By Naade Ali

Context

Afghanistan is once again at the dead center of great power rivalries. The then Soviet Union departed Afghanistan in 1989 abandoning the quest for access to warm waters and subsequently losing the Cold War, and then US left in 2021 after claiming to have achieved the primary goals of War Against Extremism.

The departure of U.S. from Afghanistan did not mean that it did no longer had any interests left in the country. It made sure to maintain over the horizon counter-terror capabilities. While the government of Pakistan at the time facilitated the peace talks between the US and Afghanistan and the withdrawal that followed – it was reluctant to offer further assistance as it related to fighting terrorists in Afghanistan. Many believe, this led to the fall of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government in Pakistan.

As the balance of power tussles escalate, with the US on the one side, and Russia and China on the other, the significance of Afghanistan is fast changing. The UN General Assembly recently adopted a resolution despite US objections, and abstentions of China, Russia, India and Iran, and with 116 nations including Pakistan voting in favor. The resolution calls on Taliban to reverse their growing oppression of women and girls and eliminate all terrorist organizations operating from its soil.

On the other hand, Russia that emerged from the ashes of Soviet Union, became the first country in the world to officially recognize Afghanistan on July 3rd, as US removed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which now is in power in Syria, from its list of terrorist organizations. This was after quick Western legitimation of Islamic authorities in Syria led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, a former al Qaeda member. Meanwhile, China congratulated Russia for recognizing Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan with it foreign ministry commenting, Afghanistan “should not be excluded from the international community”. Earlier in January 2024, China had recognized Bilal Karimi, as an official envoy to Beijing out of security concerns and economic interests.

The international configuration formulated in the aftermath of 9/11 to fight the Global War on Terror (GWOT) appears to be dismantling with the potential reemergence of traditional game play of ‘proxy wars.’ While US stance towards Afghan Islamic Emirate appears to be easing since the withdrawal, it does not look any closer to bestow recognition.

Where Does US Stand on Afghanistan?

Although the U.S. removed a $10 million bounty on Sirajuddin Haqqani, State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce clarified recently that many Taliban leaders remain designated terrorists and that this position remains unchanged. This statement came in the wake of a U.S. delegation’s visit to Kabul in March, where they secured the release of American hostages and held important meetings with Taliban leadership. During the meetings, the Taliban expressed their interest in re-engaging with the U.S. and resetting bilateral ties. They offered to reopen the U.S. embassy in Kabul in exchange for the transfer of control of the Afghan Embassy in Washington to the Taliban government.

Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi has repeatedly called on Washington to engage with the Taliban administration—a message he reiterated during trips to Saudi Arabia and Qatar in April. Muttaqi, explaining his interaction with American counterparts, said that during their discussions, he dismissed concerns about instability and the Taliban’s perceived lack of public support. He asserted, “No power can control Afghanistan without the support of its people. This truth must be acknowledged, and engagement with this government must take place.” He further argued that Taliban rule has brought enhanced internal stability and cautioned that any effort to weaken their government could lead to renewed instability in Afghanistan, threatening broader regional peace and security.

Despite the Taliban’s diplomatic overtures, the Trump administration has so far ruled out the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul or the formal recognition of the interim Taliban government. State Department spokesperson Bruce stated , “The United States does not recognize any entity as the government of Afghanistan and therefore has no plans to allow for the reopening of its embassy.” National Security Council spokesperson James Hewitt reinforced this stance, saying, “We have made no commitments regarding the Afghan Embassy in Washington, and there are no discussions underway concerning the status of the U.S. Embassy compound in Kabul.”

Pakistan-U.S. Pressure on Taliban

Washington’s continued refusal to recognize the Taliban regime is also widely seen as part of a coordinated counterterrorism understanding with Pakistan, aimed at pressuring the Taliban to break its ties with the internationally designated terrorist groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Pakistan has raised concerns about the U.S.-weapons left behind during the American withdrawal falling into the hands of terrorist organizations. A Washington Post report revealed that the perpetrators of the March Jaffar Express train attack in Balochistan used these abandoned U.S. weapons. Although President Trump had previously threatened to permanently suspend U.S. aid to Afghanistan unless the Taliban returned the military equipment, the Taliban flatly rejected the demand, declaring that the remaining American weapons “now belong to the Taliban and will not be returned.”

However, recent developments suggest a significant shift in the Taliban’s stance as U.S. and Pakistani pressure intensifies. In a phone call between U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar reported in April, both leaders underscored the urgency of neutralizing the threat posed by these weapons. Shortly after, Pakistan’s special envoy for Afghanistan, Muhammad Sadiq Khan, issued a stern warning that “all deals with Afghanistan are off” if the Taliban failed to address Islamabad’s terrorism concerns. He then traveled to Kabul to participate in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Joint Coordination Committee (JCC), aimed at restarting dialogue and addressing key security issues, particularly the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) threat.

According to media reports, the Taliban leadership has, for the first time, shown signs of flexibility suggesting a potential policy shift in response to Pakistan’s demands. Analysts point to mounting pressure from both Washington and Islamabad, including U.S. aid suspension and Pakistan’s mass expulsion of Afghan refugees, as key factors forcing the Taliban to reconsider their approach. With limited capacity to manage a large influx of returning refugees, the Taliban government now face the risk of a deepening humanitarian crisis. On the other hand, with the on-going tensions between Iran and Israel in the Middle East, Iran has also started deporting undocumented Afghan immigrants.

Afghanistan-India and U.S.

At the same time, growing Indian engagement in Afghanistan warrants equal attention. As a key U.S. strategic partner, India—owing to its improving ties with the Taliban regime—is well positioned to tap into Afghanistan’s vast mineral reserves, including rare earth elements vital for semiconductor manufacturing. With India striving to become a global semiconductor hub in collaboration with the U.S., Afghanistan could serve as a crucial resource partner. India’s trade with Afghanistan has already hit a record $642.29 million in 2023–24, according to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

If India succeeds in establishing a firm strategic and economic presence in Afghanistan, the U.S. could advance its goal of curbing China’s growing influence in Central Asia—without reintroducing a military footprint. Washington is well placed to leverage its bilateral relationships with both India and Pakistan in this context. While continuing to support Pakistan in counter-terrorism operations, the U.S. may once again delegate regional security responsibilities to Islamabad.

At the same time, it could enable India to expand its geo-economic role in Afghanistan, effectively advancing U.S. interests. This dual-track strategy—outsourcing security to Pakistan and economic engagement to India—offers a cost-effective, high-return approach for the U.S., especially when Trump prefers limited, transactional relations with South Asia. With larger foreign policy priorities elsewhere, this model allows Washington to remain influential in the region without committing significant resources.

U.S.-China and Afghanistan

The House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Authorization and Oversight Plan for the 119th Congress explicitly identified China as its top oversight priority and aligns with the central foreign policy objective of the Trump administration, underscoring countering Chinese influence while offering alternative development paths.

Part of the challenge from the American perspective is that Pakistan is strategically aligned with China, which is actively engaged to reconfigure the region around its interests, and the recent inclusion to this vision is Bangladesh. Pakistan’s Foreign Office Spokesperson Shafqat Ali Khan commented earlier this month on the topic that the cooperation between China, Bangladesh, and Pakistan is part of Beijing’s development agenda.

China holds significant geo-strategic stakes in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. As a key ally to Pakistan, China would face substantial setbacks if relations between the two neighbors further deteriorate. Beijing has sought to leverage its Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Global Development Initiative (GDI) as frameworks to promote peace, counter-terrorism cooperation, and economic development in the region. Chinese Ambassador to Afghanistan Zhao Xing, in a recent interaction with Taliban leaders, proposed key strategies to enhance collaboration with Afghanistan, which could potentially restore its strained relations with Pakistan.

It’s due to these interests that a trilateral summit between China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan was held on May 21 in Beijing soon after the four-day conflict between India and Pakistan. Some of the major outcomes of the meeting was the restoration of diplomatic ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan leading to the exchange of ambassadors. Moreover, the Chinese foreign ministry announced that China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) would now also be extended to Afghanistan.

The trilateral meeting occurred after Afghan side has progressively adjusted its position regarding the criticism emanating from Pakistan on providing support to TTP. The Afghan Taliban government has publicly denied accusations of supporting the TTP and allowing them to operate from Afghan soil. They have reiterated their commitment to preventing any group from using Afghanistan to threaten other countries. In a recent move, Afghan officials announced, “Sheikh Hibatullah’s diktats bind all groups pledging allegiance to him, and his diktat is that attacking Pakistan is haram.”

The Afghan Game Plan

In the evolving great power rivalry Afghanistan appears to be courting both US and China to get involved in Afghanistan, especially to address the security concerns emanating from the country – and using that as a leverage to gain international recognition. This approach seems to have worked in the case of Russia. Moreover, it’s also exploiting the vulnerabilities of Pakistan and China from India – possibly suggesting its potential utility to the U.S.

On the other hand, the Chinese strategy involves getting more involved in trade and connectivity of Afghanistan, through its partnership with Pakistan, pushing Afghans to change their behavior. However, U.S. appears to be employing the same approach towards Afghanistan, utilizing its partnership with India, to change Pakistan’s calculations.

Related Articles:

Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions, Trump, And Wakhan Corridor – Feb 3, 2025
Political Or Military Solution; Pakistan’s New Counter-Terrorism Operation Azm-e-Istehkam – Aug 1, 2024
Convergences in US Pakistan Ties and Afghanistan – Jan 1, 2024
Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP – Feb 22, 2023
Post Withdrawal Campaign Against Extremism In Afghanistan And US-Pakistan Relations – Sep 7, 2022
Emerging US Policy Towards Afghanistan After Withdrawal – March 2, 2022
Recalibrating The US-Pakistan Partnership In Afghanistan – Jun 22, 2021
US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden – Mar 2, 2021

The post Afghanistan, Pakistan Relations and Great Power Rivalry appeared first on Politact.

By Naade Ali
South Asia and Middle East Fellow, PoliTact

Context

The recent brief yet intense escalation between India and Pakistan has further exposed the fragile nature of South Asia’s security landscape. The four-day-long tit-for-tat cross-border military confrontation between the two nuclear-armed rivals has significantly undermined prospects for normalization, redefining the rules of engagement and signaling a shift in how both countries may manage their relationship moving forward. What began as a terrorist attack on Indian tourists in the Pahalgam region of the disputed India-administered Kashmir last month, resulting in the deaths of 26 people, quickly escalated into a significant diplomatic and military crisis.

India’s Strategic Shift: Operation Sindoor and the ‘New Normal

India hastily accused Pakistan of orchestrating the terror attacks and used the incident as justification to revise its military doctrine through the launch of Operation Sindoor.

In a public speech highlighting the goals of Operation Sindoor, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced what he described as reaching a ‘new normal,’ signaling a decisive departure from India’s earlier posture of restraint, long shaped by the perceived threat of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent. He emphasized that the new approach centered on firm and unyielding retaliation against terrorist attacks, including cross-border military operations and a deliberate refusal to distinguish between militant groups and their state sponsors—effectively placing direct responsibility on Pakistan for any acts of terrorism on Indian soil. Modi also stated that India would no longer be deterred by the threat of nuclear escalation, signaling a willingness to pursue bold and proactive actions despite potential risks. Having absorbed the initial Indian strikes, Pakistan, in response to the damage inflicted from Operation Sindoor, initiated its own military campaign named Banyan-Marsoos, targeting key Indian military targets to restore deterrence.

A Pause in Hostilities: U.S. Intervention and the Ceasefire

As the two countries climbed the escalation ladder, a surprise ceasefire announcement by U.S. President Trump on social media temporarily halted the hostilities. While the truce continues to hold, prospects for lasting peace remain uncertain. Inflammatory national rhetoric and the unresolved diplomatic deadlock continue to fuel tensions. At the core of the post-ceasefire period is a significant divide between India and Pakistan, each celebrating their military campaigns as a victory and viewing the outcome of their confrontation through a zero-sum lens. This has made the aftermath more complex and contentious than the conflict itself, while also revealing how both sides intend to manage their ongoing disputes moving forward. In this context, key questions have emerged: what does the temporary truce mean for the India-Pakistan rivalry, and what are its implications for the long-term stability of South Asia?

Experts Respond

On May 12, PoliTact hosted a panel discussion under the auspices of recently formed US-Pakistan Policy Forum titled: “India-Pakistan Tensions and the Way Forward,” moderated by its Chief Analyst, Arif Ansar. The session featured a distinguished panel, including Dr. Hassan Abbas, Chair of the Department of Regional and Analytical Studies at the U.S. National Defense University; Dr. Qamar ul Huda, Michael E. Paul Chair in International Affairs and Distinguished Visiting Professor at the U.S. Naval Academy; and Mr. Khaled Al Maeena, former Editor-in-Chief of Arab News and Saudi Gazette. The discussion centered on the implications of the recent ceasefire between India and Pakistan, the roles of international actors, and the significant obstacles to achieving long-term peace.

Will the Ceasefire Hold?

One of the key questions examined was whether the current ceasefire between India and Pakistan is likely to hold.

A cautious optimism emerged from Dr. Hassan Abbas, who expressed confidence that the ceasefire between India and Pakistan would likely hold — at least in the short term. He argued that both nations had achieved what they needed politically and militarily to step back from the brink. India could claim it had struck militant targets, while Pakistan could point to a successful air defense response. He emphasized that U.S. mediation had played a key role in facilitating the agreement and that both governments were likely committed to preventing further military action. However, he warned that unless deeper structural issues — particularly the Kashmir dispute and proxy militancy — were addressed diplomatically, this ceasefire would remain fragile.

Dr. Qamar ul Huda shared a more skeptical view. While not dismissing the ceasefire outright, he questioned its substance, noting the absence of a transparent or structured diplomatic process. The ceasefire, in his view, seemed to have emerged from informal channels — tweets and backchannel phone calls — rather than serious, trackable negotiations. He was concerned that such an approach lacked durability and legitimacy. Dr. Huda stressed that a real ceasefire requires more than silence on the battlefield; it demands diplomatic engagement on the root causes of conflict: Kashmir, water disputes, and terrorism. He also noted the potential influence of third-party actors, from China to Gulf states, and expressed concern over the lack of clarity in the U.S. position. In his view, the region wasn’t yet “ripe” for lasting peace, and without a comprehensive approach, this ceasefire might only be a pause rather than a turning point.

From a media and public sentiment angle, Mr. Khaled Al Maeena brought a grounded and people-centered perspective. He voiced deep concern over the role of Indian media, which he accused of fomenting hate and spreading misinformation that inflamed public opinion and made diplomacy politically costly. Drawing on conversations with people across religious and national lines, he asserted that the majority of Indians and Pakistanis want peace, not war. Mr. Al Maeena emphasized that the region’s pressing need was not military confrontation but economic development and political stability. He also highlighted the proactive role of Gulf states — especially Saudi Arabia — in de-escalating tensions. With ties to both India and Pakistan, and a vested interest in regional peace due to economic interdependence, Mr. Al Maeena saw the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia, as a credible mediator. While hopeful about the ceasefire’s potential, he underscored the importance of media responsibility, regional diplomacy, and leadership that prioritizes stability over nationalist bravado.

The panel discussed the evolving role of the Gulf states—particularly Saudi Arabia—as key international mediator. The panelists agreed that Saudi Arabia, with significant interests in both India and Pakistan, could play a constructive role in easing tensions. Mr. Khaled Al Maeena stressed that Saudi Arabia seeks regional stability, including in South Asia, and could facilitate dialogue, if requested, between the two rivals by encouraging both sides to come to the table and accept international mediation.

The panelists agreed that India and Pakistan must move beyond tactical ceasefires and pursue a comprehensive, long-term peace process—ideally supported by third-party mediation. The speakers emphasized that unless the two countries address their domestic challenges and regional rivalries, their aspirations will remain unmet.

What Role should US Play?

Throughout the discussion, the panelists recognized the United States as a pivotal external actor with the capacity to influence the trajectory of the India-Pakistan ceasefire. However, their assessments revealed a shared caution about the limitations and inconsistencies in the U.S. approach.

Dr. Abbas emphasized that U.S. involvement was instrumental in brokering the initial ceasefire, with both India and Pakistan reaching out to Washington behind the scenes. He argued that this reflected the high-level trust and strategic alignment both countries maintain with the U.S., albeit for different reasons. India is a key partner in the Indo-Pacific strategy and a counterbalance to China, while Pakistan has long-standing security and geopolitical ties to the U.S., particularly in the context of Afghanistan. However, Abbas cautioned that the U.S. influence alone cannot guarantee lasting peace. He urged Washington to move beyond tactical mediation and instead support long-term conflict resolution mechanisms, including structured dialogue on Kashmir and militancy. He also noted that U.S. credibility depends on maintaining a balanced posture, especially when public narratives in India resist outside interference.

Dr. Huda took a more critical and analytical stance on the U.S. role. He noted that while President Trump’s tweet announcing the ceasefire was widely reported, it lacked substantive follow-through or diplomatic backing. From his view in Washington, the ceasefire appeared to be the result of sporadic political gestures rather than coordinated U.S. policy. Huda questioned whether the U.S. is truly committed to sustained mediation or simply reacting to crises. He highlighted the ambiguity in U.S. policy—initially appearing indifferent, then suddenly claiming credit—and argued that this inconsistency undermines its ability to lead serious peace efforts. To sustain negotiations, the U.S. would need to invest diplomatically and involve multilateral partners, such as the EU, China, and Gulf states, in creating a legitimate and lasting peace framework.

Mr. Khaled Almaeena provided a regional and Gulf-centered perspective, acknowledging the U.S. role but emphasizing that regional actors—particularly Saudi Arabia—are just as important. He noted that while the U.S. has diplomatic leverage, it should not attempt to dominate the process unilaterally. Instead, he advocated for a collaborative approach, where the U.S. works in concert with Gulf countries and other stakeholders who maintain strong ties with both India and Pakistan. Mr. Al Maeena viewed President Trump’s announcement of the ceasefire with skepticism, suggesting it may have been more performative than strategic. He argued that the U.S. can help facilitate talks, but its influence must be exercised carefully and in support of locally driven, regionally endorsed initiatives.

In summary, the panelists suggested that while the U.S. remains a necessary actor for de-escalation, its role must evolve from crisis management to sustained diplomacy, ideally in partnership with regional powers who have both legitimacy and proximity to the conflict.

Great Power Rivalry and Peace Talks

In the discussion of whether the ceasefire between India and Pakistan could evolve into lasting peace, all three panelists acknowledged that great power dynamics—particularly involving China—play a critical role in shaping the strategic landscape of South Asia.

Dr. Qamar-ul Huda emphasized the geopolitical complexity introduced by China’s growing influence and the competing interests of major powers. He noted that China, along with the Gulf states, the EU, and the U.S., has shown interest in being involved in conflict resolution efforts between India and Pakistan. However, this multiplicity of actors creates a crowded diplomatic space, making coherent mediation more difficult. Dr. Huda pointed out that China’s strategic alignment with Pakistan and its rivalry with India complicate peace efforts. He also raised a broader concern: if India aspires to be a global leader, as envisioned through its role in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategy and the Quad alliance, it must demonstrate stability and responsible leadership in its own region. Repeated border skirmishes and crises with Pakistan, he argued, undermine India’s credibility as a reliable partner in the great power competition with China.

Dr. Hassan Abbas echoed these concerns, observing that China’s influence is an integral part of South Asia’s strategic fabric, particularly through its economic and military ties with Pakistan. He highlighted how Chinese military technology—especially fighter jets used by Pakistan—played a significant role in the recent skirmishes, which helped Pakistan demonstrate parity in air power despite India’s numerical advantage. Dr. Abbas saw China’s indirect support as a factor that emboldens Pakistan to resist Indian pressure and sustain its strategic posture. However, he also noted that the escalation ladder is becoming dangerously steep due to technological advancements and information warfare, increasing the risk of miscalculation in a region already shaped by great power rivalries.

Mr. Khaled Al Maeena took a broader, more diplomatic view, situating China within a network of powerful states — including the U.S. and Gulf nations — that have vested interests in regional stability. While not delving deeply into China’s military role, Mr. Al Maeena acknowledged that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are increasingly aware of China’s regional footprint, particularly through its economic initiatives like the Belt and Road. He suggested that China, like the U.S., could play a constructive role in diffusing tensions if it acts as a responsible stakeholder. However, he warned that foreign involvement, including by great powers, must be invited and balanced, as unilateral or self-interested interventions could backfire.

Collectively, the panelists agreed that China’s strategic position and the broader great power rivalry intensify the stakes in South Asia. While this rivalry may deter full-scale war, it also raises the risk of prolonged instability unless managed through inclusive and multilateral diplomacy.

Nuclear Environment and the Escalation Ladder

In examining how the India-Pakistan conflict unfolds within a nuclear framework, the panelists offered nuanced perspectives on the risks and realities of escalation.

Dr. Hassan Abbas presented a cautiously optimistic view, asserting that while both nations had indeed tested the boundaries of military engagement—through strikes, counterstrikes, and air skirmishes—they ultimately pulled back due to the overarching presence of nuclear deterrence. He emphasized that both sides were able to claim symbolic victories: India asserted it had targeted militant-linked sites, while Pakistan showcased its military preparedness and air defense capabilities, including the successful use of advanced Chinese aircraft. For Dr. Abbas, this demonstration of strength on both sides created the space for de-escalation, as neither nation was willing to push the conflict into full-scale war, knowing the devastating consequences of nuclear engagement. He remained confident that, despite heightened tensions, both countries were rational actors who understood the mutual destruction that a nuclear exchange would bring.

Dr. Qamar-ul Huda, meanwhile, offered a more cautious and critical interpretation. He characterized the pattern of India-Pakistan escalation as a dangerous cycle—an unending loop of skirmishes, retaliations, and brief periods of calm that lacked any strategic architecture. According to him, this repetitive behavior pointed to a fundamental weakness in regional diplomacy and governance. Despite the presence of nuclear weapons acting as a deterrent, he argued that the failure to address root causes—such as the Kashmir dispute, water-sharing tensions, and cross-border terrorism—meant that both countries continued to climb the escalation ladder in an ad hoc and reactive manner. Without institutional reforms or sustained international engagement, he warned, the region remained vulnerable to miscalculations that could spiral beyond control, even in a nuclear context.

Mr. Khaled Almaeena approached the issue from a societal and media perspective, underscoring how misinformation, media sensationalism, and hyper-nationalist rhetoric often play a more dangerous role in escalation than military strategy itself. Drawing comparisons to the “phony war” period of World War II, Mr. Al Maeena argued that the most recent flare-up between India and Pakistan resembled more of a media-fueled standoff than a genuine military confrontation. He criticized the Indian mainstream media in particular for manufacturing a climate of hostility, which in turn pressured political leaders to take aggressive stances to appease domestic audiences. In this environment, the escalation ladder becomes more volatile—not because of formal military decisions, but because public sentiment, stoked by inflammatory media narratives, compels leaders to act out of fear of appearing weak.

In essence, the three panelists painted a complex picture of escalation in South Asia. While they all agreed that nuclear deterrence plays a restraining role in preventing all-out war, they also highlighted different drivers of danger—be it military miscalculation, diplomatic failure, or media manipulation. The consensus was clear: the region may be protected by the logic of mutual destruction, but without responsible leadership, institutional dialogue, and media accountability, the rungs of the escalation ladder remain all too easy to climb.

Domestic Politics and Sustained Political Dialogue

As the conversation shifted from immediate military de-escalation to the prospect of sustained political dialogue, all three panelists highlighted domestic political dynamics in both India and Pakistan as central to whether the ceasefire could evolve into meaningful negotiations.

Dr. Abbas offered a deep dive into the Pakistani domestic landscape, emphasizing that the ceasefire had inadvertently strengthened the military establishment’s standing at a time when it was under intense public and political criticism—especially over its handling of the Imran Khan-led Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) movement. He noted that the military’s effective management of the immediate crisis had boosted its credibility and given the current coalition government some breathing room. However, he warned that without broader political consensus and constitutional legitimacy, Pakistan could not sustain a serious peace process. He stressed that internal unity, political stability, and inclusiveness—particularly reconciling with PTI’s large support base—would be necessary if Pakistan hoped to engage in long-term diplomacy with India.

Dr. Huda placed domestic politics within a broader governance and institutional context, particularly in Pakistan. He saw the moment as an opportunity for political re-examination, noting that recurring conflict cycles had revealed the deep fractures in the country’s political system. He emphasized the need for Pakistan’s political institutions to commit to constitutionalism and inclusivity, warning that sidelining popular political parties (such as PTI) or suppressing dissent only deepens instability. For Dr. Huda, sustainable negotiations—whether about the ceasefire or Kashmir—would require a bipartisan or multiparty consensus. In his view, the absence of such internal coherence would make Pakistan an unreliable negotiating partner, especially in the eyes of international actors.

Mr. Khaled Al Maeena focused more broadly on the popular mood and societal divide within both India and Pakistan. He warned that rising hate rhetoric, media manipulation, and political polarization—particularly in India—create an environment where leaders are constrained by nationalist pressures. In both countries, he argued, the public appetite for peace exists, but political elites often exploit nationalist sentiment for short-term gain. He called for leadership that could rise above partisanship and media-driven hysteria, emphasizing that economic development and social stability should be the common goals uniting political factions. Mr. Al Maeena also stressed that peace efforts cannot be externally imposed; they must be grounded in domestic political will and legitimacy.

The panelists agreed that no ceasefire or peace process can succeed without strong, credible, and inclusive domestic political foundations. While foreign mediation may help broker talks, lasting peace must come from within, supported by political leadership that reflects the will and aspirations of their people.

Related Research

Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States August 4, 2023
Examining Saudi-Iran Tensions And Its Impact On South Asia, China Jan 4, 2019

The post India-Pakistan Ceasefire And The Way Forward appeared first on Politact.

Context

As the reach of the coronavirus deepens – so does the need to understand the extent of its geopolitical implications. While the most recent focus has been on the health and economic shock, little has been understood about the geopolitical and defense related repercussions.

Some of this could be due to the time needed to assess the damage; the other may have to do with safeguarding the strategic policies and postures. Some recent estimates suggest that over 10 years, the economic loses for US could add up to about $11 trillion in an optimistic scenario, and $19 trillion in a worse case scenario.

Obviously, economic prowess influences the political dynamics and defense postures. If one reveals how a nations defense capabilities have been compromised, then possibly this could become a leverage for the adversary. Since all nations have been negatively impacted by the still spreading coronavirus, the question becomes what capabilities are affected more. And associated with this exercise is the process of exploring options to recover or replace such capabilities – for the short and long term.

While there are many dimensions of this assessment, the main attempt is to recalibrate the global balance power. For example, one such critical inquiry relates to the campaign against extremism that is being fought in various theaters, but primarily in the Middle East, North Africa, and South and Central Asia. As noted before, the war against extremism has been intertwined for some time now with the global balance of power of tussle.

Some of the key related questions in this regard are:

1. How will the Syrian conflict be impacted if the major stakeholders like Iran, Turkey, and Russia are busy dealing with the COVID-19 issues? The civil war is brewing there and the nation’s health care systems is in ruins. According to UN Refugee Agency, there 6.6 internally displaced persons in Syria, while 5.6 million people have fled Syria since the conflict began in 2011, seeking refuge in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordon and beyond.
2. How will the situation of Yemen evolve, as Iran and Saudi Arabia now have to deal with challenges deriving from COVID-19? According to Save the Children charity organization 85,000 children may have died between 2015 and 2018 due to severe malnutrition. About 80% of Yemen’s 24 million population needed humanitarian assistance even before the coronavirus arrived. While Iran was already under sanctions, the drop of oil prices will likely curtail Saudi ambitions. Meanwhile, there are media reports that Yemen peace process is making major headway.
3. In Libya, a previously agreed temporary peace has fallen apart and hostilities between the warring factions have escalated. A UN migration agency has indicated that Libya is ill prepared to deal with coronavirus and it could be catastrophic for the internally displaced people (IDP) and about 700,000 refugees and migrants there.
4. The Iraq situation was already under political stress with the government unable to deliver to people resulting in protests. The Iraqi officials are concealing the real number of infections because that could once again ignite public disorder. Iraq’s neighbor Iran was hit hard early by the pandemic and Iraq receives many religious pilgrims from across the region. Both Iran and the US may have to reevaluate their positions in Iraq as they deal with the aftershocks of coronavirus. Meanwhile, reports indicate that Iran militants have increased rocket attacks on US bases.
5. The peace agreement was reached between the US and Taliban on February 29, just as coronavirus was picking pace in Europe. This is pressurizing all immediate stakeholders, to include the Afghan government, Taliban, Pakistan and the US, to not let the peace process stall under the circumstances.
   
   For example, since the agreement was reached the disunity of the Afghan government has been apparent. More so, it refused to release 5,000 Afghan Taliban prisoners promised in the US-Taliban deal. To pressure the Ashraf Ghani’s government, US went as far as threatening to withhold $2 billion dollars of US aid to Afghanistan. The American patience is likely to decrease even further in the evolving situation resulting from the coronavirus.
6. At this stage, it is not clear how much will with the pandemic impact India and Pakistan related matters. Nonetheless, focus on dealing with the pandemic could mean less Indian focus on Afghanistan, and increased militant activity in Indian held Kashmir, where India has put the entire population under a security lockdown since 2019 for different sets of reasons. Recent easing of the security and communication lockdown in Kashmir is direclty linked to the pressures exerted by the infectious disease.

Non-State Actors

While the impact on state actors overtime is measurable, it’s unclear how the non-state actors and proxies will be handling the indiscriminate reach of the virus. With lack of immediate medical assistance, and the backers of various proxies distracted by their own economic woes, one can assume dismal consequences.

However, past conflicts indicate that while there may be a temporary slowdown in conflicts due to the spread of disease, such as notably during Spanish Flu of 1918, ultimately the rivalries continued with each side trying to exploit the circumstances. Nonetheless, at least in Afghanistan and Yemen there is movement towards peace. However, there is also a risk of Arab Spring style public disturbances if the governments involved in the campaign against extremism are unable to deal amicably with the reach of coronavirus. And the refugees and internally displaced persons are likely to suffer greatly.

While US is busy dealing with its own health and economic emergency, its China that is extending its geopolitical influence by offering medical and humanitarian assistance to the needy in the war ravaged nations.

The post COVID-19 And Campaign Against Extremism appeared first on Politact.

Context

On the anniversary of the December 2014 terrorist attack on the Army Public School, Peshawar, some important questions have been raised. How far has the campaign progressed in achieving the goals of the war against extremism? Moreover, what were the lessons learned from this tragic attack and have they been addressed as part of Pakistan’s National Action Plan?

A discussion was held on Voice of America to discuss the various facets of this campaign, which included the KPK Information Minister Shaukat Yusufzai. PoliTact’s Chief Analyst Arif Ansar, pointed out the economic loss is just one aspect of the cost – but often the most mentioned. One of the key consequences of the war against extremism is the societal transformation in the areas where this campaign has been carried out.

Like any individual that has undergone trauma, the places where the war is being conducted also needs ongoing rehab to address the psychological damage and aftershocks – to manage the anger – and to cure the mindset prone to violence. But this first requires a period of normalcy, which in many places has not been established. In fact, they are being confronted by many secondary and tertiary side effects, for which awareness has to be raised before they can be addressed in any meaningful way.

Listen to the Discussion:

The post The War Against Terror And Societal Transformation appeared first on Politact.

Context

“The history repeats itself, “first as tragedy, then as farce.”

These profound quotes, irrespective of the source, are often repeated – but then we see them unfolding right in front of our eyes.

PoliTact has been observing the connection of the affairs of the Middle East and South Asia, while contending that what transpires in the Middle East region will have a profound impact over South Asia, especially Pakistan and India. Moreover, we had pointed out last year that the Gulf region is slowly moving out of Pakistan’s sphere of influence and into that of India.

The present Kashmir crisis has exposed and highlighted this fissure more than ever, where other than Qatar, the other Gulf Nations have come out in favor of India. The rationale is that under the nation-state structure – the state has to protect its national interest, and economic interests trump religious inclinations. However, there is much more sinister global trend at play and that has to do with the rise of racism and right wing extremism. This is a boomerang impact of the War against Extremists, when thousands of uprooted Muslims headed to the economically struggling Europe to seek refuge – meanwhile escalating ethnic tensions and reinforcing the fears and the message of the right-wingers.

Analysis

Core versus Periphery Dynamics

There is obviously the internal dynamics of the Islamic World, what we term as the ‘Core versus Periphery’ dynamics, on who stands up and represents the held over Umma grievances from Palestine to Kashmir. As the Core regions represented by the Arab world abdicates the role, the Peripheral powers of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan have attempted to fill the vacuum.

These nations of South Asia and Central Asia, Middle East, and North Africa emerged from the ashes of WW I and II – when the tussles of the colonial powers had boiled over. However, even after attaining their nationhood, some of these states remained aligned with the West, as they switched from the British to the American sphere of influence.

However, after the cessation of the Cold War, and as the Global War on Terror (GWOT) evolved, the established and emerging power dynamics resurfaced will full swing. By the time, this campaign entered Syria and Libya, it transformed and has become a full fledge proxy war. Presently, it’s moving from the stage where the non-state actors were the primary targets – to becoming an inter-state conflict, which it had narrowly escaped up to now. Nonetheless, the war against terror and the tussles of the emerging and established powers are fully intertwined now.

While the low level conflict related to war against extremism played out, China has gradually made inroads into many of these former Western allies. Meanwhile, the US ties have deteriorated with peripheral powers of Pakistan and Turkey, which is also a NATO member. While an attempt was made during the Obama administration to ease tensions with Iran, the scraping up of the Iran nuclear deal, has rekindled the tensions. Meanwhile, the Syrian crisis has indicated that Russia never left the Middle East.

To counter these dynamics, US has developed strategic ties with India and the Gulf States. While Europe has served as the source of global power projection since the end of World Wars, India and the Gulf States are serving that purpose in these regions.

On the other hand, as the two-state solution is on a trajectory of slow death, the Gulf States have been aligning themselves with Israel and India, at the cost of both the Palestinian and Kashmiri Muslims. Instead, the rich Gulf States, with the exception of Qatar, have focused on fighting Iranian proxies in Yemen, and to counter the Iranian influence in places like Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. And in this they have convergence with Israel and the US.

On their side, both India and Israel have exploited the war against terror by linking the Palestinian and Kashmir cause with extremism. Irrespective, the Arab States will find it very difficult to manage the street as this transition unfolds, and even the peripheral powers will have a hard time sitting back – when India ruthlessly subjugates its Muslim citizens from Kashmir to Assam.

Post GWOT Era

With close to two decades of involvement in GWOT, in its new defense strategy, the US has finally shifted to focus on what it calls the strategic adversaries, such as China and Russia.

However, the post GWOT era is characterized by the weakness of Europe, growing ethnic nationalism, trade wars, and diminishing effectiveness of multilateral institutes such as UN, whose purpose was to prevent future wars and maintain peace.

Then there is the challenge of security versus economic dynamics. Meaning, should security affairs take precedence over economic matters, or vice versa. One thing is clear, that economies truly flourish in secure and peaceful environments. At the same time, when economy and fiscal conditions deteriorate, it gives rise to the blame game, xenophobia, ethnic nationalism, and civil strife. If religion is added as a variable to this dynamics, it results in a really combustible situation.

While the end of World Wars resulted in the cessation of empires and the emergence of nation-state structure, any future war of such magnitude is likely to spell the end of nation-state framework. And it’s not clear at this point what will replace the nation-state structure.

Conclusion

When it comes to India and Pakistan, the religious premise on which the division of India and Pakistan came about in 1947, appears to have been vindicated. But the history has not run in its course yet. While the politics, economics, and security of the region, and beyond, has evolved; people do try to settle scores when the timing is right, and in this sense history is always being rewritten.

India up to now represented the epitome of secularism and democracy, something it proudly shared with the West. A dramatic Indian turn to the right perhaps is matching the trend that is emerging in the West and the US as well. While this is by no means a done deal in the West, India seems to have chosen a direction that will be fought vehemently by the liberals there, as it is being in the West and Israel.

For right now, the vision of economic interdependence laid out in the post World War landscape, to prevent wars and prohibit ethnic nationalism from spreading its lethal tentacle in the future, is faltering right in front of us. The very powers that laid out the lofty aspirations are themselves turned inwards – from Brexit to America First. Once again, the world is entering a bleak phase where there is more reliance on military might and ethnic superiority to resolve issues – than negotiating and coexisting.

The post The Global Rise Of Far Right And Indian Annexation of Kashmir appeared first on Politact.

Germany has long been receiving migrants from different countries. However, the past few years, the crisis with migrants from the Middle East and Africa has intensified. People are mostly fleeing from war and conflict. With a request to comment on this issue, we turned to Abdullah Khurram, Visiting Research Fellow, Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin, South Asia & Middle East Fellow, PoliTact in Washington.

Do you think German society is prepared to accept large numbers of refugees and economic migrants from the Middle East? Is Germany able to painlessly assimilate those people?

Arguing from deep compassion, Chancellor Angela Merkel convinced the German public to continue to accept refugees from conflict-ridden countries such as Syria. Around 1.1 million refugees were accepted by Germany, mainly from the Middle East and Africa. This won Germany praise from many around the world, including from Pope Francis and President Obama. These refugees were met with cheering crowds and the German people wholeheartedly invested their time, energy, and money to welcome them.

In refugees, Germany saw a humanitarian duty, as well as an economic opportunity. Germany estimates its working age population would reduce by 6 million by 2030, and therefore, an influx of young population through refugees would help sustain economic growth.^[1]In words of the Economy Minister Sigmar Gabriel, “If we manage to quickly train those that come to us and to get them into work, then we will solve one of our biggest problems for the economic future of our country: the skills shortage.”^[2]

Moreover, as Konstantin Richter argues, “Other nations have long respected and envied Germany for its economic success. But we have not exactly been considered warm-hearted or lovable. Now, all of a sudden, millions dreamt of coming here – and we felt flattered. The refugees made us feel good about ourselves.”^[3]

However, amidst this humanitarian duty and economic opportunity, larger questions such as what would ‘German-ness’ mean to the refugees remain unanswered. Assimilation and cultural issues were a problem from day one. In words of one German citizen who hosted refugees at his apartment in Berlin, “Some never even said ‘thank you’. One seemed to feel genuinely sorry for us because we have three daughters and no sons. Another asked, apropos of nothing, whether my wife was ‘a Jewish girl’”.^[4]

What truly started turning the public opinion against refugees were the New Year Eve’s sexual assaults in Cologne. Germany’s “willkommenskultur”—meaning welcoming culture— and Chancellor Merkel’s slogan “wir schaffen das”— meaning “we can do this”— had now started fading away. Moreover, economic concerns also become a part of how the public opinion started changing. 77 percent Germans believe refugees will increase German debt, 66 percent think it will make it harder for them to find housing, and 62 percent believe it would lead to more criminality.^[5]

While for many decades, German people have consistently voted for traditional postwar political parties; however, today, a huge influx of refugees has enabled a rapid rise of the far right that staunchly stands against the refugees. In particular, the populist Alternative For Germany (AfD) party is using the situation to its advantage to shake up the political dynamics in the country. This refugee influx has also stirred up the far-right movement of “Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West.”

There have been more than 1,800 recorded attacks against asylum seekers and their accommodations in Germany since January, 2016.^[6] Moreover, lack of acceptance can also be seen in other areas; for example, in Neuperlach Sud, a suburb of Munich, residents have started building a 13ft-high stone wall to separate their houses from a refugee center.^[7] Furthermore, in September 2016, far-right extremists were suspected of being behind attempted bombings targeting a mosque in Dresden.^[8]

People from other countries too have taken advantage of Germany’s generous asylum policies. For example, as of 2015, Albanians and Kosovars were among the top five groups of people arriving in Germany. This trend particularly alarmed the German government because it considers both these countries as “safe countries of origin.”^[9] Thus, the challenge of refugee management continues to become more complicated. Moreover, Berlin’s courts are paralyzed by the amount of back-log of asylum applications, and even more worrisome is the fact that only 13 percent of the refugees have so far been able to find work. However, one reason of this is also that until their asylum application is approved by the courts, they can formally not join the labor market.^[10] But for those who are already in the labor market and yet unemployed, cultural issues also reduce their employment prospects. In words of a Syrian refugee, “Regardless of our educational levels, maybe sometimes the nationality plays a big role in choosing the people. That’s what I felt – sometimes, not always.”^[11]

Despite the increasingly negative public opinion, Germany’s stance towards the refugees is still very generous as compared to other European countries. The German state and society continue to rebuild the lives of the refugees. At the same time, refugees are also positively contributing in the German society. For example, refugees from Afghanistan have helped revive cricket in Germany, and the country now has 230 teams with over 5,000 cricketers taking part in official leagues.^[12]

Yet, the underlying question that remains is: if the Turkish Germans— country’s largest immigrant group— largely continue to remain in their own enclaves, then isn’t it perhaps a far-fetched belief that the Middle East and African asylum-seekers would one day be able to properly integrate into the wider German society? There are reasons to be optimistic. But cultural forces keep diffusing this optimism.

This interview originally appeared in The Greater Middle East

The post Germany Becomes The Bastion Of Liberal Values But Challenges Remain For Recent Migrants appeared first on Politact.

Context

By Abdullah Khurram

The Balkan states have come a long way since the Yugoslav wars and the ethnic cleansing of the 90s. The region has improved both economically as well as politically. Slovenia and Croatia have become members of the EU while all other countries in the region are actively working towards this goal. However, despite the tremendous progress, the region is still confronted with considerable political, economic and security challenges.

On my trip to the region in July, I interacted with a number of Balkan based centers of intellectual thinking especially in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia and Albania. These discussions helped develop these five key areas that can help the Balkan nations deal with their domestic and international challenges.

1- Economic and political stability is the key, and for that, engagement with all global powers can be valuable
2- Increasing advocacy for joining the EU
3- Leveraging the role of moderate Islamic clerics to counter extremism
4- Restoring hope in the state
5- Rebranding the region and developing best practices from within

Analysis

1. Economic and political stability is the key, and for that, engagement with all global powers can be valuable

Instead of choosing one international camp over the other, the Balkan states should rather be focused on engaging with all global powers, while promoting regional cooperation to deal with local challenges. Moreover, the attraction of becoming a corridor for transporting goods should not take away the emphasis from strengthening domestic economic and manufacturing capability. This requires being aware of one’s strengths and limitations and the ability to create win-win scenarios.

The EU, US, China, Russia and Turkey can all help the region advance towards attaining political and economic stability.

The Bush administration played a key role in supporting the Albanian and Croatian membership to NATO. It also helped improve Kosovo’s diplomatic status by encouraging its parliament to unilaterally declare independence.

The Russians too have shown a keen interest in engaging with the Balkans; visits of politicians and businessmen have increased over the past decade, which has consistently increased Russia’s economic clout and strategic assertiveness in the region.

On the other hand, Turkish companies have made heavy investments in areas like healthcare, airport management, and agriculture. The facility of visa-free travel and trade liberalization, both have helped boost business between Turkey and Western Balkans and it has increased by 84 percent between 2000 and 2008.1

China is also committed towards advancing the New Silk Road project and is not only enhancing regional investments but also creating a network of large ports and railway lines. As part of this, Montenegro chose a Chinese company to build a 800 million Euro highway that connects the country to Serbia. Similarly, a Chinese company is to construct a highway between Albania and Macedonia. The third largest Albanian port of Shengjin, located in the Adriatic Sea, has also been leased to China for the next 25 years.

While the US and the EU might not be in the best of their financial condition to invest heavily in the region, they still maintain a tremendous diplomatic leverage to improve political stability in the region. At the same time, Turkish economic penetration and Chinese investment can help the region become economically more prosperous.

Thus the regional countries should be willing to openly engage with all global players who can contribute to local stability and development.

2- Increasing advocacy for joining the EU

The EU nations have consistently supported the case for the Balkan states becoming full members. However, many in the region think that due to the current problems being faced by EU, it is not prepared to accept any new member in the near future. Despite such perceptions, support for their membership does exist.

On 25 May, 2015, the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Daniel Mitov noted that “There must not be the slightest doubt that all of the countries of the Western Balkans should be part of the EU one day. They have clearly and categorically expressed their desire for this. We have to help them constantly”.2

Similarly, Albania’s Defense Minister Mimi Kodheli emphasized during her speech at the Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. that “If the EU wants our countries to one day be prosperous member states,” then it must reach out more enthusiastically and energetically, rather than “placing all responsibility for achieving this on these countries themselves”. ³

To create a sense of urgency, the Balkan nations should increase their advocacy not only towards EU states but also in the US, a country that maintains significant influence over Europe. To do this, the embassies of these nations in the US could either host joint conferences in collaboration with the think-tank community, and/or create a joint lobby group with regional countries pooling in their resources.

3- Leveraging the role of moderate Islamic clerics to counter extremism

Different regions of the world where Muslim populations are predominant are searching for methods to counter violent extremism. The role of clergy is key in this regard, who have often not lived up to the preset day requirements by coming out with a clear-cut narrative on what it means to be a good Muslim in the modern pluralistic societies. Their messages either promote hatred or do not publicly condemn extremism.

In a recent video, as it is doing in other places, the Islamic State (IS) has attempted to recruit Balkan citizens. It has also been attempting to extend its reach to the region. IS is trying to do this by promoting a distorted version of history and by claiming that the design of World War I was to conduct a “global assault by [infidel] nations against Islam” and that its primary goal was to “create nation states in the lands of the Muslims.” 4

According to the video, this humiliation can only be finished with a “hijra” (migration) to the IS-controlled territory in Iraq.

The Balkan states should engage with influential religious leaders in the region, and beyond, to promote tolerant views and to prevent extremist groups from misusing religion to their advantage. In this regard, influential Islamic clerics should emphasize that resorting to extremist ideologies is an unacceptable way to address the grievances people may have with their respective governments.

The think-tank community of the region can also play a pivotal role in understanding militant ideology and motivation. For example, the Tirana based think-tanks, Institute for Democracy and Mediation and the Albanian Institute for International Studies, have been conducting instrumental studies on preventing radicalization of masses. ⁵

4- Restoring hope in the State

The hopes of joining the EU have already improved rule of law and accountability, while at the same time reducing corruption in the Balkans. However, this progress is not shared equally amongst different states. Moreover, the region is experiencing a number of economic challenges; FDI is low, unemployment remains high, and the average salaries very low.

To tackles these issues, the governments would have to step up their efforts.
They  could do so by further supporting the local businesses and by developing regional and global commercial and academic linkages. The region can specially benefit from promoting tourism. Croatia has been particularly successful in promoting tourism on its coastal cities of Split and Dubrovnik.

When it comes to governance, Bosnia and Herzegovina poses the greatest challenge. The Dayton Accord, reached two decades ago, was praised for protecting representation of various ethnic groups in the government. However, the model that was established has created unique impediments for the proper functioning of a state. The formula had allowed Bosniaks (Muslims), Croats (Catholics) and Serbs (Orthodox) each to choose their own president, with the chairman of this tripartite Presidency rotating between the three every eight months.

It created one country, but two entities, The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (home to Bosniaks and Croats) and the Republika Srpska (dominated by ethnic Serbs). Today, Bosniaks aspire for a centralized government, Croats look for a third entity of their own, while the Republika Srpska seeks even greater autonomy. Such a political system essentially reduces any chances of improved governance.

To improve the state of affairs in Bosnia, perhaps there is a need to promote a Bosnian identity as opposed to a system that re-emphasizes ethnic divisions. Ultimately, Bosnia needs international support to establish a system of governance which is pluralistic, all-inclusive and progressive in nature. It needs a single head of state that can work towards benefiting the entire country.

5- Rebranding the region and developing best practices from within

Over the past few years, the Balkan nations have made considerable progress towards improving regional ties. For example, Slovenia and Croatia agreed to settle their border dispute through international arbitration, a move that was also ratified by the parliaments of both countries.

Moreover, under the outgoing EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, Serbia and Kosovo have also improved their relationship.⁶ While Serbia is not likely to recognize Kosovo’s independence in the near future, nonetheless, the two have started talking on various issues.

On the other hand, Albania has started to think beyond its historical rivalry with Greece by opening its doors to Greek investment.⁷ Furthermore, in October 2009, Kosovo and Macedonia concluded the demarcation of their border, which made Macedonia the first former Yugoslav republic to demarcate all of its borders.⁸

With these successes, the nations of the region have a tremendous opportunity to rebrand the global image of the Balkans. Instead of being associated with conflicts and divisions, the Balkans could become an image of diversity where different states and various ethnicities are actively trying to overcome the past and reaping the benefits.

This may also require them to reframe the challenges that are viewed as domestic to be now considered as international.

The trade of illicit drugs is one such area. It is generally accepted that the Balkan networks play a crucial role in facilitating the smuggling of Heroin from Afghanistan to Europe. As the European Stability Initiative points out, the heroin first has to pass through “EU members Greece, Bulgaria and Romania to even get to the Western Balkans,” and “Smugglers then still have to cross the external Schengen borders in Slovenia or Hungary as well”.9

Another area needing attention has to do with refugees, asylum seekers and migrants making their way across the Balkans. Increasingly, they are getting trapped in Serbia due to Hungary’s new wall and its border with Serbia

Addressing such issues would require a multilateral approach.

Conclusion

Since the breakup of former Yugoslavia, the Balkan countries have demonstrated progress on various fronts. To avoid the risks and overcome challenges, they would need to increase their advocacy in the US and the EU to fasten their membership prospects.

While the US and EU might not be investing heavily in the region, they still maintain a diplomatic leverage that helps in maintaining political stability. At the same time, Turkish and Chinese investments can help the region become economically more prosperous. It is imperative that the regional countries be willing to openly engage with all international players who can contribute to the stability and development of the region.

Additionally, the Balkan governments should work to improve local employment rates, attract more FDI, and develop local industries that include tourism. These countries should also engage influential religious figures in the region, and from beyond, to promote tolerant views and to prevent extremist groups from misusing religion.

In the emerging interconnected world, overcoming challenges require adopting regional and multilateral approaches to various issues. While ethnic tensions have bedeviled the region in the past, to avail future economic opportunities necessitates more interdependence and cooperation.

End Notes

1 http://csis.org/blog/western-balkans-turkey-back

2 www.novinite.com/articles/168778/Bulgaria,+Croatia+Unanimous+on+Need+of+Western+Balkans’+Integration+into+EU#sthash.tIXRepDo.dpuf

3 http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/ukraine-isis-wars-increase-europes-risks-in-western-balkans

4 http://www.rferl.org/content/islamic-state-balkans-targeted-message/27058370.html

5 http://idmalbania.org/?p=4195

6 http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=56484

7 http://www.newsweek.com/balkan-success-story-69243

8 http://www.usip.org/events/diplomacy-in-the-balkans

9 http://www.esiweb.org/rumeliobserver/2010/06/16/iiss-trafficking-and-stereotypes-about-the-wild-balkans/
About the Author:

Abdullah Khurram is a South Asia and Middle East Fellow at PoliTact and is based at Johns Hopkins University in Washington D.C. He just finished a tour of the Balkans where he was invited by the Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies in Ljubljana, Slovenia, to deliver a talk on the “Geopolitics in Middle East & South Asia: Lessons for the Balkans.”

The post A 5-Point Agenda For The Western Balkans appeared first on Politact.

Context
A media discussion on VOA Urdu program ‘Round Table’ held on June 22, 2015. The program covered the US Department of State report on extremism for 2014 and comparing it with PoliTact’s forecast that lays out the top 10 characteristics of the war against terror.

The panel included:

– PoliTact’s Chief Analyst Arif Ansar
– Former Interior Secretary of Pakistan Tasneem Noorani
– Editor of London based Newspaper ‘Western Affairs’ Manzar Qureshi
– Journalist Aqil Yusufzai,
– Brigadier (R) Saad Nazir from the Institute of Policy Studies Pakistan

Analysis

The post 2014 US State Department Report On Extremism And Characteristics Of The Campaign Against Terror appeared first on Politact.

Context

By Arif Ansar

In earlier articles different facets and phases of the ‘war against terror’ since it got underway, have been discussed. The terminology has almost become defunct as the balance of power in Middle East stands at a tipping point. Why that has happened is instrumental towards understanding the present status of the campaign against extremists.

For all intents and purposes, the first phase can be classified as the time frame between 9/11 and the demise of Osama bin Laden. The period between Operation Geronimo to the ignition of Yemen conflict can be termed as the second phase. While Yemen has been in the limelight for a while as a strong seat for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the departure of US Special Forces in March this year represented a turning point. The eruption of Yemen conflict in its current form, and the growing Saudi and Gulf involvement there, marks the beginning of the third phase.

Each period of the campaign was accompanied by its own sets of assumptions and characteristics that have been previously discussed. They are being summarized to recollect and help us understand the Stage III. Obviously, each one these patterns pose unique implications.

Phase III of the campaign against terror may see more direct interstate conflict which risks involving one or the other global power. And this will fundamentally change the nature of the conflict that was initially deemed as the war against Islamic extremists.

Mitigating far-flung security threats is one thing, risks that can imperil influence in the home sphere and economic lifeline of an aspiring or an established global power, is a different matter altogether.

Analysis

Character I – The growth of Non-State Actors of different colors accompanied by Asymmetric Warfare, which the conventional militaries were not trained to engage in.

These include Sunni Islamic State (IS, ISIL, ISIS, Daesh) and AQ that apparently do not listen to anyone. Since 9/11 many affiliates of AQ have also sprung up in the extremism inflicted regions. Some are loosely attached while others are more directly linked with AQ. In some instances, these associates are also perceived to be under the influence of a state entity.

On the other hand, there is the Shia Hezbollah acting as a proxy of Iran.
The third kind of non-state actors are nationalist in character such as the Kurds and Houthis, and moderate forces like Free Syrian Army (FSA) supported by the West, and others, against the extremists.

Character II – Future of extremism as represented by Fission and Fusion of Sunni extremists and the emergence of IS. The harmonization or divisions have resulted in new alignments amongst extremist posing ominous risks for the nation-states of the region and beyond. For examples the tussles between AQ and Associates against IS and Associates.

Character III – Societal transformation of extremist inflicted regions with increased polarization, growing religious conservatism, decreasing secular space and respect for minorities, with difficulty in achieving political consensus. The election results are narrow; power sharing formulas and unity governments are the outcome as witnessed in places like Iraq, Afghanistan and Tunisia.

In addition, this transformation has created a fear that religious parties may make it to the helm of power using the system, as occurred in Egypt. Preventing this is requiring constitutional amendments.

Character IV – The application of military force against extremists appears to have not worked and the political reconciliation is proving to be equally difficult; there are no clear winners or losers. The agenda of the extremists is often too harsh to reach any settlement. On the other hand, there is lack of ingenuity in crafting an alternative approach.

Character V – The tactics and strategies employed against extremists are mostly event/incident driven. Strategically, the emerging focus is on regional approaches and the onus is shifting towards western allies to take the lead in the fight against extremists and applying kinetic tactics. In many theaters of the war against terror, civil war like scenarios are now ripe, and Urban Warfare the likely outcome

Character VI – The weakening Nation-State structure is under dual economic and security pressures. The governments of the regions concerned are finding it harder and harder to govern as the multidimensional internal and external security risks intermingle and manifest. Internal divisions make it harder to deal with the external enemies, while those that pose external threats exploit internal risks. This dynamics produces a circular threat perception for the subject.

Character VII – Globalization and interconnectivity is being hindered by security apprehensions whether it be Trans Pacific Partnership, Kashgar-Gwadar Economic Corridor, Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project, or New Silk Road.

Economic aspirations now stand face to face with security concerns in many parts of the world, and the individual identity hangs in balance between the national, global, religious, tribal, and ethnic loyalties. The forces of religion and globalization are both acting against the nation-state structure and are often perceived as exploitive.

Character VIII – The cross-pollination of global power tussles, Arab Spring, and extremism has made the war against terror even more complex and motives confusing. This is amply visible in Syrian conflict. Moreover, weakening Europe and emerging BRICS have created a flux in the international systems, making the balancing act very stressful for international players.

Character IX – The future role of religion and the crisis of identity is brewing as nation states become weaker. Two key questions are emerging in this context:
one of them is equally applicable to the West and has to do with the settled debate of the separation of church and state. The other question is related to the extremist inflicted regions, in terms of who represents Islam.

Character X – The emergence of virtual soft weapons of mass destruction: Information and Cyber Warfare. The use of Social Media for radicalization, recruitment, and countering extremist messages and ideologies is an example. While the access to physical WMD’s is limited, these virtual soft weapons are freely available.

Arab and Western Perspectives

In essence, the campaign that was initially directed primarily against the perpetrators of 9/11 and their collaborators, have now spread to the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia. Afghanistan and Iraq, which were the focus of the Phase I and II, have remerged as a threat and have complicated western withdrawal strategies.

In Phase II, we saw other nations such as Syria, Libya and Yemen join the widening ring of instability. The beginning of Phase III is marked by gradual destabilization of the more secure states of the region, to include Egypt, Saudi Arabia and GCC, Jordan, Pakistan, and potentially India.

While the primary threat posed to these states initially came from the Sunni AQ and Associates, over time, the sectarian dimension and nationalist non-state actors (such as Kurds) have joined the fray. While the Western nations have remained supportive in the fight against Sunni extremists, when it comes to the sectarian angle and nationalist forces, their postures are more ambiguous. This has magnified the headaches for the respective states in question.

The present paranoia exhibited by Saudi Arabia and GCC nations is stemming from these contradictions. While the Sunni Arab nations have been fighting the war against Sunni non-state actors, the influence of Iran and Hezbollah has increased in places like Iraq and Syria. In contrast to opposing Hezbollah and Iran, the West entered in to negotiations with the country related to its nuclear program. According to the GCC nations, Iran’s behavior has been rewarded and this will embolden it. Imagine if Saudi Arabia was to do the same; back AQ and IS and then build a nuclear program, while at the same time threaten Israel and the West.

From the Western perspective, Sunni Arab nations have not led a spirited fight against Sunni extremists like Iran, Hezbollah, and Kurds have. Moreover, Western policy is premised first of all on preventing weapons of mass destruction falling in to the hands of extremists, or rogue and autocratic leaders that can threaten Israel or the West. Secondly, to prevent the extremists attacking Western targets again or becoming a proxy for an adversarial power in the future, along the lines of Afghan Jihad of the 80s.

As it stands now, Arab states are left with no leverage other than using the religious card. Even on the sensitive issue of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is Iran, Turkey, and to some extent Qatar, that took the lead. For its role, Qatar faced serious opposition with in the GCC.

In essence, the Iran deal, if finalized, contains its nuclear program, reduces the risk to Israel and the West, and thus strengthens it to become a strong ally in the fight against Sunni extremists. Additionally, it can help in pushing the Middle East Peace Process forward.

The Emerging Approach to the Middle East Peace

At an event hosted by Atlantic Council on May 7, the author asked the former US Special Envoy for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the present Executive Vice President of Brookings Institution, Martin Indyk, about how the Iranian nuclear deal and the US-Gulf partnership can help or hinder the Middle East Peace Process. Martine Indyk commented that the prospects of a solution emerging from an ‘inside out approach’ i.e., from with in Israel and Palestine, and independent of whatever else is going on in the Middle East, are not good. However, the potential for an ‘outside in’ solution which has emerged because of the possible Iran nuclear deal and Israeli and Arab countries being on the same side, might emerge with positive response because of the new strategic alignment in the region.

Speaking at the Heritage Foundation, Israeli envoy to the US, Ron Dermer, recently commented along the same line:

“They used to believe the key to that [a rapprochement with the Arab word] was solving the Palestinian question, and there is no doubt that issue cannot be ignored,” Dermer said.

He continued: “But as the prime minister said a few months ago, I’m not so sure the reverse won’t be true, meaning that I don’t know if Israel and Palestinian peace will unlock wider rapprochement with the Arab world. It might be broader rapprochement with the Arab world will unlock Israeli-Palestinian peace. We should be focusing the next few years on how we can take advantage of this historic aligning of interests between Israel and our Arab neighbors.”

(Note: It’s too early to tell if a similar ‘Outside In’ approach is applicable towards other festering hot spots, such as Afghanistan and Kashmir. However, despite differences, parallels do exist, and PoliTact will be researching this comparison further.)

The US Elections and Middle East

From the Arab and GCC perspective, the shift in the regional balance of power towards Iran is an additional danger to their security, perhaps even bigger than that posed by Sunni extremists. This view is shared by Israel and the Republican Party in the US, which is in control of both the House and the Senate. This is why the next US election is becoming so crucial. On it depends the direction of the Middle East; will the new American president share the threat perception of Israel and Arab allies, is in contention. In addition, the foreign policy hawks in the Republican Party also want US to once again take an aggressive role in the fight against extremists and against Russia and China.

Extremism and Global Players

US, Russia, and China, and other global powers, share the threat from Islamic extremists and have supported the fight against them in one form or the other. While US has been doing the heavy lifting, other powers have facilitated by building capacity of the allies; by giving training and providing military equipment. Moreover, they have also helped by allowing the use of their territories as part of the crucial supply lines for the campaign against extremists.

However, as the regional states become more entangled in this fight, and with their future at stake, the question for these global players is: what does the change in the regional equilibrium of power means for the global balance. Or in other words, what does the extending arc of instability in these regions implies for their security and economic interests.

In essence, three main considerations arise from this for the global players:

Firstly, if the states involved in the campaign against extremists, which may be allied with China and Russia, start faltering, what would that mean for their global positioning?

Secondly, how will these powers react to the activities of the competitor in their perceived home spheres of influence?

For example, Russia has cooperated with the West when it comes to Syrian chemical weapons and the Iran nuclear deal, as being part of P5+1, but it is playing a different role when it comes to the affairs of Ukraine. Similarly, China would evaluate its posture in South and Central Asia in comparison to what occurs as part of the ‘Pivot to Asia’ US policy.

Thirdly, what would be their contingency plans if the regions engulfed by extremism sink to full fledge chaos that may impact global energy and trade flows?

The Chinese and Russian energy deals may be the direct result of these assessments. On the other hand, US has also made big gains towards energy independence while Europe is still caught in the bind. Phase III of the campaign against terror may see more direct interstate conflict which risks involving one or the other global power. And this will fundamentally change what was initially deemed as the war against Islamic extremists.

While mitigating far-flung security threats is one thing, risks that can imperil influence in the home sphere and economic lifeline of an aspiring or an established global power, is a different matter all together.

The post The Future Of The War Against Extremists; The Arrival Of Stage III appeared first on Politact.

Context

Arif Ansar

Mixed reviews have emerged on the threat posed by IS to South Asia. One of the arguments postulates that the group will not be able to make significant inroads because the socio-political and religious terrain of the Middle East and South Asia are fundamentally different. Others have pointed out to the geographic reasons for why IS may not be able to fully penetrate South Asia; the two regions are obviously separated by Iran, a Shia power. The most dangerous development can be the coming together of AQ and IS in the future.

In its past analysis, PoliTact has projected that the affairs of Middle East, especially related to extremism and Iran’s nuclear program, were likely to dominate the affairs of South Asia at some point. Associated with this assessment was an alarm that if the Afghan reconciliation process lingers on for too long, as it has, the dynamics of the Arab politics may start to complicate the Afghan affairs, including Pakistan and India, in a manner they have not in the past. Now we feel it is beginning to happen in the form of Islamic State (IS).

Core Al Qaeda (AQ) has long had a presence in the region and has morphed in to a phenomenon known as AQ and Associates. The introduction of IS in to the extremist mix has considerably raised the stakes for the region. In a series of articles, PoliTact is examining the various facets of the threat posed by IS to the South Asia region, which will ultimately project towards Central Asia. Speaking at a conference held at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC on March 17, Kazakhstan’s Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Yerzhan Ashikbayev, noted that his country is deeply worried about the reports of IS presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan and is closely monitoring the situation.

Analysis

Different Understandings Of The IS Threat

In a recent development six leading TTP figures – Shahidullah Shahid, Hafiz Saeed Khan, Hafiz Daulat Khan, Maulana Gul Zaman, Mufti Hassan and Khalid Mansoor – swore allegiance to the IS. As widely reported, the IS spokesman Muhammad al-Adnani officially recognized the wilayah of Khorasan on January 26. He also designated Hafiz Saeed Khan, a former commander of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Orakzai tribal agency, as regional commander. On the other hand, Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadim, a former Afghan Taliban commander, was appointed as the deputy regional chief.

PoliTact’s South Asia Fellow Shreyas Deshmukh noted in his analysis of these reports:

“Against the backdrop of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) withdrawal from Afghanistan, ongoing military operations against TTP in Pakistan and the crucial Afghan peace talks, such unprecedented changes at the high level of Taliban leadership along with the spread of the IS ideology and influence will only strengthen the morale of terrorists in the South Asian region.”

On the other hand, PoliTact’s director for strategic initiatives Dr Claude Rakists commented: “what this means in practical, military terms is difficult to assess today. However, what it does imply is that AQ’s pull in Pakistan is weakening and that its level of influence has diminished under the leadership of Ayman Al Zawahri. Zwahiri’s public stunt of creating a South Asia branch of Al-Qaeda (AQIS) did little to hide this. On the contrary, it confirmed its desperate search for relevance in the wake of IS’s meteoric rise in the world of terrorism. The decision by the leader of the Pakistan-based Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan to also swear allegiance to IS in October 2014 was further confirmation of Al-Qaeda’s fast diminishing weight in Pakistan’s tribal areas.”

Commenting on the motivation behind these Taliban desertions, PoliTact’s South and Central Asia Fellow Zia-ur-Rehman noted:

“An official in Afghan government believe that the elements who are part of the IS, especially Khadim, who swore his allegiance to al-Baghdadi and became IS’s local leader, have lost their connections with Quetta Shura. According to the official, their key motivation is clear; IS is a strong brand and they can regain some of their prestige and show their muscle to the leadership of Afghan Taliban.”

What The Region Thinks

Despite these developments, confusion regarding IS and its regional ambitions persists in Pakistan. Speaking to the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee in February, Foreign Secretary, Azaz Ahmed Chaudhry, admitted that IS poses a serious concern and that the government is taking all necessary steps to counter the risk. On the other hand, Pakistan’s Interior Minister dismissed the IS threat as media hype in Washington while attending the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism.

Speaking at the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) on February 18, Pakistan’s Interior Minister Chuadhry Nisar Ali Khan vehemently denied that IS had any presence in Pakistan. Moreover, he added that the extremist space in the region is already full and has no room to accommodate IS. Furthermore, he emphasized to use the regional context to understand the extremist landscape and avoid generalization. What he probably meant was that Pakistan does not want to get entangled in another round of ‘do more’ demands, or to get sucked in to the to the Arab-Iranian politics.

Chaudhry Nisar’s cautious approach is similar to the Indian posture towards IS. India has maintained a low profile on the issue and does not want to unnecessarily complicate its relations with the GCC states, on which it depends heavily for energy needs, importing roughly 59 percent of its oil. According to a World Bank report, in 2013 India received about $73 billion in remittances from the Middle East, where nearly seven million Indians reside as guest workers.

During President Obama’s visit to India in January, US Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes commented, “When you look at our broader counter-terrorism cooperation and how we’re tracking the flow of fighters and terrorist financing there, I do think we want to find space for cooperation,” he told journalists. However, when it comes the risks posed by extremists from the direction of Afghanistan and Pakistan, US-India security cooperation goes beyond the realm of tracking finances.

On the other hand, the Afghan governments understanding of the IS threat is different than Pakistan and India. President Ashraf Ghani told the Munich Security Conference on February 8: “… And it is very important not to isolate the events from Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya from what is unfolding in Afghanistan and South Asia. Because the threats from the network perspective are becoming stronger, the state response is, unfortunately, weaker.”

US and NATO are also not taking the IS threat to the region lightly especially after how events have unfolded in Iraq. A drone strike early in February took out its main recruiter and recently appointed deputy regional commander, Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadim. Speaking at the Woodrow Wilson Center on March 17, Director at the office of OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) Secretary General, Ambassador Marcel Pesko, noted that IS can spoil the Afghan reconciliation process. Moreover, he stated that as the Afghan peace talks pick speed, the IS phenomenon in the region may get worse.

The IS threat may be behind the review of the number of forces that would remain in Afghanistan and the withdrawal timeline, being undertaken by the new US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter. However, the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan is one of the key demands of the Afghan Taliban before it would reconcile. Dr Shahrbanou Tadjbaksh noted at the Woodrow Wilson Center on March 17 that IS can spoil President Ashraf Ghani’s vision for regional connectivity. Furthermore, she pointed out that the interests of regional states are a bigger threat to Afghanistan than those posed by the non-state actors.

The Associates Of IS, AQ And The Future

The present enhanced security cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, including Pakistan’s on-going military operations in FATA, are likely being stimulated by an emerging trend that has already settled in the Middle East, and may be now moving towards the South and Central Asia. This pattern is the infighting between the associates of AQ and IS.

As reflected above, the full shape of what constitutes the Associates of IS in South and Central Asia is still in the formative stages. Nonetheless, as it evolves it can disrupt the nascent Afghan reconciliation process and with implications for India. To understand how this trend can unfold, the past provides one sample. In a dangerous development in December 2011, AQ, Afghan Taliban, and TTP representatives came together in the form of a consultative body called Shura-e-Murakeba.

Senior Al Qaeda leader Abu Yahya al-Libi as well as Siraj-ud-din Haqqani of Haqqani network, attended the meetings to form this Shura. Reportedly, other leaders attending included Hakimullah Mehsud and his deputy Waliur Rehman of TTP. Spokesperson for TTP, Ehsanullah Ehsan had stated that Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahdur, which Pakistan considered as Good Taliban, including Zabiullah Mujahid and Maulvi Sangeen, were also present. Some accounts suggest that Mullah Omar had sent Siraj Haqqani and Mullah Mansour to broker the agreement.

The congregations had produced the following outcomes: sort out differences between the groups; avoiding the unnecessary killings and kidnappings for ransom; ending of attacks on Pakistan’s military and refocusing of efforts towards US led coalition in Afghanistan. The timing of the birth of the Shura is noteworthy, the body came in to being after the November, 2011 NATO Mohmand attack. The incident resulted in the death of 26 Pakistani soldiers.

In a fashion similar to the meetings under Shura-e-Murakebha, Pakistan’s Punjab based jihadist also came together at the time. Banned religious group Jamaatud Dawa (JD) protested against the granting of most favored nation (MFN) to India, and declared it was ready for jihad against NATO. The gathering of 44 right wing entities was held under the banner of the Difaa-i-Pakistan Council (Pakistan Defense Council).

These meetings were interpreted by some as Pakistan’s attempt to pull the Islamists together in the aftermath of the NATO Mohmand attack. The coming together of extremist leaders in the form of Shura-e-Murakeba was also working against the strategy of dividing the AQ and Associates. Irrespective of this, as the US-Pakistan relations improved, many of the participants of the FATA conferences have since been eliminated. However, the fear has persisted that Pakistan and its military maintains some level of influence on various militant and extremist groups, a case consistently reinforced by India. In the aftermath of the Army Public School (APS) attack in Peshawar, and via Operation Zarb-e-Azb, Pakistan now suggests it has dropped the classification of Good and Bad Taliban.

In the future, IS could become the centripetal force for disgruntled extremists of all sorts, leading to friction and infighting between various configurations of extremists, with the states caught in the middle, as is the case in the Middle East. This could further complicate Afghan reconciliation and normalization of Pakistan-India ties. On a more ominous note, IS could potentially compete against Pakistan’s alleged influence over some groups. While the consistent pressure on Core AQ may have indeed weakened it, the emergence of IS has created an opportunity and a focal point for the Associates of AQ to gravitate towards. This is a potent reason for Pakistan and India to resume results oriented dialog.

The post Understanding The Threat Posed By Islamic State To South Asia appeared first on Politact.