The Geography of Stalemate: Risk Thresholds, Narrative Warfare, and the Quest for a New Regional Order

By Naade Ali

Context

Since the war began, it has become clear that the U.S., Israel, and Iran operate with fundamentally different risk thresholds—and those differences shape their strategies. The U.S. is less willing to tolerate prolonged economic strain but more inclined to employ overwhelming force, assuming it will bring the conflict to a swift conclusion. Israel, on the other hand, is betting on a scenario in which Iranian strikes on Gulf states provoke diplomatic backlash, potentially drawing those states into retaliatory action. Such a chain of events could pave the way for the broader regional alignment envisioned by Prime Minister Netanyahu, aimed at countering “radical Shi’a and Sunni forces” and ultimately weakening the Iranian regime. Israel, therefore, is prepared to bear the costs necessary to make this outcome possible.

From Iran’s perspective, the goal is to prevent this scenario from unfolding while influencing on GCC that American military presence on their soil has a cost and no benefit. Iran’s mosaic military doctrine is designed to endure sustained pressure while simultaneously increasing unpredictability and risk, making its actions more dangerous and uncertain. This high-risk tolerance remains one of its few tools to establish and maintain deterrence—something it is unlikely to compromise.

Iran’s geography plays a key role in its Anti-Access/Area-Denial

At present, it appears that the world’s most advanced military systems, equipped with cutting-edge and futuristic capabilities, are fundamentally constrained by geographical realities. Iran’s geography is a central “force multiplier” for its Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategy, effectively turning the country into a natural fortress that complicates any conventional military intervention. The superior airpower fielded by Israel and the United States has not translated into absolute control over critical chokepoints held by Iran, nor has it succeeded in dismantling the undersea and “Undermountain” missile infrastructure that keeps Iran’s defensive network largely operational and difficult to conquer despite relentless bombardment. These deeply embedded installations, carved into the Zagros Mountains, act as fortified nodes that enable Iran to sustain command-and-control functions.

While air strikes can degrade capabilities, complete neutralization requires a high-intensity land campaign—a scenario fraught with risk. Iran’s military doctrine leverages its unique topography, using natural barriers and limited access points to offset an adversary’s technological edge. For any invading force, the combination of logistical hurdles and Iran’s mastery of its difficult terrain makes a quick victory highly improbable. Consequently, U.S. strategy faces a stark trade-off: rely on stand-off strikes that degrade but do not eliminate threats, or escalate toward high-risk options for more decisive results. This geographic and structural advantage effectively cements a strategic stalemate, as Iran’s hardened infrastructure and ‘natural fortress’ prevent any effort from achieving a rapid military outcome.

For Iran, prolonging the conflict appears to be the preferred course at this stage. Tehran has deliberately increased the costs of the war to unprecedented levels so it can have maximum leverage in negotiations with the United States, with its core demands of—financial compensation, the removal of all sanctions, a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region and recognition of its control over strategic maritime chokepoints.

Iran’s use of threat language is particularly significant in this regard. The rhetoric can exert psychological pressure on adversaries, yet it risks backfiring if not supported by actual capability. In Iran’s case, however, its warnings have proven credible rather than symbolic. This is demonstrated by its selective attacks on regional countries and control over the Strait of Hormuz, where only vessels linked to China are permitted passage, effectively transforming global trade into a strategic instrument against the U.S. alliance.

The Narrative Pivot: Trump’s Strategy of Perception Over Conquest

In the conflict with Iran, Trump’s “winning card” is his ability to control the narrative, prioritizing the appearance of victory over the reality of a physical win. He relies on narrative dominance, using the perception of a diplomatic breakthrough to maintain both domestic support and global leverage. While he projects an image of Iran “begging” for a deal, the actual conflict on the ground remains a complex stalemate.

The sudden and highly visible emphasis on diplomacy, initiated under the Islamabad Talks, reflects a calculated effort to manage domestic expectations through narrative control. By steering attention toward backchannel negotiations, President Trump diverts focus from military challenges or internal criticism. It illustrates a broader tactic of strategic distraction: when one narrative weakens, another is introduced to create uncertainty. This deliberate blurring of facts makes it harder for the public to form clear judgments or hold leadership accountable. In this way, confusion becomes a tool—dampening opposition and creating space for an exit framed more by optics than by conventional military success.

On the other side, deeper internal challenges confronting the Trump administration are becoming increasingly evident. Among them is a formal Pentagon request for $200 billion to sustain military operations, a proposal that has provoked strong criticism and concern among both Democrats and fiscal conservatives in Congress. Democrats are actively leveraging the conflict for political advantage, accusing Trump of leading the United States into an unnecessary and prolonged war while positioning themselves ahead of the November midterm elections in hopes of securing a legislative majority. Meanwhile, Republicans with long-term political aspirations—like Vice President JD Vance, widely considered a likely contender for the 2028 presidential race—are encountering increasing challenges in presenting a persuasive “America First” vision as the conflict drags on.

It was during the widespread fatigue and disillusionment from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that Trump originally solidified his “America First” persona. Yet, the prolonged confrontation with Iran threatens to undermine that narrative, as rising casualties, economic strain, and geopolitical entanglements make it harder for emerging Republican leaders to argue for restrained foreign intervention while projecting strength abroad. Vance and others must now navigate a delicate balance: appealing to a voter base that values both national security and fiscal prudence, while demonstrating that they can manage a complex, protracted conflict without repeating the mistakes of previous administrations. This tension illustrates how domestic political ambitions are increasingly intertwined with the outcomes and perception of foreign military engagements.

As a result, the U.S. campaign against Iran has generated numerous challenges and setbacks that outweigh its tactical military achievements to date.

Israeli Game Plan

For Israel, the conflict represents a rare and historic opportunity to significantly weaken Iran. The country appears prepared for a prolonged confrontation; recent surveys indicate that 81% of Israelis support military action, with many willing to endure sustained attacks to see the collapse of the Iranian regime. Years of conflict with Hamas and Hezbollah have conditioned Israel to absorb both psychological and physical strain. In such an environment, hardship becomes normalized, allowing for greater societal resilience. While both Iran and Israel appear capable of enduring prolonged shocks, the United States lacks the same tolerance, creating a possible divergence in strategic trajectories.

In Israel’s view, the objective is to push further toward definitive regime change. However, it recognizes that airstrikes alone are unlikely to achieve this goal, which is why it is increasingly considering the possibility of a ground invasion, potentially with U.S. support. Such a move, however, would likely initiate a prolonged conflict. Israel understands that ending the war prematurely would risk undermining the gains it has already made. While this could help the Israeli government to maintain domestic unity by framing the conflict as an existential necessity, it would not necessarily produce similar political benefits for President Trump or his Republican Party at home.

For the United States, one possible course could involve stepping back and allowing Iran and Israel to confront each other directly. However, Iran appears to have anticipated such a scenario and does not intend for the conflict to remain confined. Its recent shift in military doctrine—confirmed by Major General Ali Abdollahi as a transition from defense to offense—indicates an ambition to expand the effects of the war from a regional to a global scale. By exploiting interconnected vulnerable systems of energy, food, and trade, Iran seeks to create a cascading effect in which damage inflicted upon it reverberates worldwide. Its broader objective appears to be the erosion of U.S. dominance and the restructuring of global power toward a Chinese-centered order.

By encouraging Arab states to align with China’s Global Security Initiative, Iran is promoting an alternative model of security that prioritizes sovereignty over U.S. involvement. In effect, it is attempting to achieve through warfare what China could not accomplish solely through economic means. This strategic gameplay was acknowledged by President Trump himself, who described the situation as a ‘big chess game’ suggesting that Iran is acting as a “smart player, playing high-level chess.”

Iran is striving to ensure that any resolution to the conflict will not restore the pre-war status quo. Instead, it seeks to extract maximum gains whenever negotiations take place. If Iran’s objectives are realized and revenues begin to flow, Iran would not only rebuild its economy but also invest heavily in military modernization, developing capabilities that could prove extremely difficult to counter in any future confrontation.

This prospect is deeply concerning for Israel, which anticipates that a post-war Iran could emerge as a highly militarized and resilient power. From Israel’s perspective, the only viable strategy is to continue the war and ensure that Iran is weakened to such an extent that rebuilding its military strength would take decades. However, such an approach demands sustained endurance, strategic patience, and a high tolerance for risk—traits that Iran has already demonstrated.

Whether Israel can maintain this level of resilience remains uncertain, and this question will become clearer as the conflict continues. This is not a short-term confrontation, but a prolonged struggle likely to reshape regional power dynamics. With diplomatic positions varying and domestic political pressures mounting, the conflict is likely to persist. The result is a negative-sum dynamic in which decisive victory remains unlikely; escalation risks stay high, and any eventual endgame will reflect not shared interests but the relative exhaustion and leverage of the parties involved.

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The post The US-Israel and Iran Conflict: The Interplay of Goals and Strategies appeared first on Politact.

By Arif Ansar

Context

The Middle East’s contemporary realignment did not begin with the war between Iran and Israel, nor with Iranian strikes on U.S. bases across the Gulf. It began earlier, with the slow erosion of faith in a security order built on American primacy, Israeli military overmatch, and the assumption of Arab strategic compliance. The Israeli strike on Doha in September 2025 merely stripped away the last illusions. What followed was not unity, but fragmentation. Instead, the Islamic world entered a phase of deliberate Middle Power alliance‑building, driven by layered threat perceptions and an urgent desire for strategic autonomy.

At the center of this transformation is a paradox. The region is witnessing the rise of new alliances, yet these alliances are not designed to fight a single enemy. They are instead meant to buffer against multiple threats simultaneously: Iranian asymmetry, Israeli unilateralism, and U.S. unpredictability. Complicating this further is the re‑emergence of the “Greater Israel” narrative, which has amplified regional fears that Israeli military power is no longer bounded by defensive logic alone.

From Gulf Unity to Gulf Divergence

For much of the post‑Arab Spring period, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates were viewed as the twin pillars of Arab order. They coordinated in Yemen, aligned against political Islam, and worked closely with Washington. That partnership now seem to have fractured into a structural rivalry rooted in fundamentally different understandings of power and risk.

Saudi Arabia has increasingly embraced a state‑centric, formalized security approach and strategic autonomy. Scarred by years of proxy warfare and conscious of the vulnerability of its economic transformation under Vision 2030, Riyadh has grown wary of open‑ended confrontation—particularly wars triggered by actors outside its control. Iranian attacks on energy infrastructure, U.S. bases, and shipping lanes reinforced Saudi fears not just of Tehran, but of being caught between Washington and Tehran. This explains Riyadh’s pivot toward formal defense guarantees, most notably with Pakistan, and its growing strategic convergence with Turkey.

The UAE, by contrast, has doubled down on a networked, maritime, and technology‑driven security model. Abu Dhabi prefers flexible alignments, proxy leverage, and intelligence dominance over rigid alliance hierarchies. Its deepening ties with Israel and India reflect a desire to hedge not only against Iran, but also against Saudi Arabia’s ambition to re‑centralize Arab leadership. This divergence—well captured in PoliTact’s analysis of Saudi‑UAE power tussles with Turkey and Iran—has become one of the most important drivers of bloc formation in the region. The result is not a split over ideology, but over risk management. Riyadh fears escalation without control; Abu Dhabi fears marginalization within a Saudi‑led order.

As Middle Power alliances harden across the Middle East, the other Gulf states—Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait—illustrate divergent strategies for managing exposure, autonomy, and survival amid the erosion of the U.S.-centric security order. Unlike Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which seek to shape regional outcomes through competing alliance architectures, these states operate primarily as system navigators, each responding differently to rising unilateralism and unmanaged escalation.

Qatar occupies the most exposed position. Its foreign policy has emphasized mediation, diplomatic connectivity, and hosting high‑level interlocutors, allowing Doha to play a central role in ceasefire negotiations and crisis diplomacy. This strategy, however, has carried increasing risk. The Israeli airstrike in Doha in September 2025—widely analyzed as a stress test for Gulf mediation and U.S. security guarantees—demonstrated the limits of protection derived from connectivity alone and raised questions about the durability of mediator immunity in a more permissive strike environment. Mediation provides access and relevance, but as escalation becomes kinetic, it offers diminishing insulation.

Bahrain represents the opposite strategy. Rather than seeking autonomy through flexibility, Manama has embedded itself deeply within Saudi‑led and U.S.‑aligned security structures. Hosting the U.S. Fifth Fleet and relying on external guarantees for regime stability, Bahrain externalizes risk upward to larger patrons, trading strategic maneuverability for protection. This approach offers short‑term stability but reduces Bahrain’s ability to hedge as the regional order fragments.

Oman occupies a quieter middle ground. Like Qatar, Muscat prioritizes mediation, but it does so through deliberate low visibility and strategic restraint. Omani diplomacy is characterized by neutrality, confidentiality, and avoidance of high‑profile military entanglements, allowing it to act as an intermediary without becoming a primary target. This combination has enabled Oman to preserve autonomy with comparatively lower exposure.

Kuwait, meanwhile, adopts a strategy of institutional caution. Its foreign policy emphasizes international law, neutrality, and multilateral legitimacy, shaped in part by domestic constitutional constraints and a historically empowered legislature. Kuwait avoids both alliance leadership and high‑risk mediation, focusing instead on predictability and restraint as a means of survival.

Taken together, these cases highlight the narrowing options available to small states in a region increasingly defined by unilateral force and competitive alignment. Flexibility, dependence, invisibility, and restraint each offer partial protection—but none fully insulate against a security environment in which traditional guarantees no longer reliably constrain escalation.

The Emergence of an “Islamic NATO” and Hexagon Alignment

Out of this environment has emerged what is increasingly described as an Islamic NATO‑style alignment, anchored by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, with Turkey as a central pillar. This bloc is often misunderstood as a purely anti‑Iran coalition. In reality, it is built on three overlapping threat perceptions.

First is Iranian asymmetry: missile forces, drones, and proxies that threaten energy infrastructure and regime stability. Second is U.S. unpredictability—the fear that American military decisions, often aligned closely with Israeli objectives, could entangle Muslim states in wars they neither seek nor control. Third is Israeli strategic autonomy, particularly as Israel demonstrates a willingness to strike across borders without regard for Arab diplomatic calculations.

The Pakistan–Saudi defense agreement reflects this logic. Pakistan offers nuclear credibility and conventional depth; Turkey provides expeditionary experience, NATO interoperability, and drone warfare expertise; Saudi Arabia contributes financial resources and diplomatic weight. Together, they form a deterrence architecture designed less to confront Israel directly than to prevent Muslim states from being involuntary participants in U.S.–Israeli campaigns. This bloc is therefore as much about autonomy as opposition.

Parallel to the perceived Islamic NATO is a looser but influential alignment in infancy, centered on Israel, India, and potentially UAE—often described as a Hexagon Alliance when extended to include additional partners. This bloc is driven by a different hierarchy of threats and economic incentives. For Israel, the priority remains Iran, but also the risk of regional isolation should Sunni states consolidate into a unified security framework. India views the Gulf through the lens of maritime security, energy flows, and competition with China. The UAE sees in this alignment a way to offset Saudi leadership ambitions while retaining access to Israeli technology and U.S. strategic networks. This bloc is not primarily anti‑Islamic. It is anti‑consolidation. Its purpose is to ensure that no single Sunni‑led alliance can dominate the region’s security architecture.

Greater Israel as a Strategic Disruptor
One of the most destabilizing factors shaping alliance behavior today is not a military doctrine, but a narrative: the re‑emergence of the idea of Greater Israel. While not an official policy of the Israeli state, the concept—rooted in religious‑nationalist ideology and echoed by influential political figures—has gained unprecedented visibility during and after the Gaza war. Regional actors interpret this discourse as signaling a rejection of territorial finality and Palestinian sovereignty. Al Jazeera and Middle East Eye have documented how references to biblical borders and permanent Israeli control “from the river to the sea” have triggered alarm across Arab and Muslim capitals.

The destabilizing effect of the Greater Israel narrative is threefold. First, it reframes Israeli military action as potentially expansionist rather than defensive. Second, it undermines the political sustainability of normalization agreements by making it harder for Arab leaders to justify cooperation without a Palestinian resolution. Third, it reinforces the perception that U.S. power in the region is structurally aligned with Israeli territorial objectives rather than regional stability. Even states aligned with Israel, such as the UAE, hedge against this uncertainty. Others respond by accelerating independent deterrence mechanisms.

Great Power Rivalry and the Turn to Hedging

The Islamic world is no longer a passive theater of Great Power rivalry. It is actively shaping a multipolar order in which Middle Powers hedge against everyone—including their allies. The Saudi–UAE split, the rise of Islamic NATO and Hexagon formations, the disruptive force of the Greater Israel narrative, and the quiet advance of China and Russia all point to the same conclusion: the era of uncontested security hierarchies in the Middle East is over. What replaces it is not stability, but agency. And in a region long defined by external control, that may be the most consequential shift of all.

As regional blocs multiply, China and Russia benefit not by conquest but by optionality. China’s deepening involvement in South Asia and the Gulf—through infrastructure, security arrangements, energy, and industrial investment—positions Beijing as an indispensable economic partner to all sides without entanglement in regional wars. Russia, meanwhile, offers selective military alternatives, reinforcing a multipolar security environment in which no single actor dominates. Neither power demands ideological alignment; both profit from fragmentation.

Who Are These Alliances Really Meant to Counter?

The central question—who are these alliances meant to counter—has no single answer. They are not aimed solely at Iran, Israel, or the United States. They seemed designed to manage uncertainty in a system where all three generate risk. Iran threatens through asymmetry. Israel threatens through unilateral escalation and expansionist rhetoric. The United States threatens—not intentionally, but structurally—through unpredictability and alignment choices that subordinate regional interests to global strategy and balance of power calculations.

For Saudi Arabia, Iran is dangerous not only because of missiles and proxies, but because Iranian escalation reliably draws in U.S. and Israeli responses that Riyadh does not command. For the UAE, Iran is disruptive but manageable through deterrence, diversification, and diplomacy. For Israel, Iran is framed as an existential threat demanding pre‑emptive action. For Turkey and Pakistan, Iran is a competitor to be balanced, not annihilated.

Iran’s retaliatory attacks on U.S. bases in GCC states did not unify the region. Instead, they exposed the costs of hosting American power. Gulf monarchies found themselves targeted not for their own actions, but for decisions made in Washington and Tel Aviv. As the Carnegie Endowment has noted, this dynamic has pushed Gulf states toward independent security thinking rather than deeper reliance on U.S. guarantees. In this sense, Iran functions less as the architect of regional order than as its accelerator—forcing others to adapt. The alliances forming across the Islamic world appear to be alliances of insulation, not crusades. They seek to preserve autonomy, reduce exposure, and prevent any single power from dictating outcomes.

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The post Geopolitics Of Islamic World And Middle Power Alliances After Iran Attack appeared first on Politact.

By Arif Ansar

Context

In the aftermath of the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021—formalized through the Doha Accords of 2020—South Asia has entered an entirely new and volatile phase. The Taliban’s return to power, their continued lack of international recognition, and the deepening conflict along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border have collectively reshaped the region’s geopolitical contours. What once was envisaged as an American “peace deal” has since evolved into a crucible of power rivalries, ideological contestations, and security dilemmas extending far beyond Kabul.

Amid this changing landscape, Washington finds itself confronting an old question in a new era: What strategic interests does the United States still have at stake in Afghanistan? This question gained renewed urgency after the tragic shooting near the White House on the eve of Thanksgiving in 2025, when Rahmanullah Lakanwal—a former Afghan supporter of U.S. forces who immigrated under the Protect America Operation—opened fire, killing two National Guard members. The attack, still under investigation, reignited the debate about the consequences of U.S. disengagement from Afghanistan and the enduring ripple effects of America’s two-decade military presence.

To assess these evolving dynamics, The Middle East Institute (MEI) collaborated with PoliTact to host a Webinar in November last year to explore these aspects centered around the evolving situation of Afghanistan and if merits a fresh policy and approach. Earlier in May, soon after the four-day conflict between Pakistan and India, MEI also conducted a discussion with regional experts to assess President Trump’s policy towards Taliban. Both discussions were moderated by Dr. Marvin Weibnbaum, the Director of Afghanistan-Pakistan Center.

Through these deliberations, a sobering consensus emerged: the U.S. has abandoned its nation-building ambition, replacing it with a strictly transactional and selective engagement guided by short-term counterterrorism and strategic interests. This shift marks a watershed in South Asian geopolitics—one in which regional powers like Pakistan, India, China, and Russia are recalibrating alliances, while the Taliban’s regime struggles to define its sovereignty amid growing internal fractures and international isolation.

Counterterrorism and Pragmatism

According to panelists such as Joshua White and David Sedney, Washington’s current strategy toward South Asia is driven not by ideology or doctrine but by political expediency. The United States, still wary of being drawn into another endless conflict, now prefers “quick interventions that can be framed as political wins” without the burden of prolonged commitments. At the heart of this approach lies counterterrorism (CT)—the only enduring U.S. interest in Afghanistan. The Taliban, Washington, and Pakistan paradoxically, share a common adversary: the Islamic State–Khorasan Province (ISKP). While formal cooperation remains limited, intelligence coordination to prevent ISKP attacks has emerged as a rare channel of pragmatic engagement. Adjunct Professor at George Town University, Doug London, underscored this convergence, observing that neither Washington nor the Taliban can afford an al-Qaeda-style attack “with fingerprints all over Afghanistan.” Thus, even hostile actors find themselves bound by mutual survival instincts.

Another dimension of U.S. engagement is transactional diplomacy—a pragmatic mechanism aimed at resolving targeted issues such as hostage recovery and retrieval of left-behind military assets. As former Afghan ambassador Javid Ahmad explained, these dealings often blur ethical lines; American captives have been freed in exchange for concessions, including the removal of Haqqani Network bounties. Similarly, billions of dollars’ worth of infrastructure and equipment left during the withdrawal remain part of simmering behind-the-scenes negotiations—either to buy back through intermediaries like Pakistan or to ensure their destruction to prevent exploitation.

Pakistan’s position in this matrix is particularly complex. While the U.S. remains a visible interlocutor, Islamabad’s deepest strategic alignment continues to be with China. Pakistan leverages Washington’s engagement as a counterbalance against overreliance on Beijing. According to the panelists, efforts to “reset” U.S.-Pakistan relations on the basis of trade, minerals, and counterterrorism cooperation may refresh dialogue but are unlikely to override hard security realities.

Human Rights and the Counterterrorism Dilemma

The Taliban’s domestic policies, particularly toward women and civil society, continue to complicate U.S. engagement. As Lisa Curtis observed, the regime has demonstrated “no change in policies” from its 1990s practices—the repression of women and stifling of dissent remain total. This poses a moral and strategic crisis for Washington: how to cooperate on counterterrorism while refusing to legitimize a regime that flagrantly violates human rights.

Curtis argued that sacrificing principles for intelligence access risks undermining long-term stability, as repression fuels extremism by creating ungoverned spaces ripe for recruitment. Yet London countered that, in practice, the U.S. often cooperates with regimes that commit abuses when it aligns with national interests, effectively separating human rights advocacy from realpolitik.

The delicate balance between moral credibility and strategic necessity defines Washington’s Afghan dilemma—where human rights concerns, while loudly voiced, often take a back seat to the imperatives of terrorism prevention.

The TTP Factor

When U.S. troops exited Afghanistan, many in Pakistan assumed the Taliban’s ascension would enhance Islamabad’s regional leverage. Instead, the opposite has occurred. The enduring ties between the Afghan Taliban and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have emerged as the central source of cross-border friction, destabilizing Pakistan more than any external actor.

Since the short but intense four-day war between Pakistan and India in May 2025, border skirmishes between the Taliban and Pakistani forces have intensified, reflecting a broader regional unraveling. Analysts such as Sedney describe these clashes as a subtext of the larger India-Pakistan rivalry, with each side using Afghan soil as a pressure valve for strategic signaling. Yet a full-scale Taliban-Pakistan war remains improbable. Pakistan’s military, with its overwhelming technological and nuclear superiority, could decimate Taliban forces—but at the risk of provoking a drawn-out insurgency it cannot control. The Taliban, aware of this asymmetry, prefer hybrid tactics, allowing the TTP to wage low-intensity proxy warfare inside Pakistan.

The Taliban dismiss Islamabad’s demands to curb the TTP, calling it a “domestic problem”. This refusal underscores their ideological kinship and the shared ambition to see Pakistan’s border tribal belt revert to Taliban-style Sharia governance. Ahmad warned that this dynamic is perilous: the TTP’s suicide battalions possess the capacity to incite urban terror within Pakistan, amplifying the country’s internal vulnerabilities.

Behind these clashes lies a larger ideological project—the Taliban’s belief, shared by TTP hardliners, that regional power is shifting back to the “Islamic Emirate” model. Sedney noted that radical circles envision a future, within a generation, where Pakistan and even India could see Taliban-like movements ascend. Whether delusional or strategic, this belief animates the persistence of militancy and shapes Islamabad’s deepening anxiety.

US Leverages and Pakistan’s Regime Change Dilemma

The question of whether the U.S. or Pakistan can leverage internal Taliban factionalism looms large. Within the movement, a pragmatic Haqqani network faction favors economic engagement and limited U.S. cooperation, while the isolationist Kandahar faction, led by Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada, rejects dependency and seeks autonomy. Although tensions exist, Akhundzada maintains ultimate control, preventing visible fragmentation that might invite civil war. For Pakistan, frustration with the Taliban’s defiance has sparked talk of supporting Afghan resistance groups. Yet Ahmad warns this path is fraught: funding insurgency would demand resources, while the disunited Afghan opposition lacks both cohesion and stamina.

Consequently, Islamabad’s strategy has shifted from influence to contingency—exploiting Taliban divisions when advantageous, but no longer betting on a “friendly” Kabul. As White put it, the myth of a compliant, pro-Pakistan “Pashtun leadership” in Afghanistan has always been just that—a myth. This reality has spurred a profound shift in mindset within Pakistan’s government. No longer divided between the “good Taliban” and “bad Taliban,” Islamabad increasingly sees a spectrum of “bad and worse Taliban.”

At an event held at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in February, 2022, the Special Representative for Afghanistan at the time, Tom West, had discussed the economic leverages US still holds and commented that Afghan Taliban has shown the least interest in future cooperation with the US in fulling the terms of their side of the Doha Accord. At the same time, West noted that US is not supporting any opposition to Afghan Taliban and is advising other nations to refrain from that, but some will do that sooner or later if Taliban does not show urgency. Answering a question, he commented that many players are realizing that not having US engagement in Afghanistan is not in their interest.

Regional Rivalries and Great Power Calculus

Beyond the Pakistan-Taliban binary, regional power competition has turned Afghanistan into a geopolitical chessboard once again. None of the major powers—China, Russia, India, or the U.S.—wants a total state collapse, yet each pursues a distinct agenda. India, for its part, has pivoted sharply. As Curtis noted, New Delhi is now actively courting elements within the Taliban to undermine Pakistan’s influence. The May 2025 conflict with Pakistan demonstrated India’s willingness to strike deep into Pakistani territory, signaling a readiness to rewrite the traditional escalation playbook.

Meanwhile, China and Russia tread cautiously. For Beijing, the overriding concern is protecting multibillion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) investments from militant spillover. Russia, despite its history of confrontation with Islamist movements, maintains unpublicized CT cooperation with the Taliban to prevent ISKP’s expansion into Central Asia. Trump’s renewed engagement with Central Asian leaders under the “C5+1 initiative”—focused on strategic minerals—has further rattled Moscow and Beijing, who view it as U.S. encroachment upon their regional sphere of influence.

Panelists such as White and Karp noted that China now holds more extensive economic leverage in both Pakistan and Afghanistan than any other actor. Despite attempts to mediate between them, Beijing’s balancing efforts have faltered. Nonetheless, economic interdependence has rendered China an unwilling stakeholder in both states’ stability.

For the Taliban, the Great Power rivalry offers an opportunity. In an assessment, PoliTact noted last year: “As Afghan Taliban celebrate 4^th year in power, the nation now finds itself at a crossroads of competing currents. The net effect is a cautious, multi-prong stance: keep Iranian channels open for trade and energy, nurture Indian economic alternatives through Chabahar, avoid burning bridges with Pakistan as it courts Washington, and remain pragmatically receptive to Chinese infrastructure where it serves Afghan interests.”

Javid Ahmad observed, the regime seeks “economic neutrality,” extracting benefits from all sides while avoiding puppeteering by any. Pragmatic factions engage Russia and China for investment; hardliners in Kandahar, wary of foreign intentions, prefer cautious distance. This balancing act defines Kabul’s foreign policy—a tactical survival strategy that keeps all powers interested, but none dominant.

Containment Over Resolution: The U.S. Strategic Dilemma

Dr. Weinbaum summarized the prevailing expert view succinctly: “There is no military solution to the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict—only conflict management.” After decades of direct engagement, the U.S. now acts as a remote balancer, occasionally intervening diplomatically but avoiding deep entanglement. Washington’s immediate goal is not victory, but containment: preventing Afghanistan’s collapse while denying extremist sanctuaries the freedom to orchestrate global terror. This means sustaining aid and limited engagement but conditioning every form of support on verifiable security behavior.

Panelists urged regional coordination involving China, Turkey, and Qatar, whose economic leverage could pressure the Taliban to restrain the TTP. However, as Karp pointed out, both Turkey and Qatar’s favoritism toward Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated movements complicates their credibility as neutral mediators.

Ahmad cautioned that the U.S. must abandon the pursuit of ideological “unicorns” and embrace pragmatic realpolitik—dealing with actors as they are, not as Washington wishes them to be. The mantra, he argued, should be “leverage first, ideals later.” Delayed engagement only increases risks of ungoverned chaos, but overreaction could trap the U.S. in another open-ended quagmire.

The Perpetual Balancing Act

As of 2025, U.S. policy in South Asia has evolved into a delicate balancing act—a calculated choreography between engagement and restraint. America’s current presence is limited but consequential: intelligence links, sporadic negotiations, and cautious cooperation with regional allies. Yet looming questions remain. If Afghanistan once again becomes a safe haven for transnational terrorist networks, what tools does Washington have to respond? Under Trump’s renewed mandate, analysts predict the U.S. would double down on counterterrorism partnerships—especially with Pakistan and India—to prevent another 9/11-style surprise.

However, as India’s outreach to the Taliban deepens, it risks entrenching the very militant alignments that destabilize Pakistan and jeopardize U.S.-Pakistan rapprochement. Such dynamics may inadvertently revive the ideological monster once defeated by the War on Terror. Moreover, the Taliban’s tacit encouragement of TTP demands—such as reversing Pakistan’s merger of tribal areas and enforcing Sharia law—threatens to seed an insurgent domino effect. This could erode Islamabad’s internal cohesion and ripple across borders, complicating U.S. peace efforts from Gaza to Central Asia. Trump’s Taliban policy would require broader public ownership of Pakistan’s CT strategy and preventing the budding India-Afghan ties from destabilizing Pakistan and the rejuvenated US-Pakistan ties.

Related Articles:

The Unbroken Alliance: Why the Afghan Taliban-TTP Nexus Is Dooming Peace with Pakistan – Nov 4, 2025
The Fragile Truce Between Pakistan And Afghanistan And The War Of Narratives – Nov 2, 2025
Afghanistan’s Strategic Outlook And New Geopolitical Realities – Aug 18, 2025
Afghanistan, Pakistan Relations and Great Power Rivalry – Jul 21, 2025
Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions, Trump, And Wakhan Corridor – Feb 3, 2025
Political Or Military Solution; Pakistan’s New Counter-Terrorism Operation Azm-e-Istehkam – Aug 1, 2024
Convergences in US Pakistan Ties and Afghanistan – Jan 1, 2024
Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma And TTP – Feb 22, 2023
Post Withdrawal Campaign Against Extremism In Afghanistan And US-Pakistan Relations – Sep 7, 2022
Emerging US Policy Towards Afghanistan After Withdrawal – March 2, 2022
Recalibrating The US-Pakistan Partnership In Afghanistan – Jun 22, 2021
US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden – Mar 2, 2021

The post The Future Of Afghan Taliban-Pakistan Conflict: Implications For Regional Stability And US Interests appeared first on Politact.

By Naade Ali

President Trump and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) are redefining the U.S.-Saudi alliance to address China’s rising influence and the Gaza crisis, effectively moving the partnership beyond its traditional foundations. Since their inception, the Saudi-US relations have experienced fluctuations but have been sustained by overlapping strategic interests and mutual dependencies. At the center of their crucible of interaction stood a security–petrodollar arrangement. Even when relations hit their lowest point, the core bargain held: Saudi Arabia continued selling oil in dollars and remained a key supplier to the United States, while Washington preserved its role as the Kingdom’s primary security guarantor and leading defense provider.

However, shifting global dynamics, fueled in part by intensifying great power competition between China and the United States, have pushed middle powers like Saudi Arabia to reduce their dependence on any single major actor and seek greater strategic autonomy. While this shift has broadened their ambitions, it has also uncovered greater opportunities and challenges. The Saudi-US relations are not indifferent to these evolving dynamics, with both countries recalibrating their bilateral ties along new strategic dimensions.

Saudi Arabia as a Swing State in the U.S.–China Rivalry

Today’s Saudi Arabia appears to be hedging away from over reliance on the United States, building a strategy centered on its pragmatic interests and exercising sovereign leverage. This helps in deal-making and to secure the space needed to navigate the great power rivalry. Saudi Arabia’s move to reduce its dependence on the United States gained momentum exactly when ties with Washington soured under the Biden administration. Confronted with the unpredictability of American policy, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) found an attractive alternative in Beijing, which offered strategic engagement without preconditions. Closer ties with China enabled Saudi Arabia to pursue a multidimensional strategy, diversify its partnerships, and maintain the flexibility necessary to manage uncertainties in its relationship with Washington.

For China, Saudi Arabia became a central pillar for expanding regional influence in the Middle East. Riyadh hosted the first-ever China-Arab States Summit and, through Beijing’s mediation, reconciled diplomatic ties with Tehran. Further consolidating their ties with Beijing, both Tehran and Riyadh also integrated into multilateral blocs where China and Russia hold considerable sway, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS. Additionally, China strengthened economic relations with the Kingdom, becoming its largest trading partner and providing robust support for Vision 2030. A major payoff of Saudi Arabia’s strategic pivot toward China was that it transformed Saudi Arabia into a geopolitical swing state. This effectively signaled to Washington it is fully prepared to deepen ties with Beijing unless the U.S. proactively restores its coveted central role.

The Trump–MBS Summit: A Strategic Inflection Point

President Trump’s extraordinary embrace of Mohammed bin Salman during his visit to Washington in November suggests that Riyadh’s calibrated swing-state posture is working. Riyadh now carries significant geostrategic weight and has taken center stage in the U.S.–China competition for influence in the Middle East.

Trump’s approach to strategic competition with China rests on two pillars: credible deterrence and tightening of alignment with key U.S. middle power partners. Within this framework, any complete Saudi drift into Beijing’s orbit is viewed as strategically unacceptable. At the same time, he is acutely aware of the practical limits of attempting to sever Riyadh’s growing relationship with Beijing, recognizing that containment of China cannot succeed solely through coercive pressure on allies to reverse course.

As evidenced by President Trump’s foreign policy conduct, he employs a distinctive blend of generous incentives and far-reaching, exclusive agreements in energy, critical minerals, technology, and defense. These arrangements simultaneously fortify bilateral partnerships and allow middle powers, such as Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to maintain a semblance of strategic autonomy in their relations with China. Beneath this veneer, however, the United States methodically secures alignment on matters of vital national interest, while deliberately imposing significant strategic costs on any partner that leans excessively toward Beijing.

Nevertheless, Trump’s transactional foreign policy has provided Saudi Arabia with an opportunity for adjusting its own strategy, allowing the Kingdom to pursue a more robust, interest-driven relationship with Washington. Riyadh recognizes that being a center of the Islamic holy places provides it immense influence in the Muslim world. United States relies on it not only to balance China in the Middle East but also to help secure a stable regional environment for Israel. This is a goal that, in Trump’s view, could be advanced if Saudi Arabia joins the Abraham Accords, potentially encouraging other Arab and Muslim countries to follow suit.

The Summit Outcome

Through Vision 2030 reforms and skillful diplomatic maneuvering, the Kingdom has transcended its traditional role. This transformation not only redirects the calculus of their bilateral partnership but also carries profound implications for the Middle East’s balance of power and the broader dynamics of great power competition. It has emerged as a pivotal regional powerhouse whose energy resources, vast investment capital, and geopolitical influence make it indispensable to both Washington and Beijing.

During their meeting, President Trump stated he was “the best friend Saudi Arabia has ever had in Washington,” a statement that highlighted his administration’s desire to deepen ties through personal rapport. Nevertheless, the agreements concluded between the two leaders demonstrate that the U.S.-Saudi relationship remains firmly grounded in their respective national interests and strategic imperatives, with both seeking to extract maximum advantage.

President Trump secured a $1 trillion investment pledge from the Crown Prince, alongside the signing of a Strategic Framework for Cooperation. This framework includes Saudi commitments to supply uranium, metals, permanent magnets, and critical minerals essential for U.S. defense and energy sectors. Leveraging Saudi Arabia’s vast deposits of rare earth elements (REEs), Trump advanced his goal of countering China’s dominance in critical minerals.

For his part, Crown Prince achieved major strategic gains: the Kingdom was granted major non-NATO ally status, a defense agreement was finalized, and approval was secured for the purchase of American F-35 fighter jets and other advanced weapons. These acquisitions will strengthen Saudi defense architecture. Additionally, in line with its ambition to become a global hub for artificial intelligence, Saudi Arabia also gained access to advanced AI chips and U.S. technology firms to support the development of its domestic AI infrastructure.

US-Saudi Ties and Gaza Peace Plan

The Washington meeting between President Trump and the Crown Prince highlighted both progress and persistent challenges in U.S.–Saudi relations, with Saudi-Israel normalization remaining a key point of divergence. While Trump pressed Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords, Mohammed bin Salman insisted that any normalization depend on Israel committing to “an irreversible, credible, and time-bound path toward Palestinian statehood.” Following the Israel–Gaza conflict, Riyadh has emerges as a leading advocate for international recognition of Palestine, a position consistently opposed by the U.S. and Israel. Its refusal to yield to Trump’s push for normalization reflects the broader post-war realities in Gaza.

By taking this stance, Crown Prince delivered a twofold message: First, the strengthening of U.S.–Saudi ties must remain entirely independent of any precondition for Saudi–Israeli normalization. Second, while Riyadh is open in principle to normalization, Israel’s refusal to recognize Palestinian statehood remains a major impediment. While Riyadh supports the Trump Gaza peace plan in principle, it rejects full Israeli control over the Gaza territory and insists on concrete conditions: a time-bound Israeli withdrawal, the deployment of an international protection force, and the reinstatement of authority to the Palestinian Authority.

Saudi Arabia’s demands on the Palestinian issue clash directly with Israel’s red lines, leaving Washington struggling to balance relations with both capitals. From Israel’s viewpoint, the rapidly deepening U.S.–Saudi partnership, explicitly decoupled from any obligation of Saudi–Israeli normalization, raises two profound concerns. First, it risks elevating Riyadh’s regional influence while undermining Israel’s primary strategic objective: the expansion of the Abraham Accords. Second, as long as Riyadh continues to regard Israel as a principal source of regional instability, not Iran, the possibility persists that Saudi Arabia could further deepen its relations with Iran.

Historically, the shared enmity toward Iran has been the bedrock of both the U.S.–Israel alliance and U.S.–Saudi security relations. Following their China-brokered détente, Riyadh and Tehran no longer see each other as existential threats. To prevent Washington from viewing improved Saudi–Iranian ties with alarm, Mohammed bin Salman has carefully framed them as potentially beneficial to the United States, offering to help the U.S and Iran reach a deal that could be vital to regional stability. Riyadh can indeed encourage Iran to talk, but persuading Tehran to accept U.S. terms is no less daunting than U.S. convincing Israel to meet Saudi demands on Palestine. The scenario thus exposes the limits of influence on both sides: neither Washington nor Riyadh can fully impose their will on Israel and Iran.

The Washington summit also revealed a deeper convergence: the United States and Saudi Arabia need each other to achieve their core objectives in the Middle East. Under the Trump approach, US appears willing to delegate primary responsibility for preserving and enforcing the U.S.-led order in the Middle East to Saudi Arabia. However, for Riyadh to fully assume the role of America’s pre-eminent regional partner, it will also have to bear the main burden of protecting U.S. interests, containing rivals, and upholding the existing regional architecture.

Such an alignment would signal to Iran that Saudi Arabia had become the de facto guarantor and enforcer of core American interests. A U.S.–Saudi power-sharing arrangement would also carry significant implications for Israel. Confronted with a region increasingly shaped around Saudi primacy, Israel would face a stark choice: either challenge Riyadh and risk damaging its own relationship with Washington, or accommodate Saudi terms and move toward normalization on conditions set by the Kingdom. Under this approach, in which Saudi Arabia and the United States emerge as mutually reinforcing strategic partners, both are able to secure the outcomes they seek from Iran and Israel.

The Saudi-UAE Rivalry and Yemen Conflict

As the new year begins, the region is no longer defined by “Arabs vs. Iran” or “Islamists vs. Monarchies,” but by the fallout of weakening Iran that is creating a power vacuum. Muslim Middle Powers are competing to to fill the space, illustrated by the Saudi-UAE split. In places of old alliances, new ones are taking shape premised on cold, transactional game of national interest. And these tensions are playing out from Yemen to Syria, Sudan, Libya, and Somalia.

While the Trump-MBS summit secured vital U.S. interests in energy and defense, it exposed the fragility of the broader regional architecture. Saudi Arabia is acting like a state, prioritizing borders, stability, and institutions to protect Vision 2030. The UAE resembles a corporation, prioritizing ports, trade routes, and resource extraction. Turkey and Qatar are navigating the space between them, leveraging their military and ideological assets to carve out their own spheres of influence.

Similarly, President Trump’s “20-Point Peace Plan,” unveiled in September 2025, was predicated on a unified regional architecture: Gulf capital would fund reconstruction, Egyptian-Turkish logistics would secure the ground, Pakistan-Indonesia-Turkey may be part of the International Stabilization Force (ISF), and Israeli-Saudi normalization would provide the political horizon.

As of late December 2025, the dramatic rupture between Saudi Arabia and the UAE—culminating in the Saudi airstrike on UAE-backed assets in Mukalla, Yemen—has shattered the “Sunni Coalition” prerequisite for the plan’s success. The 20-point framework is now being pulled apart by the competing power centers and Israel may find itself the short-term beneficiary of Arab fragmentation. Unless Washington can repair the rupture within the Gulf Cooperation Council, its grand strategy for the Middle East risks becoming a two-legged stool: supported by a strong U.S.-Saudi bilateral deal, but lacking the regional stability required to stand.

Related Articles:

Israel Airstrike Targets Hamas Negotiators In Doha, Threatening Gaza Ceasefire Talks – Sep 15, 2025
Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions – April 26, 2025
Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran – February 25, 2025
Assad’s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East – Dec 26, 2024
The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump – Dec 5, 2024
Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences – Aug 30, 2024
The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities – Sep 27, 2024
Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States – Aug 4, 2023
What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply? – Aug 4, 2022

The post Saudi Arabia as a Rising Middle Power: The Trump-MBS Summit, China, and the Future of Gaza appeared first on Politact.

PoliTact’s Global Security Study

With inputs from Naade Ali and Arif Ansar

Context

Negotiations on the Trump’s 20-point Gaza Peace Package has been ongoing in Egypt since Monday, and the deal on the first phase between Hamas and Israel was announced on October 8th. At first glance, the focus appears to be on tactical choices, such as cease-fires, hostage exchanges, the future of Gaza, the fate of Hamas, and whether the Abraham Accords survive the region’s new trauma. Trump’s plan is pragmatic: a phased cease-fire, hostage-prisoner swaps, an interim technocratic authority to oversee Gaza reconstruction and demilitarization. However, it’s much vaguer where the politics bite: long-term political status, refugee questions, and Palestinian statehood.

The leaders of eight Muslim-majority states: Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Türkiye, Indonesia, Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan, who met Trump on the sidelines of the 80th UN General Assembly in New York, had expressed support for the plan in a joint statement, praising his “sincere efforts to end the war in Gaza” and expressing confidence in his ability to achieve peace. However, the text of the plan released subsequently has raised concerns among Arab countries and drawn significant domestic criticism, as it deviates from the proposals of the foreign ministers of the eight Muslim states. Reports indicate that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu secured “the last word,” persuading Washington to make additional changes at a stage when it was harder for the Muslim countries to intervene.

How the Gaza question is resolved — whether as a primarily security-led stabilization by disarming, re-building, and technocratic governance or as a political settlement that recognizes Palestinian political rights in a durable way — is yet to be seen. An Israeli-U.S. approach that produces security and normalization without a credible, enforceable pathway to Palestinian political rights and without addressing refugee claims, settlements or permanent borders risks locking in a durable, managed status quo that advantageously cements Israeli gains and rewards Arab normalization while leaving Palestinian grievances unresolved.

For critics and many Palestinians, the plan’s biggest flaw is that it recapitulates the old “deal by omission” problem — postpone the hard political questions and hope that security fixes suffice. Robert Malley’s long reflection on the failure of past peace processes is a timely reminder that postponing core issues almost guarantees revival of conflict rather than durable peace.

Shift in the Middle East Balance of Power

Since Trump’s first term in power led to Abraham Accords in September 2020, the Middle East is undergoing tumultuous shift in the balance of power. This shift is away from Iran’s axis of resistance and towards those that signed the Abraham Accords – and others that were moving towards accepting it. Highlighting plans to expand the signatories to the Abraham Accord and emphasizing the strategic and economic benefits of cooperating with Israel, Trump recently stated:

“History has shown us that those who establish relations with Israel have thrived, while those who devote resources and attention toward the destruction — even the annihilation — of Israel have languished. Israel is not going anywhere. They are going to coexist with other peoples and countries in the region. The Abraham Accords demonstrate that nations are better off when they communicate, work together, and embrace new opportunities.”

The last five years have seen aggressive Israeli campaigns and intelligence operations directed at damaging — sometimes decisively — Iran’s regional network: kinetic blows, targeted assassinations of key operatives in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, and continued pressure on Iran’s enlistment of militias. Another focus has been the degrading of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, whether by eliminating key scientists, or by cyberattacks on its nuclear facility. In June, US also carried out bombing of the Iran’s nuclear facilities in Fordow, Isfahan, and Nanatz sites.

The net effect has been to cripple Iran’s reach: Hezbollah was weakened on the battlefield during the 2023–24 rounds of fighting; Iran’s Quds Force lost its most iconic commander in Qasem Soleimani in January 2020. Recently, Isreal shifted its focus to the political leadership, which lead to the assassination of Ismael Haniyeh on Iranian soil in July 2024, followed by elimination of Hassan Nasrullah in Lebanon in September 2024. However, it was the Israeli attack on Hamas negotiators in Doha last month that many experts believe may have broken the camel’s back. It blurred the line of who is Israel after – and what does it want to achieve with all the mayhem that followed Oct 7, 2023, tragic Hamas attack on Israel. The campaign against Iran has demonstrated that Israel can play with international rules at will and without any consequences. This will have grave long-term consequences for global order.

But degradation does not mean elimination — proxies adapt, civilian costs grow, and local politics evolve in unpredictable ways. Alongside coercion and violence, normalization diplomacy has quietly reshaped the balance. The Abraham Accords proved that several Arab states were prepared to prioritize trade, technology, and counter-Iran cooperation, over the old formula that required Palestinian statehood before normalization. This bargain created an “outside-in” model of Israeli influence — Israel’s security and economic ties extend into the Arab world even as its control over Palestinian territories and the facts on the ground become more entrenched.

That model has a dual consequence: it strengthens Israel’s regional legitimacy and deterred coalitions, but it also delegitimizes the Palestinian cause in some Arab capitals. Unless meaningful political concessions accompany normalization under the current rounds of peace accords – the situation may plan in the hands of hardliners in the longer run.

Reshaping the New Middle East

The 20-point Trump plan thus revolve around two linked wagers.

First: can an externally led, security-first approach end immediate bloodshed and create a stable environment for reconstruction? Second: can that short-term security compact be turned into a politically legitimate, durable settlement that includes Palestinian rights and prevents radicalization? If the answer to the second question is “no,” then any tactical success will be ephemeral — the security gains will ossify into new grievances and a renewed cycle of violence.

If the American-Israeli tack succeeds in producing a stable Gaza that is demilitarized, internationally managed and economically rebuilt — but without a credible pathway to Palestinian statehood, refugee resolution, or substantive political participation — the regional consequence is likely to be twofold:

(a) the anti-Abraham Accord camp will consolidate, and (b) the Palestinian national cause shifts from mainstream diplomacy back to asymmetric forms of resistance and transnational advocacy. That benefits actors that can exploit grievances — whether non-state actors in the region or international rivals that seek influence by presenting themselves as alternatives to the U.S. model.

Middle East and the Global Balance of Power

Potential failure of the U.S.-Israeli approach does not automatically favor China and Russia — but it creates openings. China and Russia are playing a long game: both have expanded political and economic ties in the Middle East, offering infrastructure, arms, and diplomatic cover without the political conditionalities the West often attaches. Beijing’s economic footprint, growing role in regional institutions, including BRICS partners, and willingness to court Gulf states for energy and investment means it can offer attractive alternatives to American dependency.

Moscow, for its part, remains an arms supplier and a diplomatic interlocutor (especially in Syria), and it relishes opportunities to undercut U.S. influence. If Washington’s approach produces stability without justice, public sentiment may turn away from the U.S. narrative and look to non-Western partners who promise investments or political balance-as as has already started to occur. That said, China and Russia do not currently possess the same depth of security integration with Israel or the same network of alliances that would let them ‘replace’ American influence overnight — what they can do is exploit U.S. credibility gaps to gain economic and political footholds.

The Way Forward

Three practical conclusions emerge from a realistic appraisal of Trump’s 20-point plan:

1. Security outcomes are necessary but not sufficient. Short-term stabilization that includes hostage releases, ceasefires, and reconstruction, is important and politically urgent — but by itself it will not end the conflict’s structural drivers. The old lesson of Oslo remains: postponing core grievances breeds future crises.
2. Normalization without a political track is a strategic accelerant for some actors and a strategic liability for others. States that prioritize economic and security ties with Israel will gain leverage; however, the Arab and Muslim Street will judge outcomes by whether justice is achieved for Palestinians.
3. Geopolitically, every gap left by U.S. leadership, or perceived U.S. indifference to justice, creates space for China and Russia to expand influence — primarily through diplomacy and investment, and secondarily through arms and political support. But neither Beijing nor Moscow offers a ready-made substitute for U.S. regional security guarantees; rather, they offer alternative hedges that regional states will use in pursuit of their own short-term interests.

If Cairo deal and the Trump package are to avoid merely delaying the next crisis they must do three things simultaneously:

Secure an immediate end to mass killing and human suffering; create an inclusive, accountable reconstruction process that gives Palestinians meaningful agency; and set out an enforceable, internationally backed political roadmap that addresses, not postpones, refugee claims, borders and sovereignty – as was done in the Oslo Accords. Without that tripod, any “victory” will be tactical, not strategic — and the balance of power will keep shifting unpredictably, with winners among states and non-state actors who are best at exploiting unresolved grievances.

Related Articles:

Israel Airstrike Targets Hamas Negotiators In Doha, Threatening Gaza Ceasefire Talks – Sep 15, 2025
Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions – April 26, 2025
Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran – February 25, 2025
Assad’s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East – Dec 26, 2024
The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump – Dec 5, 2024
Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences – Aug 30, 2024
The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities – Sep 27, 2024
What Does President Biden’s Visit To Israel And Saudi Arabia Imply? – Aug 4, 2022

The post From Oslo To Trump’s Abraham Accords And 20-Point Peace Plan For Gaza appeared first on Politact.

Risk Assessment

Israel Strike in Doha Shakes Middle East Stability

Context

Israel struck Doha on September 9th—an attack that targeted Hamas political leaders during Gaza ceasefire negotiations and has pushed the Middle East into a new phase of instability. The incident killed at least six people, including a Qatari security officer and the son of a senior Hamas negotiator, and sent shockwaves through the already fragile Gaza peace process. The strike was remarkable not only for its timing, but for its location: an unprecedented Israeli operation on the sovereign soil of Qatar, a key player in Israel-Hamas mediation.

The immediate impact on the Gaza ceasefire talks has been devastating. Hamas quickly announced that its demands had not changed—insisting on a full ceasefire, Israeli withdrawal, humanitarian aid, and a prisoner-hostage exchange—while condemning Israel for sabotaging negotiations. Qatar, which has long played host to Hamas’ political bureau and served as a linchpin in past ceasefire talks, declared that the attack had “killed any hope” of a near-term agreement. The perception is now widespread that Israel is prioritizing military elimination of adversaries over a negotiated solution, a view reinforced by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s repeated calls for the “total defeat” of Hamas. This narrative threatens to undermine confidence in ongoing Gaza peace initiatives.

For Qatar and the broader Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the strike represents not only a political affront but a strategic shock. Doha has convened emergency consultations, and GCC states from Saudi Arabia to the UAE have summoned Israeli envoys to protest the violation of sovereignty. An Arabic-Islamic leaders’ summit is scheduled for September 15 to discuss the situation created by the Israel strike. The summit will be attended by members of Arab League and Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

After decades of multibillion-dollar arms purchases and hosting of U.S. military bases, the GCC now confronts the reality that Washington either could not—or would not—prevent Israel from striking within their borders. The strike risks driving Gulf nations to reconsider their reliance on U.S. guarantees and to explore alternative security alignments. The Israeli strike has shaken Gulf confidence in the American security umbrella. Qatar’s Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani also met with President Trump in New York on September 12 but the details of the meeting were not disclosed.

The Future of Hamas

Whether Hamas keeps political and military control or is replaced in Gaza, and how any post-conflict governance would work, remains the key stumbling block. Israel has pressed for assurances related to demilitarization while Hamas rejects disarmament demands or removing its political authority without a full agreement.

For Hamas, its armed wing is more than just a military tool—it is central to its political identity. The group insists that its “weapon of resistance” is sacred and non-negotiable. In recent ceasefire discussions, Hamas has repeatedly declined to give up its military capabilities without a comprehensive deal that includes guarantees of Palestinian statehood, Israeli withdrawal, and full respect for humanitarian and governance rights. Any demilitarization demand, from this perspective, is seen as a demand for surrender.

On the Israeli side, demilitarization is non-negotiable. Israel views Hamas’s military and governing structure as the main obstacle to peace and security. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other officials have made clear that any viable ceasefire or peace agreement must include: the destroying or dismantling of Hamas’s military infrastructure; the exclusion of Hamas from any future governance of Gaza; and the establishment of long-term oversight or guarantees that Gaza will not again become a base for armed attack.

For Israel, the demilitarization demand serves several purposes: a way to neutralize threats (rockets, tunnels, armed operations), to reassure its domestic political coalition especially hardline elements who see any compromise as weakness, and to prevent the recurrence of another large-scale conflict.

Third-party mediators, including Egypt, Qatar, and the United States, recognize that full instantaneous demilitarization is extremely unlikely. Hamas is deeply embedded in Gaza society, not only militarily but also through governance, social services, charities, religious institutions, and local legitimacy. Stripping it of arms without offering political, security, and governance compensations risks collapse of both trust and order.

The Israeli strike on Hamas negotiator’s in Doha can be seen as a tactics to pressure Qatar, and other Arab interlocutors, to support the demand for not only disarming Hamas-but to prevent any future role for the group in governance. Not doing so, now risks their own security.

Religious Dimension

By striking Hamas negotiators on Sunni Arab soil, Israel risks reframing its conflict as a broader war against Islam. For years, Israel’s regional clashes were directed largely against Shiite state actors such as Iran and groups affiliated with it. By striking Hamas leaders on Sunni Arab soil, Israel may have inadvertently broadened perceptions: that its war is not just against specific militant or extremist groups, but against Islam itself.

This is precisely the narrative that the U.S. sought to avoid during the War on Terror when American officials took pains to distinguish between global extremist movements like Al Qaeda and Daesh, and groups with localized political grievances like the Afghan Taliban. Ironically, the Taliban peace deal that the U.S. eventually negotiated was known as the Doha Accords, named for the very city that has now been bombed by Israel. The targeting of Hamas negotiators in Doha erodes the perception that there are safe spaces for diplomacy, and risks fueling extremist narratives.

Netanyahu’s own trajectory adds fuel to this interpretation. In recent weeks, he has doubled down on settlement expansion in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, bluntly declaring that “there will be no Palestinian state.” Reports suggest he has ordered preparations for a full military takeover of Gaza, with evacuation of civilian populations and consolidation of Israeli control.

At the same time, momentum is building at the United Nations for recognition of Palestinian statehood. The non-binding resolution sponsored by France and Saudi Arabia, named the ‘New York Declaration’, was presented on September 12. The resolution supporting the two-state solution was endorsed by 142 states with 12 nations abstaining. U.S. and Israel voted against the resolution. Netanyahu is expected to reject such recognition outright, portraying it as a reward for terrorism and a betrayal of Israeli security. Indeed, his government may respond by accelerating annexation policies to establish irreversible “facts on the ground.”

Implications for US

For the United States, the diplomatic fallout is complex. Qatar has been a vital partner in Hamas mediation and hostage negotiations and hosts the largest U.S. airbase in the Middle East. The GCC’s strategic importance to U.S. energy, counter-terrorism, and anti-Iran strategies makes the Israeli strike particularly sensitive.

Israel, meanwhile, remains Washington’s closest regional ally. The strike in Doha thus forces U.S. policymakers to confront the uncomfortable question: will American policy sacrifice credibility with Arab allies to defend Israel’s unilateral actions? The Trump administration’s own dismay was evident when President Trump declared himself “very unhappy” with the strike. The incident comes at a critical time for the Abraham Accords, the Trump initiative carried over from his first term, to normalize Israel’s relations with Arab states, potentially undermining Israel-Gulf diplomatic relations.

The implications for U.S. strategy are stark. Washington risks losing its credibility as a mediator, damaging its relations with the Gulf, and undermining its own long-term vision for Middle Eastern stability while benefiting China and Russia. More dangerously, it risks fueling the perception that Israel—and by extension its American backer—is engaged in a wider war against Islam. This perception could radicalize new generations across the Arab and Muslim world, erasing the careful distinctions that U.S. officials have drawn for decades between extremist groups and sovereign states.

The Israeli strike on Qatar is a wake-up call. It threatens not only the Gaza peace process, but the entire architecture of U.S. strategy in the Middle East. Unless Washington can re-balance its approach—standing firm on sovereignty, reviving diplomacy, and reaffirming its partnerships—it risks watching both the peace process and its regional influence collapse.

Related Articles:

Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions – April 26, 2025
Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran – February 25, 2025
Assad’s Demise And The Shifting Balance Of Power In Middle East – Dec 26, 2024
The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump – Dec 5, 2024
Iran’s Potential Retaliation For Haniyeh’s Killing And Wider Consequences – Aug 30, 2024
The Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project: Economic and Geopolitical Realities – Sep 27, 2024

The post Israel Airstrike Targets Hamas Negotiators In Doha, Threatening Gaza Ceasefire Talks appeared first on Politact.

Policy Brief – Vantage Point Analysis

Context

The recent meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Field Marshal Asim Munir, has stirred considerable global attention in particularly regarding what led to the meeting and what could have been discussed. It marks the first-ever instance of a sitting U.S. president holding a one-on-one meeting with Pakistan’s top military leader—an unprecedented move that reveals deeper shifts in regional strategy and global alignments.

Great Power Rivalry

U.S.-Pakistan relations have always been shaped by broader global dynamics, and the context now is the intensifying great power rivalry, primarily between the U.S., China, and Russia. The escalating Iran-Israel conflagration has added to this.

One of the persistent suggestions coming out of some DC based think-tanks is to avert pushing Pakistan into the full embrace of China. On the other hand, Pakistan has been messaging insistently that it wants to maintain close ties to the US despite its strategic ties to China. The meeting between President Trump and Field Marshal Asim Munir – and what follows – will likely test this. In the unfolding international relations maintaining a balance between great powers is becoming increasingly untenable.

Another critical dimension is the ongoing Iran-Israel conflict. In the post October 7, 2023, Hamas led attack on Israel, the geopolitics of Middle East is fast evolving. This has been accompanied by the loss of Hamas and Hezbollah leadership and the fall of Assad regime in Syria in December 2024, as part of what many consider the Outside-in Approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The likelihood of a broader conflict between Iran and Israel hangs in balance as President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have forged a strong strategic alignment. Netanyahu has tried to ensure that U.S. policy remained closely aligned with Israel’s objective of weakening Iran’s defense capabilities, particularly preventing it from ever acquiring nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Iran had hoped that Trump would adopt a pragmatic approach and revive nuclear talks leading to easing of economic pressure. To Iran’s disappointment, Trump pursued the reinstatement of “maximum pressure” policy on Tehran – culminating into an attack on its nuclear sites on June 22.

Pakistan has maintained the policy of siding with Iran. In his speech to the diaspora in Washington DC, Field Marshal Asim Munir reportedly cited Pakistan’s ‘clear and strong support’ for Iran in war against Israel. President Trump would have likely discussed Pakistan’s intent and the scope of its support in the background of expanding Israeli-Iran conflict, especially if US gets engaged, as it did on June 22, in eliminating Iran’s nuclear program – or any endeavors to change the regime.

From what has been reported since the meeting, Pakistan has offered to mediate with Iran and to assist President Trump pursue a negotiated solution, as he did with its recent short war with India. After meeting with Field Marshal Asim Munir, Trump had given two weeks window to arrive at a decision on if the US will get directly involved in the war against Iran. However, the attack on Iran’s nuclear sites occurred much before the window for negotiated solution was to expire.

According to some estimates, about 15%-20% of Pakistan’s population belong to Shia sect. Any attack on Iran, regime change, or any subsequent insurgency can have serious consequences for the ethnic and religious harmony in Pakistan and the Islamic regions. A foreign policy alignment too closely with Western military actions against Iran could inflame sectarian tensions at home. It would also put Pakistan and Chinese strategic alignment to the test – as Iran is also an ally of China and Russia. Additionally, the aforementioned nations shared membership in the China dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

US Pakistan Relations

Under President Biden, Pakistan was often viewed critically and often through an India-centric lens, particularly in the context of counter-terrorism. In contrast, the Trump administration was initially expected to adopt a hardline stance toward Pakistan, recent events suggest a pragmatic recalibration driven by strategic needs. Moreover, Pakistan’s government has carried out an active trade and security outreach with the U.S. administration to demonstrate its economic and security potential. In remarks by CENTCOM Commander Gen. Michael Kurilla, or Trump’s own statements, there’s been notable recognition of Pakistan’s role beyond the narrow counterterrorism framework.

The performance of the Pakistani military during the brief conflict with India in May has raised its global stature. While both sides de-escalated after Trump administration negotiated a cease fire, Pakistan’s ability to outmaneuver a much larger adversary, despite its plaguing political and economic challenges, captured international attention and enhanced the credibility of its defense establishment. This strengthened perception has also prompted the US to reconfigure its engagement with Pakistan’s power centers—primarily its military—based on shared regional interests, particularly as tensions in the Middle East escalate.

Allied with the U.S., Pakistan has played a decisive security role in the Cold War and the Campaign Against Extremism. Due to this partnership, it received western economic and military assistance. Pakistan once again stands at the juncture of another critical role involving the change in global balance of power. U.S. would once again desire security relation with Pakistan and furthering of the future envisioned under the Abraham Accords. As the security situation related to Iran worsens, it’s possible that different brands of non-state actors operating from the region and beyond attempt to exploit the situation. Pakistan’s experience in managing extremists could become very useful. For this cooperation, U.S. could potentially assist in dealing with India, undo the suspension of Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), while moving forward with the trade deals.

Civil-Military Imbalance: A Familiar Pattern

While the Trump-Munir meeting may elevate Pakistan’s global profile, it also underscores a persistent internal challenge: the civil-military imbalance. The fact that such a high-level bilateral meeting involved the military chief—and not the elected civilian leadership—highlights the dominance of Pakistan’s military in both foreign policy and national security.

This imbalance perpetuates a troubling precedent in which strategic decisions of national consequence have to be made in private without discussion, consensus, or public ownership. Such secrecy has historically resulted in policies with long-term political, economic, and social consequences—often to the detriment of public trust and national cohesion.

The Trump-Munir meeting is emblematic of a shifting global landscape in which Pakistan finds itself once again at a strategic crossroads. The potential for a renewed, multifaceted partnership with the U.S. is real, but it hinges on careful diplomacy, a balance between competing alliances, and a rethinking of how power is exercised at home. As great power competition intensifies and both the Subcontinent and the Middle East become more volatile, Pakistan may well reemerge as a pivotal actor—if it can navigate both its external relations and internal governance with foresight and integrity.

The post What Does Trump-Munir Meeting Means for US-Pakistan Relations – As Iran-Israel Conflict Escalates? appeared first on Politact.

By Naade Ali
South Asia and Middle East Fellow, PoliTact

Context

The recent brief yet intense escalation between India and Pakistan has further exposed the fragile nature of South Asia’s security landscape. The four-day-long tit-for-tat cross-border military confrontation between the two nuclear-armed rivals has significantly undermined prospects for normalization, redefining the rules of engagement and signaling a shift in how both countries may manage their relationship moving forward. What began as a terrorist attack on Indian tourists in the Pahalgam region of the disputed India-administered Kashmir last month, resulting in the deaths of 26 people, quickly escalated into a significant diplomatic and military crisis.

India’s Strategic Shift: Operation Sindoor and the ‘New Normal

India hastily accused Pakistan of orchestrating the terror attacks and used the incident as justification to revise its military doctrine through the launch of Operation Sindoor.

In a public speech highlighting the goals of Operation Sindoor, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced what he described as reaching a ‘new normal,’ signaling a decisive departure from India’s earlier posture of restraint, long shaped by the perceived threat of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent. He emphasized that the new approach centered on firm and unyielding retaliation against terrorist attacks, including cross-border military operations and a deliberate refusal to distinguish between militant groups and their state sponsors—effectively placing direct responsibility on Pakistan for any acts of terrorism on Indian soil. Modi also stated that India would no longer be deterred by the threat of nuclear escalation, signaling a willingness to pursue bold and proactive actions despite potential risks. Having absorbed the initial Indian strikes, Pakistan, in response to the damage inflicted from Operation Sindoor, initiated its own military campaign named Banyan-Marsoos, targeting key Indian military targets to restore deterrence.

A Pause in Hostilities: U.S. Intervention and the Ceasefire

As the two countries climbed the escalation ladder, a surprise ceasefire announcement by U.S. President Trump on social media temporarily halted the hostilities. While the truce continues to hold, prospects for lasting peace remain uncertain. Inflammatory national rhetoric and the unresolved diplomatic deadlock continue to fuel tensions. At the core of the post-ceasefire period is a significant divide between India and Pakistan, each celebrating their military campaigns as a victory and viewing the outcome of their confrontation through a zero-sum lens. This has made the aftermath more complex and contentious than the conflict itself, while also revealing how both sides intend to manage their ongoing disputes moving forward. In this context, key questions have emerged: what does the temporary truce mean for the India-Pakistan rivalry, and what are its implications for the long-term stability of South Asia?

Experts Respond

On May 12, PoliTact hosted a panel discussion under the auspices of recently formed US-Pakistan Policy Forum titled: “India-Pakistan Tensions and the Way Forward,” moderated by its Chief Analyst, Arif Ansar. The session featured a distinguished panel, including Dr. Hassan Abbas, Chair of the Department of Regional and Analytical Studies at the U.S. National Defense University; Dr. Qamar ul Huda, Michael E. Paul Chair in International Affairs and Distinguished Visiting Professor at the U.S. Naval Academy; and Mr. Khaled Al Maeena, former Editor-in-Chief of Arab News and Saudi Gazette. The discussion centered on the implications of the recent ceasefire between India and Pakistan, the roles of international actors, and the significant obstacles to achieving long-term peace.

Will the Ceasefire Hold?

One of the key questions examined was whether the current ceasefire between India and Pakistan is likely to hold.

A cautious optimism emerged from Dr. Hassan Abbas, who expressed confidence that the ceasefire between India and Pakistan would likely hold — at least in the short term. He argued that both nations had achieved what they needed politically and militarily to step back from the brink. India could claim it had struck militant targets, while Pakistan could point to a successful air defense response. He emphasized that U.S. mediation had played a key role in facilitating the agreement and that both governments were likely committed to preventing further military action. However, he warned that unless deeper structural issues — particularly the Kashmir dispute and proxy militancy — were addressed diplomatically, this ceasefire would remain fragile.

Dr. Qamar ul Huda shared a more skeptical view. While not dismissing the ceasefire outright, he questioned its substance, noting the absence of a transparent or structured diplomatic process. The ceasefire, in his view, seemed to have emerged from informal channels — tweets and backchannel phone calls — rather than serious, trackable negotiations. He was concerned that such an approach lacked durability and legitimacy. Dr. Huda stressed that a real ceasefire requires more than silence on the battlefield; it demands diplomatic engagement on the root causes of conflict: Kashmir, water disputes, and terrorism. He also noted the potential influence of third-party actors, from China to Gulf states, and expressed concern over the lack of clarity in the U.S. position. In his view, the region wasn’t yet “ripe” for lasting peace, and without a comprehensive approach, this ceasefire might only be a pause rather than a turning point.

From a media and public sentiment angle, Mr. Khaled Al Maeena brought a grounded and people-centered perspective. He voiced deep concern over the role of Indian media, which he accused of fomenting hate and spreading misinformation that inflamed public opinion and made diplomacy politically costly. Drawing on conversations with people across religious and national lines, he asserted that the majority of Indians and Pakistanis want peace, not war. Mr. Al Maeena emphasized that the region’s pressing need was not military confrontation but economic development and political stability. He also highlighted the proactive role of Gulf states — especially Saudi Arabia — in de-escalating tensions. With ties to both India and Pakistan, and a vested interest in regional peace due to economic interdependence, Mr. Al Maeena saw the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia, as a credible mediator. While hopeful about the ceasefire’s potential, he underscored the importance of media responsibility, regional diplomacy, and leadership that prioritizes stability over nationalist bravado.

The panel discussed the evolving role of the Gulf states—particularly Saudi Arabia—as key international mediator. The panelists agreed that Saudi Arabia, with significant interests in both India and Pakistan, could play a constructive role in easing tensions. Mr. Khaled Al Maeena stressed that Saudi Arabia seeks regional stability, including in South Asia, and could facilitate dialogue, if requested, between the two rivals by encouraging both sides to come to the table and accept international mediation.

The panelists agreed that India and Pakistan must move beyond tactical ceasefires and pursue a comprehensive, long-term peace process—ideally supported by third-party mediation. The speakers emphasized that unless the two countries address their domestic challenges and regional rivalries, their aspirations will remain unmet.

What Role should US Play?

Throughout the discussion, the panelists recognized the United States as a pivotal external actor with the capacity to influence the trajectory of the India-Pakistan ceasefire. However, their assessments revealed a shared caution about the limitations and inconsistencies in the U.S. approach.

Dr. Abbas emphasized that U.S. involvement was instrumental in brokering the initial ceasefire, with both India and Pakistan reaching out to Washington behind the scenes. He argued that this reflected the high-level trust and strategic alignment both countries maintain with the U.S., albeit for different reasons. India is a key partner in the Indo-Pacific strategy and a counterbalance to China, while Pakistan has long-standing security and geopolitical ties to the U.S., particularly in the context of Afghanistan. However, Abbas cautioned that the U.S. influence alone cannot guarantee lasting peace. He urged Washington to move beyond tactical mediation and instead support long-term conflict resolution mechanisms, including structured dialogue on Kashmir and militancy. He also noted that U.S. credibility depends on maintaining a balanced posture, especially when public narratives in India resist outside interference.

Dr. Huda took a more critical and analytical stance on the U.S. role. He noted that while President Trump’s tweet announcing the ceasefire was widely reported, it lacked substantive follow-through or diplomatic backing. From his view in Washington, the ceasefire appeared to be the result of sporadic political gestures rather than coordinated U.S. policy. Huda questioned whether the U.S. is truly committed to sustained mediation or simply reacting to crises. He highlighted the ambiguity in U.S. policy—initially appearing indifferent, then suddenly claiming credit—and argued that this inconsistency undermines its ability to lead serious peace efforts. To sustain negotiations, the U.S. would need to invest diplomatically and involve multilateral partners, such as the EU, China, and Gulf states, in creating a legitimate and lasting peace framework.

Mr. Khaled Almaeena provided a regional and Gulf-centered perspective, acknowledging the U.S. role but emphasizing that regional actors—particularly Saudi Arabia—are just as important. He noted that while the U.S. has diplomatic leverage, it should not attempt to dominate the process unilaterally. Instead, he advocated for a collaborative approach, where the U.S. works in concert with Gulf countries and other stakeholders who maintain strong ties with both India and Pakistan. Mr. Al Maeena viewed President Trump’s announcement of the ceasefire with skepticism, suggesting it may have been more performative than strategic. He argued that the U.S. can help facilitate talks, but its influence must be exercised carefully and in support of locally driven, regionally endorsed initiatives.

In summary, the panelists suggested that while the U.S. remains a necessary actor for de-escalation, its role must evolve from crisis management to sustained diplomacy, ideally in partnership with regional powers who have both legitimacy and proximity to the conflict.

Great Power Rivalry and Peace Talks

In the discussion of whether the ceasefire between India and Pakistan could evolve into lasting peace, all three panelists acknowledged that great power dynamics—particularly involving China—play a critical role in shaping the strategic landscape of South Asia.

Dr. Qamar-ul Huda emphasized the geopolitical complexity introduced by China’s growing influence and the competing interests of major powers. He noted that China, along with the Gulf states, the EU, and the U.S., has shown interest in being involved in conflict resolution efforts between India and Pakistan. However, this multiplicity of actors creates a crowded diplomatic space, making coherent mediation more difficult. Dr. Huda pointed out that China’s strategic alignment with Pakistan and its rivalry with India complicate peace efforts. He also raised a broader concern: if India aspires to be a global leader, as envisioned through its role in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategy and the Quad alliance, it must demonstrate stability and responsible leadership in its own region. Repeated border skirmishes and crises with Pakistan, he argued, undermine India’s credibility as a reliable partner in the great power competition with China.

Dr. Hassan Abbas echoed these concerns, observing that China’s influence is an integral part of South Asia’s strategic fabric, particularly through its economic and military ties with Pakistan. He highlighted how Chinese military technology—especially fighter jets used by Pakistan—played a significant role in the recent skirmishes, which helped Pakistan demonstrate parity in air power despite India’s numerical advantage. Dr. Abbas saw China’s indirect support as a factor that emboldens Pakistan to resist Indian pressure and sustain its strategic posture. However, he also noted that the escalation ladder is becoming dangerously steep due to technological advancements and information warfare, increasing the risk of miscalculation in a region already shaped by great power rivalries.

Mr. Khaled Al Maeena took a broader, more diplomatic view, situating China within a network of powerful states — including the U.S. and Gulf nations — that have vested interests in regional stability. While not delving deeply into China’s military role, Mr. Al Maeena acknowledged that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are increasingly aware of China’s regional footprint, particularly through its economic initiatives like the Belt and Road. He suggested that China, like the U.S., could play a constructive role in diffusing tensions if it acts as a responsible stakeholder. However, he warned that foreign involvement, including by great powers, must be invited and balanced, as unilateral or self-interested interventions could backfire.

Collectively, the panelists agreed that China’s strategic position and the broader great power rivalry intensify the stakes in South Asia. While this rivalry may deter full-scale war, it also raises the risk of prolonged instability unless managed through inclusive and multilateral diplomacy.

Nuclear Environment and the Escalation Ladder

In examining how the India-Pakistan conflict unfolds within a nuclear framework, the panelists offered nuanced perspectives on the risks and realities of escalation.

Dr. Hassan Abbas presented a cautiously optimistic view, asserting that while both nations had indeed tested the boundaries of military engagement—through strikes, counterstrikes, and air skirmishes—they ultimately pulled back due to the overarching presence of nuclear deterrence. He emphasized that both sides were able to claim symbolic victories: India asserted it had targeted militant-linked sites, while Pakistan showcased its military preparedness and air defense capabilities, including the successful use of advanced Chinese aircraft. For Dr. Abbas, this demonstration of strength on both sides created the space for de-escalation, as neither nation was willing to push the conflict into full-scale war, knowing the devastating consequences of nuclear engagement. He remained confident that, despite heightened tensions, both countries were rational actors who understood the mutual destruction that a nuclear exchange would bring.

Dr. Qamar-ul Huda, meanwhile, offered a more cautious and critical interpretation. He characterized the pattern of India-Pakistan escalation as a dangerous cycle—an unending loop of skirmishes, retaliations, and brief periods of calm that lacked any strategic architecture. According to him, this repetitive behavior pointed to a fundamental weakness in regional diplomacy and governance. Despite the presence of nuclear weapons acting as a deterrent, he argued that the failure to address root causes—such as the Kashmir dispute, water-sharing tensions, and cross-border terrorism—meant that both countries continued to climb the escalation ladder in an ad hoc and reactive manner. Without institutional reforms or sustained international engagement, he warned, the region remained vulnerable to miscalculations that could spiral beyond control, even in a nuclear context.

Mr. Khaled Almaeena approached the issue from a societal and media perspective, underscoring how misinformation, media sensationalism, and hyper-nationalist rhetoric often play a more dangerous role in escalation than military strategy itself. Drawing comparisons to the “phony war” period of World War II, Mr. Al Maeena argued that the most recent flare-up between India and Pakistan resembled more of a media-fueled standoff than a genuine military confrontation. He criticized the Indian mainstream media in particular for manufacturing a climate of hostility, which in turn pressured political leaders to take aggressive stances to appease domestic audiences. In this environment, the escalation ladder becomes more volatile—not because of formal military decisions, but because public sentiment, stoked by inflammatory media narratives, compels leaders to act out of fear of appearing weak.

In essence, the three panelists painted a complex picture of escalation in South Asia. While they all agreed that nuclear deterrence plays a restraining role in preventing all-out war, they also highlighted different drivers of danger—be it military miscalculation, diplomatic failure, or media manipulation. The consensus was clear: the region may be protected by the logic of mutual destruction, but without responsible leadership, institutional dialogue, and media accountability, the rungs of the escalation ladder remain all too easy to climb.

Domestic Politics and Sustained Political Dialogue

As the conversation shifted from immediate military de-escalation to the prospect of sustained political dialogue, all three panelists highlighted domestic political dynamics in both India and Pakistan as central to whether the ceasefire could evolve into meaningful negotiations.

Dr. Abbas offered a deep dive into the Pakistani domestic landscape, emphasizing that the ceasefire had inadvertently strengthened the military establishment’s standing at a time when it was under intense public and political criticism—especially over its handling of the Imran Khan-led Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) movement. He noted that the military’s effective management of the immediate crisis had boosted its credibility and given the current coalition government some breathing room. However, he warned that without broader political consensus and constitutional legitimacy, Pakistan could not sustain a serious peace process. He stressed that internal unity, political stability, and inclusiveness—particularly reconciling with PTI’s large support base—would be necessary if Pakistan hoped to engage in long-term diplomacy with India.

Dr. Huda placed domestic politics within a broader governance and institutional context, particularly in Pakistan. He saw the moment as an opportunity for political re-examination, noting that recurring conflict cycles had revealed the deep fractures in the country’s political system. He emphasized the need for Pakistan’s political institutions to commit to constitutionalism and inclusivity, warning that sidelining popular political parties (such as PTI) or suppressing dissent only deepens instability. For Dr. Huda, sustainable negotiations—whether about the ceasefire or Kashmir—would require a bipartisan or multiparty consensus. In his view, the absence of such internal coherence would make Pakistan an unreliable negotiating partner, especially in the eyes of international actors.

Mr. Khaled Al Maeena focused more broadly on the popular mood and societal divide within both India and Pakistan. He warned that rising hate rhetoric, media manipulation, and political polarization—particularly in India—create an environment where leaders are constrained by nationalist pressures. In both countries, he argued, the public appetite for peace exists, but political elites often exploit nationalist sentiment for short-term gain. He called for leadership that could rise above partisanship and media-driven hysteria, emphasizing that economic development and social stability should be the common goals uniting political factions. Mr. Al Maeena also stressed that peace efforts cannot be externally imposed; they must be grounded in domestic political will and legitimacy.

The panelists agreed that no ceasefire or peace process can succeed without strong, credible, and inclusive domestic political foundations. While foreign mediation may help broker talks, lasting peace must come from within, supported by political leadership that reflects the will and aspirations of their people.

Related Research

Great Power Rivalry And China’s Deepening involvement In South Asia, Gulf States August 4, 2023
Examining Saudi-Iran Tensions And Its Impact On South Asia, China Jan 4, 2019

The post India-Pakistan Ceasefire And The Way Forward appeared first on Politact.

By Naade Ali

Context

What began as a focused conflict between Israel and Hamas has morphed into a complex regional crisis that threatens to engulf the entire Middle East. Despite intensive diplomatic efforts from both Western powers and Arabian Gulf states, the situation continues to get worse, with military action becoming less a means to peace and more an end in itself.

The results of the American elections have added to the complex situation, in terms of what policy direction will president elect Trump will take after his inauguration on January 20th. His administration was the architect of Abraham Accords reached in 2020, which envisioned normalization of Arab Israeli ties – accompanied by two-state solution. Reportedly, his Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, has already traveled to Qatar to help achieve Gaza ceasefire accompanied by release of hostages.

Netanyahu’s War Strategy and Domestic Pressures

In the aftermath of October 7, Israel’s military response has evolved into a pattern of expanding operations that extends far beyond its initial defensive posture. Under Netanyahu’s leadership, the emphasis is on military action irrespective of the cost, rather than diplomatic engagement.

The strategy is most visible in two key theaters. In Gaza, where the conflict began, Israel has made its intentions clear through leaflets declaring “Hamas will no longer rule Gaza,” suggesting plans for a fundamental restructuring of the territory’s governance.
Netanyahu’s approach is defined by several consistent elements: an unwavering rejection of the two-state solution, a commitment to military rather than diplomatic solutions, and a stated goal of eliminating both Hamas and Hezbollah. His vision extends beyond immediate security concerns to what he describes as “reshaping the region’s security landscape for future generations.” Some call this a version of the Greater Israel approach.

This expansive military strategy has manifested in multiple forms: the deployment of forces to Lebanon, sustained operations in Gaza, reinforced positions along the Golan Heights, and over 220 strikes in Syria. Each action suggests a regional approach to security that prioritizes military control over diplomatic compromise.

Israel’s security challenges extend far beyond Lebanon. The Houthi forces in Yemen have opened a maritime front, targeting Israeli-linked ships in the Gulf of Aden and forcing Israel to consider establishing a military base in Somaliland. Iraq’s Islamic Resistance has joined the fray with drone strikes, while Syria serves as a strategic haven for Hezbollah while maintaining support from both Iran and Russia.

Russia’s role adds another layer of difficulty, warning Israel against attacking either Syrian President Assad’s regime or Iranian nuclear facilities. Recent Russian bombing of rebel-held areas in Syria serves as a reminder of Moscow’s military presence and its potential to intervene.

The broader implications of this strategy are still unfolding, as Israel balances its military objectives against growing international pressure and regional resistance. However, Netanyahu remains steadfast in his position that Israel will “stand alone if needed,” suggesting a long-term expansive security approach regardless of international opinion or diplomatic alternatives.

This hard-line stance also serves a domestic political purpose. With Israel experiencing widening divisions between secular elites and the far-right, Netanyahu has positioned the war as crucial not only for national security but for his own political survival. Even attacks on his private residence have been leveraged to reinforce this narrative of unwavering determination.

The Multi-Front Challenge

Israel’s military ambitions are most visible in Lebanon, where Operation Northern Arrows has expanded far beyond its initial scope of “limited, localized raids.” The deployment of over 15,000 troops across four army divisions suggests potential territorial ambitions reminiscent of Israel’s 1981 annexation of the Golan Heights.

However, Hezbollah has proven a formidable opponent. Despite losing key leaders, including Hassan Nasrallah, the group maintains significant combat capabilities with an arsenal of 150,000 rockets, missiles, and drones. Under the new Secretary General Naim Qassem, Hezbollah has adapted its strategy, combining traditional guerrilla warfare with sophisticated drone strikes that have exposed vulnerabilities in Israel’s defenses. Reports estimate Hezbollah has a stockpile of about 2,000 long-range drones capable of striking targets up to 2,000 km away.

The human cost has been substantial, with Israel suffering over 700 military fatalities and thousands of wounded soldiers. This has forced heavy reliance on reservists, raising questions about their effectiveness against Hezbollah’s experienced fighters. Despite Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s attempts to boost morale by claiming Hezbollah is “collapsing,” continued rocket salvos into Israel suggest otherwise.

Iran’s Diplomatic and Military Maneuvers

Iran has emerged as a sophisticated player in this expanding conflict, balancing military deterrence with diplomatic outreach. While maintaining the threat of harsh retaliation for any Israeli attacks, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has conducted an aggressive diplomatic campaign, strengthening ties not only with traditional allies but also with countries having peace agreements with Israel.

This diplomatic offensive has included warnings to Gulf Arab states against allowing their airspace or military bases to be used by Israel, while simultaneously calling for regional cooperation to prevent Lebanon from becoming “another Gaza.” Turkey has emerged as Iran’s most vocal supporter, promising backing if Israel draws Iran into direct conflict.
Strains in the Western Alliance

With its emphasis on military solution that has coming at a tremendous human toll, Israel’s relationships with Western allies show increasing strain. European nations are divided, with some calling for weapons sales restrictions and potential sanctions against far-right Israeli ministers. France’s President Macron has repeatedly urged countries to stop arms deliveries to Israel, while Spain and Ireland push for reevaluating EU-Israel relationships. Germany, however, remains steadfast as Israel’s second-largest arms supplier after the U.S.
The U.S.-Israel relationship faces its own complications. While the U.S. has deployed anti-missile systems and forces to support Israel’s defenses, it has also warned of potentially cutting off arms shipments unless more humanitarian aid reaches Gaza. Netanyahu appears to be looking beyond current tensions, possibly anticipating renewed support under Trump presidency.

Conclusion

The conflict has evolved into a war of attrition, with both Israel and Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” seeking to exhaust each other militarily. However, this strategy risks indefinite conflict escalation. Even if a ceasefire is achieved, deep-rooted ideological animosities suggest continued regional instability.

For Iran and its allies, the struggle against Israeli Zionism represents a religious obligation. Israel, conversely, appears committed to pursuing regime change in Iran and neutralizing its proxy forces. This fundamental clash of worldviews, combined with historical grievances and religious differences, has created a self-perpetuating cycle of violence that continues to reshape the Middle East’s political landscape.

As the conflict enters new phases, neither side shows signs of backing down. Netanyahu maintains his position that Israel will stand alone if necessary, while Iran continues to strengthen its regional alliances with the backing of Russia and China. The intersection of religious conviction, political ambition, and great power competition has created a complex web of conflicts that threatens to permanently alter the region’s security architecture. Without significant diplomatic breakthroughs or shifts in strategic thinking from key players, the Middle East appears set for continued instability and potential further escalation.

Possibly the best result at this point can be the renewal of the Abraham Accord as President Trump returns to office. However, it was the very apprehensions regarding the ‘Outside In’ approach, associated with the Abraham Accords, which also caused the October 7 Hamas attack last year.

The “Outside-In” approach refers to Israel’s strategy of normalizing relations with Arab and Muslim-majority countries to foster regional stability and security. This strategy was notably advanced through the Abraham Accords in 2020, which established diplomatic ties between Israel and nations such as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco – but left out the Palestinians.

Rekindling the Abraham Accords would mean accepting the two-state premise as agreed in the 1995 Oslo Accords. It would also require a cessation of military hostilities and inflow of massive humanitarian assistance for Gaza – followed by the reconstruction phase in earnest. The stickiest points would be to determine if the two-state solution is still on the table  – and who now represents the Palestinians.

The post The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump appeared first on Politact.

Naad-e-Ali Sulehria

Context

The assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31st has brought Iran and Israel, and the larger Middle East, to the brink of all-out conflict. Not only that, it has also escalated the great power rivalry, which was already simmering over the situation of Ukraine. For the first time, Ukrainian forces have crossed the Russian border in the Kursk region and have taken over a few border cities.

Iran has threaten retaliation against Israel. While Israel has previously targeted other high profile Iranian figures, such as its nuclear scientists. However, for various reasons the country failed to give a proportionate response. One of the main one being that Iran does not want a full-blown conflict which can result in a strike against its nuclear program.

It was just on April 14 this year that Iran launched a barrage of missiles at Israel for assassinating two of its generals, targeted at the Iranian consular building in Syria. Most of these projectiles were intercepted. The Iranian reaction this time may be different. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, has vowed to punish Israel and recently denounced what he described as Israel’s psychological warfare, intended to make Iran reconsider its reprisal. He also offered a religious justification, declaring that any retreat—whether military, political, or economic—would be a grave sin in the eyes of God, inviting “divine wrath.”

While the nations response is inevitable, the uncertainty around its timing and scale, have intensified psychological strain and war fatigue in Israel. While some see this delay as reflecting Iran’s dilemma—caught between the need to respond decisively to Israel and the desire to avoid being drawn into a catastrophic regional war. This is especially true when the U.S. is fully backing Israel. However, others interpret the delay as a sign of Iran’s strategic patience, possibly preparing a more powerful and calculated response than before.

Why the Delay in Response?

Recently, Ali Mohammad Naini, spokesperson for Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, disclosed that the nation is unlikely to repeat previous style of operations and that there might be a significant pause. Two factors are likely contributing as Iran deliberates.

First, the annual ‘Arbaeen Walk,’ a major Shiite pilgrimage to Iraq is underway, with over 2.6 million Iranian pilgrims crossing the border. According to the Iranian Airport Authority, more than 100 flights have operated between Iran and Iraq over the past days, transporting thousands of Iranian pilgrims. With over 20 million pilgrims from Iran, Iraq, and other countries participating this year, Tehran is highly focused on securing this major event and is hesitant to engage in a conflict with Israel. Once the pilgrimage concludes, Iran will likely be able to refocus.

The second factor involves Iran’s continued efforts to secure international support for what it views as its legal right to defend its sovereignty and deter any further Israeli aggression on its territory.

Efforts towards Cease Fire

In the midst of heightened tensions, the U.S. has put forward a bridge ceasefire proposal for Gaza, contingent on the release of Israeli hostages held by Hamas. At the same time, the U.S. has called on OIC member states to urge Tehran to show restraint, cautioning that regional escalation could undermine the chances of securing a truce. To reach a deal between Hamas and Israel, the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken also visited the region again.

Following pressure from the U.S, reportedly Israel accepted the terms of the deal on 19 August. The U.S. is now counting on its Arab partners Qatar and Egypt to persuade Hamas to comply as well. While these efforts aim to prevent a broader conflict, Iran has downplayed these developments, insisting that a ceasefire will not deter Tehran’s plans for retaliation against Israel, indicating that it’s a matter of when, not if.

Experts estimate that instead of launching costly missile strikes, Iran may copy Israel’s tactic and may attempt to target  top Israeli officials. Whatever form Iran’s reaction takes, it is clear that such an action would provoke a full-scale response from Israel, significantly impacting regional security, particularly for its neighbors, including the GCC countries and Pakistan.

China and Russia

Both Russia and China have echoed Tehran’s narrative on protecting its “sovereignty, security, and national dignity.” Reports suggest that Iran is seeking to acquire Chinese spy satellites to enhance its capability to target U.S. and Israeli forces. This latest deal builds on the 25-year strategic agreement signed between Iran and China in 2021, in which both countries committed to advancing military, security, and economic cooperation.

Similarly, following the assassination of Haniyah, Russia’s Secretary of the Security Council visited Tehran to discuss enhanced security ties and pledged to increase military contracts between Tehran and Moscow. Subsequently, reports emerged that Russia had transferred Iskander missile systems and Murmansk-BN electronic warfare systems to Iran, adding to its already extensive arsenal of over 3,000 ballistic missiles. Russia will likely counteract NATO supplying assistance and weapons to Ukraine by bolstering its ally Iran and use this as a leverage against the West.

OIC, GCC, Turkey and Pakistan

Additionally, 57 Muslim-majority countries expressed their support for Iran during an emergency meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) on August 7th. While all member states condemned Haniyah’s killing as a blatant violation of Iran’s sovereignty, Pakistan voiced the strongest support for Iran in confronting Israeli aggression.

GCC countries with strategic partnerships with the U.S. are likely to avoid coming to Iran’s aid, as their agreements prohibit them from attacking a key U.S. ally. The same applies to Turkey, which could risk its NATO membership if it sides with Iran. However, Turkey’s recent stance towards Israel suggests it might be willing to take that risk. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has issued early warnings suggesting its military may get involved on the side of the Palestinians. Additionally, Turkish Ambassador to Iran has reportedly indicated support for Iran’s response, implying that Turkey and other Muslim-majority countries bear a shared responsibility to respond to Haniya’s assassination.

If Turkey becomes entangled in the conflict, Pakistan, with one of the strongest military forces in the Muslim world, would face immense pressure to take sides. This would create a strategic dilemma for the country, in the same way as it has for Turkey, which may want to defend Iran against Israel but also avoid jeopardizing ties with its key security partner, the U.S.

Supporting Iran could help Pakistan’s military restore its declining domestic reputation and advance the objective of fostering religiously inspired stability in the country. Even opposition figures like Imran Khan, whose standoff with the military establishment remains a major factor in Pakistan’s political polarization, might alter his position and support the military.

Alternatively, if bull blown conflict erupts in the Middle East and Pakistan supports remains lackluster for Iran, the country could face protests, especially from the religious groups. While the state might resort to cracking down on political dissent to contain domestic unrest, this could widen the gap between the civil-military establishment and the public.

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