game: both have expanded political and economic ties in the Middle East, offering infrastructure, arms, and diplomatic cover without the political conditionalities the West often attaches. Beijing’s economic footprint, growing role in regional institutions, including BRICS partners, and willingness to court Gulf states for energy and investment means it can offer attractive alternatives to American dependency.

Moscow, for its part, remains an arms supplier and a diplomatic interlocutor (especially in Syria), and it relishes opportunities to undercut U.S. influence. If Washington’s approach produces stability without justice, public sentiment may turn away from the U.S. narrative and look to non-Western partners who promise investments or political balance-as as has already started to occur. That said, China and Russia do not currently possess the same depth of security integration with Israel or the same network of alliances that would let them ‘replace’ American influence overnight — what they can do is exploit U.S. credibility gaps to gain economic and political footholds.

The Way Forward

Three practical conclusions emerge from a realistic appraisal of Trump’s 20-point plan:

1. Security outcomes are necessary but not sufficient. Short-term stabilization that includes hostage releases, ceasefires, and reconstruction, is important and politically urgent — but by itself it will not end the conflict’s structural drivers. The old lesson of Oslo remains: postponing core grievances breeds future crises.
2. Normalization without a political track is a strategic accelerant for some actors and a strategic liability for others. States that prioritize economic and security ties with Israel will gain leverage; however, the Arab and Muslim Street will judge outcomes by whether justice is achieved for Palestinians.
3. Geopolitically, every gap left by U.S. leadership, or perceived U.S. indifference to justice, creates space for China and Russia to expand influence — primarily through diplomacy and investment, and secondarily through arms and political support. But neither Beijing nor Moscow offers a ready-made substitute for U.S. regional security guarantees; rather, they offer alternative hedges that regional states will use in pursuit of their own short-term interests.

If Cairo deal and the Trump package are to avoid merely delaying the next crisis they must do three things simultaneously:

Secure an immediate end to mass killing and human suffering; create an inclusive, accountable reconstruction process that gives Palestinians meaningful agency; and set out an enforceable, internationally backed political roadmap that addresses, not postpones, refugee claims, borders and sovereignty – as was done in the Oslo Accords. Without that tripod, any “victory” will be tactical, not strategic — and the balance of power will keep shifting unpredictably, with winners among states and non-state actors who are best at exploiting unresolved grievances.

Related Articles:

Israel Airstrike Targets Hamas Negotiators In Doha, Threatening Gaza Ceasefire Talks – Sep 15, 2025
Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions – April 26, 2025
Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran – February 25, 2025
Assad’s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East – Dec 26, 2024
The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump – Dec 5, 2024
Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences – Aug 30, 2024
The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities – Sep 27, 2024
What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply? – Aug 4, 2022

The post From Oslo To Trump’s Abraham Accords And 20-Point Peace Plan For Gaza appeared first on Politact.

By Naade Ali
South Asia and Middle East Fellow, PoliTact

Context

The recent brief yet intense escalation between India and Pakistan has further exposed the fragile nature of South Asia’s security landscape. The four-day-long tit-for-tat cross-border military confrontation between the two nuclear-armed rivals has significantly undermined prospects for normalization, redefining the rules of engagement and signaling a shift in how both countries may manage their relationship moving forward. What began as a terrorist attack on Indian tourists in the Pahalgam region of the disputed India-administered Kashmir last month, resulting in the deaths of 26 people, quickly escalated into a significant diplomatic and military crisis.

India’s Strategic Shift: Operation Sindoor and the ‘New Normal

India hastily accused Pakistan of orchestrating the terror attacks and used the incident as justification to revise its military doctrine through the launch of Operation Sindoor.

In a public speech highlighting the goals of Operation Sindoor, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced what he described as reaching a ‘new normal,’ signaling a decisive departure from India’s earlier posture of restraint, long shaped by the perceived threat of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent. He emphasized that the new approach centered on firm and unyielding retaliation against terrorist attacks, including cross-border military operations and a deliberate refusal to distinguish between militant groups and their state sponsors—effectively placing direct responsibility on Pakistan for any acts of terrorism on Indian soil. Modi also stated that India would no longer be deterred by the threat of nuclear escalation, signaling a willingness to pursue bold and proactive actions despite potential risks. Having absorbed the initial Indian strikes, Pakistan, in response to the damage inflicted from Operation Sindoor, initiated its own military campaign named Banyan-Marsoos, targeting key Indian military targets to restore deterrence.

A Pause in Hostilities: U.S. Intervention and the Ceasefire

As the two countries climbed the escalation ladder, a surprise ceasefire announcement by U.S. President Trump on social media temporarily halted the hostilities. While the truce continues to hold, prospects for lasting peace remain uncertain. Inflammatory national rhetoric and the unresolved diplomatic deadlock continue to fuel tensions. At the core of the post-ceasefire period is a significant divide between India and Pakistan, each celebrating their military campaigns as a victory and viewing the outcome of their confrontation through a zero-sum lens. This has made the aftermath more complex and contentious than the conflict itself, while also revealing how both sides intend to manage their ongoing disputes moving forward. In this context, key questions have emerged: what does the temporary truce mean for the India-Pakistan rivalry, and what are its implications for the long-term stability of South Asia?

Experts Respond

On May 12, PoliTact hosted a panel discussion under the auspices of recently formed US-Pakistan Policy Forum titled: “India-Pakistan Tensions and the Way Forward,” moderated by its Chief Analyst, Arif Ansar. The session featured a distinguished panel, including Dr. Hassan Abbas, Chair of the Department of Regional and Analytical Studies at the U.S. National Defense University; Dr. Qamar ul Huda, Michael E. Paul Chair in International Affairs and Distinguished Visiting Professor at the U.S. Naval Academy; and Mr. Khaled Al Maeena, former Editor-in-Chief of Arab News and Saudi Gazette. The discussion centered on the implications of the recent ceasefire between India and Pakistan, the roles of international actors, and the significant obstacles to achieving long-term peace.

Will the Ceasefire Hold?

One of the key questions examined was whether the current ceasefire between India and Pakistan is likely to hold.

A cautious optimism emerged from Dr. Hassan Abbas, who expressed confidence that the ceasefire between India and Pakistan would likely hold — at least in the short term. He argued that both nations had achieved what they needed politically and militarily to step back from the brink. India could claim it had struck militant targets, while Pakistan could point to a successful air defense response. He emphasized that U.S. mediation had played a key role in facilitating the agreement and that both governments were likely committed to preventing further military action. However, he warned that unless deeper structural issues — particularly the Kashmir dispute and proxy militancy — were addressed diplomatically, this ceasefire would remain fragile.

Dr. Qamar ul Huda shared a more skeptical view. While not dismissing the ceasefire outright, he questioned its substance, noting the absence of a transparent or structured diplomatic process. The ceasefire, in his view, seemed to have emerged from informal channels — tweets and backchannel phone calls — rather than serious, trackable negotiations. He was concerned that such an approach lacked durability and legitimacy. Dr. Huda stressed that a real ceasefire requires more than silence on the battlefield; it demands diplomatic engagement on the root causes of conflict: Kashmir, water disputes, and terrorism. He also noted the potential influence of third-party actors, from China to Gulf states, and expressed concern over the lack of clarity in the U.S. position. In his view, the region wasn’t yet “ripe” for lasting peace, and without a comprehensive approach, this ceasefire might only be a pause rather than a turning point.

From a media and public sentiment angle, Mr. Khaled Al Maeena brought a grounded and people-centered perspective. He voiced deep concern over the role of Indian media, which he accused of fomenting hate and spreading misinformation that inflamed public opinion and made diplomacy politically costly. Drawing on conversations with people across religious and national lines, he asserted that the majority of Indians and Pakistanis want peace, not war. Mr. Al Maeena emphasized that the region’s pressing need was not military confrontation but economic development and political stability. He also highlighted the proactive role of Gulf states — especially Saudi Arabia — in de-escalating tensions. With ties to both India and Pakistan, and a vested interest in regional peace due to economic interdependence, Mr. Al Maeena saw the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia, as a credible mediator. While hopeful about the ceasefire’s potential, he underscored the importance of media responsibility, regional diplomacy, and leadership that prioritizes stability over nationalist bravado.

The panel discussed the evolving role of the Gulf states—particularly Saudi Arabia—as key international mediator. The panelists agreed that Saudi Arabia, with significant interests in both India and Pakistan, could play a constructive role in easing tensions. Mr. Khaled Al Maeena stressed that Saudi Arabia seeks regional stability, including in South Asia, and could facilitate dialogue, if requested, between the two rivals by encouraging both sides to come to the table and accept international mediation.

The panelists agreed that India and Pakistan must move beyond tactical ceasefires and pursue a comprehensive, long-term peace process—ideally supported by third-party mediation. The speakers emphasized that unless the two countries address their domestic challenges and regional rivalries, their aspirations will remain unmet.

What Role should US Play?

Throughout the discussion, the panelists recognized the United States as a pivotal external actor with the capacity to influence the trajectory of the India-Pakistan ceasefire. However, their assessments revealed a shared caution about the limitations and inconsistencies in the U.S. approach.

Dr. Abbas emphasized that U.S. involvement was instrumental in brokering the initial ceasefire, with both India and Pakistan reaching out to Washington behind the scenes. He argued that this reflected the high-level trust and strategic alignment both countries maintain with the U.S., albeit for different reasons. India is a key partner in the Indo-Pacific strategy and a counterbalance to China, while Pakistan has long-standing security and geopolitical ties to the U.S., particularly in the context of Afghanistan. However, Abbas cautioned that the U.S. influence alone cannot guarantee lasting peace. He urged Washington to move beyond tactical mediation and instead support long-term conflict resolution mechanisms, including structured dialogue on Kashmir and militancy. He also noted that U.S. credibility depends on maintaining a balanced posture, especially when public narratives in India resist outside interference.

Dr. Huda took a more critical and analytical stance on the U.S. role. He noted that while President Trump’s tweet announcing the ceasefire was widely reported, it lacked substantive follow-through or diplomatic backing. From his view in Washington, the ceasefire appeared to be the result of sporadic political gestures rather than coordinated U.S. policy. Huda questioned whether the U.S. is truly committed to sustained mediation or simply reacting to crises. He highlighted the ambiguity in U.S. policy—initially appearing indifferent, then suddenly claiming credit—and argued that this inconsistency undermines its ability to lead serious peace efforts. To sustain negotiations, the U.S. would need to invest diplomatically and involve multilateral partners, such as the EU, China, and Gulf states, in creating a legitimate and lasting peace framework.

Mr. Khaled Almaeena provided a regional and Gulf-centered perspective, acknowledging the U.S. role but emphasizing that regional actors—particularly Saudi Arabia—are just as important. He noted that while the U.S. has diplomatic leverage, it should not attempt to dominate the process unilaterally. Instead, he advocated for a collaborative approach, where the U.S. works in concert with Gulf countries and other stakeholders who maintain strong ties with both India and Pakistan. Mr. Al Maeena viewed President Trump’s announcement of the ceasefire with skepticism, suggesting it may have been more performative than strategic. He argued that the U.S. can help facilitate talks, but its influence must be exercised carefully and in support of locally driven, regionally endorsed initiatives.

In summary, the panelists suggested that while the U.S. remains a necessary actor for de-escalation, its role must evolve from crisis management to sustained diplomacy, ideally in partnership with regional powers who have both legitimacy and proximity to the conflict.

Great Power Rivalry and Peace Talks

In the discussion of whether the ceasefire between India and Pakistan could evolve into lasting peace, all three panelists acknowledged that great power dynamics—particularly involving China—play a critical role in shaping the strategic landscape of South Asia.

Dr. Qamar-ul Huda emphasized the geopolitical complexity introduced by China’s growing influence and the competing interests of major powers. He noted that China, along with the Gulf states, the EU, and the U.S., has shown interest in being involved in conflict resolution efforts between India and Pakistan. However, this multiplicity of actors creates a crowded diplomatic space, making coherent mediation more difficult. Dr. Huda pointed out that China’s strategic alignment with Pakistan and its rivalry with India complicate peace efforts. He also raised a broader concern: if India aspires to be a global leader, as envisioned through its role in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategy and the Quad alliance, it must demonstrate stability and responsible leadership in its own region. Repeated border skirmishes and crises with Pakistan, he argued, undermine India’s credibility as a reliable partner in the great power competition with China.

Dr. Hassan Abbas echoed these concerns, observing that China’s influence is an integral part of South Asia’s strategic fabric, particularly through its economic and military ties with Pakistan. He highlighted how Chinese military technology—especially fighter jets used by Pakistan—played a significant role in the recent skirmishes, which helped Pakistan demonstrate parity in air power despite India’s numerical advantage. Dr. Abbas saw China’s indirect support as a factor that emboldens Pakistan to resist Indian pressure and sustain its strategic posture. However, he also noted that the escalation ladder is becoming dangerously steep due to technological advancements and information warfare, increasing the risk of miscalculation in a region already shaped by great power rivalries.

Mr. Khaled Al Maeena took a broader, more diplomatic view, situating China within a network of powerful states — including the U.S. and Gulf nations — that have vested interests in regional stability. While not delving deeply into China’s military role, Mr. Al Maeena acknowledged that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are increasingly aware of China’s regional footprint, particularly through its economic initiatives like the Belt and Road. He suggested that China, like the U.S., could play a constructive role in diffusing tensions if it acts as a responsible stakeholder. However, he warned that foreign involvement, including by great powers, must be invited and balanced, as unilateral or self-interested interventions could backfire.

Collectively, the panelists agreed that China’s strategic position and the broader great power rivalry intensify the stakes in South Asia. While this rivalry may deter full-scale war, it also raises the risk of prolonged instability unless managed through inclusive and multilateral diplomacy.

Nuclear Environment and the Escalation Ladder

In examining how the India-Pakistan conflict unfolds within a nuclear framework, the panelists offered nuanced perspectives on the risks and realities of escalation.

Dr. Hassan Abbas presented a cautiously optimistic view, asserting that while both nations had indeed tested the boundaries of military engagement—through strikes, counterstrikes, and air skirmishes—they ultimately pulled back due to the overarching presence of nuclear deterrence. He emphasized that both sides were able to claim symbolic victories: India asserted it had targeted militant-linked sites, while Pakistan showcased its military preparedness and air defense capabilities, including the successful use of advanced Chinese aircraft. For Dr. Abbas, this demonstration of strength on both sides created the space for de-escalation, as neither nation was willing to push the conflict into full-scale war, knowing the devastating consequences of nuclear engagement. He remained confident that, despite heightened tensions, both countries were rational actors who understood the mutual destruction that a nuclear exchange would bring.

Dr. Qamar-ul Huda, meanwhile, offered a more cautious and critical interpretation. He characterized the pattern of India-Pakistan escalation as a dangerous cycle—an unending loop of skirmishes, retaliations, and brief periods of calm that lacked any strategic architecture. According to him, this repetitive behavior pointed to a fundamental weakness in regional diplomacy and governance. Despite the presence of nuclear weapons acting as a deterrent, he argued that the failure to address root causes—such as the Kashmir dispute, water-sharing tensions, and cross-border terrorism—meant that both countries continued to climb the escalation ladder in an ad hoc and reactive manner. Without institutional reforms or sustained international engagement, he warned, the region remained vulnerable to miscalculations that could spiral beyond control, even in a nuclear context.

Mr. Khaled Almaeena approached the issue from a societal and media perspective, underscoring how misinformation, media sensationalism, and hyper-nationalist rhetoric often play a more dangerous role in escalation than military strategy itself. Drawing comparisons to the “phony war” period of World War II, Mr. Al Maeena argued that the most recent flare-up between India and Pakistan resembled more of a media-fueled standoff than a genuine military confrontation. He criticized the Indian mainstream media in particular for manufacturing a climate of hostility, which in turn pressured political leaders to take aggressive stances to appease domestic audiences. In this environment, the escalation ladder becomes more volatile—not because of formal military decisions, but because public sentiment, stoked by inflammatory media narratives, compels leaders to act out of fear of appearing weak.

In essence, the three panelists painted a complex picture of escalation in South Asia. While they all agreed that nuclear deterrence plays a restraining role in preventing all-out war, they also highlighted different drivers of danger—be it military miscalculation, diplomatic failure, or media manipulation. The consensus was clear: the region may be protected by the logic of mutual destruction, but without responsible leadership, institutional dialogue, and media accountability, the rungs of the escalation ladder remain all too easy to climb.

Domestic Politics and Sustained Political Dialogue

As the conversation shifted from immediate military de-escalation to the prospect of sustained political dialogue, all three panelists highlighted domestic political dynamics in both India and Pakistan as central to whether the ceasefire could evolve into meaningful negotiations.

Dr. Abbas offered a deep dive into the Pakistani domestic landscape, emphasizing that the ceasefire had inadvertently strengthened the military establishment’s standing at a time when it was under intense public and political criticism—especially over its handling of the Imran Khan-led Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) movement. He noted that the military’s effective management of the immediate crisis had boosted its credibility and given the current coalition government some breathing room. However, he warned that without broader political consensus and constitutional legitimacy, Pakistan could not sustain a serious peace process. He stressed that internal unity, political stability, and inclusiveness—particularly reconciling with PTI’s large support base—would be necessary if Pakistan hoped to engage in long-term diplomacy with India.

Dr. Huda placed domestic politics within a broader governance and institutional context, particularly in Pakistan. He saw the moment as an opportunity for political re-examination, noting that recurring conflict cycles had revealed the deep fractures in the country’s political system. He emphasized the need for Pakistan’s political institutions to commit to constitutionalism and inclusivity, warning that sidelining popular political parties (such as PTI) or suppressing dissent only deepens instability. For Dr. Huda, sustainable negotiations—whether about the ceasefire or Kashmir—would require a bipartisan or multiparty consensus. In his view, the absence of such internal coherence would make Pakistan an unreliable negotiating partner, especially in the eyes of international actors.

Mr. Khaled Al Maeena focused more broadly on the popular mood and societal divide within both India and Pakistan. He warned that rising hate rhetoric, media manipulation, and political polarization—particularly in India—create an environment where leaders are constrained by nationalist pressures. In both countries, he argued, the public appetite for peace exists, but political elites often exploit nationalist sentiment for short-term gain. He called for leadership that could rise above partisanship and media-driven hysteria, emphasizing that economic development and social stability should be the common goals uniting political factions. Mr. Al Maeena also stressed that peace efforts cannot be externally imposed; they must be grounded in domestic political will and legitimacy.

The panelists agreed that no ceasefire or peace process can succeed without strong, credible, and inclusive domestic political foundations. While foreign mediation may help broker talks, lasting peace must come from within, supported by political leadership that reflects the will and aspirations of their people.

Related Research

Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States August 4, 2023
Examining Saudi-Iran Tensions And Its Impact On South Asia, China Jan 4, 2019

The post India-Pakistan Ceasefire And The Way Forward appeared first on Politact.

Context

The saga of the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline project is a stark illustration of how geopolitical complexities can impede critical infrastructure development, even when the need is dire. For Pakistan, a country grappling with chronic energy shortages, this pipeline has long represented a beacon of hope for economic stability and growth. Yet, for decades, it has remained tantalizing out of reach, a victim of international pressures, regional rivalries, and economic challenges.

The story begins in 2010 when Pakistan, facing an escalating energy crisis, signed a landmark deal with Iran to construct a 2,750-kilometer pipeline. Initially valued at $7.5 billion, the project promised to be a game-changer for Pakistan’s energy sector. The potential impact was significant: according to a USIP report, Pakistan’s persistent power crisis was trimming off about 2 percent of the country’s annual domestic product[1]. Furthermore, a World Bank study estimated that power shortages in developing countries like Pakistan could reduce business profitability by up to 40 percent[2]. These figures underscored the critical nature of the project for Pakistan’s economic well-being and future growth prospects.

Economic and Geopolitical Realities

From its inception, the project has been shadowed by the looming threat of U.S. sanctions. Unlike India, which received exemptions for its involvement in Iran’s Chabahar port, or Afghanistan, which was granted allowances for trade through Iran, Pakistan has consistently faced stern warnings from Washington about the consequences of proceeding with the pipeline. This disparity in treatment reflects the complex web of U.S. strategic interests in the region. India is viewed as a potential counterweight to China’s growing influence, while for Afghanistan Chabahar represents and alternative for its dependence on Pakistan. Pakistan, with its complex relationship with the U.S. and close ties to China, finds itself in a less favorable position.

The US policy towards Pakistan, Iran, and India have different ambitions. The situation demonstrates the complexity of international relations, where strict policy adherence often gives way to strategic exceptions based on broader geopolitical goals. The American approach has been criticized for its inconsistency, but from the U.S. perspective, it reflects a nuanced balancing of various strategic interests in the region. Using exceptions and restrictions as tools allows U.S, to influence foreign policy choices of regional players.

The geopolitical landscape has further complicated Pakistan’s position. Historically, tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran meant that Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations were hesitant to support a project that could increase Iran’s influence and decrease Pakistan’s financial dependence on them. Especially because Iran’s influence in the Middle East has consistently been increasing. China and Iran also signed $400 billion-dollar strategic economic agreement in 2021.

While the Chinese facilitated Saudi-Iran détente reached in 2023 offered a glimmer of hope, it has not significantly altered the dynamics surrounding the pipeline project. This hesitation from traditional allies has left Pakistan in a precarious position, caught between its energy needs and its diplomatic relationships. Moreover, the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel has further hardened positions against Iran.

Pakistan’s economic instability has added another layer of difficulty. The country’s frequent need for IMF bailouts and its struggle to finance large-scale infrastructure projects have made the pipeline’s completion seem increasingly elusive. As years passed, the project’s costs escalated, and the global political and security environment became even more convoluted, making it more challenging for Pakistan to move forward. In August 2023, Pakistan announced the suspension of the project due to the threat of U.S. sanctions, highlighting the ongoing pressures and uncertainties surrounding the initiative.

The failure of alternative energy projects has exacerbated Pakistan’s predicament. Initiatives like TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline) and CASA 1000 (Central Asia-South Asia power project) have stalled, often citing security concerns in Afghanistan and Baluchistan. Consequently, Pakistan remains heavily reliant on expensive Independent Power Producers (IPPs), a situation that undermines the competitiveness of its exports in the global market. This dependence on costly energy sources creates a vicious cycle, hampering economic growth and making it even more difficult for Pakistan to invest in long-term energy solutions.

Meanwhile, regional dynamics have shifted dramatically. India has made significant strides in enhancing its connectivity to Central Asia through the Chabahar port, effectively bypassing Pakistan. In May 2024, India signed a 10-year agreement to develop and operate Iran’s strategic Chabahar Port, committing $120 million, along with an additional $250 million loan credit facility for related projects. This development not only provides India with strategic advantages but also highlights the opportunities Pakistan is missing due to its inability to complete the pipeline project. The Chabahar port offers India an opportunity to reestablish its presence in Afghanistan and enhance its access to Central Asian markets, areas where Pakistan could have played a pivotal role had the pipeline project moved forward.

The Opportunity Cost

The opportunity cost for Pakistan is substantial and multifaceted. Economically, the completion of the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline could have significantly reduced Pakistan’s energy import bill. Conservative estimates suggest that access to Iranian natural gas could have saved Pakistan billions of dollars annually in energy costs[3]. This reduction in energy expenses would have had a cascading positive effect on the economy, potentially boosting GDP growth by 1-2% per annum[4].

Moreover, the availability of reliable and affordable energy would have been a boon for Pakistan’s industrial sector. Many industries, particularly textiles – a key export sector for Pakistan – have suffered due to inconsistent power supply. With a steady supply of natural gas, these industries could have operated at full capacity, potentially increasing export revenues by 15-20% annually[5].

The pipeline could have also played a crucial role in reducing Pakistan’s dependence on the IMF. By stabilizing energy costs and boosting industrial output, Pakistan could have improved its foreign exchange reserves and reduced its current account deficit. Economic projections suggest that over a 10-year period, the pipeline could have contributed to reducing Pakistan’s external debt by 20-25%, significantly altering its financial landscape and reducing the need for frequent IMF interventions[6].

Furthermore, the project had the potential to transform Pakistan into an energy corridor, linking Iran to the vast markets of South Asia. This role could have brought in significant transit fees and positioned Pakistan as a key player in regional energy dynamics. Conservative estimates put potential transit fee earnings at $500 million to $1 billion annually, a substantial boost to Pakistan’s foreign exchange earnings[7].

The environmental impact is another overlooked aspect. Natural gas, being a cleaner fuel compared to oil and coal, could have helped Pakistan meet its climate change commitments more effectively. The shift to gas could have reduced carbon emissions by 15-20% in the power sector alone, contributing to global climate goals while also improving local air quality[8].

Navigating the Future

As Pakistan grapples with these lost opportunities and ongoing challenges, it finds itself at a critical juncture. The country must navigate the escalating great power rivalry between the United States and China while addressing its pressing energy needs. In this context, Pakistan could consider a multi-faceted approach to move forward.

Firstly, Pakistan should intensify its diplomatic efforts with the United States, emphasizing the project’s importance for regional stability and economic development. Framing the pipeline as a crucial element for broader international goals in the region might help in securing exemptions or finding a middle ground. This approach could involve highlighting how energy security in Pakistan contributes to overall regional stability, a key U.S. foreign policy objective. A more economically stable Pakistan could be a more effective partner in fighting extremism and promoting regional security.

Engaging with Iran through economic projects could provide more diplomatic leverage for the international community in negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program. While the pipeline would benefit Iran, it would also make Iran more dependent on its neighbors for economic stability, potentially increasing leverage in nuclear negotiations.

Secondly, Pakistan could leverage the improved Saudi-Iran relations to garner support from GCC countries. This diplomatic outreach should be coupled with a renewed focus on diversifying energy sources, including accelerating the development of domestic resources and exploring alternative gas import options. The recent geopolitical shifts in the Middle East offer a unique opportunity for Pakistan to reposition itself in regional energy dynamics.

Thirdly, Pakistan should consider a phased implementation of the pipeline project, starting with sections less likely to trigger immediate sanctions. This approach could be complemented by exploring technical solutions that might mitigate sanctions risks, such as processing Iranian gas at the border. By breaking the project into smaller, more manageable phases, Pakistan might be able to demonstrate progress and build momentum while navigating complex international regulations.

Furthermore, Pakistan needs to reduce political polarization and strengthen its economic foundations through structural reforms. Improving the investment climate to attract foreign investment in the energy sector and reducing dependence on external financial support would put Pakistan in a stronger position to pursue its energy security goals. These reforms could include streamlining bureaucratic processes, enhancing transparency in the energy sector, and developing a clear, long-term energy policy that prioritizes sustainable and affordable energy sources.

In the broader context of great power rivalry, Pakistan should maintain a balanced approach between the U.S. and China. Leveraging relationships with both nations, while also exploring multilateral forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and potentially BRICS, could open new avenues for support and cooperation on energy projects. This balanced approach could involve positioning the pipeline project as part of a broader regional connectivity initiative that benefits multiple stakeholders, potentially making it more palatable to international partners.

The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline project remains a symbol of unfulfilled potential in regional cooperation and energy security. Its completion could catalyze a transformation in Pakistan’s economic landscape, potentially adding 2-3% to annual GDP growth, creating hundreds of thousands of jobs, and significantly reducing the country’s carbon footprint. The ripple effects would extend beyond Pakistan’s borders, fostering regional integration and potentially contributing to stability in a volatile region.

As Pakistan continues to navigate the complex interplay of domestic needs and international pressures, the path forward requires astute diplomacy, economic resilience, and strategic foresight. By addressing these challenges head-on and adapting to the evolving geopolitical landscape, Pakistan may yet find a way to turn this long-delayed project into a reality. The stakes are high – not just for Pakistan’s energy security, but for its economic future and its role in an increasingly interconnected region.

The coming years will be crucial in determining whether Pakistan can overcome the hurdles that have long delayed this project. Success would not only secure a more stable energy future for its people but could also redefine Pakistan’s position in the regional and global economic order. The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline, therefore, represents more than just an energy project; it is a test of Pakistan’s ability to navigate complex geopolitical waters and emerge as a key player in the changing dynamics of South and Central Asia.

References:

[1] United States Institute of Peace (USIP) report on Pakistan’s energy crisis (2023)

[2] World Bank study on power shortages in developing countries (2022)

[3] Asian Development Bank (ADB) report on South Asian energy trade (2021)

[4] International Monetary Fund (IMF) country report on Pakistan (2023)

[5] Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Annual Export Data (2023)

[6] Economic projections by Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) (2022)

[7] Estimates from Pakistan’s Ministry of Energy (Petroleum Division) (2021)

[8] Pakistan’s Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to the Paris Agreement (2021)

Related Links:

Iran-Pakistan Cross-Border Clashes And Deep-Rooted Challenges

Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States

The Future and Politics of Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project

The post The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities appeared first on Politact.

Context

In an endeavor to understand the emerging geopolitical realities, PoliTact partners with leading thought centers to understand the longitudinal multi-faceted tangents of a particular theme. One such topic is the political, security, and economic interconnections between South Asia and the Gulf States, and one of the subsets, Pakistan and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This relationship has taken on added significance in the context of ongoing great power rivalry and China’s wider engagement with the Middle East, which resulted in the Saudi-Iran détente in March.

This article presents a summary of three events held to date, especially the most recent one that took place on May 22.

US Presence in Afghanistan

The first event to cover this theme was held on November 16, 2018 in collaboration with the Middle East Institute. With US still present in Afghanistan, obviously influenced the perspectives, but it was clear this interrelationship would become more pronounced in the future. The GCC nations, especially Qatar, was facilitating the peace talks between the Afghan Taliban and the US, which later led to the Doha Agreement in February 2021.

One of the other significant trends was the continuing Indian economic encroachment of GCC, from where Pakistan has traditionally drawn support. One of the Panelist, former director for Pakistan and Afghanistan at the White House’s National Security Council, Shamila Chaudhary, had commented then:

“Pakistan does need to pay attention to the growing nexus between India and the Gulf States, especially when its transitioning from purely economic and into security and defense domains.

China-Iran Economic Deal and Abraham Accords

On July 28, 2020, PoliTact held a webinar to discuss the potential China-Iran $400 billion economic deal and its impact on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). China-Iran defense cooperation has been growing in the aftermath of President Trump’s decision in 2018 to unilaterally withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal reached in 2015 – which was a hallmark achievement of the Obama administration.

Moreover, additional Muslim states, such as UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco officially recognizing the state of Israel as a consequence of Abraham Accords, reached during the Trump’s presidency in 2020.

These developments resulted in deepening of the contradictory pressures for Pakistan. On the one hand, the country is China’s closest strategic partner, which was also expanding its ties with Iran. On the other hand, Pakistan’s closest Arab allies, UAE and Saudi Arabia, were moving closer to Israel.

When it comes to the Indian alignment with Israel and its growing ties with the Gulf nations, a question was again assessed about how these relations undercut the traditional support Pakistan has generated from the Gulf region, as referenced above.

Commenting on this during the webinar, panelist and former Editor-in-Chief of Arab News and Saudi Gazette, Khaled Almaeena, stated: “Pakistan’s position has been undermined by the negative economic and security news consistently emanating from the country. And this has been occurring at a time when India has positioned itself as an information technology and economic powerhouse, and by investing in Saudi Arabia that brought jobs to the Kingdom.” He further added, “the younger leadership of KSA do not hold the same kind of affinity towards Pakistan as past leaders had.”

China and Saudi-Iran Detente

PoliTact collaborated with the Middle East Institute again on May 22 to analyze the South Asia and GCC connection in the aftermath of China facilitated Saudi-Iran détente announced in March.

The panel discussion, led by Gerald M. Feierstein, Director of MEI’s Arabian Peninsula Program, assessed Chinese foreign policy within the framework of the Arabian Gulf and South Asia, with a specific emphasis on great power competition. Gerald Feirstein highlighted that much of the attention surrounding the intensifying competition between the US and China has been focused on the Asia-Pacific region. However, China’s growing involvement in the Middle East and South Asia has increasingly become a significant concern for the US.

The panelists were Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the East Asia Program and Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center, Yun Sun; Senior Advisor on South Asia at the United States Institute of Peace, Dr. Daniel Markey; veteran Saudi journalist, Khaled Almaeena; and Syed Muhammad Ali; the South Asia expert Non-Residence Scholar at the Middle East Institute.

The panelists examined several key questions:

1. Are China’s objectives in the region primarily driven by economic interests or do they have political and security dimensions as well?

2. How do countries in the wider Middle East perceive their relationships with China?

3. How does the US-India partnership influence China’s regional initiatives and impact    Pakistan’s interests in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor?

4. What is China’s vision and long-term goals in the region?

Chinese Perspective

Yun Sun emphasized that Chinese foreign policy is well structured, viewing the Middle East and South Asia as distinct regions. China’s focus on the Middle East is primarily driven by its reliance on energy imports, with 52 percent of its energy sourced from the region. Beijing has effectively pursued its objectives in the Middle East by employing a diplomatic approach that seeks to balance economic and political engagements with all significant parties, including those in conflict with each other.

It is important to note that China does not see itself as a mediator responsible for the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the assumption that China will replace the United States as the primary security provider in the Middle East is premature – but this is an overarching perception.

She pointed out this perception in the Middle East that US will disengage with the region and pivot to Asia does play out well in the long run and needs to be countered. Overtime people will start believing this.

She went on to add, China lacks the necessary political, security, and military engagement in the region. Conversely, China’s interests in South Asia mainly revolve around regional security concerns, particularly counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as maintaining its influence by counterbalancing India at a sub-regional level.

While China aims to preserve a certain level of affinity with India to prevent it from completely aligning with the United States against China’s ambitions, Pakistan plays a crucial role in China’s South Asia regional strategy. There are two notable aspects in China’s foreign policy formulation concerning the Middle East and South Asia.

Firstly, due to its energy requirements, China aspires to establish an energy transportation corridor linking the two regions.

Secondly, China advances its commercial and political goals by considering the shared interests among Muslim-majority countries in the Gulf and South Asia.

The other panelists, Daniel Markey reiterated that China’s interests in the Middle East are primarily driven by energy, while its interests in South Asia are focused on security matters and partially aimed at counterbalancing India.

Markey highlighted that China is gradually displaying an opportunistic willingness to assume an active leadership role, leveraging its economic influence to gain political influence. Additionally, all countries in the Middle East and South Asia have their own unique interests and perceive collaboration with China as a mutual opportunity. This applies not only to India and Pakistan but also to Iran and Saudi Arabia. As different countries engage with China, its prospects for exerting political influence multiply.

Moreover, Daniel acknowledged that China has surpassed the need for relying solely on Pakistan’s support to maintain its favorable relations with the Muslim world.

Pakistan’s Perspective

Syed Muhammad Ali, providing the Pakistani perspective on the country’s increasing dependence on China, emphasized that Pakistan’s relationship with China has predominantly revolved around security concerns. However, Pakistan aims to transform its geo-strategic position from being primarily security-oriented to becoming a geo-economic actor. Despite facing multiple crises such as political instability, terrorism, and economic challenges, Pakistan is actively pursuing engagement with the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. At the same time, US is the biggest market for Pakistan’s exports and China is never going to replace that.

Moreover, the Saudi-Iran détente provides it with the breathing space – as in the past the tensions between the two have played out in Pakistan. This could result in more focus on the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline.

Syed also pointed out that as the US-India strategic partnership grows, it will increasingly make US unable to play the mediator role between India and Pakistan. This will only increase Pakistan’s insecurity.

Gulf Perspective

Khaled Almaeena presented the perspective of Gulf countries regarding China. He emphasized that in comparison to the West, these nations have overtime come to view China as a reliable economic partner and an impartial political mediator. China has gradually strengthened its diplomatic influence in the Middle East through a methodical and gradual approach.

Daniel Markey noted that the US decoupling from the Middle East, if it is happening, will take time to unfold, especially because of the military dimension. Furthermore, as China engages more with these nations, it may confront the same challenges and sentiments that US has had to deal with.

Uyghur Issue and China

When its comes to the Uyghur issue, Daniel Markey commented that China has skillfully portrayed it as an internal matter related to national security. Furthermore, the significant economic interests shared between Muslim countries and China are of such magnitude that China’s political oppression of the Uyghur population does not jeopardize their relations.

Yun Sun added that although anti-China ethnic movements are gaining momentum in Central Asian countries, however, the involvement of Russia in Ukraine has led these countries to increase their reliance on China. As a result, they are unlikely to pose a potential threat to Chinese security and economic interests soon.

She also noted that in light of the Taliban’s takeover in Afghanistan, China has prioritized its security interests in Central and South Asia, leading to enhanced security cooperation with regional countries. Such as the Quadrilateral Group on Afghanistan which include Pakistan, Iran, and Russia.

 China-Russia Relations

Daniel Markey argued that Russia has become a junior partner to China in the region, but countries like India are attempting to maintain a balance between China and Russia based on their own strategic interests – and wedge between the two helps India.

On the other hand, Yun Sun stated that China views Russia as a helpful partner and has benefited from Russia’s involvement in the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia. China has found Russia’s strategy of creating chaos indirectly advantageous, providing China with more leverage. However, chaos in Ukraine can become a liability for China.

The discussion concluded by noting that China’s leadership role and influence in the Gulf and Asia regions are growing, with these countries welcoming China more favorably compared to the West, as pointed out by Khaled Almaeena earlier. China has become a significant player in geopolitical bloc politics. At the same time, many Arab nations aspire to become members of SCO. At the same time, Yun Sun stated that it’s not clear what tangible successes the organization has achieved.

Meanwhile United States has also formed alternative regional groupings driven by geopolitics, such as I2U2 and QUAD, but their effectiveness is questionable as well. As Daniel Markey commented, there is a question of rhetoric and reality when it comes to these organizations.

Recommendations for US Policy

Recommendations were made for US policy, with panelists agreeing that the US should not completely disengage or overreact to Chinese influence in a state of anxiety. Instead, the US should adopt a clearer approach to its political, economic, and security interests in the region. Viewing US relations with its partners in the Middle East and Asia within the framework of great power competition with China may negatively impact the US approach and its interests.

The post Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States appeared first on Politact.

Context

Syria has emerged as one of the most critical fault line for the global balance of power struggles. It is perhaps the only place in the world where both the global and regional powers have boots on the ground – such as US, Russia, and Turkey. US has about 900 soldiers based there, while Russian presence constitutes about 5,000 troops, and Turkey according to some estimates has more than 10,000 soldiers in northern Syria carrying out military operations.

Syria is also home to Iranian backed proxies which includes Shiite Hezbollah, and Sunni extremist groups such as ISIL and Al Qaeda. Moreover, there are other local non-state actors that are fighting against the Assad regime, such as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Free Syria Army (FSA), with western support and backing of Turkey and other Arab nations, such as UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. And then there is legacy business of Kurds, Syrian Kurds (YPG) operate from northern Syria against Turkey while also receiving US support for the fight against ISIL.

Arab Spring and Syria

The Arab Spring protests in Syria began in March 2011 as part of a series of pro-democracy demonstrations that swept across the Middle East. The protests initially called for increased civil liberties, greater freedom of speech, and the end of the Ba’ath Party’s rule. The Syrian government responded with a brutal crackdown on protesters, resulting in hundreds of deaths and thousands of arrests. As the protests continued, the government’s reaction grew increasingly violent, and the conflict escalated into a full-scale civil war and millions of refugees. Close to 3.5 million Syrian refugees migrated to Turkey while others went to different places in MENA region, Europe, and the US.

The threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) emerged in Syria around 2011. The group joined forces with other extremist groups in the region to fight against the Assad government – and quickly gained control over large swathes of territory in the country. ISIL was eventually defeated in Syria in March 2019.

The Assad regime in Syria was able to survive largely due to support from Russia, Iran, Hezbollah. They provided the Assad regime with military and financial support, enabling it to remain in power despite the civil war and international sanctions. Iran sent thousands of militiamen to fight alongside Syrian government forces in their fight against ISIL, SDF, and FSA that were operating to topple the Syrian government. Additionally, the Assad regime was able to rely on its strong security apparatus to repress domestic opposition and maintain control over the country. At the same time, while US, Turkey, and UAE were backing groups such as SDF and FSA to remove Assad, they were also fighting against ISIL.

As the extremist threat diminished, which was a common threat for state actors operating in Syria, the fissures became apparent along the respective geopolitical interests that are tied to the great power competition.

The Fight to Remove Assad’s Regime and Iran

Since the beginning of Arab Spring, one of the overarching aspirations has been to do deal with the wider Iranian behavior and influence in the Middle East, and constraining its nuclear and missile program. From the perspective of Israel and the US, any potential regime change in Syria would have undermined Iran and its control over Hezbollah – that extends its influence into Lebanon and Palestinian territories. Moreover, Iranian proxies also complicate the Middle East Peace Process between Israel and Palestine.

To counter this, Israel has simultaneously been working on what has come to be known as the Outside-In Approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and associated with it the ‘War between Wars’ strategy. The premise of the Outside-In approach has been to alter the regional dynamics to such an extent that it leads to diminished Arab support for the Palestinian cause – this would make the Palestinian more amenable to accept peace on Israeli terms. The approach also envisions undermining Iran’s nuclear and missile program while maintaining the threat of military action against Iran. This overtime led to the agreements which came to be known as Abraham Accords in 2020 and normalization of ties between UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco and Israel.

One the other hand, the main focus of the ‘War between Wars’ strategy is to prevent Iran from getting entrenched in Syria and thus threatened Israel directly via Lebanon. According to some estimates close to 2500 Iranian Revolutionary Guard members are operating in Syria.

Russian Role in Syria

The Russian support of Assad’s government and military intervention in 2015, directly undercuts the objective of regime change. Moreover, Israeli strikes against Iranian targets and Hezbollah in Syria risks hurting ties with Russia. Yet Israel has maintained close ties with Russia despite their differences over the Syrian conflict. Israel and Russia cooperate on a variety of matters, including security and trade. Additionally, the two countries have developed a mechanism to de-conflict their operations in Syria and ensure that their forces do not come into conflict with one another. Despite their differences, Israel and Russia have managed to maintain a good working relationship.

On the other hand, Russia has provided the Assad regime with military, financial, and political support, helping to keep it in power despite international sanctions and widespread opposition. Additionally, Russia has deployed thousands of troops and airpower to support the government in its fight against the FSA, SDF, and ISIL. To keep amicable ties with Turkey, Russia has generally maintained a neutral stance towards the Kurdish-led YPG in Syria.

In addition to air bases, Russia also maintains a naval base in Tartous. The larger Russian strategy is not only to protect the Assad regime but also maintain a foothold in the larger Middle East and North Africa. Russia is also military involved directly or through mercenaries in Libya and Sudan. But the conflict in Ukraine has had a significant impact on Russia’s military presence in Syria. Following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2014, the United States and its allies imposed economic sanctions on Russia hitting its economy. As a result, Russia has had to reduce its military presence in Syria and focus its resources on the conflict in Ukraine.

Turkey, YPG, PKK and Syria

Turkey is another stakeholder to the conflict in Syria, it has carried out military operations against the Kurdish-led YPG. Additionally, Turkey has sought to maintain a buffer zone along its border with Syria, which has been opposed by the YPG. Turkey’s actions against the YPG have caused tensions with the United States since it supports the group in its fight against ISIL – and YPG has collaboration with SDF and FSA to topple Assad’s regime. Being a NATO member, Turkey has also provided the SDF and FSA with arms, training, and financial support in their fight against the Assad regime.

On the other hand, both Russia and Iran have not directly engaged in the conflict between YPG and the Assad government and accused the group of cooperating with the United States and other foreign powers.

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Kurdish-led YPG in Syria have a close ideological and organizational relationship. The PKK has provided the YPG with military and financial support in its fight against ISIL, as well as political and diplomatic support in international forums. Additionally, many members of the PKK have joined the YPG in its fight against ISIL.

Like Turkey, US and EU consider PKK a terrorist organization. This approach which supports YPG in Syria but considers PKK a terrorist group, complicates US and European ties with Turkey and NATO – and raises Turkish concerns about the real intent behind supporting separatist YPG.

Saudi-Iran Detente

The question becomes how the situation of Syria will impact the Chinese facilitated Saudi-Iran truce reached in March. Or, in other words, what are the key terms of the détente reached by Saudi Arabia and Iran, that will facilitate establishing a regional balance of power and resolve proxy wars in places like Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, and Palestine. Moreover, what does it imply for the budding great power rivalry in South Asia.

One of the immediate benefits of the truce has been the ceasefire in Yemen, followed up by exchange of prisoners. The foreign minister of Syria has also visited Saudi Arabia, reciprocated by the Saudi Foreign Minister’s trip to Syria – raising hopes for potential reentry of Syria into the Arab League. Earlier in March, Assad had also visited UAE to rebuild ties that had been cut-off due to the support provided by Gulf States to anti-Assad Forces.

Iran’s nuclear program and the threat posed by its wider behavior in the region, represented the threat perception that had moved the Arab world closer to Israel – and by extension to the US. Additionally, the criticism of the Abraham Accord, reached in 2020, has been that it has not resulted in any quid-pro-quo when it comes to Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In fact, with the return of Netanyahu’s right-wing government and the aggressive actions it has taken, has reversed the gains made under the Abraham agreement. This has adversely impacted Israeli ties with the US.

However, it is also a fact that US interests in the Middle East have transformed in the aftermath of the campaign against extremism, and military withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan. It is no longer dependent on the energy resources of the region, as China is, but it is engaged head on in the great power rivalry with China and Russia. The Middle Powers are caught in the middle of these power tussles. According to the White House Coordinator for MENA, Brett McGurk, the main objectives of US in Syria are to reduce the violence, maintain a check on the activities of ISIL, help the Syrian humanitarian crisis, and back Israel.

The shift in UAE and Saudi position reflects a realization the Assad’s regime has survived the worse with Russian and Iranian support. The China, Iran Economic and Security Deal reached in 2020 demonstrated that China was also throwing its weight behind Iran, which has traditionally been also backed by Russia. PoliTact had pointed out at that time that the pact represented China’s pivot to the Middle East. With the China facilitating the Saudi-Iran truce, the balance of power appear to be shifting away from the US, which is increasingly been seen as an unreliable partner. Commenting on the deal, former Israeli prime minister commented that “This is a fatal blow to the effort to build a regional coalition against Iran.”

Will Israel counter or accept any potential guarantees from China that it can manage Iranian nuclear program and wider behavior in the region, remains to be seen. The new Chinese foreign minister Qin Gang recently stated that it is ready to mediate peace talks between Israel and Palestine.

Meanwhile, the Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had warned Israel in 2019 to reduce its economic and security ties with China or risk reduced security cooperation from US. During his visit to Saudi Arabia in 2022, President Biden had stated, “We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia or Iran … We will seek to build on this moment with active, principled, American leadership.”

Related:

• What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply? Aug 4, 2022
• Biden’s Middle East Policy, China-Iran Ties, and CPEC
  On July 28, 2020, PoliTact held a webinar to discuss the potential China-Iran economic deal and its impact on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

• PoliTact’s Chief Analyst Arif Ansar’s interview on the situation of Syria on Pakistan Television, March 2023

• The Emerging ‘Outside In’ Approach To Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Afghan Reconciliation, And Kashmir Issue. July 15, 2015

The post Saudi-Iran Détente, Syria, And Changing MENA appeared first on Politact.

How to Deal with Afghanistan’s Extremist Landscape?

Context

Since the full withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan in August 2021, it was assumed that Pakistan’s war against extremism had come to an end. There was a perception that the installation of Afghan Taliban in Kabul will make Pakistan’s regional influence grow. Besides, the nation was blamed for supporting the Taliban and providing them safe havens. Prior to 9/11 attacks, Taliban had extended its control to almost all of Afghanistan – and there were fears of its influence extending even further into Central Asia while threatening Iran. In 1998, 11 Iranian diplomats were killed in Mazar-e-Sharif in a battle between Iranian supported Northern Alliance and the Taliban forces – bringing the two close to a full blown conflict.

What transpired in the aftermath of 9/11 saw the reversal of the Taliban fortunes – and along with them with their supporters, particularly Pakistan. At the peak of the war against extremism, all major cities of the country were targeted by terrorists including its security forces. According to one estimate 83,000 lives were lost with an economic toll of about US$126 billion. The extremists accused Pakistan of supporting the infidels and providing bases and supply lines for NATO forces fighting Taliban.

However, since the US withdrawal, after a brief lull, the situation got progressively worse for Pakistan. Especially since the fall of Imran Khan’s government in April 2022. First came the elimination of Al Qaeda (AQ) mastermind Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul in July 2022, which demonstrated that Taliban were not holding up to their promise of breaking ties with AQ. Second, Pakistan was hoping that after US left Afghanistan, it could convince Taliban to act against Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). TTP had found refuge in Afghanistan since the operations carried out by Pakistan’s military in Swat and other Tribal Areas.

The horrific attack in Peshawar late January this year, which claimed the lives of more than 100 worshiping policemen, has reminded the country of the worse times of the war against extremism. This was followed by an attack on the police headquarters in Karachi on February 17. The country is once again grappling with the question of how to deal with Afghan Taliban and TTP.

Pakistan and TTP

Speaking at the Munich Security Conference on Feb 18, Pakistan’s foreign minister Bilawal Bhutto highlighted the risk:

“The concern is that if we and the interim (Afghan) government don’t take these groups seriously and they don’t demonstrate the will and the capacity to take on terrorist groups then they will conduct terrorist activities in the region first — we are already witnessing an uptick in terrorist activity in Pakistan since the fall of Kabul — but it won’t be long before it reaches somewhere else.”

He went on to add that Pakistan wants to work with Afghan Taliban to deal with TTP and to build its counter-terrorism capabilities, and is not looking to interfere in Afghanistan militarily. However, media reports indicate that Pakistan has targeted TTP linked leadership in Afghanistan several times since last April – and when Afghan Taliban are unwilling to assist. It reportedly carried out air strikes in April 2022 in Eastern Afghanistan. In August 2022, TTP commander Omar Khalid Khorassani was killed in a IED attack.

But it’s not clear if US desires to focus on Afghanistan – as its attention is presently preoccupied with Ukraine, Russia, and China. Even Europe is in the process of decoupling from China. On the other hand, Pakistan claims China to be a strategic partner, and it was the former prime minister Imran Khan’s visit to Moscow in February 2022 that unnerved the US. Soon after, his government fell in April 2022.

Prior to his visit to Moscow and since the US Afghan withdrawal, a debate had been raging about how US would maintain pressure on the global jihadists present in Afghanistan from repeating a 9/11 type attack – or from pulling a serious attack on India. Reportedly, US had wanted bases in Pakistan from where to maintain kinetic pressure on global extremists in Afghanistan. Imran Khan’s government was vehemently against providing any such cooperation since his political mantra was based on a negotiated approach – at least as far as groups like TTP were concerned. Moreover, he had consistently questioned the wisdom of Pakistan’s previous involvement in the campaign against extremism in support of NATO at a tremendous cost of blood and treasure.

During his time in power, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) led government had sought Afghan Taliban assistance in pacifying TTP, resulting in a ceasefire that fell apart in November 2022 – and resumption of TTP attacks against Pakistan. The TTP demands related to release of prisoners were met to some extent. On the other hand, their requirements of decreasing the number of security forces in FATA – and rescinding of FATA merger are more complicated.

These conditions truly show that TTP aspires for a space from where AQ and Afghan Taliban can extend their reach. Moreover, how TTP wants to achieve these demands i.e., through terrorism – as compared to negotiations, needs to be transformed. To change the way TTP is going about its demands will require a change in Afghan Taliban thinking first. While Afghan Taliban were fighting foreign troops, there is no such validity in case of TTP – as it relates to Pakistan. TTP using the argument that it seeks to implement Sharia does not garner much merit.

To alleviate the source of TTP’s appeal requires integration of FATA into the mainstream while improving the infrastructure and economic wherewithal of the areas involved. Moreover, to empower groups like Pashtun Tahafaz Movement (PTM) in helping to bring the disgruntled towards political inclusion and addressing grievances.

US and TTP

The presence and elimination of AQ mastermind Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul was a clear violation of Doha Agreement reached in February 2020. One of the key terms of the treaty stipulated Taliban will not allow Al Qaeda, ISIS-K and other International terrorist groups and individuals to use Afghan territory to launch attacks against US and its allies.

These allies could be interpreted to mean India and Pakistan. Over the years Afghanistan has become a hotbed for extremists from all brands. For example, AQ and Daesh (ISIS-K) targeting the US prior to withdrawal, TTP carrying out attacks against Pakistan, Lashker-e-Taiba (LeT) and related groups striking India, while East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) was linked to terrorist activities in China. What Bilawal’s comments quoted above may be referring to is the nightmare scenario of a terrorist attack occurring in India which can trigger a wider regional war.

A report published by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) recently indicates that on one hand US does not consider TTP to be a direct threat to US – but at the same time worsening security situation of nuclear Pakistan is deemed a security concern for the US.

The reality is there is an ominous lack of public support and political consensus in Pakistan on how to deal with extremists, especially with the likes of TTP. Additionally, the economic woes of the country prevents it from dealing aggressively with extremism. This could change if TTP were to launch and claim more deadly attacks within Pakistan. On the other hand, if the threat perception from TTP were to change towards being perceived as a direct threat to the US – the calculus could alter. Moreover, if fresh elections are held in Pakistan, and Imran Khan governments returns to the helm, he may take a different approach to dealing with TTP and galvanize public support.

While it remains unclear where the assets used for eliminating Ayman al-Zawahiri were based, it’s clear that US retains the capability to deal with risks from global extremists that directly threaten it. Will US allow these assets to be used against TTP, like in the past, remains ambiguous. Pakistan needs to develop a wider political consensus on how it wants to deal with extremism and reevaluate its ties with Afghan Taliban. This is very difficult to do for a nation amidst political and economic meltdown.

Understanding Afghan Taliban

The evolving extremism landscape in Afghanistan provide hints towards the future of the campaign against extremism. As Afghan Taliban have settled in – it’s not clear if they are willing to break ties with global extremists such as AQ, or act against local affiliates like TTP. On the other hand, its ability to counter ISIS-K is also questionable. So far, it’s not accepted any assistance in this regard fearing being labelled as a Western collaborator. Attacks from Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) in Pakistan are also on the rise, especially related to CPEC.

The opportunistic postures of Afghan Taliban are meant to exploit the fears of stakeholders like US, China, Russia, Pakistan, India, and Iran – and by maintaining a leverage of extremism over all of them. For example, it has kept the TTP gambit over Pakistan, while at the same time offering India to keep a check on LeT and Al Qaeda in the Indian Sub Continent (AQIS), and then delicately adjusting its policy towards global extremists (AQ and ISIS-K) and other Western concerns – including women rights and inclusion of minorities in governance.

Writing in the National Interest after his recent visit to Afghanistan, former senior policy advisor to the US State Department Secretary’s Office of Religion and Global Affairs, Qamar-ul Huda commented: “Washington must realize that religious-political actors like the Taliban are acutely aware of their value in regional politics; they understand that local governments and global coalitions are seeking them out to counterbalance the weight of violent extremism and build multilateral ties for stability and economic benefits. The key question is whether the Taliban can transform from militia-minded fighters to nation-building technocrats and deliver for Afghanistan.”

Speaking at a webinar organized by Karachi Council on Foreign Relations on January 11, 2022 Taliban’s Representative in Pakistan Sardar Ahmed Khan Sakeeb took a stance on Durand Line that is not much different from the Ashraf Ghani and Karzai governments. He stated that his administration wants to take the matter to the Afghan people and then discuss the matter further.

On relations with India and Pakistan’s apprehensions, the Taliban representative explained that they wanted to pursue economic and political relations with India, and will not make it an enemy because of Pakistan, or make anyone else an adversary because of India – and this is beneficial for all. Replying to criticism for not speaking up for Indian atrocities in Kashmir, he added that they will speak out whether the atrocities are being committed by India or anyone else. He advised on solving all matters though negotiations.

Conclusion

The unfolding scenario of Afghanistan is directly impacting the political and security situation of Pakistan. Its ability to convince Afghan Taliban to act against TTP has only produced facilitation of negotiations. This has greatly frustrated the new Pakistan government and perhaps has pressured it towards more counter-terrorism cooperation with the US – for which there is little public buy-in in Pakistan. And this puts the economically fragile nation in a quandary.

Faced with growing US-India strategic partnership, counter-terrorism cooperation with the US could provide the security and economic lifeline Pakistan desperately needs. However, US has shifted away from counter-terrorism to strategic competition with China and Russia. And thus, the question becomes where do Afghan Taliban, including regional and global extremists, and for that matter Pakistan, fit in the great power rivalry equation. On the other hand, it’s likely the joint pressure of China and Pakistan, to protect their common interests, could nudge the Afghan Taliban in the direction of more serious action and curtailing the activities of TTP, ETIM, and BLF.

Correction: A previous version had stated Omar Khalid Khorassani was killed in a drone strike – he died in an IED attack.

The post Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP appeared first on Politact.

Context

As Biden administration formulates its Pakistan policy, and reviews the Afghan peace deal reached in February last year – a debate is raging in both US and Pakistan based think tanks on the future of US-Pakistan relations. It is like a new season of an exciting Netflix drama serial, only that this one has been continuing for about two decades. For all intents and purposes Biden administration represents Season 4 of the US-Pakistan serial which has seen many twists and turns. During this period, several terms were used to represent the ties, such as ‘frenemies’ or a troubled marriage heading towards a divorce.

If we use this analogy, the serial started right after the 9/11 attack – represented by season 1 under Bush, followed by Obama’s season 2, and Trump’s season 3 just concluded on January 20^th.

What may happen in season 4 requires an understanding of the plot. And the great debate ranging in the think tank world represent this assessment. One of the assertions is that although the nation has maintained an important position during the previous administrations, its likely to be low on Biden’s priority list. This emphasis is not much different than the approach adopted under Trump where military aid was cut to Pakistan. A greater emphasis was towards global adversaries than on countering extremism or promoting human rights. The analysts are thus suggesting areas around which convergences can be built.

Some have mentioned that Pakistan can help build bridges between US and China, just as it can between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Others have emphasized trade as the focus, and cooperation in dealing with the pandemic and climate change. As the balance of power in the Muslim world is shifting away from the Arab world and towards the peripheral nations of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, the country can play an active balancing role vis a vis the global powers.

On the other hand, Pakistan is stressing it has moved away from geopolitics to geoeconomics, as witnessed by CPEC like initiatives. This has been a consistent message from Pakistan’s National Security Advisor, Moeed Yusuf, who recently spoke at the Karachi council on Foreign Relations and Woodrow Wilson Center.

Under the Coronavirus induced circumstances, this could be interpreted to mean that the nations focus is on economics and less on engaging in another kinetic phase in Afghanistan – which has devastated Pakistan’s social fabric and economy. And this mantra goes along with the policy the present Prime Minister Imran Khan adopted when he came to power in 2018 – that it can help in making peace but not in the continuation of war. Just about the same time, US also shifted its position, which resulted in direct talks with the Afghan Taliban. Previously, Taliban had consistently refused to negotiate with the Afghan government, calling it a puppet.

In essence, as opposed to the thrust on military solutions that had remained the hallmark of Bush and Obama administrations, under Imran Khan, Pakistan’s assistance was focused on facilitating the peace talks with Afghan Taliban. The concentrated efforts, and cooperation from China, Russia, and Iran, resulted in an agreement between the US and Afghan Taliban in February 2020.

The peace deal was not arrived at easily and there were obstacles at each step of the way, consistently from the same sets of players. The very first challenge perhaps came from President Karzai when Taliban were allowed to open an office in Doha in 2013, carrying the sign and flag of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. He argued that peace talks should be Afghan led.

In September 2019, the talks between the US and Taliban were abruptly broken off by President Trump – when peace deal was nearly at hand. Reportedly, he called-off talks due to an attack carried out by Afghan Taliban in Kabul that killed an American soldier. The confusion remained for some time if Trump had permanently abandoned the talks or if it was a temporary suspension. Moreover, he faced severe push back from Ashraf Ghani’s government. Senior former US officials with experience in Afghan affairs recommended US should not pullout before a real peace agreement, or in other words a responsible withdrawal.

Even when the deal was signed, everybody knew that the next step of intra-Afghan talks will be even more difficult, especially because of the role of spoilers, especially India. Heating global power tussles between US and China during the Trump administration added another dimension of worries. Up to now, global powers have cooperated when it comes to Afghanistan. Can it stay that way is not guaranteed.

As Biden administration evaluates its Afghan options, it is important to keep perspective of how we arrived at this juncture, what has already been tried. More importantly, to not get distracted under different pressures, especially when domestic challenges are mounting for the US. Keeping in view the historical context, about what can be achieved in Afghanistan at present – may not be possible six months from now.

How Did We Get Here?

Season 1 – 9/11 Attack (2001-2008)

Bush administration had been in power for about nine months when September 11 attacks struck the US. America launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) on October 7, 2001 with military strikes against Al Qaeda (AQ) and Afghan Taliban. The Taliban government crumbled quickly. While there were confrontations like the Battle of Tora Bora in December 2001, Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters mostly retreated to fight another day.

Early on US pressured Pakistan to join what later became known as the Global War on Terrorism. The nation had been one of the few, including UAE and Saudi Arabia, that recognized the Taliban government. The military ruler General Pervez Musharraf decided to support the US and to go after former allies, the Afghan Taliban.

In the aftermath of the 1999 short and bloody Kargil conflict, then the army chief Pervez Musharraf had overthrown the civilian government in October 1999, removing Nawaz Sharif from power. For this US had slapped sanctions on his government, which were in addition to the ones imposed on Pakistan and India in the aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests. For Musharraf’s support in Afghanistan, Bush lifted all sanctions on Pakistan in October 2001.

The 9/11 attacks presented an opportunity for Musharraf to gain international credibility. It was only later the realization dawned that AQ and Taliban had mostly slipped away from Afghanistan into the ungoverned Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

While US got distracted by going into Iraq in 2003, Bush administration increased pressure on Pakistan to launch military operations in FATA to eliminate what it termed as safe havens. Pakistan moved nearly hundred thousand troops from the Indian border towards Afghanistan to tackle the issue. US also conducted thousands of drone strikes in FATA between 2004 and 2018 to go after the extremist leaders hiding there. But Pakistan’s military operations in FATA, including the Lal Masjid operation in July 2007, accompanied by drone strikes, started to create an ominous backlash internally. It was unclear if the US drone strikes were occurring with Pakistan’s acquiescence – but it would publicly protest the strikes vehemently as violation of its sovereignty.

Many high value targets and facilities were hit in Pakistan as extremist reprisal spread, with thousands of civilian and soldiers killed and maimed. According to Dawn newspaper, Pakistan’s economic loss in the war against terror was a figure around $126.79 billion. The security and political turmoil, including the civil-military divide, was reflected by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007.

By this time, the internal politics of Pakistan had gotten fully intertwined with the support it was providing US in the war against extremism and at what cost. While Musharraf had become increasingly unpopular, and US grievances with him grew, the death of Benazir Bhutto demonstrated that this was a battle for Pakistan’s survival too.

The Mumbai Attack in November 2008, just about a month and a half before Obama was inaugurated on Jan 2009, created fresh headaches for Pakistan on how it was dealing with good and bad extremists.

Season 2 – Obama’s AfPak

On assuming power, President Obama initiated an exhausting evaluation of the US Afghan policy, which later adopted the acronym of AfPak. The late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke was appointed to lead the office, whose mandate was to originally include India, but that part was dropped due to heavy lobbying from the country. This may have been a critical mistake, as India remains opposed to any negotiated settlement with Afghan Taliban.

At the time it was assumed that the new policy would break from the Bush era focus on kinetic approach, and tilt more towards a diplomatic surge and a search for political solutions based on a regional emphasis. Obama’s assessment went through a metamorphosis of sorts and ended up being an evaluation of the entire US foreign policy. Reappraisal of policy involved the critical questions of what is at stake for America in Afghanistan? Dealing satisfactorily with this inquiry required evaluating US interests globally, understanding how they are related and then prioritizing in terms of the prevailing economic recession at the time.

The strategy that finally emerged represented the competing institutional influences that shape American foreign policy. Obama had to balance domestic economic realities with the perception of appearing weak on national security threats, a leverage he did not want to offer to the Republican Party. Additionally, he also wanted to fulfill his campaign promises of pulling troops out of Iraq and focusing on Afghanistan. Specifically, the new strategy opted for sending 30,000 more troops while setting a timeline for an exit to begin by July 2011.

The new US policy was followed-up with a process of strategic dialogue with Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. What transpired from this dialogue with India was a civil nuclear deal, the groundwork for which was laid during the Clinton administration. On the other hand, Kerry-Lugar-Berman aid package ran into controversy because of provisions that many in Pakistan thought compromised its sovereignty. The Raymond Davis incident in January 2011 further validated Pakistan’s apprehensions. At the same time, Mumbai attacks and dealings associated with David Hadley, increased cooperation between US and India against groups such as LeT based in Pakistan.

Thus, the feeling of mistrust between US and Pakistan continued to increase, with both actors blaming each other for playing a double game. The Operation Geronimo gave further evidence of how deeply each party distrusts the other, while claiming to be strategic partners. The subsequent Memogate Affair, followed by the Salala Incident on November 26, 2011 further dented the relationship. A perception grew that the Civil-Military divide in Pakistan was being exploited.

During Obama’s tenure, war against extremism had expanded quite wide and included Yemen, Syria, and Libya. Moreover, by 2011 and onward the extremist threat had transformed as many new groups came in to being, such as Daesh (also known as ISIS and ISIL). Moreover, the Arab Spring related upheaval was further destabilizing many regimes in the MENA theater, to be exploited by extremists and other global adversaries.

As US was over-consumed by the war against extremism, China and Russia were resurging. China launched the Belt and Road global infrastructure initiative in 2013, with CPEC being one of its main arteries. At the cost $62 billion China plans to upgrade Pakistan’s infrastructure, build modern transportation networks, numerous energy projects and special economic zones.

While US remained busy with the war against extremism, the economy was impacted. The 2008 recession had a significant impact on the American middle class and a thought was taking shape that China, and even American allies, were exploiting Globalization – and US was paying. These sentiments were galvanized and channeled by Trumps ‘America First’ mantra.

Season 3 – Making American Great Again and ‘America First’

While July 15, 2015 Iran nuclear agreement (JCPOA) was a significant step in the direction of negotiated settlement to conflicts, only a year and a half later President Trump reversed the deal. On the Middle East Peace Process, he went ahead to make the controversial decision of accepting Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

Trump also stepped out of the Paris Agreement and annulled the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that Obama had pushed and was signed in 2016. In essence, Trump was against multilateralism and multilateral institutions and preferred bilateral approach to issues. Trump stated in his speech at the 74^th UN session:

“Globalization exerted a religious pull over past leaders, causing them to ignore their own national interests. Those days are over.” He went on to add, “Around the world our message is clear, America’s goal is lasting, America’s goal is harmony, and America’s goal is not to go with these endless wars, wars that never end.”

While on the political and economic front he declared: “If you want freedom, hold on to your sovereignty, and if you want peace, love your nation. The future does not belong to Globalists. The future belongs to patriots. The future belongs to strong, independent nations.”

Following this principle, Trump supported direct talks with Afghan Taliban leading to the peace agreement. If it had not been for the Coronavirus, Trump would have likely won the election.

The storming of the Capitol Hill on January 6, and the events associated with the recent concluded US elections are reflective of the tremendous stress US is under to chart out its future direction; whether it be the globalized one or based on America First. The coronavirus has added to the woes – where many have lost jobs and the lifestyle of others acutely impacted – adding to the public anger and stress.

Irrespective of who is to blame for what transpired on January 6th, Biden administration would have to focus on how to bring the disillusioned, and the Trump supporters, back into the system. This is the best approach to prevent matters being further exploited. This implies Biden would have to address the concerns reflecting by the America First mantra – to provide jobs and to improve the economic well being of the Americans.

Season 4 – ‘America is Back’

Delivering a speech virtually at the Munich Security Conference on February 19, President Biden stated unequivocally that America is back. “I’m sending a clear message to the world,” Biden addressed the security conference. “America is back. The transatlantic alliance is back. And we are not looking backward.”

On the other hand, soon after his acquittal from his impeachment trial in the Senate, Trump stated: “Our historic, patriotic and beautiful movement to Make America Great Again has only just begun”. His acquittal from Senate trial means Trump can run for office again in the election of 2024, which is likely to be the most consequential in American history.

The domestic politics is becoming increasingly polarized and that is directly linked to the state of the economy, which has been seriously dented by mishandling of the coronavirus pandemic. In such conditions, it would become increasingly challenging for the US to concentrate on foreign affairs, especially on the ‘unending wars’.

And it is in this domestic and global context the US-Pakistan relations, and the associated Afghan conflict, will unfold. There is no appetite left in Pakistan, and perhaps amongst European allies as well, for the continuation of the war other than supporting a reasonable exit. Whatever could be done, has been done, and now the responsibility lies squarely on Afghans. This message needs to be delivered – accompanied by reduction in violence on the Afghan Taliban side – associated by agreed withdrawal of troops on the part of the alliance.

The mantra of Trade not Aid is more prevalent as far as Pakistan is concerned. While China, Russia, Iran, and Turkey, have all supported the resolution of the Afghan conflict and have not linked it to their other frictions with the US, this cannot be assured in the future.

In other words, if US would make things difficult for China and Russia in other places and matters, they will now likely reciprocate in Afghanistan. While re-engaging with Iran on nuclear talks, and suspension of sanctions, may buy some favors with Iran – coming in and out international agreements have casted a long-term impact on US credibility. There was a time when American word was taken as ironclad, and leadership changes did not matter. Now US is telling the world to accommodate its dysfunction and confusion.

One of the fundamental question at this point is, to what extent will Afghanistan become a theater where global power tussles are going to play out. And thus – how critical is Afghanistan to undercut China and Pakistan’s influence in the region – and this is where the role of India, the Indo-Pacific, and the related Quad strategy fits in. The answer to this question makes the decision for US and NATO easier – if they should leave now and fight somewhere else – or stay. In other words, will Afghanistan remain an area of cooperation amongst global powers – or will competition ensue.

The post US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden appeared first on Politact.

Guest Analyst Muhammad Siraj ul Huda Khan assisted in researching and developing this article.

Context

PoliTact periodically invites leading regional and global experts to understand the changing geopolitical situations and significant emerging themes. One such theme is the budding China-Iran economic and security partnership.

China and Iran are entering a $400 billion 25 year economic and security deal that would lead to enhanced military and trade relations. The agreement ensures Chinese investment in Iranian telecommunication, transportation, and military fields. The military cooperation includes exercises, intelligence sharing, and joint research and development of weapons. China will also procure its energy needs from Iran on discounted price for over next 25 years.

On July 28, 2020, PoliTact held a webinar to discuss the potential China-Iran economic deal and its impact on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The panelists analyzed the major developments taking place in the South Asia and Middle East regions and provided perspectives on the evolving situation. The theme has taken on added significance in the aftermath of US elections and with additional Muslim states, such as UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco officially recognizing the state of Israel.

CEO and Chief Analyst of PoliTact, Arif Ansar, moderated the panel discussion. The opening remarks were made by Ikram Sehgal, who is a Chairman of the Karachi Council on Foreign Relations, CEO of Pathfinder Group, and member of the East West Institute’s Board of Directors.

The panel included:

• Ambassador Mustafa Kamal Kazi – Senior Vice Chairman at the Karachi Council on Foreign Relations, former Foreign Secretary and Ambassador of Pakistan to the Russian Federation, the Kingdom of Netherlands, Republic of Indonesia and Republic of Iraq.
• Khaled Almaeena – Former Editor-in-Chief of Arab News and Saudi Gazette, CEO of a PR Firm, and Saudi Television news anchor.
• Claude Rakisits – Honorary Professor at the Asia Pacific College of Diplomacy at the Australian National University. He is also a Director at PoliTact and covers the South Asia and Middle East region.

The Webinar explored the following key questions:

1. What are the implications of the China-Iran economic and security deal on the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)?
2. Assessing Chinese influence in the Middle East region and does the China-Iran deal represent a Chinese pivot to the Middle East? Moreover, how does Chinese sway play out against that of India, Israeli, and the US in the region?
3. How the does the China-Iran treaty correlates with the Quad and Indo-Pacific strategy?
4. Will China use the Iran deal as a leverage in its dealing with the US, just as Russia has done?
5. History informs that Muslim nations or empires have often sided with one or the other global power – and then fought directly with each other. What can be done to prevent such an outcome in the framework of the present regional and global geopolitics?

Implications of the potential China-Iran Deal on China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

There are multiple angles to review this connection; that of Pakistan and Iran, and one cannot ignore the positions of China and the US.

Pakistan sees no negative impact of the potential China-Iran deal on CPEC. Former foreign minister Sartaj Aziz once stated that the Chabahar Port was not competing with the Gwadar port, in fact they were seen as complimentary. Media reports have also indicated that a road was to connect the two closely located ports at some point.

On the other hand, Iran is likely to see the Chinese deal as a blessing in disguise. Fearing US sanctions, Pakistan has been dragging its feet on the Iran Gas pipeline project for years, and India has also been slow in developing the Chabahar Port. In all likelihood, once the deal is finalized, Chinese investments will start flowing in quickly and provide immense relief to the much-penalized Iran. More importantly, the China-Iran deal would provide the strategic counterbalance to the American, Israeli, and Arab pressure.

According to Ambassador Kazi, the US withdrawal from the Iranian deal of 2015, and mismanagement of the multipolar world, is one of the reasons China-Iran economic and security partnership is coming to fruition.

However, for China, the treaty with Iran diversifies the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) providing it with another tributary. This is especially true if the CPEC route runs into trouble, or if the work slows down considerably due to the American, Indian, and Arab pressure on Pakistan.

Chinese Pivot to the Middle East and American, Israeli and Indian Coalition

China has been building strategic ties with the Middle East for some time now – in addition to the Asia Pacific, Middle East represents its other flank. Khaled Almaeena pointed out that the Saudi ties with China got underway in the 90s, as the Gulf region started to balance ties between China and the US. On the other hand, Dr. Claude Rakisits noted that the Chinese push westward is not necessarily a pivot, irrespective, the Iran deal will be seen negatively in both Saudi Arabia and the US.

Speaking at the Saudi embassy in China in July on the occasion of the 30 anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties, Saudi Ambassador Turki M. A. Almadi commented: “our relations are all-round, multi-field, not only about bilateral trade and mutual investment, but also extended to cooperation in the fields of culture, science and technology, and health.”

Zhai Jun, China’s special envoy on Middle East affairs indicated at the occasion that the bilateral trade volume between the two nations stood at $78.04 billion at the end of 2019. He added Saudi Arabia was the largest supplier of crude oil to China, and also the Arab nations largest trading partner.

Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has become an active player in the Middle East with strategic ties with a number of regional players, to include Saudi Arabia. As its influence increases gradually, it could become an active interlocutor between Israel and the Palestinians, and other conflicts of the Middle East. However, it is not clear if China aspires to get involved in the security affairs of the region, like Russia has in Syria.

Chinese analysts present a case that the nation wants to be more active in providing economic support than engaging in security affairs of the Middle East. Nonetheless, China has amicable political and military relations with both Iran and Israel. As part of BRI, China has been extending its trade relations with Israel and lately US has objected strongly to some of them citing security concerns – such as the Chinese company Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) running a container terminal at the Port of Haifa – near an Israeli naval base that is frequently visited by the US Sixth Fleet.

If the China-Israeli economic ties continue to strengthen uninhibited, overtime China will be able to build leverages that can potentially undercut US primacy in the affairs of the Middle East. The Israelis disagree on this possibility, stating that the nature of its ties with China and the US are of totally different nature. Nonetheless, the push under President Trump to normalize ties between Israel and the Arab nations can be seen as an attempt to counter China becoming an influential Middle Eastern player in the future.

When it comes to the Indian alignment with Israel and its growing ties with the Gulf nations, a different question is raised. How do these relations undercut the traditional support Pakistan has generated from the Gulf region?  In November 2018, PoliTact collaborated with the Middle East Institute to examine the political, security, and economic interconnections between South Asia and the Gulf States, and one of the subsets, Pakistan and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The report pointed out to how India was strategically undermining Pakistan, a risk that has matured now.

Commenting on this during the webinar, Khaled Almaaena stated that Pakistan’s position has been undermined by the negative economic and security news consistently emanating from the country. And this has been occurring at a time when India has positioned itself as an information technology and economic powerhouse, and by investing in Saudi Arabia that brought jobs to the Kingdom. He further added, the younger leadership of KSA do not hold the same kind of affinity towards Pakistan as past leaders had.

Irrespective, we can see an attempt to undermine both the Chinese and Pakistan connections in the Middle east as they compete with the American, Israeli and Indian interests.

China-Iran Deal and Quad Strategy

Answering the moderator, and as noted above, Dr. Claude Rakisits noted that the Chinese push westward does not represent its pivot to the Middle East – and how this relates to the Quad strategy is a different angle.

Dr. Claude added that Quad is meant to “keep China within its borders”. And as a counter, China is pushing US away from the first island chain by building artificial islands in the South China Sea. Moreover, China-Iran deal counteracts Quad and the Indo-Pacific strategy by providing China with a key footprint in the Indian Ocean, which together with Gwadar and Djibouti, enhances Chinese naval potential.

While Quad would desire to box-in China, conversely China wants to limit the Indian role in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, by keeping it busy within its borders. This dynamics can be witnessed by the present tensions and skirmishes on the Line of Actual control (LAC) and the Ladakh region.

Biden’s Middle East Policy, Iranian Sanctions, and Chinese Leverage

A related inquiry has to do with sanctions on Iran and how will China navigate them? Previous European attempts to build trade relations with the nation hit numerous roadblocks. As soon as Trump administration took oath in January 2017, within almost a year and a half of signing the Iran nuclear deal (July 2015), US started to build pressure on western companies attempting to build trade relations with Iran. As a result, even the $20 billion aircraft deal Boeing had signed with Iran had to be scrapped.

Under President Elect Biden’s Iran Policy, will these sanctions be eased if US rejoins the treaty? This will all depend on how the Biden administration re-engages Iran. Recently Biden has indicated that it will want to renegotiate the Iran deal to include its missile program, and wider behavior in the region; these were widely seen as major weaknesses of the 2015 deal.

This, however, will likely be a non-starter for Iran. The country has expressed it would not enter fresh negotiations with the US when even the terms and guarantees of the 2015 agreement were not kept.

A parallel concern is, with the ‘Outside In’ approach to the Middle East Peace Process so far along resulting in the Abraham Accords, will President Elect Biden be able to reverse it and thus jeopardize the present Arab-Israeli normalizing process? A more likely approach would be that the normalization process would have to incorporate the two-state solution under Biden – including a more transparent give and take by the Israelis – of the type that is frequently hinted by the Saudi leadership.

Irrespective, Dr. Claude was of the opinion that China will continue its dealings with Iran, despite the sanctions, and will push back on any efforts to restrict the ties between Iran and China. It is also possible that China will use the Iran deal as a leverage in its dealing with the US, just as Russia has done in the past. On several occasions when Russian ties stumbled with the West, it threatened to supply Iran with modern weaponry that could help it withstand any attack on its nuclear program.

The US Iran policy has circled around two approaches recently: the negotiated settlement was adopted by President Obama by signing the JCPOA in 2015, which sidelined the aggressive route against Iran propagated by Israel and Saudi Arabia. Trump took on the more militaristic alternative – moving away from the two-state solution, with wider recognition of Israel from the GCC and Arab States. The assassination of two top Iranian officials recently, Major General Qassim Soleimani and nuclear scientist Mohsin Fakhrizadeh, are linked to this approach.

The challenge is that a military solution towards Iran would be unacceptable for both China and Russia. Similarly, the reenactment of the JCPOA, along with potential China-Iran deal, will make China a stronger player in the Middle East. It could possibly utilize its clout to bring about Israeli-Palestinian agreement, which US has not been able to do alone.

On the one hand this cooperation between China and the US would be an immensely positive development that can bring about peace in the Middle East. However, this directly contradicts with what is transpiring in the Asia Pacific and resulting Indo-Pacific and the Quad strategy. And this also does not factor in Russian role in the whole scenario – and the interplay of the Muslim Middle powers, such as Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.

Islamic World and Global Power Tussles

In the past Muslim nations or empires have often sided with one or the other global power – and then fought directly with each other. And the question becomes what can be done to avert such an outcome in the framework of the present regional and global geopolitics.

Replying to the moderator, Khaled Almaeena pointed out that the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) is unable to fulfill this role. He added this requires strong Islamic leadership to prevent being exploited, commitment to their citizens, and rule of law. Moreover, he stated that ‘if Iran suffers, the Arabs will suffer too’. In his opinion CPEC can play a constructive role by being a bridge, ‘good economics makes good politics,’ he stated.

On the other hand, Ambassador Kazi was critical of the role the GCC nations have played in this regard and pointed to the infighting between the Arab nations. He noted that ‘what happens in the Arab world, impacts the Islamic world’.

Meanwhile, Ikram Sehgal added the role of Turkey is important, and one should not forget the Regional Cooperation for Development Organization (RCD) formed between Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey in 1964, and replaced by Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in 1979. He emphasized that Russia and China have good ties with Pakistan, Turkey and Iran, and that ‘constructive engagement can be a harbinger of peace’.

Conclusion

While Saudi Arabia has delayed recognizing the statehood of Israel, and while Qatar remains closer to Turkey, the shifting alliance of most GCC and Arab nations towards Israel and the US, represents a decisive shift in the balance of power. Adopting the threat perception that centers on Iran, and without any clear give and take from Israel in the context of Abraham Accords, is likely to revitalize the message of non-state actors.

While China has made an economic entry in the Middle East, it has not decided to influence the security affairs – other than under the umbrella of UN and for maritime security purposes. In Syria too, it has adopted a non-interventionist approach and has supported the Assad regime.

However, economic leverages will eventually lead to influences in other areas. And China would have to utilize its sway – especially when it has the most to lose if a conflict breaks out in the region. One measure of if matters are heading in that direction would be the establishment of military bases, like the one in Djibouti, and potential militarization of Gawadar and Chabahar port. And in this context, the China-Iran economic and security deal takes on an added emphasis.

In the long run, US would want to create a wedge between China and Russia. Since attaining self-sufficiency in its energy needs, the US interests in Middle East is primarily to prevent nuclear weapons from falling in the hands of rogue states, or non-state actors, and this this a goal it shares with Israel. At the same time, US would not want to lose its primacy in the Middle East, but to exploit the existing fault lines to further extend its reach – to the detriment of China and Russia.

At the same time, under President Elect Biden, there is an opportunity to move away from the zero-sum approach to world affairs – by reaching out to China for a wider détente and cooperation – and the geopolitics resulting from the Coronavirus related pandemic especially necessitates this. Reaching that stage, however, would require first a smooth transition of power in the US.

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