PoliTact’s Analysis of Perception and Perspective

Context

President Donald Trump’s second term has ushered in a foreign policy that departs sharply from the liberal internationalist consensus of the post–Cold War era. Instead of multilateralism and institution-building, the Trump administration has embraced transactional diplomacy, tariff-based leverage, and a CEO-style approach to global power. The guiding logic is less about sustaining a rules-based order than about extracting concessions in a world Trump views as fundamentally zero-sum.

This orientation—the so-called Trump Doctrine—is reshaping the United States’ posture toward rivals and allies alike. He frames his foreign policy as an extension of his populist domestic agenda: “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) through trade realignment, industrial re-shoring, and hard bargaining. Yet while tariffs and deal-making remain his preferred tools, Trump also harbors ambitions for statesmanship, including a quixotic pursuit of a Nobel Peace Prize. His attempts to mediate conflicts from Ukraine to South Asia illustrate both the promise and the peril of his approach. The result is a high-risk strategy that could redefine America’s global role—and shape the political landscape of the next U.S. elections.

Tariffs as Tools of Statecraft

During his first term, as Robert Blackwill of the Council on Foreign Relations had noted, Trump consistently makes major foreign policy decisions against the advice of seasoned advisors, amid unprecedented turnover in senior defense and diplomatic posts. A 2020 Senate Democratic report accused him of transforming U.S. foreign policy into a tool of personal and business interests, undermining alliances and institutions alike.

At the heart of Trump’s foreign policy is the use of tariffs and trade leverage. Where previous presidents relied on sanctions or diplomatic pressure, Trump employs tariffs as his signature instrument—against adversaries and allies alike.

During his first term, tariffs targeted China, the EU, and even Canada and Mexico. His second term has expanded this logic into a global bargaining strategy: tariffs are cast not merely as economic tools but as instruments of national security. Trump argues that tariffs protect American workers, pressure foreign governments into concessions, and restore industrial self-sufficiency.

The long-term effects remain uncertain. Economists warn that trade wars increase consumer costs and disrupt supply chains. Yet Trump has succeeded in re-framing tariffs as patriotic policy, appealing to swing-state voters who see globalization as a betrayal. Going into the next election cycle, this rhetoric will be central to his pitch: only a tariff-wielding America, he claims, can reclaim greatness.

French observer of American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville, once warned that democracies risk losing their moral compass when governed solely for material gain. Trump’s America First agenda, rooted in tariffs and short-term bargaining, embodies this danger. For him, alliances and norms are not ends in themselves but bargaining chips.

Trump as Peace and Deal Maker

The Ukraine-Russia Stalemate

Trump’s most high-profile attempt at statesmanship came with the August 2025 Alaska Summit, where he hosted Vladimir Putin on U.S. soil—the first such visit since 2007. Styled as CEO-style deal-making, the summit bypassed traditional diplomats. Analysts at Chatham House concluded that the meeting emboldened Putin, who intensified his war aims rather than compromising. The Council on Foreign Relations reported that Putin’s demands remained maximalist: Ukrainian neutrality, demilitarization, and recognition of annexed territories.

Far from resolving the conflict, Trump’s intervention muddled U.S. messaging while alienating allies and NATO. Reuters called the summit a tilt toward Moscow, while AP noted it granted Putin undeserved legitimacy. European leaders have since moved to fill the vacuum, training Ukrainian forces and planning “reassurance forces” with limited U.S. backing. The Ukraine episode illustrates Trump’s foreign policy paradox: eager for dramatic breakthroughs, he often undercuts long-term credibility in pursuit of short-term optics.

Iran and the Quest for a Nobel Prize

Trump has repeatedly hinted that he seeks a Nobel Peace Prize, viewing it as the ultimate validation of his leadership. His prior efforts—such as the Abraham Accords in the Middle East—bolstered his claim but fell short of Nobel recognition.

Looking ahead, Trump is likely to focus on Iran’s nuclear program as the most dramatic arena for a potential peace deal. He has oscillated between threats of military action and promises of “the best deal ever.” His critics note that scrapping the 2015 JCPOA nuclear accord in his first term weakened U.S. leverage and pushed Iran closer to enrichment thresholds. Yet Trump now suggests he alone can broker a new accord, one tougher than his predecessors achieved.

Israel, Palestine, and the Limits of Transactionalism

Trump’s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains deeply shaped by his earlier recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and the Abraham Accords. In his second term, he presents himself as uniquely capable of brokering a “grand bargain” between Israel and Arab states.

Yet Palestinians remain sidelined, and violence in Gaza and the West Bank has escalated. European analysts argue that Trump’s transactional diplomacy—focused on Arab-Israeli normalization—ignores the structural roots of Palestinian grievances. Without addressing Palestinian claims to sovereignty, however, any settlement risks being cosmetic.

The recent Israeli attack on Hamas negotiators in Doha has threatened the entire architecture of U.S. strategy in the Middle East. GCC now confronts the reality that Washington either could not—or would not—prevent Israel from striking within their borders. The strike risks driving Gulf nations to reconsider their reliance on U.S. guarantees and to explore alternative security alignments, as Saudi Arabia demonstrated by concluding a defense treaty with Pakistan.

Not only that, on the domestic front, the incident has reinforced the MAGA-Israeli rift. Many America First voters have started to question Trump’s policy of prioritizing Israeli support over American interests. How this plays out will be utterly consequential for the future of American politics.

India and Pakistan Tensions

Trump has also cited his efforts to mediate between India and Pakistan, two nuclear-armed rivals, as evidence of his unique statesmanship. After the recent four-day conflict, he offered to broker talks over Kashmir, even claiming that Prime Minister Narendra Modi requested U.S. intervention. While India denied such overtures, Trump continued to highlight his role in lowering tensions during border skirmishes. Irrespective, Trump revives this narrative, portraying himself as the only leader willing to bring two nuclear powers to the table.

For domestic audiences, the image of Trump as peacemaker between two nuclear states reinforces his argument that he alone can prevent catastrophic wars—an argument likely to feature prominently in his re-election campaign.

No More Soft Power

Traditional presidents—including many of the Founders—understood that America’s influence lay in both persuasion and force. George Washington counseled avoiding entangling alliances, but also promoting republican values. Trump’s policy inverts this balance: U.S. soft power—the tools of USAID, VOA—is slashed, replaced by tariffs, threats, and military posturing.

Removing soft power tools weakens long-term credibility. A legislative report warned Trump’s instincts make U.S. a “bystander in international efforts,” undermining democracy promotion and global cooperation. Institutions like WHO, climate accords, and multilateral forums are dismissed, even as authoritarian players fill the void.

Trump’s defense of using military power against Iran’s nuclear program—despite ongoing talks—underscores reliance on hard tools over diplomacy. His use of economic coercion—tariffs on allies and adversaries alike—challenges norms of trade reciprocity.

At home, this approach reflects his populist stance: reclaiming leverage against countries like India by imposing tariffs and stricter oversight of H1B Visa Program, while demanding Europe meet NATO obligations. While Trump distances U.S. from multilateralism, countries like China and Russia are deepening cooperation via BRICS, SCO, and other forums. Meanwhile, U.S. has alienated NATO and EU—evident in the diplomatic backlash after Alaska.

On the other hand, European efforts to assure Ukraine’s security—a potential buffer zone, peacekeepers—are gaining momentum and autonomy, though still needing U.S. support. Emerging countries view Trump’s U.S. as transactional and surveys by the European Council on Foreign Relations indicated that global responses to his second term reflect hedging, not alliance-building.

Trump’s foreign policy represents a break with the post-1991 liberal order, which emphasized collective security, open markets, and democratic values. Instead, his worldview echoes 19th-century great-power politics, in which spheres of influence and economic coercion dominate.

Trump’s posture harks back to classic great-power thinking. Scholars have noted that U.S. resistance to Russian or Chinese spheres of influence is a post–Cold War construct. Historically, the U.S. itself wielded Monroe Doctrine-style influence and accepted postwar spheres such as Eastern Europe under Soviet control. He appears to embrace that tradition—viewing global competition through the lens of zero-sum regional hierarchies, especially across Eurasia. He prioritizes a strategy of wedge-driving between Russia and China, rather than accepting a multi-polar order.

The conventional wisdom in think-tank literature—a world moving towards multi-polarity, with diplomatic messiness but strategic balance—is largely ignored. Some argue multipolarity may be more hazardous than bipolarity. However, Trump avoids such debates: instead, he seems to seek a revival of bilateral leverage, playing off great powers to U.S. advantage where possible.

Election Implications: Tariffs and Populism at Home

Trump’s foreign policy represents a radical experiment in realpolitik. It replaces liberal order with transactional bargaining, elevates tariffs to tools of statecraft, and prizes symbolic breakthroughs—especially peace deals that might burnish Trump’s legacy.

For the next election, Trump’s tariff-driven populism may prove a potent political weapon at home. His campaign will emphasize tariffs, industrial re-shoring, and economic nationalism as proof of “America First” success. Swing-state voters, especially in the Midwest, may respond favorably to tariff-driven protection of steel, autos, and manufacturing. Yet suburban and business constituencies could rebel against higher consumer prices and global instability.

But internationally, America risks being seen less as a reliable leader than as a transactional actor chasing deals and prestige. Allies face uncertainty about whether U.S. commitments will endure. The credibility gap—created by Trump’s personalized, ad-hoc decision-making—risks long-term erosion of American leadership, regardless of who wins in the next election.

Equally, it’s critical to keep in perspective the sense of exploitation which resulted in the America First Mantra, using which President Trump came into power for the second time. If America First policy does not produce economic dividends for common Americans in the short and long term, it will further complicate the domestic politics and confusion regarding its global role and future direction. In this, how Trump balances his foreign policy regarding Israel will be critical.

Related Articles

Israel Airstrike Targets Hamas Negotiators In Doha, Threatening Gaza Ceasefire Talks – Sep 15, 2025
Gaza Ceasefire Plan And US-Iran Tensions – Apr 26, 2025
Two-State Solution, Future Of Gaza, And Iran – Feb 25, 2025
The Escalating Middle East Crisis And President Elect Trump – Dec 25, 2024
What Would Trump 2.0 Mean For The Future Of NATO? – Oct 29, 2024
Ukraine-Russia: Stalemate Ensues, Concerns Multiply – Jan 27, 2024
Ukraine Conflict And Global Balance Of Power Tussles In Europe – Jan 5, 2023
‘America First’ And Future Of Globalization – Nov 12, 2019
Understanding Trump’s America First Doctrine And Its Implications – Sep 17, 2017
Understanding The Change in America – How To Make America Great Again? – Mar 20, 2017
Deciphering Obama’s UN Speech; Non-State Actors, State Sovereignty, And Future Of UN – Sep 30, 2013

The post The End of Liberal Internationalism? Trump’s Foreign Policy Revolution and Its Electoral Implications appeared first on Politact.

Trump had criticized NATO even in his first term, and the prospect of him getting re-elected is making the European allies worried. Trump has consistently questioned NATO’s relevance, criticized member countries for not meeting defense spending commitments, and pushed for a more transactional approach to alliances.

This strategy could lead to several significant outcomes in terms of U.S. influence, its global standing, and its ability to manage rising geopolitical tensions, especially in the context of great power rivalry with China and Russia.

1. Erosion of U.S. Influence in Europe

Trump’s skeptical view of NATO could weaken transatlantic relations, leading to a reduced U.S. leadership role in Europe, think tanks such as Brooking Institutions and Council on Foreign Relations have written extensively on this. NATO is a cornerstone of American power projection in the region and beyond since the end of World War II. It has served not only as a military alliance but also as a vehicle for maintaining U.S. influence over European affairs. Trump’s criticism of the alliance as “obsolete” or overly reliant on American funding creates uncertainty within NATO and potentially undermines the unity and strategic coherence of the organization.

If Trump undermines NATO further, European countries may begin to pursue more independent security policies, potentially seeking alternative alliances or focus more on strengthening European Union defense capabilities. Such responses could diminish U.S. leverage in European geopolitical affairs, leading to greater fragmentation within the West and provide opportunities for Russia to exploit these divisions. Russia, already seeking to weaken NATO’s eastern flank, would likely see this as a strategic opportunity to reassert its influence over former Soviet states and weaken Western deterrence.

The erosion of U.S. influence in Europe would also undermine its ability to project power into regions like the Baltics, Eastern Europe, and even the Middle East and North Africa, where NATO missions have played a role in stabilizing conflict zones and countering terrorism.

2. Reduced Deterrence Against Russia

NATO serves as the primary bulwark against Russian aggression in Europe, particularly in Eastern Europe and the Baltics, where countries like Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania depend on the alliance for security guarantees. Trump made a statement in February 2024, that if NATO countries do not raise their defense spending, he will allow Russia to ‘whatever the hell they want’. A farewell visit from President Biden to Europe did little to calm European anxiety regarding upcoming US Elections and what Trump might do if he is elected.

Trump’s reduction of focus on NATO could embolden Russia, as Moscow would see a weakened NATO as an opportunity to further destabilize Eastern Europe, whether through direct military action (as seen in Ukraine) or hybrid warfare tactics like cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and energy manipulation.

Russia has long viewed NATO expansion and U.S. military presence in Eastern Europe as a threat to its sphere of influence. If Trump were to further pull back from NATO or question the U.S. commitment to Article 5, the collective defense clause, it could undermine deterrence against Russian aggression. Eastern European countries, feeling less secure under the U.S. security umbrella, might either seek new alliances or pursue policies of appeasement towards Russia to safeguard their own security.

A weaker NATO would allow Russia to challenge U.S. influence more aggressively in Europe, possibly leading to increased Russian intervention in places like Ukraine, Georgia, and even the Balkans, where Russian-backed forces or political parties have significant influence.

3. Shift of U.S. Focus to Bilateral and Transactional Alliances

Under Trump, the U.S. could shift away from multilateral alliances like NATO and focus more on bilateral or ad-hoc agreements that are more transactional in nature. Trump has long favored a more “America First” approach, expecting allies to pay more for U.S. protection and to contribute more to shared defense goals. This approach could lead to a recalibration of U.S. alliances, with Washington seeking more cost-effective, flexible partnerships in regions it deems strategically important.

This shift would likely see the U.S. working more closely with countries like Poland, the U.K., or other European states that are willing to increase defense spending or pursue joint military projects on more favorable terms to the U.S. However, these ad-hoc alliances would lack the collective strength and unity that NATO provides, making U.S. power projection less consistent and reliable.

Moreover, Trump’s skepticism towards NATO could push European countries to seek greater autonomy, leading to the development of EU-led defense initiatives, which could dilute U.S. influence further. France has made a case for European defense force in the past as well. While European nations might still value U.S. support, they may increasingly turn towards France or Germany for leadership within Europe, weakening U.S. dominance over transatlantic security matters.

France has been one of the uneasy members of the alliance that had initially left NATO in 1958, on quarrels related to its unequal status vis-a-vis the special relationship of United States and the United Kingdom. Then president of France Charles De Gaulle sought to establish a tripartite commission which would put France on equal footing with United States and United Kingdom. It had also wanted to extend the geographic reach of NATO to include Algeria, where France needed NATO’s help in fighting an insurgency. Furthermore, France wanted maneuvering room to negotiate its own peace with communist Eastern European nations, independent of NATO-Warsaw rivalries. (Under Nicholas Sarkozy, France has returned as a member of NATO since April 2009.)

4. Impact on Power Projection in Asia and the Middle East

While Trump has largely focused his criticisms on NATO, any weakening of U.S. multilateral commitments could have ripple effects in other regions where American alliances are critical for power projection. In Asia, where the U.S. relies on a network of alliances to counter China’s growing influence, Trump’s de-emphasis on collective security arrangements could raise questions about the U.S. commitment to alliances like those with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines. China could exploit any perception that the U.S. is retreating from multilateral alliances to assert more control over the South China Sea, expand its Belt and Road Initiative, and influence other Asian nations to align with Beijing.

Similarly, in the Middle East, U.S. power projection has often relied on partnerships with countries like Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the Gulf states, but these relationships have also been supported by broader international coalitions. Trump’s focus on more transactional, bilateral deals, such as a possible NATO-style nuclear security pact with Saudi Arabia, could strain multilateral efforts to address issues like Iranian influence, terrorism, or stability in the region.

5. China and Russia Taking Advantage of a U.S. Retreat

China and Russia would likely see Trump’s de-emphasis on NATO and broader multilateral commitments as a strategic opportunity to fill the vacuum left by a less engaged U.S. In Europe, Russia would see a weakened NATO as a chance to reassert its influence over its Near Abroad. In Asia, China would push to expand its influence in the South China Sea, assert more control over Taiwan, and strengthen its economic and military ties with Southeast Asian countries that might question U.S. reliability.

Both powers could also collaborate more closely to undermine U.S. influence in key regions, as seen through China and Russia’s growing cooperation in military, energy, and diplomatic matters. If the U.S. under Trump pulls back from its global commitments, China and Russia could further position themselves as alternative global powers, offering security and economic deals to countries wary of relying on a less predictable U.S. ally. Such as through BRICS conference, being held in Kazan, China and Russia will demonstrate the alternative to Western model exists, and also in the form of SCO.

6. Weakened U.S. Global Leadership and Soft Power

NATO is not just a military alliance but also a symbol of U.S. leadership in the post-World War II liberal order. A retreat from NATO and multilateralism could weaken U.S. soft power globally, as countries increasingly view the U.S. as an unreliable partner. This would reduce America’s ability to lead on global issues, whether in addressing climate change, global health crises, or humanitarian interventions.

Weaker alliances would also mean that the U.S. has less diplomatic leverage in shaping the policies of its allies, making it harder to forge consensus on global challenges like counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, and non-proliferation. Meanwhile, China’s influence through initiatives like the Belt and Road, and Russia’s use of hybrid warfare, could rise, with both powers offering alternatives to a U.S.-led international order.

The post What Would Trump 2.0 Mean For The Future Of NATO? appeared first on Politact.

Naad-e-Ali Sulehria – South Asia Fellow, PoliTact

As the conflict between Ukraine and Russia continues, statement has set in. In recent negotiations, both sides rejected each other’s terms thus suggesting that finding a resolution remains elusive.

Despite previous indications of openness to a ceasefire, Russia, in a Security Council meeting this Monday, criticized and rejected Ukraine’s peace proposal. Russia denounced President Zelensky’s plans, which include the withdrawal of Russian troops from all Ukrainian territory and the prosecution of Russian officials for war crimes. Russia asserted its readiness to negotiate for peace but not on compromising terms while declaring the present plan a guise to continue Ukraine’s war ambitions while obtaining more western funds.

Zelensky, in turn, has rejected Russia’s offer for a ceasefire, expressing concerns that any frozen conflict would likely reignite. By exploiting Ukraine’s vulnerabilities, Russia can launch a new aggression that could expand to other countries. Zelensky believes that accepting a ceasefire at the current positions, where Russia has already annexed four Ukrainian regions, would provide Russia with a claim to victory. Meanwhile, Ukraine will lose the gains it has made or could make in its offensive against Russia.

Last week at the World Economic Forum, Zelensky voiced his fear that any shortage of military equipment and ammunition will result in strengthening Putin, especially as the EU and the US, have shown reluctance to fulfill their commitments.

In response, the US and EU have affirmed their support for Ukraine, with promises from US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. However, despite renewed commitments, Zelensky’s hopes for a significant breakthrough may be dashed as attention has been diverted by the Gaza-Israel conflict and upcoming US elections.

Support for Ukraine is contingent upon the outcome of the US presidential elections. European allies, including NATO, are also anxious about the result of these elections. Zelensky has expressed concern over Donald Trump’s suggestion that he could swiftly end the Russia-Ukraine war if he returns to the White House. Apprehensive about the past ties between Putin and Trump, Zelensky insists that any unilateral decisions by Trump would undermine Ukraine’s genuine demands and would weaken Ukraine’s position.

The post Ukraine-Russia: Stalemate Ensues, Concerns Multiply appeared first on Politact.

Context

As Biden administration formulates its Pakistan policy, and reviews the Afghan peace deal reached in February last year – a debate is raging in both US and Pakistan based think tanks on the future of US-Pakistan relations. It is like a new season of an exciting Netflix drama serial, only that this one has been continuing for about two decades. For all intents and purposes Biden administration represents Season 4 of the US-Pakistan serial which has seen many twists and turns. During this period, several terms were used to represent the ties, such as ‘frenemies’ or a troubled marriage heading towards a divorce.

If we use this analogy, the serial started right after the 9/11 attack – represented by season 1 under Bush, followed by Obama’s season 2, and Trump’s season 3 just concluded on January 20^th.

What may happen in season 4 requires an understanding of the plot. And the great debate ranging in the think tank world represent this assessment. One of the assertions is that although the nation has maintained an important position during the previous administrations, its likely to be low on Biden’s priority list. This emphasis is not much different than the approach adopted under Trump where military aid was cut to Pakistan. A greater emphasis was towards global adversaries than on countering extremism or promoting human rights. The analysts are thus suggesting areas around which convergences can be built.

Some have mentioned that Pakistan can help build bridges between US and China, just as it can between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Others have emphasized trade as the focus, and cooperation in dealing with the pandemic and climate change. As the balance of power in the Muslim world is shifting away from the Arab world and towards the peripheral nations of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, the country can play an active balancing role vis a vis the global powers.

On the other hand, Pakistan is stressing it has moved away from geopolitics to geoeconomics, as witnessed by CPEC like initiatives. This has been a consistent message from Pakistan’s National Security Advisor, Moeed Yusuf, who recently spoke at the Karachi council on Foreign Relations and Woodrow Wilson Center.

Under the Coronavirus induced circumstances, this could be interpreted to mean that the nations focus is on economics and less on engaging in another kinetic phase in Afghanistan – which has devastated Pakistan’s social fabric and economy. And this mantra goes along with the policy the present Prime Minister Imran Khan adopted when he came to power in 2018 – that it can help in making peace but not in the continuation of war. Just about the same time, US also shifted its position, which resulted in direct talks with the Afghan Taliban. Previously, Taliban had consistently refused to negotiate with the Afghan government, calling it a puppet.

In essence, as opposed to the thrust on military solutions that had remained the hallmark of Bush and Obama administrations, under Imran Khan, Pakistan’s assistance was focused on facilitating the peace talks with Afghan Taliban. The concentrated efforts, and cooperation from China, Russia, and Iran, resulted in an agreement between the US and Afghan Taliban in February 2020.

The peace deal was not arrived at easily and there were obstacles at each step of the way, consistently from the same sets of players. The very first challenge perhaps came from President Karzai when Taliban were allowed to open an office in Doha in 2013, carrying the sign and flag of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. He argued that peace talks should be Afghan led.

In September 2019, the talks between the US and Taliban were abruptly broken off by President Trump – when peace deal was nearly at hand. Reportedly, he called-off talks due to an attack carried out by Afghan Taliban in Kabul that killed an American soldier. The confusion remained for some time if Trump had permanently abandoned the talks or if it was a temporary suspension. Moreover, he faced severe push back from Ashraf Ghani’s government. Senior former US officials with experience in Afghan affairs recommended US should not pullout before a real peace agreement, or in other words a responsible withdrawal.

Even when the deal was signed, everybody knew that the next step of intra-Afghan talks will be even more difficult, especially because of the role of spoilers, especially India. Heating global power tussles between US and China during the Trump administration added another dimension of worries. Up to now, global powers have cooperated when it comes to Afghanistan. Can it stay that way is not guaranteed.

As Biden administration evaluates its Afghan options, it is important to keep perspective of how we arrived at this juncture, what has already been tried. More importantly, to not get distracted under different pressures, especially when domestic challenges are mounting for the US. Keeping in view the historical context, about what can be achieved in Afghanistan at present – may not be possible six months from now.

How Did We Get Here?

Season 1 – 9/11 Attack (2001-2008)

Bush administration had been in power for about nine months when September 11 attacks struck the US. America launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) on October 7, 2001 with military strikes against Al Qaeda (AQ) and Afghan Taliban. The Taliban government crumbled quickly. While there were confrontations like the Battle of Tora Bora in December 2001, Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters mostly retreated to fight another day.

Early on US pressured Pakistan to join what later became known as the Global War on Terrorism. The nation had been one of the few, including UAE and Saudi Arabia, that recognized the Taliban government. The military ruler General Pervez Musharraf decided to support the US and to go after former allies, the Afghan Taliban.

In the aftermath of the 1999 short and bloody Kargil conflict, then the army chief Pervez Musharraf had overthrown the civilian government in October 1999, removing Nawaz Sharif from power. For this US had slapped sanctions on his government, which were in addition to the ones imposed on Pakistan and India in the aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests. For Musharraf’s support in Afghanistan, Bush lifted all sanctions on Pakistan in October 2001.

The 9/11 attacks presented an opportunity for Musharraf to gain international credibility. It was only later the realization dawned that AQ and Taliban had mostly slipped away from Afghanistan into the ungoverned Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

While US got distracted by going into Iraq in 2003, Bush administration increased pressure on Pakistan to launch military operations in FATA to eliminate what it termed as safe havens. Pakistan moved nearly hundred thousand troops from the Indian border towards Afghanistan to tackle the issue. US also conducted thousands of drone strikes in FATA between 2004 and 2018 to go after the extremist leaders hiding there. But Pakistan’s military operations in FATA, including the Lal Masjid operation in July 2007, accompanied by drone strikes, started to create an ominous backlash internally. It was unclear if the US drone strikes were occurring with Pakistan’s acquiescence – but it would publicly protest the strikes vehemently as violation of its sovereignty.

Many high value targets and facilities were hit in Pakistan as extremist reprisal spread, with thousands of civilian and soldiers killed and maimed. According to Dawn newspaper, Pakistan’s economic loss in the war against terror was a figure around $126.79 billion. The security and political turmoil, including the civil-military divide, was reflected by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007.

By this time, the internal politics of Pakistan had gotten fully intertwined with the support it was providing US in the war against extremism and at what cost. While Musharraf had become increasingly unpopular, and US grievances with him grew, the death of Benazir Bhutto demonstrated that this was a battle for Pakistan’s survival too.

The Mumbai Attack in November 2008, just about a month and a half before Obama was inaugurated on Jan 2009, created fresh headaches for Pakistan on how it was dealing with good and bad extremists.

Season 2 – Obama’s AfPak

On assuming power, President Obama initiated an exhausting evaluation of the US Afghan policy, which later adopted the acronym of AfPak. The late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke was appointed to lead the office, whose mandate was to originally include India, but that part was dropped due to heavy lobbying from the country. This may have been a critical mistake, as India remains opposed to any negotiated settlement with Afghan Taliban.

At the time it was assumed that the new policy would break from the Bush era focus on kinetic approach, and tilt more towards a diplomatic surge and a search for political solutions based on a regional emphasis. Obama’s assessment went through a metamorphosis of sorts and ended up being an evaluation of the entire US foreign policy. Reappraisal of policy involved the critical questions of what is at stake for America in Afghanistan? Dealing satisfactorily with this inquiry required evaluating US interests globally, understanding how they are related and then prioritizing in terms of the prevailing economic recession at the time.

The strategy that finally emerged represented the competing institutional influences that shape American foreign policy. Obama had to balance domestic economic realities with the perception of appearing weak on national security threats, a leverage he did not want to offer to the Republican Party. Additionally, he also wanted to fulfill his campaign promises of pulling troops out of Iraq and focusing on Afghanistan. Specifically, the new strategy opted for sending 30,000 more troops while setting a timeline for an exit to begin by July 2011.

The new US policy was followed-up with a process of strategic dialogue with Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. What transpired from this dialogue with India was a civil nuclear deal, the groundwork for which was laid during the Clinton administration. On the other hand, Kerry-Lugar-Berman aid package ran into controversy because of provisions that many in Pakistan thought compromised its sovereignty. The Raymond Davis incident in January 2011 further validated Pakistan’s apprehensions. At the same time, Mumbai attacks and dealings associated with David Hadley, increased cooperation between US and India against groups such as LeT based in Pakistan.

Thus, the feeling of mistrust between US and Pakistan continued to increase, with both actors blaming each other for playing a double game. The Operation Geronimo gave further evidence of how deeply each party distrusts the other, while claiming to be strategic partners. The subsequent Memogate Affair, followed by the Salala Incident on November 26, 2011 further dented the relationship. A perception grew that the Civil-Military divide in Pakistan was being exploited.

During Obama’s tenure, war against extremism had expanded quite wide and included Yemen, Syria, and Libya. Moreover, by 2011 and onward the extremist threat had transformed as many new groups came in to being, such as Daesh (also known as ISIS and ISIL). Moreover, the Arab Spring related upheaval was further destabilizing many regimes in the MENA theater, to be exploited by extremists and other global adversaries.

As US was over-consumed by the war against extremism, China and Russia were resurging. China launched the Belt and Road global infrastructure initiative in 2013, with CPEC being one of its main arteries. At the cost $62 billion China plans to upgrade Pakistan’s infrastructure, build modern transportation networks, numerous energy projects and special economic zones.

While US remained busy with the war against extremism, the economy was impacted. The 2008 recession had a significant impact on the American middle class and a thought was taking shape that China, and even American allies, were exploiting Globalization – and US was paying. These sentiments were galvanized and channeled by Trumps ‘America First’ mantra.

Season 3 – Making American Great Again and ‘America First’

While July 15, 2015 Iran nuclear agreement (JCPOA) was a significant step in the direction of negotiated settlement to conflicts, only a year and a half later President Trump reversed the deal. On the Middle East Peace Process, he went ahead to make the controversial decision of accepting Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

Trump also stepped out of the Paris Agreement and annulled the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that Obama had pushed and was signed in 2016. In essence, Trump was against multilateralism and multilateral institutions and preferred bilateral approach to issues. Trump stated in his speech at the 74^th UN session:

“Globalization exerted a religious pull over past leaders, causing them to ignore their own national interests. Those days are over.” He went on to add, “Around the world our message is clear, America’s goal is lasting, America’s goal is harmony, and America’s goal is not to go with these endless wars, wars that never end.”

While on the political and economic front he declared: “If you want freedom, hold on to your sovereignty, and if you want peace, love your nation. The future does not belong to Globalists. The future belongs to patriots. The future belongs to strong, independent nations.”

Following this principle, Trump supported direct talks with Afghan Taliban leading to the peace agreement. If it had not been for the Coronavirus, Trump would have likely won the election.

The storming of the Capitol Hill on January 6, and the events associated with the recent concluded US elections are reflective of the tremendous stress US is under to chart out its future direction; whether it be the globalized one or based on America First. The coronavirus has added to the woes – where many have lost jobs and the lifestyle of others acutely impacted – adding to the public anger and stress.

Irrespective of who is to blame for what transpired on January 6th, Biden administration would have to focus on how to bring the disillusioned, and the Trump supporters, back into the system. This is the best approach to prevent matters being further exploited. This implies Biden would have to address the concerns reflecting by the America First mantra – to provide jobs and to improve the economic well being of the Americans.

Season 4 – ‘America is Back’

Delivering a speech virtually at the Munich Security Conference on February 19, President Biden stated unequivocally that America is back. “I’m sending a clear message to the world,” Biden addressed the security conference. “America is back. The transatlantic alliance is back. And we are not looking backward.”

On the other hand, soon after his acquittal from his impeachment trial in the Senate, Trump stated: “Our historic, patriotic and beautiful movement to Make America Great Again has only just begun”. His acquittal from Senate trial means Trump can run for office again in the election of 2024, which is likely to be the most consequential in American history.

The domestic politics is becoming increasingly polarized and that is directly linked to the state of the economy, which has been seriously dented by mishandling of the coronavirus pandemic. In such conditions, it would become increasingly challenging for the US to concentrate on foreign affairs, especially on the ‘unending wars’.

And it is in this domestic and global context the US-Pakistan relations, and the associated Afghan conflict, will unfold. There is no appetite left in Pakistan, and perhaps amongst European allies as well, for the continuation of the war other than supporting a reasonable exit. Whatever could be done, has been done, and now the responsibility lies squarely on Afghans. This message needs to be delivered – accompanied by reduction in violence on the Afghan Taliban side – associated by agreed withdrawal of troops on the part of the alliance.

The mantra of Trade not Aid is more prevalent as far as Pakistan is concerned. While China, Russia, Iran, and Turkey, have all supported the resolution of the Afghan conflict and have not linked it to their other frictions with the US, this cannot be assured in the future.

In other words, if US would make things difficult for China and Russia in other places and matters, they will now likely reciprocate in Afghanistan. While re-engaging with Iran on nuclear talks, and suspension of sanctions, may buy some favors with Iran – coming in and out international agreements have casted a long-term impact on US credibility. There was a time when American word was taken as ironclad, and leadership changes did not matter. Now US is telling the world to accommodate its dysfunction and confusion.

One of the fundamental question at this point is, to what extent will Afghanistan become a theater where global power tussles are going to play out. And thus – how critical is Afghanistan to undercut China and Pakistan’s influence in the region – and this is where the role of India, the Indo-Pacific, and the related Quad strategy fits in. The answer to this question makes the decision for US and NATO easier – if they should leave now and fight somewhere else – or stay. In other words, will Afghanistan remain an area of cooperation amongst global powers – or will competition ensue.

The post US-Pakistan Relations And Afghanistan Under Biden appeared first on Politact.

Context

Serious questions have come to the fore since Capitol Hill got overwhelmed by Trump supporters on January 6^th. While there are security dimensions of what took place in Washington DC that day, for example why was the Capitol Police not prepared, the focus here is to understand what led to the violent attack – and what it could mean for American politics and the US global standing.

The dramatic events of January 6^th may have come as a surprise to many – but matters had been boiling for a while. Since last November, and even before, President Trump consistently remained ambiguous on if he would accept the election results if he were to lose – and when he actually lost – he remained defiant.

Furthermore, Trump’s appealing to right-wing extremists was also nothing new. Political pundits have overlooked this right-wing empathy as rhetoric and posturing. This belief came crashing down when supporters of Trump ran over Capitol Hill, with five casualties.

While he hardly exhibits the wherewithal to stand for a cause he is promoting, it seemed convenient to exploit the grievances of the disenfranchised Americans. The attack has now manifested the rhetoric; indicating that Trump meant what he said. While he has since attempted to back track – is the genie out of the bottle?

And this raises the alarming prospects for what comes next. To understand the trajectory, Trumps phenomenon and mantra of American First needs to be grappled with.

Politics, American Standing and Biden Administration

In the aftermath of the disturbances, Trump released a video indicating that he will allow a smooth transition of power. However, the political landscape has been seriously wounded. With the newfound majority in both the House and Senate, the Democrats move to impeach Trump would further aggravate political polarization. Moreover, it is unclear that the sentiments that Trump has ignited can now be tapered down.

The present chaos and drama is reflective of the tremendous stress US is under to chart out its future direction; whether it be the globalized one or based on America First. The coronavirus has added to the woes – where many have lost jobs and the lifestyle of others acutely impacted – adding to the public anger and stress.

Irrespective of who is to blame for what transpired on January 6th, Biden administration would have to focus on how to bring the disillusioned, and the Trump supporters, back into the system. This is the best approach to prevent matters being further exploited. This implies Biden would have to address the concerns reflecting by the America First mantra – to provide jobs and to improve the economic well being of the Americans than outsourcing jobs overseas.

The challenge would be to differentiate between those that want to deal with the differences peacefully – and those that are bent on using violence.

As far as the American image and global standing is concerned, its directly connected to how smartly Americans are perceived to be choosing the future direction of the country. For example, getting out of the deals US itself help shape was a clear sign to the world that America is confused about its future course. This also adversely impacts its global standing and credibility.

The post Storming Of Capitol Hill; Biden Administration, Globalization And American First appeared first on Politact.

Since its advent, Coronavirus has been creating social, economic, and political havoc around the world. In this, US has been most adversely impacted. More than 100,000 Americans have died, a larger number than any other country. The economic impact is still unfolding and more than 41 million have lost their jobs. As expected, the lower stratum of the society was acutely impacted, including minorities. However, up to this point it had not taken on a racial dimension.

The death of two black Americans, Ahmaud Arbery in Georgia, and subsequently George Floyd in Minnesota, have now transfused the economic impact of COVID-19 along racial lines. Inequality, poverty, and racial tensions are a consistent part of the American social landscape that boil over from time to time, but in the COVID-19 atmosphere they pose a unique concern and risk. And while the racial tensions have a unique setting in the US, many other nations are likely to face similar stresses and riots if the economic downturn continues.

The messaging from President Trump appears to be further complicating race relations. Then there is the polarization developing from the policies adopted by the Republican and Democratic Party to deal with the pandemic and in preparation for the upcoming elections.

In the COVID-19 environment, President Trump is appealing to the right wing white supremacists and big businesses, while the Democrats want to harness the minorities and the small businesses. This is creating a volatile political environment. Moreover, President Trump is against electronic voting that may have to be implemented if the Coronavirus related circumstances prevail. For this, Trump recently ran in to a quarrel with Twitter – on being factually incorrect.

For all intents and purposes, March to May represented the first phase of the pandemic in the US. The businesses were shutdown and the society went into a lockdown. The government provided needy citizens and businesses direct financial assistance to deal with the dire economic consequences. However, as lockdowns are being lifted in phases, many of the assumptions being made are likely to be tested in the next three months i.e., from June to August. For example,

1. Will the opening up lead to increase in the spread of the disease – and will the health care system be able to deal with it?
2. Will the business activity recover quickly enough, which is key to the viability of many businesses?
3. With millions out of job and looking for assistance, will they continue to be able to get government assistance if the crisis prolongs?
4. Will the government continue to suspend evictions from homes and rental properties due to non-payment?

What steps the government takes to address the present and upcoming challenges, carry high stakes as protests continue. While the Democratic Party wants to offer a new economic assistance package for the impacted Americans, the Republican Party appears to be delaying it stating that they want to observe how the earlier stimulus package was utilized. Under pressure from big businesses, the Republic Party wants to lift lockdowns and have also attempted to safeguard businesses from liabilities if a person acquires Coronavirus at work.

On the other hand, by involving the military to calm the situation President Trump wants to appear strong and for law and order, while the Democratic Party leaders have criticized the move to involve the military. Albeit a few, most members of the House of Representatives and Senate are conspicuously missing from the media and debate related to the racial tensions, and the matters have mostly been relegated to the Governors, Mayors, and Police Chiefs. With the elections fast approaching, the politicians are aware of the sensitivity and don’t want to get caught on the wrong footing.

Delivering a statement on Twitter, Sen. Tammy Duckworth, D-Ill stated, “We cannot allow any Commander in Chief to put our Armed Forces’ reputation as the last institution Americans can trust and respect at risk by using them unlawfully and putting them in a position of exacerbating the divisions driving our union apart. … Threatening military force and imprisonment against Americans exercising their Constitutional rights is not Presidential, it’s tin-pot dictatorial.”

If the riots spread further, they are likely to incorporate other long entrenched economic and social grievances and upset the multicultural setting of the US. Already there are signs; some elements want to aggravate the riots and confrontation for their own political ends – that would escalate the anti-globalization and anti-immigration agenda.

Thus the politics of Coronavirus can convert inter-racial tensions in to an ideological tussle between the haves and have-nots. The political parties will have to adapt to the new reality. The masses, the proletariat, will need more assistance than usual, and the Republican Party will not be able to continue toeing the corporate line – and at the same time maintain the system. And with the decreasing tax base, it’s unclear how the government would continue to provide social services and safety nets for its citizens. And in this context, the whole social contract is at stake in the US and around the globe.

The post Coronavirus, Race Relations, And Upcoming US Elections appeared first on Politact.

Context

Before the arrival of Coronavirus to the US, President Trump appeared pretty comfortable with his prospects of winning the 2020 elections. However, the unfolding pandemic has adversely impacted the election season and many questions have since been raised on if the voting could even be held on time towards the end of the year.

A parallel discussion is raging on if alternative methods of voting, such as by mail or absentee ballot, will work, with Democrats in favor of it while the Republicans opposing it. Republicans claim such methods, other than in-person voting, increase the chances of fraud, and some believe such methods are likely to favor the democratic voters.

The Economy

One of the positives President Trump had going for him has been the economy. However, Coronavirus has jolted the Wall Street seriously. According to some estimates, all three major indexes had lost 20% of their value by mid March. Over the last three weeks, close to 17 million people have applied for jobless benefits, and the figure reportedly could go as high as 47 million by summer.

This has the made the present administration nervous. If they mishandle the crisis and it prolongs, the chances of Trump getting reelected are going to diminish. On the other hand, if Trump effectively deals with the pandemic and is able to contain it in the short term, then the American economy could possibly be on track to recovery come election time.

However, if the pandemic spreads and the crisis deepens, then the societal fissures are likely to become more acute. As witnessed during the economic crisis of 2008, while the corporations were bailed out, the benefits did not trickle down, and the middle class significantly lost its economic prowess. This in turn will also erode the public confidence in the political system and reinforce the argument that the political system is tilted towards favoring the few – at the cost of many. 

Short Term Scenario

If matters can be brought under control in two to three months, then the chances of normalcy returning are higher – just because the economic consequences of the lock down will be less. However, the system-level impacts and disruption to the supply chains will still linger for time – and so will be the questions regarding hard choices that will have to be made.

Then there is the aspect of staggering. The crisis that seems to have originated in China, gradually shifted to Europe before heading to the US. Within US, it hit Seattle hard before targeting New York. Many fear that its now heading to the other major suburbs of the US, and thus prolonging the crisis and making it difficult to manage the economic and political costs.

Then there is the lingering question, if the lockdowns are ceased too soon, will the infections resurge again? Gauging from where Coronavirus has treaded before, these questions have to be very carefully examined.

Long Term Scenario

However, if the situation extends for a period longer than 3 months, a direr situation could emerge. It would lead to stark choices regarding where the government spending would have to be cut – so that it can be beefed up for social programs. And the obvious area to be addressed would be the defense and security related funding. Moreover, it would lead to tensions between the state and the federal levels of government on budgeting issues. This would obviously further complicate politics.

In the US, these fissures are already beginning to emerge, but the debate has not shifted towards defense spending. Although US was already in the process of withdrawing from Afghanistan, and drawing down its presence in Iraq. And it has also been pressuring NATO members to increase their defense spending. 

State of Emergency and Election Delay

If the long-term scenario does play out, there is a likelihood of an emergency situation, which can cause elections to get postponed. As this step is unprecedented, some have considered this to be a far fetched idea. However, the pros and cons of this prospect are being discussed. For example, in a recent tweet Hillary Clinton stated: “Let’s be clear. Trump does not have the power to cancel or postpone the November election.”

Without getting into the legal aspects of which institution has what power, there is a fear that President Trump may consider and impose emergency while postponing elections. This is especially true in the case of long-term scenario kicking in, when things don’t look promising for Trump to win.

The post COVID-19 And American Elections 2020 appeared first on Politact.

Arif Ansar

Context

Analysts and scholars from a variety of origins and backgrounds have described the present state of global affairs as going through a transition. The bilateral and multilateral ties during this interlude have remained anchored around the principles of globalization and laissez faire economic policies, which necessitate more economic cooperation.

However, the election of Donald Trump signifies the start of a new phase, which is a marked departure from the trajectory that was set forth since World War II, premised on economic interdependence as representing the best hope for safeguard humanity and preserving peace. Now, free trade is shifting towards protectionism – and the noble ideals such as promoting democracy and upholding human rights are taking the back seat. This was quite apparent in the recently laid out Trump’s Afghan policy and earlier during his visit to Saudi Arabia.

As this reversal takes shape, and contrary to what is popularly proclaimed, foreseeing the future is becoming more predictable. The history provides sufficient examples of how the commotion between the emerging and established powers usually plays out. This raises a related inquiry of why the US is seemingly ditching such high aspirations at this juncture?

A Sense of being Exploited

Whether stated or not, perhaps the most important reason is the perceived sense of being exploited by the emerging global powers that are getting ahead economically. And they are doing so by not being necessarily democratic or upholding human rights. In fact, a case can be made that in these times of chaos and polarization, democratic systems are reflecting mounting paralysis – whereas centralized and hierarchical systems are being able to better navigate the present turbulence.

Moreover, as the sources of Western economic wherewithal dwindle, they have started to challenge the very basis of their strength, such as multiculturalism and diversity. And again, historical precedence would suggest similar outcomes in such circumstances. When the going gets tough, immigrants and minorities are usually the first to be blamed for the predicament.

The prolonged war against extremism has played a pivotal role towards this dilemma. On the other hand, Europe that has acted as the bedrock of American global power projection is more and more looking unable or unwilling to play this role, as the seismic events in the form of Brexit play out. Additionally, the emerging powers of Russian and China are also acting as centrifugal forces when it comes to the future of Europe.

Thus, because of this imbalance of global power, and due to the apparent unwillingness of the US to maintain the present order, we are entering the most dangerous phase. The era of cooperation that marked the transition phase has now entered the confrontation stage. The key challenge for the other state actors has now become how to manage and maintain tranquility as the present order crumbles, while the shape of emerging system remains unclear.

On the other hand, one of the key challenges for the West, and the US, is that after an era of complete economic and military dominance, will they be able to adjust to the new global realities and multipolarity. Understanding the ‘America First’ principle is critical to grasping the emerging US posture.

Interpreting America First Doctrine

Since 9/11 US has found itself at the forefront of many theaters of the campaign against extremism. In addition to Iraq and Afghanistan, its involvement includes the GCC, Libya, Syria, Horn of Africa, and nations of Islamic Maghrib. While it has the support of Western and regional Muslim allies, however, most of the financial and security heavy lifting for this campaign has been undertaken by the US. Even NATO partners have been reluctant to increase their defense contributions to the organization. And this is despite the fact that American role brings security benefits for its regional and Western allies.

And because of this line of reasoning, resentment has gradually been building, which ultimately led to the election of Donald Trump and the mantra of ‘America First’. The full contours of this principle have not yet been laid out, and thus it is hard to comprehend it fully within the US and abroad. International actors are nervously trying to gauge what it means for the international order and for them.

From the American perspective, it has gone out of its way and at the cost of tremendous resources for the preservation and sustenance of the present system. The US has often acted for the common good and the mutual benefit of its allies. When it comes to global crises, other powers seldom act in the absence of American leadership. Obviously, American allies have their own perspective on the evolving American role and the narrative laid out above.

This sentiment has also crept over into the economic realm, and led to the quick dissolution of trade agreements such as the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) that America had itself crafted with tremendous efforts, while questioning how North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is benefiting the US. At the core of this belief is a feeling that US is being unfairly treated within the very system it helped create, and that Paris agreement on climate change will likely further strangulate American economic growth under the burden of strenuous regulations.

And if this is the case, with its emerging policies under Trump, US is telling the world that they need the present system more than it does. Moreover, it can help in maintaining the present order – but the allies would have to take the lead and the responsibility wherever applicable. This is not all, the US also seems to be saying that its interests supersede all others – and thus there is less and less room for diplomacy.

While there is an element of truth to how other nations have exploited the US, but one cannot underestimate the role played by American corporations. These companies have benefited tremendously from globalization by outsourcing work to other nations to maximize their profits while the American job markets and industrial capabilities suffered. The argument that technology and robotics are to blame for this is only a part of the explanation. And even if it is due to these reasons, it should have been a cause for alarm. A large unemployed workforce is in itself cause for instability, ethnic tensions, and hike in crimes.

Surprisingly, even the political representatives have failed to take notice of this combustible mixture, while overlooking the interests of their constituents. In one way, they are not to blame because globalization conflicts with the concept of nation-state, and often puts the citizen of their own country in second place. Globalization works best when there are minimal hindrances in the way of cross border trade, and the free market dynamics are allowed to play out.

America First and Allies

As this reversal takes shape, what will be the political, security and economic implications of the America First policy? In all practicality, America First mantra is likely to put it in confrontational mode with many of its allies, including other emerging powers. While President Trump has not repeated his earlier criticism of NATO, there is no hiding the fact that US wants NATO members to increase their defense spending if they in the long run want continued American security commitment. The America First policy was also at display in the unfolding North Korean crisis, where Trump criticized the trade dealings with South Korea at an ill-conceived time.

Moreover, the new sanctions imposed on Russia could also indirectly penalize EU, especially in the energy sector, and Germany and France have come out strongly against them.

There are five western firms that are partnering with Russia’s Gazprom to construct Nordstream 2 pipeline meant to carry gas from Russia to Germany. These include Germany’s Wintershall and Uniper, the Anglo-Dutch company Royal Dutch Shell, Austria’s OMV, and France’s Engie.

European Union President Jean-Claude Juncker was quoted as stating in July,

“If our concerns are not taken into account sufficiently, we stand ready to act appropriately within a matter of days. ‘America First’ cannot mean that Europe’s interests come last.”

In his South Asia policy President Trump also asked India to assist US in Afghanistan and payback for the benefits it derives from trade with the US.

America First approach is also accompanied by less and less emphasis on finding political solutions to international crises, whether it be in Afghanistan or the Middle East, or the emerging confrontation with North Korea.

The new doctrine thus require international actors, and even the allies, to prove how they are going to reciprocate the advantages received as a result of trade with, and security assurances provided by the US. As alluded to above, this message has already been conveyed to allies such as NATO, EU, South Korea, Pakistan, and India. Some nations, such as Saudi Arabia, have quickly jumped on the bandwagon by signing huge defense deals with the US.

At the heart of this misalignment between the US and the allies is a concern that who benefits more. In any relationship when matters sink to this level, it’s an indication that all is not well. In absence of partners, the combination of America First doctrine and American Exceptionalism, will likely produce dangerous consequences and hasten new global and regional realignments.

If American First policy does not produce economic dividends for common Americans in the short and long term, it will further complicate its domestic politics and confusion regarding its global role and future direction, and this in turn will further aggravate the present order.

The post Understanding Trump’s America First Doctrine And Its Implications appeared first on Politact.

Context

In the increasing global volatility, US had come to symbolize stability and continuity. However, the election of Donald Trump signifies this would no longer be the case. The unfolding reality has created a new level of uncertainty in world affairs, especially for allies under NATO and the European Union (EU). The EU was already struggling under the dramatic blow of Brexit, and now the Trump administration has decided to pull out of the Trans- Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the future of Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is also unclear.

Ethnic nationalism and protectionism is taking over the forces of globalization, and bilateralism is replacing multilateralism. But how did US reach this point. Back in July 2016, PoliTact had noted:

“The grave local and global challenges being confronted by the US are multifaceted and may not be resolvable by the politics of election cycles. The political jockeying can help parties win elections, but if they are able to actually resolve issues, is questionable. In fact, the problems and challenges are getting worse. If and when, America develops the will to conduct a system level correction, it will have profound global implications.”

So is the Trump administration carrying out the system level correction pointed out above, and which Trump calls “drain the swamp”. While it certainly appears to be, so far the answer seems murky. But what does reform in the system mean in the American context?

Analysis

It can be broadly referred to the relevance of American constitution and the election system. Then there are issues related to the influence of the lobbyists, corporations and interest groups. Thirdly, there are challenges connected to how strong the American institutions have become to control policy making, or implement the mandate of people exercised through the elected representatives.

In a nutshell, is the American system of checks and balances operating as the founders and the framers of the constitution intended? Or put in other words, is the system working for the benefit of the people – or for the few.

Campaign Financing

The New York Times op-ed columnist David Brooks reflected in May 2012:

“The American decentralized system of checks and balances has transmogrified into a fragmented system that scatters responsibility. Congress is capable of passing laws that give people benefits with borrowed money, but it gridlocks when it tries to impose self-restraint.”

The economic recession and banking scandals revealed what the unchecked association between money and power can do to the system. The representatives of the people are now caught between serving powerful interests groups or the welfare of common people, and the recent scandals reveal they have repeatedly chosen the former. The political leaders are dependent on funds they generate from the interest groups to contest elections, and they cannot afford to alienate them.

In a surprising ruling in 2010, the US Supreme Court gave corporations the permission to spend unlimited amounts of money to get their favored candidates elected and the despised ones defeated. The dissenting justices opined, “this threatens to undermine the integrity of elected institutions across the nation.”

A Washington Post editorial noted at the time, “It was wrong because nothing in the First Amendment dictates that corporations must be treated identically to people. And it was dangerous because corporate money, never lacking in the American political process, may now overwhelm both the contributions of individuals and the faith they may harbor in their democracy.”

Seemingly, these concerns have not been entertained. The situation has worsened to the extent that people have questioned how the complicated American Electoral College works. Irrespective of the original intent – it apparently dilutes the will of the people.

Fiscal Politics

In 2012, one of the critical battles complicating the American elections was how to address the then approaching ‘fiscal cliff’. A bi-partisan Super Committee was formed and instructed to come up with a working solution to the mounting budget deficit by Nov 23rd, 2011. Many seasoned politicians, including Senator Kerry, had warned at the time that inability to find a solution by the deadline, as had occurred, would make deficits a major issue in the presidential election. By law, the committee’s failure to develop a budget deal would automatically trigger spending reductions on October 1st, 2012, cutting $1.2 trillion from the military, education, health care and other priorities over the next decade.

The major bone of contention between the Republicans and Democrats was obviously what programs to cut. US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta had alerted lawmakers earlier not to implement a “doomsday mechanism” that would have resulted in Pentagon budget slashed by $600bn, saying that these cuts could severely threaten US national security. The cuts were only supposed to kick in if the Super Committee fails to secure a deal on budget savings.

On the other hand, President Obama faced stiff opposition from the Republicans on increasing tax on the rich to tackle the alarming US deficit. The Republicans had opposed the plan such as the ‘Buffet Tax’.

The debate between the two parties reflected their traditional world view. The Republican’s do not like to tax the rich and see it as counterproductive to inducing more investments. Moreover, they like to cut social programs, from which mostly the lower middle class and poor benefit. They are considered strong on issues of national security and thus they defend defense budgets. On the other hand, Democrats usually increase social spending that results in bigger government and want to tax the rich more and the middle class less.

The prominence of the debate on fiscal matters had given rise to the popularity of Tea Party Movement. The Tea Party believes in a nationalistic agenda with focus on balancing the budget and stopping the deficit spending. More specifically, it stands for ending the influence of special interest.

Now that Republicans have won, the defense spending is being increased and many social programs, including Obama Care are on the chopping block. According to CNN, the White House has instructed to cut the budget for State Department, US mission to the United Nations, including US peace making and development assistance, nearly by half. But how will this be beneficial for the Americans who have suffered from globalization and economic recession remains unclear.

On the other hand, presidential candidate Senator Bernie Sanders has put forth a 12-point agenda for America. This agenda focuses on themes such as rebuilding the crumbling infrastructure, raising minimum wage, implementing trade policies for the benefit of American workers, and taking on Wall Street etc.

Trump Phenomenon

It is in this context that we need to understand the Trump phenomena. He exploited that rage of the people against status quo and the establishment, when the economic prospects of many Americans have dwindled under the forces of globalization and economic recession.

Many claim that Trump did not need the support of corporations and the Wall Street to win the election, and this is why he is uniquely positioned to reform the system. With the appointment of many billionaires and executives from the Wall Street and mega Banks, that proposition has been silently laid to rest.

Another assumption is that Trump will ultimately have to compromise to win the support of other politicians and to develop consensus. This point is also being tested. Since Trump won the elections despite opposition from Republican heavies, it is questionable if he would adjust to their pressure. It is more likely the Republican Party would have to bend over backward to accommodate him, as oppose to the other way around. Trumps posses heavy sway on the constituents of these politicians, and they would probably be dislodged if they decide to go against Trump.

As policy deliberations move forward, conflicting statements continue to emanate from the top leadership regarding the future direction. In essence, the nationalistic economic agenda does not rhyme well with the US foreign policy, and aligning these will not be easy. It’s not clear how cutting social programs and resources for diplomacy, giving a free hand to Wall Street and the Banks that created the economic disaster, while increasing the defense budget, will rectify the ‘American Carnage’ Trump identified in his inaugural speech.

American Exceptionalism and Diversity

Making America great would have to be based on what US has become not what it was.

Countering Putin’s article in the New York Times on September 11, 2013, Obama had stated America is indeed exceptional, and it will act when there are justifiable moral and greater reasons to do so. “But I believe America is exceptional. In part because we have shown a willingness through the sacrifice of blood and treasure to stand up not only for our own narrow self interest, but for the interest of all.”

The query for Americans to address is: will the future policies be framed on the basis of how diverse it has become – or premised on revisionist tendencies? And this inquiry is especially relevant to the role of American Muslims, and other minorities, as the homegrown threats related to extremism become more acute. American’s would have to question that despite having a dynamic Muslim population, why is the nation loosing leverage in the Muslim world to other players, who have dismal record on dealing with their minorities.

The post Understanding The Change in America – How To Make America Great Again? appeared first on Politact.

Context

Donald Trump’s decision to nominate the CEO of ExxonMobil, Rex Tillerson, for the position of Secretary of State will have surprised Australians probably as much as anyone else. Whether it is good news or bad news for the Land Down Under is too early to tell, mainly because no one knows Tillerson’s positions on some of the key global issues which he will need to address if — and that’s a big if — he gets Senate confirmation.

However, one thing is definitely sure. Donald Trump’s election win has seriously rattled the foreign affairs and defense community in Australia. It has not only come as a shock but it got political leaders, opinion-makers, and academics pondering as to what this means for Australia.

Unfortunately, because foreign affairs was not a critical issue often debated in the presidential campaign, Australians have very little to rely on to assess what a Trump presidency will mean for the country and ANZUS, the 65-year-old alliance with the United States. Nevertheless, most commentators agree that a Trump administration means that things will not remain the same. The question is how much change will there be.

Analysis

US-Australia Alliance

Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull was the second world leader whom President-elect Trump called. Reportedly, the conversation went well. Turnbull stressed the importance of global free trade and that Trump should rethink his position about rejecting the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Unfortunately, Trump’s position on this issue and other trade agreements was a core and consistent policy position during his campaign, and all the good will toward Australia is not about to change this. The good news is that it is unlikely that a Trump administration will want to renegotiate the 2005 U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, as it very much benefits the United States.

Another thing which is almost certain is that Trump will be seeking to have America’s allies around the world contribute more financially to their defense. He has repeated this on a number of occasions on the campaign trail, whether talking about NATO members, South Korea, or Japan. And while he has not specifically singled out Australia on this issue, there will nevertheless likely be a lot of pressure on the Australian government to pull more of its military weight in the region. This will be despite the fact that Australia has excellent bilateral military relations with the United States.

However, in spite of this intimate and long-standing bilateral relationship, the election of Donald Trump has led to a soul-searching debate in Australia about the U.S.-Australia alliance and what it means for the country, particularly on the left of politics. Needless to say, Trump’s unique character and the unusual, outlandish, often offensive, and bizarre things which he said during the presidential campaign have not helped matters. Accordingly, the election of Trump has been grist to the mill of the chattering class which has regularly questioned Australia’s close foreign policy alignment with Washington.

It did not take long following the election of Trump for liberals, progressives, and other fellow ideological travelers to publicly question the alliance and advocate a more independent foreign policy. Yesterday’s political luminaries from the left-leaning Labor Party, such as former Prime Minister Paul Keating and former foreign ministers Gareth Evans and Bob Carr, have been busy advocating that Australia take a more independent line. Keating even went as far as to suggest that Australia “cut the tag” with American foreign policy.

While stressing the importance of continued American engagement in the region, Senator Penny Wong, spokesperson on foreign affairs for the opposition Labor Party, has been echoing the same sentiments, recommending that Australia have an independent foreign policy within the framework of the alliance. This is effectively advocating an à la carte commitment to the alliance: pick the good bits, and reject the not so good ones. I seriously doubt that such an approach would be acceptable to a Trump administration.

The governing conservative parties (the Liberal and National parties), on the other hand, have a less alarmist view of what a Trump administration could mean for Australia and the region. Turnbull was quite positive in his assessment of the Trump victory, stating that “he is a businessman, a deal maker, and he will, I have no doubt, view the world in a very practical and pragmatic way.” The Australian ambassador to the U.S., Joe Hockey,stresses that the Trump people “love Australia.”

Commentators like to refer to an article by two of Trump’s senior advisers on foreign affairs, Alexander Gray and Peter Navarro, to reassure wavering Australians that under a Trump administration the United States “would remain committed in the long-term to its traditional role as guarantor of the liberal order in Asia” and to its “commitment to America’s Asian alliances.” However, despite a campaign promise to increase the U.S. Navy to 350 ships, there is absolutely no guarantee that a President Trump would necessarily hold his ground against an aggressive China. In an interview with the Washington Post in March 2016, Trump said that he didn’t think the United States would go to war over the South China Sea. After all, he has clearly shown his isolationist tendencies, starting with his “America First” campaign slogan.

The Pivot To Asia Policy, China, And Implications For Australia

It would be too easy, but wrong, to compare a talk-tough Trump with President Ronald Reagan, who also spoke about having America respected again by the world and who succeeded another risk-adverse Democratic president. Reagan also significantly built up the Navy and stood up to the Soviet Union. However, the fundamental difference between these two periods is that the USSR by Reagan’s time was in decline and within 10 years had ceased to exist. China, on the other hand, is on the rise, and unless there is a sudden collapse of the ruling Communist party (unlikely), it will become more difficult to militarily counter Chinese aggressive behavior. The question that then arises is whether Washington’s will to stand up to China is greater than Beijing’s drive to contest the maritime space in the South China Sea (SCS) and elsewhere. And this is where Australians get nervous.

It will only be a matter of time before the Trump administration will request that Australia participate in joint Freedom of Navigation patrols in the SCS to challenge China’s 12 mile territorial waters claim around the controversial artificial islands it has created. Australia has been able to avoid participating in such patrols until now. But given Trump’s repeated statements about wanting to see U.S. allies pull their weight, Canberra will no longer be able to duck this one. It’s a decision policymakers would prefer not to have to make. It’s made that much more difficult because of the uncertainly as to how committed would Trump really be in staying in the region. But probably even more important in the decision-making equation is what impact would this have on Australia’s trade with China, which is the destination of 35 percent of Australia’s exports.

Notwithstanding the potential danger of retaliation by the Chinese against Australia’s exports, there is a strong argument to be made for Australia to participate in joint patrols with the United States. Not only would this confirm Canberra’s commitment to the alliance, it would also demonstrate that Australia firmly believes in the principles of freedom of navigation and the rule of law. Moreover, it would reassure the countries of the region that Australia actually stands by its principles and that it can be counted on for military support. Hopefully, this would reduce the risk of countries deciding to switch to China, as the Philippines effectively did recently.

While there is no question of abandoning — at least for the moment — the alliance with the United States and turning to China instead, this very public conversation questioning the value of the U.S. alliance would be very sweet music to the ears of the Communist leaders in Beijing. The more dissent they can cause in the Western camp the better it is for them, and all this without firing a single shot. The Chinese must think they are on a winning streak.

All in all, if to ensure Americans do not withdraw from the region means spending a bit more on defense, then this is a price Australians and other countries in the region should be ready to pay. The consequences of an American drawdown or the ripping up of the alliance, as some more extreme Australian voices advocate, would have far-reaching financial consequences for the Australian treasury. The Australian government would have to double its present commitment of 2 percent of GNP to defense spending to compensate for the loss of American military cover. This would mean other important socioeconomic programs would need to be significantly cut. And this may be a bridge too far, even for some of the more independently-inclined and China-friendly Australians.

This article originally appeared in The Diplomat.

The post The Impact Of Trump’s Victory On US-Australia Alliance, Pivot To Asia appeared first on Politact.